prisoner's dilemma
A classic game-theory scenario where two rational actors fail to cooperate even though cooperation yields the best mutual outcome.
As defined in cwt_balaji-srinivasan
Other definitions
A game-theory scenario in which individually rational choices lead to a collectively worse outcome than cooperation would.
Cass Sunstein on #RepublicA game theory concept where individual rational actors pursuing their own self-interest produce collectively worse outcomes because they cannot trust each other to cooperate, leading each to competitive behavior
Human Dignity in the Age of AI | Yuval Noah Harari
Where it comes up · 31
- 113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness4 claims
- Richard Epstein on Happiness, Inequality, and Envy 11/3/20083 claims
- The Geopolitics Of a Changing World by Professor Jeffrey Sachs3 claims
- 337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning3 claims
- Ex-Google Exec Reveals The Shocking Truth About AI with Mo Gawdat | Bad Decisions Podcast #642 claims
- Steven Pinker on Common Knowledge2 claims
- 128 - Transformations Of Mind2 claims
- Cliff Sosin - Investing in Carvana - [Invest Like the Best, EP.421]2 claims
and 23 more
Most important claims · 10 of 47Search all claims for “prisoner's dilemma” →
- The deep reason the prisoner's dilemma is so fascinating is that it is essentially an analysis of altruism: cooperating lowers your own payoff while raising others', which is materially altruistic, yet the game's structure says altruism is not individually rational—so the puzzle is why we observe so much altruism in humans and animals.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- Competition for working hours is a prisoner's dilemma: as with hockey helmets, each worker who works longer to get ahead forces everyone to work longer, leaving relative standing unchanged while everyone loses leisure.Robert Frank on Economics Education and the Economic Naturalist 10/15/2007
- In repeated public-goods experiments, contributions collapse toward zero, but when players can pay a cost to reduce free riders' payoffs, they punish heavily, contributions rise to around 80%, and punishment becomes unnecessary by the end — and people will pay to punish free riders even when the target won't learn of it until after the game, showing a deep predisposition to punish unfairness.247 | Samuel Bowles on Economics, Cooperation, and Inequality
- In a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma people tend to defect, but when the game is repeated and players know the history and expect future periods, as with two companies in a small town, cooperation can emerge that would not arise in a single round, as formalized by the folk theorem.373 | Colin Camerer on the Neuroscience of Economic Thinking
- In a basic population without added complexity, the prisoner's dilemma's Nash equilibrium of mutual defection is also the evolutionarily stable strategy: the population will evolve to all defectors, because cooperators are exploited and defectors have more offspring, so any cooperative cluster is undermined by invading defectors.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- Coordination dilemmas like Rousseau's Stag Hunt are not Prisoner's Dilemmas: in a Prisoner's Dilemma the worst outcome is to cooperate while your partner defects, but in a Stag Hunt the worst outcome is mutual defection, and crucially neither party has any incentive to lie if they can communicate—so the obstacle is assurance, not greed.Steven Pinker on Common Knowledge
- In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the simple tit-for-tat strategy—cooperate first, then copy the opponent's last move—does very well and sustains cooperation that is impossible in the one-shot game, because the threat of future retaliation (defecting tomorrow if you defect today) makes staying silent rational.337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning
- The widespread loss of trust in institutions functions like a prisoner's dilemma failure to cooperate, producing economic dead weight loss—resources spent on locks, police, and defensive measures that would be unnecessary in a high-trust society—and creates a downward spiral in which distrust breeds partisanship which breeds further distrust.389 - The Politics Of Risk
- Taking a meta step to escape an inequitable equilibrium is more plausible in bargaining than in the prisoner's dilemma: in the prisoner's dilemma even allowing communication does not guarantee cooperation (the only equilibrium is bad), whereas the bargaining game has a fair equilibrium available—but conversation alone may still fail because those getting more benefit from getting more and often engage in special reasoning to justify the status quo that benefits them.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- The prisoner's dilemma is just a math problem with no inherent moral implications: whether cooperation (staying silent) is good depends on the case—two colluding gas stations keeping prices high is bad for consumers, so sometimes defecting is the moral outcome—and people wrongly moralize criminals staying silent and escaping punishment.337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning