What this covers
Nathan Nunn, an economist, discusses how Historical Persistence shapes long-run economic outcomes across countries and regions. The conversation examines which historical forces — the slave trade, state capacity, family structure, agricultural technology — leave measurable marks on present-day income and institutions. Nunn emphasizes that persistence is probabilistic rather than deterministic: past conditions constrain but do not determine futures, much as smoking raises lung-cancer risk on average while many smokers remain healthy. The core question becomes not whether history matters, but how much of the variation we observe today it actually explains.
The discussion ranges across multiple mechanisms and evidence types. Nunn traces how slave exports depressed long-run trust and income, but notes a critical confound: slave raiders targeted densely populated, well-developed states precisely because people are easier to capture where they concentrate—selection bias that distorts naive readings of the trade's impact. He argues that persistence predicts income levels rather than growth rates, and follows peoples rather than places, meaning population movements significantly reshape which locations inherit historical advantage or disadvantage. Several mechanisms receive sustained attention: how plough-based agriculture locked in gender norms across centuries, how Catholic marriage rules fractured kinship and enabled the WEIRD Psychology underlying Western individualism, and how contract-enforcement capacity shapes what goods countries specialize in and attract as investment. Nunn also critiques common econometric pitfalls—spatial autocorrelation inflating false positives—and argues development economics should incorporate richer ethnographic and qualitative methods alongside quantitative tools.
Nunn argues that long-run economic outcomes are shaped by persistent historical and cultural forces — especially the slave trade, state formation, family/kinship structures, and agricultural technology — but that persistence is probabilistic, explains only a modest share of variation, follows people rather than places, and predicts income levels rather than growth rates.
- Historical slave exports depressed long-run trust and income, but selection effects (denser, more developed regions were targeted) confound naive readings
- Persistence tracks societies/peoples, not geographic locations, and explains levels rather than growth rates
- Cultural mechanisms like plough-based gender norms and Church-driven individualism persist for centuries but are only partial explanations
Slave trade's selective targeting of developed regions disrupted institutions and settlement patterns with lasting geographic and economic consequences.
- In cross-country growth regressions, the regions and countries from which the most slaves were taken have done worse in the long term in terms of per capita income than regions left more intact, and the same regularity holds within individual countries.
“once I had established that, across countries, there is this relationship between income and slave exports”
- The places that would otherwise have been the best to live — coasts, rivers, fertile plains — were precisely the regions most exposed to the slave trade, causing populations to move away from coasts and rivers and toward mountainous areas for protection, producing persistent patterns of settlement in Africa that look geographically perverse.
“Although secretly you want to live next to rivers, you want to live in a fertile plain, you want to live next to the coast except for the slave trade.”
- There was endogenous, strategically selective entry into the slave trade: slave raiders and merchants targeted the most densely populated regions and well-functioning, well-developed states because slaves are people and it is easier to accumulate captives where many people live — an omitted selection factor that confounds naive readings of slave-trade effects.
“it’s very clear that there was endogenous selection into the slave trade, and you could even think of that as being strategic by Europeans or the slave merchants”
- Initially uninhabited islands like Cape Verde, Mauritius, and Réunion imported slaves but did not export them, so they escaped the detrimental effects of the slave trade on indigenous institutions and traditional social structures, instead resembling plantation islands with established property rights and high inequality — whereas islands with indigenous populations like Comoros, Madagascar, and Zanzibar resemble the rest of slave-affected East Africa.
“They imported slaves and didn’t export them, so they didn’t experience the detrimental effects to indigenous institutions, the breakdown of traditional social structures.”
Medieval Church policies fostering individualism and cultural permission to question tradition enabled scientific and industrial revolutions in Western Europe.
- Medieval Catholic Church policies — disallowing polygamy and cousin marriage — broke down clans and extended family/lineage structures, making the individual the important unit and thereby creating the individualistic psychology of WEIRD societies, which was an important impetus for Western Europe's divergence from the rest of the world.
