John Nye
What this covers
John Nye of George Mason University argues that political economy scholarship has the question backwards. Rather than debating what ideal institutions ought to look like, he contends, the harder and more urgent inquiry is why Order as Non-Default State—liberal governance, free trade, and sustained economic growth—are so rare and fragile across human history. This conversation ranges across centuries of economic and political history to isolate the conditions that permit such order to emerge and persist, examining case studies from the Industrial Revolution to modern Asia and Russia.
The argument rests on several revisionist claims about familiar episodes. The opening of 19th-century European trade, Nye argues, flowed not from ideological commitment to free trade but from the bilateral Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860, which used most-favored-nation clauses to draw others in—and France actually maintained lower tariffs than Britain for most of the century. Competition Requires Preserved Order: Britain's technological lead depended less on ideas than on the absence of catastrophic war destruction and on fiscal capacity built through 18th-century tax reforms. More broadly, liberalism itself is treated as historically anomalous rather than inevitable; periods of openness tend to be short-lived, and the post-1945 order may not represent an evolutionary endpoint but an unusual stability that could collapse.
Nye traces the roots of such stability to deeper institutional foundations: State Capacity, family and religious institutions, and geography. He explores how the Catholic Church colonized the Philippines through dispersed missionary work while the Spanish state remained militarily weak, how credible commitment problems constrained early modern rulers, and how France's Grandes Écoles transformed imperial academies into meritocratic talent pipelines—contrasting with Britain's classically educated elites. He also addresses when and why meritocratic order breaks down, the mechanisms of language acquisition in bilingual children, the role of accent in perceived fluency, and the structural constraints that keep Russia poor despite resource wealth.
Nye argues that political economy is wrongly dominated by normative theorizing about ideal states, when the harder and more important questions are why liberal order, free trade, and economic growth are so rare, fragile, and difficult to sustain across human history.
- Free trade in 19th-century Europe was driven by a bilateral Anglo-French treaty, not unilateral or multilateral idealism, and France was actually more open than Britain for much of the century
- Periods of political and economic liberalism are historically short-lived; the post-WWII order is an anomaly, not an evolutionary endpoint
- Order and state capacity are prerequisites for growth, and geography, fiscal capacity, and family/religious institutions explain why some states could sustain them
Liberal political and economic order has been rare and unstable throughout history despite recent centuries of relative success.
- By the standard of economists' praise for free markets, trade, and open competition, the revealed preference of humanity is to be poor, since periods of open trade, growth, and innovation occupy only a tiny fraction of world history and waves of innovation often crash on stagnation or failure; the central unanswered question is why sustained growth and liberal order are so hard to achieve and sustain given the human problems of coercion, violence, and dissent.
“by that standard, the revealed preference of humanity is to be poor, since the periods of really open trade growth and innovation are very tiny in the long span of world history.”
- There is little evidence that human beings evolve into liberal political entities; periods of political and economic liberalism tend to be short-lived historically, making the relative stability of liberalism over the last 250 years remarkable and possibly anomalous rather than a stable or sustainable endpoint—the 1914 collapse of globalization was a genuine shock, not inevitable.
“There’s not much evidence that human beings somehow evolve into very liberal political entities. So the periods that promote political and economic liberalism tend to be short-lived, historically.”
- The current period of relative peace and order is unprecedented and anomalous: no major global conflict in nearly three-quarters of a century, and the leading military power has done remarkably little to expand its power militarily; but there is a kind of 'second law of thermodynamics' for political economy in which disorder has a pull, making the stability of the liberal world order in the next century a genuine worry.
“I still think there’s a kind of second law of thermodynamics for political economy in which disorder has a pull. And I worry a lot about the stability of the liberal world order in the next century.”
- Hitchcock's films, often read narrowly as Cold War paranoia, actually express an old British conservative, Hobbesian worldview: that civilization and order are not the default states of mankind, and that in times of peace one should be wary because such order is not self-sustaining.
“that’s the conservative worldview — that civilization and order are not default states of mankind. It’s very Hobbesian.”
- The systemic mistake of the Western world around 1910-1912 was failure to handle the problem of power—of different groups and cultures wanting their place at the table—as great-power competition fueled imperialism; for example, German and British fleets waited in Hong Kong in 1898 ready to intervene in the Philippines had the Americans not steamed into Manila Bay first.
“the German and British fleets were waiting in Hong Kong. They were waiting to see what the Americans did. And it’s quite likely that, had the Americans not steamed into Manila Bay, that the Germans or British would have intervened in the Philippines”
- Hitchcock is underrated even given his high ranking, with films like Vertigo, Rear Window, To Catch a Thief, and North by Northwest being peerless; he portrayed the aw-shucks Jimmy Stewart in a dark way and many later directors steal from his pictures.
“I think Vertigo, Rear Window, To Catch a Thief and North by Northwest are all peerless.”
- Whether written from a socialist or libertarian perspective, too much political economy is normative—asking what the ideal state should be—when the more important and understudied questions are: what good states are possible, and once possible, what good states are sustainable.
“Too much of the discussion of political economy is normative. It’s about what should the ideal state be? I’m much more concerned with the questions of what good states are possible? And once good states are created that are possible, what good states are sustainable?”
The Industrial Revolution's timing and geography reveal that innovation requires absence of catastrophic war and competitive but stable institutional order.
- The First Industrial Revolution is overrated: dating it to 1760, growth in England was very slow and workers' living standards did not dramatically improve until the 1840s-1850s; the big growth boosts and modern economic growth only accelerate in the second half of the 19th century (the Second Industrial Revolution) in Britain, France, the US, and Germany.
“there’s no evidence that the workers’ living standards dramatically improved till about the ’40s or ’50s — I mean the 1840s or 1850s.”
- The second wave of growth was driven not by fossil fuels alone but by the agglomeration of mass urbanization, industrialization, broad innovation across manufacturing, railroads, steam technology, and greater trade all coming together.
“it’s agglomeration of mass urbanization, industrialization, innovation, across the board in multiple manufacturing. Everything is — not just fossil fuels — railroads, steam technology, production, greater trade, all these things are coming together.”
- The underrated factor behind Britain's Industrial Revolution was the relative absence of catastrophic war destruction; Europe benefited from extreme political and economic competition, but such competition is only beneficial if it does not destroy the underlying order that makes competition and innovation possible in the first place.
“Europe has benefited from an extreme degree of political and economic competition. But extreme political and economic competition is beneficial if you don’t destroy the underlying order that makes competition and innovation possible in the first place.”
- American 19th-century growth, averaging about 2.5 percent over a century or more, was genuinely impressive rather than slow; it only looks slow because it occurred while integrating a large, very poor population domestically and through immigration, and because of standard biases in how GDP is measured.
“2.5 percent averaged over a century or a century and a half is quite a lot of growth, in fact, especially if you take into account the standard biases and the way in which GDP does things.”
- The 19th-century United States is a case where a country had institutions good enough to take advantage of its resource bounty, rather than falling into a resource curse.
“the evidence is that that is one case in which the United States had institutions that were good enough to take advantage of the resource bounty.”
Britain's free-trade reputation is mythologized; it remained heavily protectionist on consumption goods while France actually had lower average tariffs.
- There is no evidence that unilateral or multilateral free trade did much in the 19th century; nearly all European free trade flowed from the bilateral 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce, which used most-favored-nation status so that once others signed on with Britain or France they bought into the system, and within a decade most major European powers joined for fear of being left out—while the only Western power whose tariffs rose was the United States, because of the Civil War.
“there’s no evidence that either unilateral free trade or multilateral did very much. Almost all the free trade in Europe in the 19th century was a product of, initially, the bilateral trade agreement between Britain and France”
- Britain's reputation for free trade is misleading because, while it repealed many tariffs (often on trivial goods) and liberalized manufactures where it had comparative advantage, it remained heavily protectionist on consumption items, especially beverages like wine and other alcohol, sugar, tea, and coffee—the very tariffs Adam Smith had complained about and which blocked bilateral free-trade deals with France and Spain.
“Britain had a comparative advantage in manufacturers, so they were willing to go to free trade in manufacturers, but they were very, very protectionist when it came to consumption items and, in particular, beverages — wine, but also all alcoholic products, rum, sugar, tea, coffee, et cetera.”
- Contrary to the popular myth of free-trade Britain, France had lower average tariffs than Britain for roughly three-quarters of the 19th century (from the 1830s-1850s to the end of the century); Britain only caught up to France in trade openness at the very end of the century.
“from about the 1850s, or certainly the 1860s, to the end of the 19th century, France had, in fact, much earlier, going back to the ’30s, France seemed to have lower average tariffs than the British did, for I would say three-quarters of the 19th century.”
- British wine tariffs originated around 1700 as protectionist measures against France, but high tariffs let Britain impose heavy taxes on domestic alcohol (beer, gin, whiskey); the state became so dependent on this revenue that liberalizing alcohol trade was delayed until the rise of the income tax and other taxation gave fiscal leeway to make the change.
“They became so dependent on the revenues from those alcoholic products that... even when the consensus was growing for liberating trade in alcohol, there was still concern about tariffs, and so the rise of the income tax and other forms of taxation gave them increased leeway to make these changes.”
State capacity and centralization—fiscal strength, bureaucratic quality, and credible institutional commitment—drive sustained growth and competitive advantage.
- France's high-quality bureaucracy derives from the old imperial tradition and the revolution's transformation of imperial academies into the Grandes Écoles (Polytechnique, Normale Supérieure), which fed the state, attracted talent regardless of origin, and pioneered making mathematics central to elite education rather than just Latin and Greek as in British elite schools.
“what the revolution did was, they took a number of the old imperial academies and turned them into what are now known as the Grandes Écoles.”
- Britain was not successfully invaded not by luck but because crossing the channel was nontrivial given older technologies (paralleling Japan's protection from China), and because England developed a more centralized state earlier, made possible by fiscal reforms; British tax revenues rose 450 percent across the 18th century—the fastest-growing in western Europe—while others tried and failed to raise revenue.
“British tax revenues rose 450 percent from the 1700s through to the end of the 18th century, which is remarkable since everybody else was trying to raise revenues and were unsuccessful at doing so.”
- Classical liberal ideology played a role in the Industrial Revolution but only succeeded as a 'Baptists and bootleggers' story: ideological free-traders would not have prevailed without the venality of ministers who wanted to increase the power of the city and the British civil state at the expense of the landed aristocracy; improved national agricultural markets destroyed inefficient local landholder monopolies, consolidated agriculture and industry, weakened dispersed aristocratic elites, and thereby strengthened both the central state and concentrated commercial power.
“it was one of these Baptists and bootleggers stories. There were both those who ideologically were in favor of greater liberalism and free trade, but I don’t think they would have succeeded if they hadn’t benefited from the venality of many of the ministers”
- Building a world-class university (or institution) in a country with money but low credibility hinges less on early funding than on the harder later phase of credibility-building: being willing to fire people before tenure and credibly guarantee it after, and—crucially—guaranteeing that policies set by one ruler will be honored by the next, which many countries cannot do.
“Many people make the early phase possible, but then they falter at the later one, and that’s the real issue... Many countries cannot even guarantee that the policies instituted by one ruler will be followed by the next.”
Capitalism undermines the religious, cultural, and family norms it depends on, creating social inequality and cultural erosion that material abundance cannot solve.
- Modern economic growth was a uniquely Western phenomenon in which Christianity played a major role, particularly the Catholic Church's promotion of the nuclear family—banning cousin marriage without permission, unifying romantic love with formal marriage, requiring women's consent in marriage vows, requiring celibacy and monogamy, and discouraging polygamy and the extended family—which supported the underlying institutions that nourish capitalism and co-evolved with the rise of the Western state.
“the role the Catholic Church played in promoting the nuclear family: banning cousin marriage without special permission... focusing on the need for celibacy and the need for monogamy, discouraging polygamy and the extended family.”
- Houellebecq's Submission matters because it captures the loss of confidence in Western traditions among elites and the idea (echoing Keynes and Schumpeter) that capitalism's competition undermines the social, religious, and cultural norms it relied on; in particular, easy divorce, the sexual revolution, and the breakdown of the nuclear family recreate a de facto polygamy that produces huge numbers of 'losers' and inequalities of beauty, charm, intelligence, and power that are more intractable than economic inequality—even a hypothetical Star Trek replicator eliminating material scarcity would leave these.
“easy divorce and fairly loose sexual morals lead to a world in which you are re-creating some form of polygamy, and that these lead to stresses that go far beyond the standard inequalities that you talk about economically, and that, in many ways, are actually more intractable”
- Nye attributes his broad education to a Jesuit tradition emphasizing the well-rounded 'educated Catholic gentleman' good at all subjects, and to a self-driven desire to escape the perceived intellectual backwater of the Philippines and participate in world discussion; he frames this as a deliberate choice to favor generalization and polymathy against an age whose spirit favors specialization.
“the spirit of the age favors specialization, and my personal tastes favor generalization or being a polymath.”
France's economic lag relative to Britain stemmed from agricultural structure, property-rights arrangements, and taxation patterns that discouraged urbanization and industrialization.
- France was poorer than Britain (roughly 70 percent of per capita income) primarily because it had lower agricultural productivity and remained more heavily rural, while England urbanized much faster, with France also covering a larger area with a more diverse population.
“mostly I’d say the answer has to do with France having lower agricultural productivity and being more heavily rural than England was.”
- France's slow transformation from agriculture to industry, despite French industrial productivity being close to England's, was driven by property-rights arrangements and by land taxes and regulations that encouraged people to stay on the land and discouraged investment in cities.
