modal realism
David Lewis's metaphysical view that possible worlds are as real as the actual world, with one's counterparts existing in those other worlds (referenced via 'possible worlds that are real, though they’re not actual').
As defined in Agnes Callard
Where it comes up · 10
- AMA | August 20214 claims
- 318 - Physics Philosophy3 claims
- 193 | Daniels on Everything, Everywhere, All at Once2 claims
- 76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature2 claims
- Agnes Callard1 claim
- David Deutsch1 claim
- Marginal Revolution 20Th Anniversary1 claim
- 327 - Transformative Experiences1 claim
and 2 more
Most important claims · 10 of 17Search all claims for “modal realism” →
- The word 'multiverse' refers to several distinct ideas deserving different levels of belief: the quantum mechanical multiverse (taken very seriously), the cosmological multiverse of distant regions with different physics (indifferent), and philosophical versions like David Lewis's modal realism in which every possible world is equally real.193 | Daniels on Everything, Everywhere, All at Once
- Counterfactual claims (e.g., 'if I had let go of the rock it would have fallen') are made true not by ghostly unactualized events but by the actual laws of nature: possibilities do not exert pressure on actuality because only actual things push things around; the laws determine which counterfactuals are true, so possibility is grounded in laws rather than laws in possibility.318 - Physics Philosophy
- Under David Lewis's modal realism, where possible worlds and one's counterparts are real, the ethical implication is paradoxical: if I do good, my counterparts must do the corresponding bad to saturate all possibilities, so rather than taking counterparts into account, one might be morally obligated not to, since a line of thought suggests nothing one does matters because all possibilities are realized anyway.Agnes Callard
- David Lewis's modal realism (all logically possible worlds are equally real) and the Everettian many-worlds interpretation describe fundamentally different things: many-worlds posits physically real branches generated by quantum decoherence within one wave function obeying physical law, whereas Lewis's possible worlds are a metaphysical device for analyzing counterfactuals and modality, not physically connected to ours.AMA | October 2025
- If all possible worlds (or all mathematical structures, as in Tegmark's view) are equally real, then a world where gravity is inverse-square only until 2020 also exists, creating a measure problem: it becomes unclear why we should say our world probably isn't such a bent world, requiring some weighting like algorithmic simplicity to assign more weight to shorter descriptions.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- Many-worlds branches differ from Lewis's possible worlds because they are all spatiotemporally connected, growing from the same trunk and capable of physically interfering with one another, whereas Lewis's worlds are spatiotemporally disconnected; moreover branching is not a sharp physical event but a vague, threshold-dependent matter tied to decoherence.318 - Physics Philosophy
- Roughly 5000 times a second a nuclear decay in your body splits the universe into one where the nucleus decayed and one where it didn't, so many copies of you are constantly being made; however, these other versions are not 'you' — they merely share a past, like an identical twin, and nothing that happens to them affects you.193 | Daniels on Everything, Everywhere, All at Once
- David Lewis's modal realism—positing an uncountable infinity of concrete, spatiotemporally disconnected possible worlds where everything imaginable happens—is the least parsimonious view available; its only motivation is the philosophical utility of defining other concepts in its terms, which is not a good reason to believe such worlds exist.318 - Physics Philosophy
- David Lewis argued for modal realism: that possible worlds are not mere useful devices or stories but literally concrete chunks of reality, each a separate region bearing no spatiotemporal relation to ours, motivated by the demand to analyze possibility and necessity into non-modal terms rather than leaving an unanalyzed notion of consistency at rock bottom.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- There is more than one mode of existence — physical things exist, and non-physical things like the natural numbers also exist (the infinite primes exist while 'the second even prime' does not) — but the modal-realist view that all modes of existence are equally real is pointless.David Deutsch