Barry Weingast on the Violence Trap
What this covers
Russ Roberts interviews Barry Weingast, a political economist at Stanford, about the structural role of violence in explaining poverty and failed development. The core argument inverts standard economic advice: in poor countries, where violent regime change occurs frequently and unpredictably, leaders create economically destructive rents—monopolies, cartels, protected markets—not as arbitrary inefficiency but as the mechanism that keeps the peace. By distributing these rents to groups with the greatest capacity for violence, a leader bribes potential coup-makers into cooperation. When economists recommend removing such rents to "enlarge the pie," they miss that the rents themselves are the glue holding the regime together; dismantle them and you remove the incentive structure preventing violence, which may be worse than exploitation under stability.
Weingast documents that violent leadership turnover in the poorest half of countries has a median interval of only seven years, far shorter than commonly assumed. He develops the Proportionality Principle—the idea that rents must be allocated in proportion to each faction's power to wage violence—and traces this logic back through feudalism and Adam Smith's account of it in Wealth of Nations. The conversation examines specific cases: why conventional aid and state-building fail in places like Somalia and Iraq; how Deng Xiaoping succeeded in China by moving incrementally and applying the Pareto Principle; and how geographic distribution of organized groups shaped European political divergence between France, the Dutch Republic, and England. Weingast also notes that rule of law, democracy, and market reform may be less urgent in unstable settings than establishing a monopoly on violence and reducing the probability of conflict—a claim that challenges the standard development agenda.
Weingast argues that endemic threat of violence—especially coups and regime change—in poor countries forces leaders to create growth-destroying rents to buy off powerful groups, so the rents that destabilize the economy are actually the 'glue' preventing violence, making conventional market-liberalization advice dangerous.
- Violent regime change is far more frequent in poor countries than economists assume (median 7 years in the poorest half)
- Rents must be allocated in proportion to each group's capacity for violence (proportionality principle)
- Removing rents removes the incentive structure keeping the peace, so reform can trigger violence
Post-9/11 security measures were comparatively minor compared to historical precedents like Japanese-American internment.
- In historical perspective the US moved strikingly little toward a security state after 9/11; compared with the internment of Japanese-Americans in WWII, measures like shoe x-rays are minor, but the response would have been on a very different path had attacks recurred every six months.
“I do find it interesting in the aftermath of 9/11, in some dimension, how little we moved toward security. If we think about past episodes of U.S. history, the most obvious being the treatment of the Japanese during WWII... that is unimaginable today.”