“Some of that may have to do with various cuts of land taxes and regulations that encouraged people to stay on the land and discouraged investment in the cities, but it’s very unclear.”
- Napoleon III, dismissed as the bumbling 'idiot emperor,' actually ushered in major 19th-century reforms—the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce, freer trade, modern banking, modern Paris, railroads and roads—and presided over rising working-class wages after the 1850s; the late 19th century was a period of greater consumption equality across western Europe rather than massive inequality.
“Napoleon III ushered in many of the great reforms of the 19th century, not least of which, the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce.”
Transparent meritocratic systems provoke tribal factionalism in diverse societies, creating the very factional dangers liberal republics were designed to prevent.
- America's biggest institutional deficit is the decline of pure meritocracy; objective tests and standards should be used to judge quality wherever possible, and the rise of anti-meritocratic ideas—that meritocracy should be adjusted for social needs—has made state-of-the-art production hard to achieve in many areas, including universities and companies.
“I would like to see objective tests and standards used to judge quality whenever possible, and I think that the rise of an anti-meritocratic notion... has made it very hard to have, I think, state-of-the-art production in many areas.”
- Transparent meritocracy upsets people, which is why it is rare even in academia; in a society as ethnically and culturally diverse as the United States, transparent merit rankings produce tribalism and factionalism along group lines—recreating the very factional dangers the liberal republic was designed to suppress.
“given the ethnic and cultural diversity of the United States, then what you get is, you get tribalism along lines that recreate many of the things that I think the liberal republic was designed to get rid of. You basically recreate factionalism.”
- Magnus Carlsen is properly rated and the most phenomenal chess player since Kasparov; he is favored about two-to-one over Caruana, who has at most a one-in-four chance.
“Carlsen is clearly the most phenomenal player to come along since Kasparov.”
The 1860 Anglo-French Treaty's most-favored-nation clause created a cascade effect driving European free trade, not unilateral or ideological conviction.
- A genuinely strong bilateral trade agreement today—for example between the US, the UK, and one Asian partner—could create huge incentives for most of the EU and large chunks of Asia to join in, replicating the cascade dynamic seen after the 1860 Anglo-French treaty.
“if the US were to negotiate a genuinely strong bilateral agreement with the UK and, perhaps, one Asian partner, I wouldn’t be surprised if that would essentially create huge incentives for most of the EU and large chunks of Asia to join in.”
- Throughout history, central powers crushed regional powers that grew too strong; Francois I of France, who could only borrow at high interest rates due to credible-commitment problems, lowered his borrowing costs by allying with the city of Paris but then broke those deals and reverted to higher rates because he feared Paris becoming too powerful and a potential hotbed of Reformation opposition.
“by uniting with the city of Paris, he was able to actually borrow at lower interest rates than he could by himself. Yet he broke those deals... because he was fearful that Paris becoming too powerful would weaken his authority.”
Geography, colonization patterns, and inherited structures determine institutional capacity; some regions like Mindanao are inherently difficult to govern, producing strongmen as effect not cause.
- Contrary to the view that Mindanao's instability stems from bad institutions producing too many strongmen, the causation runs the other way: because Mindanao (an island region never fully colonized by Spanish, Americans, or Japanese) is inherently hard to govern, the politicians who emerge are those good at forming private armies and local connections, so bad institutions are the effect of ungovernability, not its cause—with no group strong enough to make it independent and Manila too weak to control it.
“you’re putting the cart before the horse. You have bad institutions because it’s so hard to run Mindanao, so it’s not a surprise that the politicians that emerge in Mindanao are those who basically are good at forming private armies or making local connections.”
- Russia's economic prospects are correctly rated as poor because of two problems: the well-known resource curse from abundant oil and gas, and the under-discussed imperative of holding together a gigantic multi-ethnic land empire and guarding its borders, which overwhelms incentives to promote internal growth and development—evidenced by Russia's deliberate failure to develop Vladivostok and the Far East as it has Moscow and St. Petersburg.
“the imperatives of holding together such a large land mass and all the peoples in it, and worrying about its borders, overwhelms incentives to promote growth and development within the country.”
- Russia's strengths in state capacity (e.g., wartime factory relocation, mass mobilization, high-quality secondary and university education) are tied to political constraints that also make diverse competition hard; the 1990s breakdown of the worst aspects of the Soviet empire also broke down its better aspects, so Russia's great challenge is recreating state capacity while simultaneously promoting economic diversity and competition.
“the breakdown of the worst aspects of the Soviet empire also broke down some of the many better aspects in terms of their ability to provide a high-quality... secondary educational system, high-quality average university quality, and to have very good state capacity.”
- Taiwan's wage stagnation and failure to move up the value chain likely stem from too strong an incentive to exploit cheap Chinese labor and the Chinese market rather than reforming Taiwan itself; its leading universities lag Singapore's partly due to reluctance to shift graduate programs into English, and Taiwan is torn between desiring independence and being dependent on deals with the mainland.
“there’s too much of an incentive to take advantage of the Chinese market, of just use cheaper labor or of selling to Chinese rather than thinking about how do we reform Taiwan itself.”
- As China uses overseas ethnic-Chinese communities to advance its national ends, East Asian states face the problem of benefiting from successful ethnic Chinese minorities without incurring suspicions of disloyalty; the more China intervenes in regional local politics, the more these clashes will grow—a serious danger given that some of history's greatest massacres have targeted ethnic minorities like the Chinese in Southeast Asia.
“the more that China tries to intervene in local politics in the region, the more you’re going to see these kinds of clashes. I worry about this a lot because many of the greatest massacres that have occurred in history have occurred by rioting people against ethnic minorities like the Chinese”
Cultural diffusion operates through adapted mass-appeal gateway products and diaspora networks rather than direct transmission of authentic forms or formal property rights.
- Filipino food is scarce in the US because no sufficiently America-centric, mass-appeal gateway dish has been found; popular American Chinese food succeeded through mediocre mass dishes (chow mein, fried rice) that bear little resemblance to authentic Hong Kong cooking but created the base enabling later experimentation with better regional Sichuan and Cantonese dishes—and most authentic Korean, Thai, and other Asian cuisines served in the US are similarly adapted, not authentic.
“The fact that you and I can buy very good Sichuan or Cantonese food is not a function of the best dishes. It’s a function of the kind of mediocre chow mein, fried rice... Because you don’t have this mass appeal food underlying it, you can’t experiment with the better stuff.”
- Bilingual children of immigrants often refuse to speak the heritage language because young kids want to conform and avoid being picked on; assigning each parent exclusively one language (mother speaks only Mandarin, father only English) reframes the languages as 'Mommy's language' and 'Daddy's language' rather than a strange tongue, producing fluency—though it can cause temporary developmental confusion and fails for a second child who has an older sibling to play with.
“you’re only going to speak to him in Mandarin, and I’m only going to speak to him in English. So instead of it becoming a strange language, English becomes Daddy’s language and Mandarin becomes Mommy’s language.”
- The Philippines became overwhelmingly Catholic because the Catholic Church, not the militarily weak Spanish state, effectively colonized it: priests proselytized across the difficult, scattered, malarial archipelago, extended central government influence through proselytization, and formally divided territory among orders (Dominicans, Benedictines, Franciscans, Jesuits) while the military made deals with tribes for allegiance.
“the Spanish had very little power to colonize the Philippines militarily... So most of the colonization outside the Manila region was often handled by the Church”
- A unique and under-discussed feature of China's reform was that it began outside the biggest commercial centers (Guangdong, Fujian, Shenzhen, Xiamen rather than Beijing and Shanghai), which avoided interfering with established companies' rents, provided plausible deniability if it failed, and exploited ethnic and linguistic ties to Taiwan (Fujianese) and Hong Kong (Cantonese) so that diaspora investors could make informal social deals despite the absence of formal property rights—and crucially, the center failed to shut these growing regions down, breaking the historical pattern of central powers crushing successful regional powers.
“the extent to which China began its reforms outside of the biggest cities... Virtually every major reform always involves the major centers of commercial power, but those would have been Beijing and Shanghai, and they were totally left out of it.”
- When learning a foreign language, accent is the most underappreciated dimension: people notice accent first, so someone with bad grammar and limited vocabulary but a 90 percent accurate accent on basic phrases is perceived as speaking well, while a highly fluent speaker with a strong American accent is perceived as not speaking well—and without a decent accent one cannot fully understand what the language and culture bring.
“If you have bad grammar and have a very limited vocabulary, but you can say 100 basic phrases with 90 percent accurate accent, most people will say you speak fairly well. If you have, however, a fairly high degree of fluency and you have a really strong American accent, a lot of people will still perceive you as not speaking well.”
Political factors, not economic forces, were decisive in ending slavery in the American South despite the consensus that pure economics would not drive abolition.
- The consensus in economic history is that pure economic factors were not going to drive slavery out of the American South in the short to medium run (perhaps over another century they might have), and that political factors, including the Civil War, were decisive in ending it.
“the consensus is that pure economic factors weren’t going to drive it out, at least in the short to the medium run... the political factors were very important in getting rid of it, including the war.”