“He talks about the breakdown of clans, which I think is important, and the breakdown of the extended family unit, the Church disallowing polygamy, the Church disallowing cousin marriage.”
- Per Joel Mokyr, Western societies learned it was acceptable to break from tradition and question the previous generation — likely tied to individualism and the Catholic Church's program — and once you can deviate from traditional structures you can have the Scientific Revolution, widespread innovation, and ultimately the Industrial Revolution.
“we learned it was okay to break from tradition and to question the previous generation”
- Conversion to Christianity does not reliably predict ties to the West or future economic optimism today, because Africa has seen massive conversion (up to ~97% Christian in many countries) without deep Western connections, including the rise of indigenous and hybrid Christian religions — whereas more Western-integrated Massachusetts has a much lower conversion rate.
“there’s been massive conversion within Africa. Now, if you’re asked in many countries the fraction of people that are Christian, it’s going to be like 97 percent”
Institutional features like contract enforcement and landlocked geographic constraints shape trade composition, FDI patterns, and economic specialization.
- Standardized test scores like the math GRE are overrated for graduate economics admissions because, while they measure the largely useless ability to solve tricky logic problems, preparing requires taking a summer off to study, imposing a large cost on financially strapped or disadvantaged students and creating a socioeconomic bias that outweighs any informational benefit.
“in order to do that, you have to basically take a summer off and study for the GRE. And if you’re financially strapped or come from a disadvantaged background, that has a huge, huge cost.”
- Landlocked countries lose much of the gains from transport to the final transit country (e.g., Djibouti capturing Ethiopia's port rents, India capturing Nepal's), but how much they lose depends on the number of outside options — a denser railway network connecting multiple potential transit countries, especially intra-African networks rather than colonial coast-to-Europe lines, would give landlocked countries more options and let them capture more of the rents.
“It depends on the number of your outside options, actually.”
- Many persistence regressions can strongly predict even spatial noise because observations close together share correlated error terms (similar omitted factors, culture, and experiences), so failing to account for spatial autocorrelation overestimates the effective number of observations and produces many false positives.
“if you’re close to one another, your error terms are going to be more similar”
- Distance from the equator predicts GDP per capita either through pure geography (malaria and sleeping sickness being more prevalent near the equator, per Jeffrey Sachs) or through history (the Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson view that equatorial areas saw less European settlement and extractive rather than institution-building colonial strategies); Nunn finds more evidence for the historical view though no single story explains everything.
“Personally, I think there seems to be more evidence for the historical view, although I don’t know that that one story explains everything.”
- Being removed from the centers of US economics during schooling forced Nunn to think more independently and take more research risks, because the pressure-cooker of a top US department pushes graduate students to think strategically about their careers in ways that work against the risk-taking and originality that ideal science requires.
“In some ways, that forces you, for better or for worse, to think differently, or think independently relative to what’s going on within the US.”
- Canadian football differs from the NFL in having a wider field, deeper end zone, and only three downs instead of four, which produces much more passing and more long bombs.
“The field is wider, the end zone is deeper, and you only have three downs instead of four downs. So you have much, much more passing.”
- Many of Canada's most successful international exports are individuals — singers like Celine Dion, Shania Twain, and Avril Lavigne, comedians like Mike Myers and Jim Carrey, and economists like Ariel Pakes and David Card — who are not recognized as Canadian because Canadians blend in, masking the country's actual export footprint.
“There are Canadian products — so let’s call them products — around. We actually often don’t know they’re Canadians just because we fit in pretty well.”
- Economics is extremely hierarchical compared to other fields, with a huge difference between top-ranked and fifth-ranked departments, while other fields are more horizontal with schools differentiated by focus; this concentration may be driven by expectations and perceptions (e.g., advisers less likely to strongly back students from lower-ranked schools) and graduate students overestimating the real research quality differences between schools of different rank.
“economics is extremely hierarchical. The difference between the first and the fifth is huge. In other fields, it’s more horizontal”
- Contract enforcement may predict the composition of foreign direct investment even better than trade, because traded goods can ultimately be seized while FDI leaves the investor permanently at the mercy of the host country — illustrated by Singapore's exceptional contract enforcement and remarkably high FDI — though FDI data is less precise than tariff-documented trade data.
“the pattern of FDI or where a foreign investment is and in which industries, in which countries, should also be predicted by the ability of a country to enforce contracts”
- South Korea's dramatic development success owes much to internalized cultural values — education, hard work, allegiance to the company, shame around taking vacations — overlaid as a hybrid of individual achievement values and collectivist values that direct individual success toward the greater good of the country.
“South Korea has these values of individual achievement, but then overlaid with values of collectivism, like wanting to have individual success go towards the greater good, which was the success of the country.”
- Canada offers many more pathways for a very low-income family to move up than the US does, where there are far fewer pathways and a person at the lowest rung essentially cannot make any mistakes to move up — an insight shaped by Nunn's own low-income upbringing in Canada.
“After moving to the US, it’s very clear, there are many fewer pathways.”
- A country's skill at contract enforcement helps explain the composition of its trade: countries with weaker, less dependable contracting environments specialize in goods that are not contract-intensive, which for China would mean specializing in lower-end manufacturing — consistent with what China has historically specialized in.
“What you would expect, then, is for China to specialize in goods that are not contract intensive.”
Historical state formation and institutional sophistication predict modern economic capacity and development trajectories across societies.
- A history of state formation — successful states, kingdoms, and empires — is correlated with economic success and modern nation-building capacity, as exemplified by Ethiopia, though the precise mechanism for why this correlation holds is not well understood.
“the standard answer would be a history of state formation. There was Axum and great kingdoms; it was the one country or area that wasn’t colonized”
- Societies can have latent characteristics — like South Korea's history of state formation, sophisticated architecture, food, and academics, and its survival sandwiched between China and Japan — that are not reflected in low per capita income at a given time but are important for subsequent development.
“I would say there are these latent characteristics that aren’t reflected in per capita income, which are important for subsequent development.”
- Botswana's relative economic success is explained by being small in population (allowing more extreme outcomes), ethnically homogenous compared to other African countries with the Tswana predominant, and having a historical social structure that was well maintained and left intact.
“in general, ethnically homogenous, particularly compared to other countries within Africa. The Tswana are the predominant ethnicity.”
Persistent cultural norms rooted in plough agriculture generate durable gender labor divisions that industrialization does not substantially alter.
- Persistent female labor norms can lock in via comparative advantage: once women participate in light manufacturing, a country develops a comparative advantage in female-friendly products it then exports, so supply of female labor shapes demand and vice versa, producing self-reinforcing equilibria — one where women work and the country specializes in female-friendly goods (Eastern Europe) and another where women don't and it specializes in other goods (Saudi Arabia).
“the norms affect your comparative advantage, and so the supply of women working affects the demand because that’s what you’re good at; that’s what you export. And then that affects the supply.”
- We overestimate gender equality in Western societies: female labor-force participation rates of 60-70% in the US and Europe are actually much lower than in poorer African countries, so once you account for income, the West's gender equality is not better than it should be — and the remaining gap is explained by the plough.
“the level of female labor-force participation rates, which is 60 percent, 70 percent — that’s actually much lower than African countries, which are much more poor”
- Societies that historically used the plough — which requires upper-body strength to control and is more efficient than the hoe — caused men to specialize in field agriculture and women in home production due to biological strength differences, generating durable norms that men work outside and women inside the home; these norms persisted through industrialization to factory and service jobs, explaining lower female labor-force participation today.
“it requires a lot of upper body strength to control the plough or to pull an animal that uses the plough”
Historical persistence predicts steady-state income levels through institutional and cultural characteristics, not short-term growth rates.
- Persistence based on societies is very strong while persistence based on geographic locations is weak, so to predict future outcomes one should trace peoples and their descendants rather than fixed locations — a crucial caveat given the large historical movement of populations.
“Persistence based on societies basically is very strong, based on locations is not strong. That’s the one caveat”
- Historical persistence is a probabilistic relationship, not deterministic: it can explain a nonzero share of cross-country variation while still allowing many individual cases to move in opposite directions, exactly as smoking causes lung cancer on average while many smokers stay healthy — so the key question is how much of total variation a past factor explains.
“we’re all pretty confident that smoking, in general, causes lung cancer, so that’s kind of a long-term factor. But you can definitely find counterexamples of that”
- Persistence predicts levels of per capita income rather than growth rates: while we may be unable to forecast which country will grow fastest over the next decade (Sachs's point), we can fairly confidently predict which societies will have higher income levels 20 years out — the Solow-model logic where underlying characteristics set the steady-state level of per capita income.
“So the persistence isn’t about growth rates... But it’s about levels.”
Genetic distance between societies captures shared history, institutions, and cultural evolution rather than biological determinants of economic outcomes.
- The gravity equation is a very powerful empirical regularity in which distance and extended bilateral variables — common language, common religion, and genetic distance — strongly predict bilateral trade and income differences, giving former settler colonies like South Africa an advantage through shared language and religion with European partners.
“the gravity equation is very, very powerful”
- The strong correlation between genetic distance between societies and their income/trade differences does not show that genes matter for GDP; rather, genetically similar societies share recent common ancestry, similar histories, common geographic shocks, and similar forces of cultural and societal evolution, so genetic distance is really capturing a bundle of history-driven cultural and institutional traits.
“I think this doesn’t tell us anything about the importance of genes for per capita, GDP, or for economic success.”
Development economics methodology should incorporate qualitative, descriptive research on social structures, beliefs, and norms alongside quantitative approaches.
- Graduate development economics should stress softer, more descriptive research methods — how to interact with people face to face, run focus groups, and ask about social structure, beliefs, values, and norms that are invisible unless asked about — because the field's narrowly scientific treatment-and-outcomes approach ignores crucial contextual data that traditional anthropology captured.
“we never learn — and I don’t know of any courses that teach development economists, when you go to a society, how do you interact with people and ask questions face to face?”
- Randomized control trials in development economics are concentrated in a few accessible locales (Nairobi, parts of India, Uganda) because of huge fixed costs to set up new sites, so although the field claims broad learning it actually learns about only a tiny slice of developing societies — and researchers, including Nunn's own team in the DRC, fall into the same trap of returning to established sites.
“it’s huge, huge fixed costs to get things set up”
- Rural Congolese society exemplifies collectivist rather than individualist culture, where the individual is less important and more embedded in the community and social relations — a structure that produces a strong sense of community and treats outsiders as community members.
“In the psychology literature, it’s often referred to as collectivist versus individualist culture.”
Trust and crime patterns reflect institutional capacity—informal community enforcement in weak-state contexts versus formal institutions in modern economies.
- Latin America's high crime relative to income is less about low trust than about which mechanisms a society can use to constrain crime: rural sub-Saharan Africa achieves extremely low crime through strong informal institutions and community enforcement (akin to mob justice) despite weak formal institutions, whereas Latin America relies on modern formal institutions that are not good enough, compounded by extreme inequality.
“It’s not through formal mechanisms, but it’s through informal mechanisms such that you could almost think of it as mob justice”
- Trust increases with education and (over a hump-shaped range) with income, but the deeper remedy for low trust is economic growth itself: when growth makes activities positive-sum rather than zero-sum, people have more frequent successful interactions, learn they can trust one another, and realize the benefits of cooperation, creating a virtuous but chicken-and-egg cycle between development and trust.
“When you have economic development, you’re going to have more interactions between individuals. You’re going to have more successful interactions, positive-sum interactions. People will learn that they can trust one another”