phenomenalism
The epistemological or metaphysical view that we only perceive and can only know appearances or phenomena, not independent reality; contrasted with realism which affirms knowledge of mind-independent objects.
As defined in 2RQRds-GU2o
Where it comes up · 4
- A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism5 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 73 19th Century Empiricism3 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 56 German Idealism1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 76 Logical Positivism1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 10Search all claims for “phenomenalism” →
- Phenomenology (the study of phenomena via descriptive method) is fundamentally different from phenomenalism (the position that only phenomena/appearances can be known). Phenomenology is a methodological approach, not a metaphysical claim about the limits of knowledge.A History of Philosophy | 56 German Idealism
- Berkeley's idealism denies matter but preserves both the reality of minds and the reality of God. It is phenomenalist about physical objects (we cannot know their independent existence, only appearances) but not completely phenomenalist because minds and God are asserted as real.A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism
- Phenomenalism is the view that all we know are appearances of things like material objects, but whether matter truly exists is another question; idealism is a subset of phenomenalism in which the idealist asserts that all that exists is ideas and appearances with no matter at all, whereas other forms of phenomenalism remain agnostic about the existence of matter.A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism
- G.E. Moore's influence on Ayer was significant not in terms of Moore's realism or phenomenalism but in Moore's emphasis on conceptual analysis rather than strictly logical analysis, which humanized the positivist approach by making it less rigidly tied to logical atomism.A History of Philosophy | 76 Logical Positivism
- Idealism and empiricism are compatible: an idealist can be a rationalist (like 19th-century German idealists) or an empiricist (like Berkeley). Similarly, phenomenalism can be grounded in either rationalist or empiricist epistemology.A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism
- Bertrand Russell's position on phenomenalism and metaphysics changed across his career ('he reserved the human person's right to change his mind and did it quite successfully at times'), indicating that 20th century empiricism was less settled than 19th century empiricism in its commitment to anti-realism.A History of Philosophy | 73 19th Century Empiricism
- Mill rejects 'necessity-realism' (hard determinism), which claims that antecedent causes are both necessary and sufficient for every human decision and action, because doing so would require knowing Hume's 'necessary connections'—something phenomenalism forbids us from claiming to know.A History of Philosophy | 73 19th Century Empiricism
- Ernst Mach, an Austrian physicist, developed 'sensationalism' as the view that every object of experience can be analyzed into observable sense qualities alone, with no non-empirical or metaphysical elements—a thoroughgoing phenomenalism in which science cannot make assertions beyond what can be sensed.A History of Philosophy | 73 19th Century Empiricism
- Metaphysical idealism is defined as the view that all that exists is of the nature of mind or immaterial spirit, and it is by definition a form of anti-realism about matter because if an idealist holds that all that exists is immaterial, then nothing material exists.A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism
- Plotinus and the Platonic tradition are phenomenalist in character because matter has no independent existence in that framework—rather, as one descends the hierarchy of being through emanations, one approaches nonbeing, with no substratum of reality called matter at the lower levels.A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism