What this covers
Sean Carroll answers questions submitted by Patreon supporters across physics, philosophy, and the foundations of science. The episode ranges widely—from quantum mechanics and cosmology to free will, artificial intelligence, and the nature of consciousness—but Carroll's recurring theme is methodological: many puzzles that seem deep dissolve when reasoned through carefully using full Bayesian reasoning, dimensional analysis, and explicit calculation, rather than relying on intuition or selective attention to facts that fit a preferred view.
The substance spans several distinct areas. On relativity and spacetime, Carroll untangles the twin paradox and black hole geometry, arguing both are artifacts of sloppy language or bad coordinate choices rather than genuine physical mysteries. On quantum mechanics, he discusses many-worlds interpretation, decoherence, and why new hidden degrees of freedom (including panpsychist mental properties) cannot exist for known particles without already showing up in scattering data. On cosmology and time's direction, he connects entropy to why life is possible—as an irreversible, dissipative process—but clarifies that entropy is necessary, not sufficient. On foundations, he distinguishes genuine philosophy of physics (how the world works) from philosophy of science (how theories are chosen), and defends Reality realism against Max Tegmark's mathematical universe thesis. The episode also takes on the Kalam cosmological argument, the fine-tuning case for theism, and the limits of Bayesian reasoning itself—noting that finite minds, whatever their priors, will attend to different evidence subsets and thus update differently from one another.
Carroll argues that many seemingly deep puzzles about physics, probability, and metaphysics dissolve once you reason carefully — using full Bayesian evidence, dimensionless quantities, emergence, and explicit calculation — rather than relying on intuition, loaded language, or selective attention to favorable facts.
- A good Bayesian must weigh ALL the evidence, not just the facts that favor a preferred hypothesis (fine-tuning argument)
- Many 'paradoxes' are artifacts of bad language, bad coordinates, or skipping the actual math (twin paradox, black hole space-time swap, macroscopic quantum fluctuations)
- The fundamental laws of physics underlying everyday life (the core theory) are understood, and questions framed in cause/effect or teleology are framed wrongly
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Emergence routinely produces emergent theories whose ontology and rules have no obvious connection to the underlying theory — quantum mechanics describes a wave function in Hilbert space while the emergent world is particles and fields in spacetime — so the puzzling feeling that emergent spacetime or consciousness arises from something of a totally different kind is just how emergence always works, provided there is a map from microscopic to macroscopic states.
“the rules of the emergent theory can have no obvious connection to the rules of the underlying theory... the ontology, the different kinds of stuff you have in the emergent theory can be totally different”
Entropy quite literally makes life possible because life is an irreversible time-directed process requiring dissipation; if the universe were in thermal equilibrium where entropy could not increase, nothing would happen and life could not exist — but this is a necessary condition, not the 'motor' of evolution, since entropy increases in many places without any life, so entropy is necessary but not sufficient for life.
“Life is a process... life requires dissipation into the universe, and dissipation means increasing the entropy of things around it... If you are at thermal equilibrium, where entropy could not increase, then life could not exist”
The Church-Turing thesis says any computable function can be computed by a Turing machine, and if the human brain has Turing-machine capabilities then in principle we can compute all such functions; but this is far from the informal claim that humans can understand anything and everything in the universe, since discovering the correct laws of physics may not be equivalent to computing a function — all the work is hidden in the phrase 'whatever you want'.
“there is sort of the rigorous statement of the thesis, and then there is the sort of informal understanding, and the informal understanding is just not that on that firm ground”
Bayesian reasoning is an idealization that doesn't map onto the real world because we are finite and computationally bounded; likelihoods aren't truly objective when propositions are ill-defined, and even people agreeing on priors and likelihoods will reach different conclusions because they pay attention to different subsets of the overwhelming available information — attention, not information, is the scarce quantity.
“even two people who agree on all of the priors and agree on all the likelihoods might choose to pay attention to different inputs, and therefore get different data that they use to update their Bayesian credences”
There are two very different things called philosophy of science: one concerns how science works (Kuhn, Popper, Feyerabend, theory choice, sociology of science), and the other — philosophy of physics, biology, or mathematics — is continuous with science itself and concerns how the world actually works (foundations of quantum mechanics, levels of selection); Carroll is interested in the latter and recommends different books per subfield.
“There are two very different kinds of things... One kind of thing is the philosophy of how science works... But then there's something that is usually called philosophy of physics or philosophy of biology... not interested in how theories are chosen, but they're interested in how the world works”
If a region of the universe had a low-entropy boundary condition in the future direction (instead of only the past), things would appear to behave anti-entropically — cards self-organizing, glasses unbreaking — and would resemble inescapable precognition events, like Craig Callender's thought experiment where Fabergé eggs inexorably assemble in a drawer despite all efforts to prevent it; living beings, which require increasing entropy, likely couldn't exist near such a boundary.
“a low entropy boundary condition is precisely a precognition event, where you know what's going to happen in the future and you can't stop it”
There can be no undetected new degrees of freedom (physical or mental) for known particles like electrons and quarks, because the number of degrees of freedom enters calculations like electron scattering probabilities and would already have shown up; this rules out a panpsychist mental degree of freedom behaving like spin, and also explains why a collapsing neutron star can't just repack fermions into new states to avoid becoming a black hole.
“if that new mental degree of freedom acted like an ordinary physical degree of freedom, like spin, for example, we would have detected it a long time ago”
What is called 'philosophy of science' splits into two very different things: the philosophy of how science works (Kuhn, Popper, Feyerabend — theory choice and sociology of science) versus philosophy of physics/biology/mathematics, which is not about how theories are chosen but about how the world works and is more continuous with science itself.
“There are two very different kinds of things... One kind of thing is the philosophy of how science works... But then there's something that is usually called philosophy of physics or philosophy of biology”
Entropy makes life possible specifically because entropy is able to increase: in a universe at thermal equilibrium nothing would happen and no irreversible, time-directed processes could occur, so life — which dissipates and remembers the past — requires the capacity for entropy to rise; however, entropy is a necessary but not sufficient condition, so calling it 'the motor of evolution' oversells it.
“Life is a process... life requires dissipation into the universe, and dissipation means increasing the entropy of things around it... the particular aspect of entropy that makes it possible is that it is possible for entropy to increase”
The infinities of quantum field theory were not a sign that we needed fancier math but, per Ken Wilson's effective field theory view, a mistake that arose from taking infinite energies and zero wavelengths too seriously when spacetime itself may break down there; rather than evolving the math, the resolution was realizing the underlying physics is simpler and less dramatic than it seemed.
“Ken Wilson showed that if you just take seriously the fact that you don't know what's happening at very, very high energies, very, very short distances, you can still do quantum field theory... Wilson said that the existence of the infinities in the first place was a mistake”
The claim that a record-breaking long jump could be a macroscopic quantum fluctuation fails because the probability of a macroscopic quantum fluctuation is exponentially small in the number of particles (roughly 10^(-10^23) for a gram of matter), so even multiplying by the ~10^20 total human jumps in history gives a probability of about 10^(20 - 10^23) — vanishingly small; no matter how large the event space, an unlikely enough event still essentially never happens.
“the likelihood of a macroscopic quantum fluctuation is exponentially small in the number of particles that you're talking about fluctuating”
The twin paradox has nothing fundamentally to do with acceleration or frames of reference; time dilation is exactly like two paths between two points in space having different lengths — any non-straight path through spacetime experiences less time, just as any non-straight line in space is longer; acceleration only matters because it lets you take a different-length trajectory, illustrated by Maudlin's example where the same acceleration concentrated near the start yields a much smaller time difference.
“The time dilation in special relativity is exactly the same as saying that if I have two paths between two points in space, those two paths can be different lengths. That's it, that's all that there is to it”
The claim that time and space switch roles inside a black hole is false; what's true is that if you naively extend external Schwarzschild coordinates inward, the radial coordinate R becomes timelike and T becomes spacelike, but this is just a dopey coordinate choice — you shouldn't reify coordinate systems, and someone falling into a large black hole notices nothing special crossing the horizon; the singularity is in your future, not at the center.
“hopefully, you can see the vast gulf in between that true statement and the very false statement that time and space have switched roles. Time and space didn't switch roles at all. We just chose a dopey coordinate system”
An exceptional athletic feat could not plausibly be a macroscopic quantum fluctuation, because however large the number of trials (even 10^20 human jumps in history), the probability of a macroscopic fluctuation is exponentially small in the number of particles involved — roughly 10^(-10^23) for a gram of matter — so no amount of trials makes such an event likely; you cannot reason 'many trials therefore rare events happen' without quantifying how rare.
“the likelihood of a macroscopic quantum fluctuation is exponentially small in the number of particles that you're talking about fluctuating”
The twin paradox is not caused by acceleration but by the length of one's trajectory through spacetime: time dilation is exactly analogous to two paths between two points in space having different lengths, where the longest-duration path is the straight (unaccelerated) one; acceleration matters only because it lets you take a different-length path, not because it causes the aging difference.
“The time dilation in special relativity is exactly the same as saying that if I have two paths between two points in space, those two paths can be different lengths. That's it, that's all that there is to it.”
The popular claim that time and space switch roles inside a black hole is false and is merely an artifact of a poor coordinate choice (the radial Schwarzschild coordinate becomes timelike inside); you should not reify coordinate systems, and an infalling observer crossing the event horizon of a large black hole would notice nothing — the singularity is in their future (like a big crunch), not at the center.
“time and space switch roles inside of a black hole, just false, just totally wrong... We just chose a dopey coordinate system, that's all. Don't reify your coordinate systems”
The fine-tuning argument for theism is flawed not because Bayesian reasoning is illegitimate, but because its proponents cherry-pick a single fact (life exists) while ignoring that most observed features of the universe — its vast size, age, and messiness — are far more likely under naturalism than theism; a good Bayesian must weigh ALL the evidence.
“to be a good Bayesian you have to take all of the evidence into account, and this is the mistake that is made by people who put forward the fine-tuning argument in my mind, is that they focus in on one fact that there is life in the universe”
Carroll holds that the universe is isomorphic to some set of equations but is not the same as the equations; he is a monist holding that the universe is sui generis — the unique thing that exists — and trying to explain what it is in more primitive terms is a fool's errand, so the universe is mathematical only in the sense that we use math to describe it, not made of mathematics as Tegmark proposes.
“I do think the universe is isomorphic to some set of equations. I do not think that that's more or less the same as saying the universe just is the equations”
Properties in physics like charge and mass are knowable precisely because they play a dynamical role in the equations of motion; a proposed 'intrinsic property' that has no effect whatsoever on what happens is not compelling, and Carroll holds 'reality realism' — the real world exists and is described by some mathematics, without needing to posit existence as an extra property compared to non-existent worlds.
“I know what properties are. I know what electric charge is. I know what mass is. And the reason why I know what they are is because they play a role, dynamically”
Carroll is not a modal realist (he doesn't think all possible worlds exist), but he does think the other worlds of quantum mechanics exist because they are causally connected to ours — they were part of our world before splitting off and their existence is a dynamical prediction of the Schrödinger equation, not merely a posit.
“I do think that the other worlds exist in quantum mechanics. But that's because they are causally connected to our world. They were part of our world before and they split off, and there's an equation that describes that”
The Kalam cosmological argument fails not because we know whether the universe began (that's open) but because its first premise — everything that begins to exist has a cause — is false: cause and effect is an emergent, entropy-and-arrow-of-time-dependent concept of the coarse-grained macroscopic world, while the fundamental laws contain only differential equations, not causes; the correct statement is 'everything obeys the laws of physics,' which yields no path to God.
“we do know that the first premise, everything that begins to exist has a cause, is just false. That's just not the right way to talk about fundamental physics kinds of questions”
Leveraging many-worlds to claim there's a version of you who guessed every cryptocurrency private key is meaningless for action: saying you have a 2^-256 chance of guessing correctly is, for all practical and actionable purposes, exactly the same as saying there are 2^256 universes in one of which you guessed correctly — the existence of a tiny-fraction branch where you succeeded means nothing to you.
“there is no important difference between those cases. By important I mean for us human beings... For all practical purposes, for all actionable, pragmatic purposes, how should I behave in this world, those two situations are exactly the same”
The Kalam cosmological argument fails not because we know the universe didn't begin (that's open) but because its first premise — everything that begins to exist has a cause — is false; cause and effect is an emergent, entropy-dependent concept of the macroscopic world, while fundamental physics is described by differential equations with no cause-and-effect law, so the correct statement is 'the universe obeys the laws of physics,' which yields no 'therefore God.'
“we do know that the first premise, everything that begins to exist has a cause, is just false. That's just not the right way to talk about fundamental physics kinds of questions.”
Bayesian reasoning is an idealization that does not fully map onto reality because likelihood functions are not truly objective when propositions (like 'theism') are not well-defined, because people assign different credibility to the same information, and crucially because finite, computationally bounded humans pay attention to different subsets of the available data and thus update differently.
“even the thought experiment of Bayesian reasoning is just something that does not map onto how the real world works”
The Church-Turing thesis (that any computable function can be computed by a Turing machine) does not establish that humans can understand anything and everything in the universe; humans likely have Turing-machine-like symbolic capability that earthworms lack — a phase transition in thinking ability — but discovering the correct laws of physics may not be equivalent to computing a function, so the informal claim rests on shaky ground.
“if you say... that the human brain is a Turing machine... then in principle, given time and enough graph paper, we can calculate all these functions, that is not the same as saying we can understand anything and everything in the universe”
There is no teleology in the laws of physics and no problem requiring it; the apparent tendency of matter toward a lowest energy state is not teleological and isn't even strictly true since energy is conserved — what actually happens is that dissipative systems with friction shed energy while increasing the universe's entropy, and high entropy is natural without any future boundary condition, so teleology is an old idea we can discard.
“ordinary dissipation full systems tumbling down to their lowest energy state, doesn't require any future condition at all, it's just the natural thing to expect to happen, just as entropy is increasing is natural. So there's no reason for teleology and there's no evidence for it”
The 'core theory' is the combination of the standard model of particle physics and general relativity treated as an effective field theory in the weak-field limit; Frank Wilczek contributed the name in 2015, not the theory, which was already there and built by many people (Einstein, Weinberg, Wilczek, Maxwell, Dirac, Higgs and others), and working quantum field theorists, when asked, generally agree it captures the laws underlying everyday life.
“What Frank Wilczek put forward in 2015 was the name, the core theory, the core theory itself was already there... the combination of the standard model of particle physics and general relativity thought of as an effective field theory in the weak field limit”
Moving from philosophy into contributing to science (or vice versa) is absolutely possible but is work, not dabbling; the key requirement is taking seriously the existing knowledge base and expertise of practitioners in the target field — for empirical science this may mean acquiring a laboratory, as Ann-Sophie Barwich did moving from philosophy of smell into experimental olfaction.
“you have to take seriously both the knowledge base and the expertise of people who already do this thing”
Asking whether the speed of light could be different is meaningless because the speed of light is always one in natural units and any other value just reflects human-chosen units; the genuinely meaningful question is whether dimensionless constants like the fine-structure constant or the proton-to-electron mass ratio could differ, since these are unit-independent.
“I can always, literally always, choose units in which the speed of light is one... the right question to ask when you're asking questions about other ways the universe could have been, is to change dimensionless quantities”
General relativity in four or more spacetime dimensions is essentially the same, but it becomes qualitatively different in three-dimensional spacetime (two spatial dimensions) because the Weyl curvature identically vanishes there, meaning no gravitational waves and no curvature of space outside matter.
“there is no such thing as Weyl curvature in three-dimensional spacetime, it just goes away, so zero, identically there is only Ricci curvature. So in three-dimensional spacetime, there are no gravitational waves”
Although in idealized physics a photon at the photon sphere can orbit a black hole so you'd see the back of your head, in the real world these orbits are unstable, so almost no photons stay there and you would notice nothing special; looking toward the black hole you'd see black, looking away you'd see the normal outside universe.
“these orbits of photons on the photon sphere are not stable... So in the real world, there's going to be almost no photons on the photon sphere”
The common picture of a proton as exactly three quarks (two up, one down) is very sloppy; the reality is best described as quantum fields not separable into particles, but if one uses particle language at all, a proton is a roiling collection of countless quarks, antiquarks, and gluons, with the 'two ups and a down' being only the net excess of three more quarks than antiquarks, fixed by the baryon number of one.
“inside protons and neutrons, there's a bubbling sea of quarks and anti-quarks and gluons... there will always be precisely more, three more quarks than anti-quarks inside a proton”
There is a crucial distinction between the curvature of space (a spatial slice) and the curvature of spacetime; in cosmology there is a preferred slicing into homogeneous isotropic spatial sections whose curvature is measured to be near zero, while our universe's spacetime is headed toward a positive-curvature de Sitter state — and negatively curved spatial slices (as in Susskind's eternal inflation) are fully compatible with positively curved spacetime.
“You have to distinguish between the curvature of space and the curvature of spacetime... There's a difference between the curvature of the overall spacetime and how you slice it into space plus time”
The claim that the whole universe is inside a black hole is false; the conjecture that enough matter in a region must collapse to a black hole really says it must either collapse to a future singularity or emerged from a past singularity, and our universe came from a past singularity (the Big Bang), so if anything the universe resembles a white hole — a time-reverse of a black hole — though without an event horizon.
“It's true that if you get enough matter, you either collapse to a singularity in the future or you came out of a singularity in the past... we came out of a singularity in the past, which we call the Big Bang. If anything, the universe is like a white hole”
It is meaningless to ask what would happen if the speed of light were bigger or smaller, because the speed of light can always be set to one in natural units; only dimensionless constants (like the proton-to-electron mass ratio or the fine-structure constant) can meaningfully be imagined to differ between universes.
“the speed of light is always one light year per year, that's the only natural units you can measure it in, anything else is just invented by human beings”
General relativity in four or more spacetime dimensions is essentially the same, but it is fundamentally different in three-dimensional spacetime because Weyl curvature vanishes identically there, meaning there are no gravitational waves and no curvature of space outside matter.
“there is no such thing as Weyl curvature in three-dimensional spacetime, it just goes away, so zero, identically there is only Ricci curvature. So in three-dimensional spacetime, there are no gravitational waves”
Although the photon sphere is the region where a photon could in principle orbit a black hole and you could see the back of your head, in the real world these orbits are unstable — any tiny deviation sends photons into the black hole or off to infinity — so there are almost no photons there and you would notice nothing special at the photon sphere.
“these orbits of photons on the photon sphere are not stable. If you deviate the direction in which the photon is pointing by any tiny bit at all, the photon will either fall into the black hole or zoom off to infinity”
A neutron star cannot avoid collapse by distinguishing fermions via some new degree of freedom because we already know all the degrees of freedom fermions have; this same fact rules out a panpsychist 'mental degree of freedom' for particles, since any new degree of freedom acting like spin would have shown up long ago in scattering calculations. Under collapse, neutrons instead convert to heavier particles to pack more tightly, but no stable configuration stops the slide to a black hole.
“we know what the degrees of freedom are that fermions can have... So, there aren't new factors that can distinguish between them. Otherwise, there wouldn't be neutron stars”
Emergence routinely connects an underlying theory to an emergent theory whose ontology is completely different in kind, with no obvious connection between their rules; quantum mechanics (a wave function in Hilbert space) emerging into classical particles and fields is the standard well-understood example, so emergent spacetime poses no special conceptual problem.
“the rules of the emergent theory can have no obvious connection to the rules of the underlying theory... the ontology, the different kinds of stuff you have in the emergent theory can be totally different”
There is a crucial distinction between the curvature of space and the curvature of spacetime: in cosmology we can slice spacetime into homogeneous spatial sections, and those spatial slices can be negatively curved (as in eternal-inflation bubble nucleation) while the overall spacetime heads toward a positively-curved de Sitter geometry driven by the cosmological constant — the two are fully compatible.
“There's a difference between the curvature of the overall spacetime and how you slice it into space plus time. So the two are actually compatible.”
Saying a proton contains three quarks is a sloppy simplification; the reality is quantum fields that are not separable into individual particles, best metaphorically pictured as a roiling sea of quarks, anti-quarks and gluons, with the key invariant being that there are always exactly three more quarks than anti-quarks (baryon number one), and the interior is actually static, not changing over time.
“inside protons and neutrons, there's a bubbling sea of quarks and anti-quarks and gluons... it's mostly virtual particles”
The universe is not inside a black hole; although enough matter in a region must be associated with a singularity, that singularity can be in the past rather than the future, and ours — the Big Bang — is in the past, making the universe far more like a white hole (a time-reversed black hole that spits things out) than a black hole, especially as it is expanding and accelerating toward emptiness.
“it's not true that if you get enough matter, you have to collapse to a black hole. It's true that if you get enough matter, you either collapse to a singularity in the future or you came out of a singularity in the past.”
Our understanding of quantum mechanics is incomplete because the textbook formulation tells you the wave function collapses on measurement per the Born rule but never defines what counts as a measurement — whether a single photon, a video camera, or a conscious observer triggers it, or how fast it happens; the very existence of competing fixes (Bohmian mechanics, many-worlds, objective collapse) that experts disagree on is itself proof we don't understand quantum mechanics.
“You're not told what it means to measure a quantum system, that's just left incomplete... The very fact that some people believe Bohmian mechanics and some other people believe many worlds... is right there a proof that we don't understand quantum mechanics”
The question 'why does the universe exist?' is not a question we have any right to think has an answer; explanatory 'why' questions normally work only within a context (like why a car is out of gas), and the existence of the universe has no such context, so it is not that we don't know the answer but that it is not an answerable question.
“the question, 'Why does the universe exist?' doesn't have a kind of context in which there would be a sensible answer... It's not a question that has an answer”
When physicists invoke unitarity in the black hole information problem, they implicitly mean the unmeasured Schrödinger evolution; violating fundamental unitarity is far more radical than measurement-induced collapse — it could catastrophically violate energy conservation as some papers showed, though some objective-collapse theories violate it acceptably, so there is only one way to be unitary but infinitely many ways to be non-unitary.
“unitary is just the fancy physicist term for obeying the Schrödinger equation, roughly speaking... There's only one way to be unitary, there's an infinite number of ways to be non-unitary”
The question 'why does the universe exist?' is not unanswerable in the sense of being beyond our powers; it is not a good question at all, because the why-questions we successfully answer are always embedded in a context, and the existence of the universe as a whole has no such context in which a sensible answer could be given.
“the question, 'Why does the universe exist?' doesn't have a kind of context in which there would be a sensible answer... It's not a question that has an answer”
The infinities in physics likely indicate that the underlying physics is simpler or less dramatic than it seemed, rather than that we need fancier math; the Wilsonian view of quantum field theory shows the infinities arose from taking infinite energies and zero wavelengths too seriously, so recognizing spacetime may break down there removes the infinities without needing new mathematics.
“Wilson said that the existence of the infinities in the first place was a mistake. And so in some sense you didn't need fancier math to deal with them.”
Textbook quantum mechanics is uncontroversially incomplete because it invokes measurement and wave-function collapse without defining what counts as a measurement (whether a photon, a video camera, or consciousness suffices, or when exactly it happens); attempts to fix this yield competing theories (Bohmian, many-worlds, objective collapse) that experts disagree about, and that very disagreement proves our understanding is incomplete.
“You're not told what it means to measure a quantum system, that's just left incomplete... you're just not told what counts as a measurement”
Quantum networking in the sense of using entanglement to operate a planet-spanning telescope does not exist, because entanglement is not a tangible connection but merely a prediction about correlated future measurement outcomes, and it cannot be used to send information; any real distributed telescope would just send classical information between instruments.
“you can't use entanglement to send information. You can't use entanglement to, I don't know, run a telescope or something like that. Entanglement is not a tangible connection.”
Cosmologists never assume the universe's expansion is constant or extrapolated from the local neighborhood; instead they predict the expansion's evolution using Einstein's equation and test it against the microwave background, redshifts, and nucleosynthesis, and they directly measure the expansion rate at different eras — which is how acceleration was discovered — so problems like dark matter and dark energy arise precisely from not making naive assumptions.
“we predict the evolution of the expansion rate of the universe using Einstein's equation of general relativity, and then we test those predictions”
Dead great physicists have little to teach us about physics today because we have far more knowledge than they did — Carroll knows more about general relativity than Einstein ever did, since Einstein did not know about black holes, singularity theorems, or much of cosmology — so the value of meeting historical figures is historical and biographical, not access to superior wisdom.
“I know a lot more about general relativity than Einstein ever did. That doesn't mean that I'm smarter than Einstein. He invented it, but we made progress”
At a boundary between regions with low-entropy boundary conditions in opposite time directions, events would appear anti-entropic and precognitive — like Craig Callender's thought experiment where Faberge eggs inevitably assemble in a drawer despite all efforts to prevent it — and either two oppositely-dissipating life forms would exist or, more likely, no living beings could exist near such a boundary at all.
“a low entropy boundary condition is precisely a precognition event, where you know what's going to happen in the future and you can't stop it”
Because the universe will not last forever and consciousness requires time and resources to both evolve and operate, there is a competition between the emergence of complex life and the heat death of the universe; this may make radically different higher-order conscious phenomena (e.g., living galaxies powered by Hawking radiation) impractical, so other conscious creatures may end up being broadly organic life like us.
“There's a competition going on between the emergence of life and complexity and the heat death of the universe. Being a conscious creature takes time.”
There is no recipe for coming up with physics paper ideas, much like asking a novelist where they get ideas; the difficulty is never finding puzzles but finding ideas promising enough to push forward — the sweet spot is a problem that is not necessarily solvable but on which progress can be made.
“the problem is never coming across a puzzle, the problem is coming up with an idea that is sufficiently promising to answer a puzzle... that's the crucial sweet spot in there, you want a problem that is not necessarily solvable, but at least progress can be made”
Putting many citations in your papers is not only ethically right but practically beneficial because it makes your paper more discoverable; services like Inspire let you see both what a paper cites and what papers cite it, so referencing relevant work connects your paper into the citation network and helps others find it.
“not only is it ethically the right thing to do, to put a lot of citations in your papers, but it makes them more discoverable”
A useful heuristic when you think you've solved a problem that has stumped scientists for decades is to ask whether decades of smart professional scientists are dummies; cosmologists never assume the expansion rate is constant — they derive its evolution from Einstein's equations and test those predictions against the CMB, redshifts, and nucleosynthesis.
“the simple strategy you should use in these situations is to think to yourself, are decades of very smart professional scientists complete dummies or not? And the answer is no, they are not complete dummies”
Putting many citations in your papers is not only ethically right but makes your own work more discoverable, because citation-indexing services (like Inspire) let researchers find papers both cited by and citing a given paper, so generous referencing increases the chance others find your work.
“by putting more citations in your paper, you make your paper more discoverable to more people, which is always a good thing”
An organism can meaningfully influence its future because, as far as the agent knows, there are genuinely alternative futures; even though a Laplace's demon could predict everything, no human has access to that prediction, so in every sense relevant to acting, there are alternative futures and our choices help bring them about — and there is no coherent way to talk about human action without the idea that we causally influence the future through our choices.
“To every single... In every single sense that is relevant to me, thinking about the future, there are a whole bunch of possible alternative futures, and my choices will help bring them about”
There is no a priori reason to insist the universe must be deterministic at the fundamental level; while it is a nice feature of our current best theories that they are deterministic, one can readily write down possible worlds obeying non-deterministic laws, and which kind we live in is an empirical question, not something settled by imagination or logic.
“I can imagine non-deterministic laws of physics, no problem... I can certainly write down possible worlds that obey non-deterministic laws. And we could live in one of those. That's just an empirical question”
Whether two quantum systems are entangled depends on which branch of the universal wave function you are in: two subsystems can be entangled in the overall wave function while being unentangled on the branch where you've measured them, so in Carroll's paper there are enough black hole degrees of freedom that every branch shows particles near the horizon entangled (no firewall) while the whole wave function preserves enough entanglement between early and late Hawking radiation to restore unitarity.
draft — not yet grounded
The fine-tuning argument for theism fails not because life-under-theism has a low likelihood, but because a proper Bayesian must consider ALL aspects of the universe; once you ask whether facts like the vast number of galaxies, the universe's age, and its messiness are more likely under theism or naturalism, the totality of evidence favors naturalism.
“to be a good Bayesian you have to take all of the evidence into account, and this is the mistake that is made by people who put forward the fine-tuning argument in my mind, is that they focus in on one fact that there is life in the universe”
While the laws of physics do not in principle forbid consciousness arising from networks of organisms, in practice nations are not conscious because human consciousness depends on special properties of brains shaped by billions of years of evolution; nations are loosely organized with no special structure, and unlike brains they have a boss, whereas no neuron is the king neuron.
“One of the aspects of why nations are very different than brains is that brains don't have a president or a king or an emperor. None of their neurons is the king neuron.”
Whether two quantum systems are entangled depends on which branch of the universal wave function you are in: two particles remain entangled in the wave function of the universe but are no longer entangled on the individual branch where you've measured them, which Carroll's firewall paper used to argue branches of a black hole wave function need not contain firewalls while still restoring overall unitarity.
“when you say that two things are entangled with each other, two quantum mechanical systems, that statement depends on where you are, in the wave function of the universe. That is to say, on what branch you're in”
Science, math, and morality are three fundamentally different domains: math posits axioms and proves theorems with many equally consistent systems; science assumes one real world we model under the hypothesis we're not being deceived; but morality is neither — moral constructivism holds that morality systematizes our incoherent built-in moral impulses, so different people can be correctly led to different conclusions and must persuade each other, which differs from relativism because one can still hold others wrong without claiming objective rightness.
“science and math and morality are three very different areas. They're not parallel to each other very much at all”
When deciding whether to treat people as having free will and choice, there are easy cases (asleep = no choice, awake and competent = choice) and fuzzy cases in between (brain tumors, addiction); the lesson of fuzziness is to think hard about the boundary, not to conclude the boundary doesn't exist or to treat everything as either fully deterministic or indeterministic — sometimes you have to live with the fuzziness of coarse-grained emergent concepts.
“The lesson should not be because the boundary is fuzzy, the boundary doesn't exist... Sometimes you gotta live with the fuzziness”
Gravity doesn't constantly decohere quantum systems because decoherence is a dynamical process requiring entanglement with a propagating environment of many degrees of freedom; the gravitational field attached to an object (like the sun sitting alone) is part of that object and static, not an environment — only emitted gravitons scattering into the environment could decohere, and gravity is so weak this happens extremely slowly, making it a hard quantitative question.
“Decoherence is of necessity a dynamical process... the gravitational field of a single object isn't the environment. An environment, you should think of as a lot of propagating degrees of freedom”
Science, mathematics, and morality are three fundamentally different domains, not parallel: math has many equally-consistent axiom systems; science has one real world we discover (not modal realism) by assuming we're not being systematically deceived; and morality is neither (no foundational axioms with theorems, nor one true system to find) — under constructivism, morality is the systematization of our differing moral impulses, so different people can be correctly led to different conclusions yet still argue and persuade without anyone being objectively right.
“science and math and morality are three very different areas. They're not parallel to each other very much at all.”
A static gravitational field attached to a single object does not cause decoherence, because decoherence is necessarily a dynamical process of becoming entangled with an environment of many propagating degrees of freedom; only emitted gravitons scattering into the environment could decohere a system, and because gravity is so weak this happens extremely slowly, making it a hard quantitative (not conceptual) question.
“Decoherence is of necessity a dynamical process... So the gravitational field of a single object isn't the environment.”
The fundamental laws underlying chemical bonds — quantum electrodynamics and the standard model — are locked in, because any possible modifications to the standard model have been pushed experimentally to regimes that would have no effect whatsoever on chemistry; future physics may teach us more about bonds but won't change the underlying equations.
“the laws of physics that give rise to chemical bonds, the fundamental equations of quantum electrodynamics and the standard model, those are there, they're not changing”
For all practical purposes there are alternative futures that our choices help bring about — every human acts this way and there is no coherent way to discuss human action otherwise — but operationalizing free will means living with fuzzy boundaries: clear cases (asleep = no choice; awake and competent = choice) and genuinely fuzzy intermediate cases (brain tumors, addiction), where fuzziness of the boundary does not mean the boundary doesn't exist.
“There's simply no coherent way to talk about human action without opening, without involving the idea that we have a causal influence on the future due to the choices that we make.”
Contrary to the questioner's assumption that it's a fallacy, winning the lottery actually is some evidence in favor of being psychic; a good Bayesian never sets credences to zero or one, so such evidence moves your credence by some amount even if other evidence keeps the overall conclusion implausible — repeatedly winning billion-to-one odds would indeed become strong evidence.
“Yes, it is a pretty strong evidence in favor of you being psychic. Now, there might be plenty of other evidence that you are not psychic”
The halting problem and the traveling salesman problem are not really related: the traveling salesman problem is hard (takes many steps) but solvable, whereas the halting problem is literally unsolvable — there is no way to determine just by inspecting a program whether it will halt, since running it can only ever confirm halting within a finite time, never prove it never halts.
“There's a difference between unsolvable and hard. Hard means it takes a lot of steps. The halting problem is it literally can't be solved”
Quantum networking in the sense of using entanglement to run a telescope spanning planets doesn't exist, because entanglement is not a tangible connection but merely a prediction about correlated future measurement outcomes and cannot be used to send information; a planet-spanning telescope would simply send classical information between instruments, with quantum mechanics playing no role.
“you can't use entanglement to send information... entanglement is a prediction. Entanglement is a prediction for future experimental outcomes”
Most physicists think there is no net charge to the universe; there is a theorem that if space is closed (spatial slices are spheres or a torus) the net charge must be exactly zero as a consequence of Gauss's law, but if the universe is open a net charge becomes conceivable and we don't know — and there isn't an exact one-to-one ratio of electrons to protons since other charged particles like muons exist.
“There's a theorem that says that if space is closed... then there can't be a net charge, then there has to be zero net charge, that's a consequence of Gauss's law”
Photons are unique compared to any single other particle type, but for every property that distinguishes a photon from one particle there is some other particle sharing that property — photons are massless like gravitons and gluons, chargeless like neutrinos, and spin-1 like W and Z bosons — so photons are not categorically different from all other particles combined.
“everything that is different about between a photon and one other kind of particle will be a similarity between a photon and some other particle”
A good Bayesian never assigns a credence of exactly zero or one to any reasonable hypothesis; new evidence shifts credence by some amount but never settles the question definitively, so even striking evidence for a hypothesis doesn't license certainty.
“a good Bayesian never puts their credence to zero or one for any reasonable hypothesis”
Gravitons are the particle (quantum) aspect of gravitational waves, just as photons are the quantum aspect of electromagnetic waves; the wave/classical-field description applies in the macroscopic limit and the particle description applies at the quantum level, and both are valid for the long-range forces but the strong and weak forces never reach a macroscopic classical-field limit because they are short-range.
“are gravitons merely the particle duality of gravitational waves? Yes, that's what they are”
The laws of physics underlying chemical bonds — the core theory of quantum electrodynamics and the standard model — are completely understood and locked in; any possible deviations from the standard model have been pushed out to regimes (like tiny muon anomalies) that would have zero effect on chemistry, so Carroll's credence that new fundamental physics will change chemistry is extremely tiny.
“the laws of physics that give rise to chemical bonds, the fundamental equations of quantum electrodynamics and the standard model, those are there, they're not changing”
The 'core theory' — the standard model combined with general relativity treated as an effective field theory in the weak-field limit — captures the laws of physics underlying everyday life, was assembled by many physicists over decades rather than invented by one person, and future physics discoveries will have no direct impact on everyday life; expert quantum field theorists, when asked, generally endorse this after brief reflection.
“the core theory is the combination of the standard model of particle physics and general relativity thought of as an effective field theory in the weak field limit”
Photons differ from any one specific kind of particle in some way, but they are not unique relative to all particles combined, because every property distinguishing a photon from one particle (masslessness, zero charge, spin-1) is shared by some other particle such as gravitons, neutrinos, or W/Z bosons.
“everything that is different about between a photon and one other kind of particle will be a similarity between a photon and some other particle”
Gravitons are the particle-like (quantum) aspect of gravitational waves, just as photons are for electromagnetic waves; long-range forces like gravity and electromagnetism have both a classical-field regime and a quantum particle regime, whereas the strong and weak forces are too short-range to ever build up a macroscopic classical field.
“there is the limit... where waves in either gravity or in electromagnetism are big classical things... and you can use F = ma... The particle-like nature of these forces comes about when you get down to the quantum mechanical level”
The halting problem and the traveling salesman problem are not really related: the traveling salesman problem is merely hard (takes many steps), whereas the halting problem is literally unsolvable — there is no way to know just by inspecting a program whether it will halt, other than running it, which can only ever confirm halting within a finite time, never confirm non-halting.
“There's a difference between unsolvable and hard. Hard means it takes a lot of steps. The halting problem is it literally can't be solved.”
There is no teleology in the laws of physics and no problem under current knowledge that teleology would solve; the apparent tendency of matter toward the lowest energy state is not teleological but a consequence of dissipative systems increasing the entropy of the universe, which is natural and requires no future boundary condition.
“The laws of physics. As we currently understand them, have no teleology in them, and there is no problem that we are faced with, under current knowledge of the physical world, that is solved by teleology.”
Noether's theorem connecting symmetries to conservation laws cannot be made fully intuitive without technical background, because understanding the proof requires the Lagrangian formulation of classical mechanics; the theorem only applies to systems for which a Lagrangian description exists, so there is likely no high-school-level route to the proof.
“you first need to understand the Lagrangian formulation of classical mechanics. Once you understand Lagrangians, you can then understand a little bit about symmetry and then you can understand Noether's theorem.”
The relativistic momentum formula p = mv/√(1-v²) simply does not apply to massless particles; the always-valid relation is E² = m² + p², so for a photon with zero mass, E = p, and this is a perfectly classical relativistic result — relativity, not just quantum mechanics, gives massless particles non-zero momentum.
“that equation, momentum is MV divided by the square to 1 minus V Squared, just doesn't apply to massless particles. That's supposed to be an equation that only applies when the mass is not zero. The other equation, E squared is M squared plus P squared, always applies.”
There is not necessarily a one-to-one ratio of electrons to protons (since other charged particles like muons exist), and whether the universe has a net charge is unknown, though most physicists think it is zero — and a theorem requires zero net charge if space is closed (a sphere or torus), via Gauss's law, while an open universe could in principle have a net charge.
“There's a theorem that says that if space is closed... then there can't be a net charge... that's a consequence of Gauss's law”
Karl Friston's free energy principle offers a non-accidental account of why cells have membranes: modeling biological systems as Markov blankets separating internal, external, active, and sensory states, the cell membrane may be an evolved way to limit the computational bandwidth needed by reducing the number of internal state variables — a plausible reason cell compartmentalization isn't merely accidental, though whether it's necessary, helpful, or accidental remains an open cutting-edge question.
“what he's saying is, 'Here's a way in a very abstract high-level sense of thinking about the usefulness, the role played by that cell membrane as a way of sort of limiting the bandwidth of information that comes back and forth between the external world and the internal world.' That makes perfect sense to me”
Stephen Wolfram's attempt to guess the fundamental laws of physics from almost nothing faces a binary: either it recovers quantum mechanics exactly — in which case it would be more efficient to start from quantum mechanics — or it doesn't, in which case it makes a testable prediction deviating from quantum mechanics; Carroll's own interest is in deriving the observable world from quantum mechanics, not deriving quantum mechanics from more primitive rules.
“there's only two options for Wolfram's project. One is, he recovers quantum mechanics exactly, and the other is he doesn't”
Karl Friston's free energy principle offers a plausible non-accidental explanation for cell membranes: a membrane may be an evolved way to limit the computational bandwidth of information exchanged between the internal and external states of a Markov-blanket system, though it remains an open, cutting-edge question whether membranes are necessary, merely helpful, or accidental for life.
“here's a way in a very abstract high-level sense of thinking about the usefulness, the role played by that cell membrane as a way of sort of limiting the bandwidth of information that comes back and forth between the external world and the internal world”
There is no a priori right to insist that the universe must be deterministic at the fundamental level; while our current best physics happens to be deterministic, one can readily write down possible worlds obeying non-deterministic laws, and whether we live in one is purely an empirical question.
“I see no reason whatsoever to say a priori that I can't imagine non-deterministic laws of physics... I can certainly write down possible worlds that obey non-deterministic laws. And we could live in one of those. That's just an empirical question.”
Good ideas in philosophy are typically recent not because recent people are smarter but because they build on earlier ideas; Carroll cares only about whether an idea is right, not whether it comes from Eastern or Western traditions, though his own training and touchstones are in Western philosophy.
“typically, the best ideas are relatively recent, not because recent people are smarter, but because they're building on ideas from a long time ago”
It is not possible to be totally fulfilled, and believing there is one final state to reach misunderstands what it means to be alive; to be alive and human is to be a process that is always changing, so the pyramid metaphor of Maslow's hierarchy is misleading and a dynamic sailboat metaphor (per Scott Barry Kaufman) is better.
“To be alive and human is to be a process, to be changing... it's completely wrong, in my view, to imagine that there is one state that we just need to get into, and then our work is done”
On the question of whether electric vehicles are better for the climate, you can't just note both processes emit greenhouse gases and call them equal — you must do the calculation; counting battery mining, manufacturing, waste, and charging electricity, the best calculations indicate an electric car gives off about one-third of the carbon emissions of an equivalent internal combustion engine car, making it a clear improvement.
“the answer is an electric car gives off about one-third of the carbon emissions of an equivalent internal combustion engine car, so it's way less”
When you actually do the calculation — counting battery mining, manufacturing, charging electricity, and disposal — an electric car produces roughly one-third the carbon emissions of an equivalent internal combustion vehicle, so despite the carbon-intensity of batteries the math shows EVs are substantially better for the planet.
“an electric car gives off about one-third of the carbon emissions of an equivalent internal combustion engine car, so it's way less, roughly speaking”
Dark matter is about five times as abundant by mass as ordinary matter, and five is a suspiciously small number given that standard methods of predicting the two densities are completely unrelated; one class of theories proposes a shared process splitting baryon number so that for every proton there is one dark matter particle weighing five times as much, but such scenarios don't easily fit together and require struggle to make work.
“The total amount of dark matter in our universe is around five times by mass as much ordinary matter... why are they so close in density, a factor of five?”
Dark matter constitutes about five times as much mass as ordinary matter, and since the standard predictions for the two abundances are completely unrelated, their closeness (a factor of five) is a coincidence begging for explanation; one class of theories proposes a shared mechanism splitting baryon number so that ordinary matter and a dark matter particle weighing ~5x a proton are produced in correlated amounts.
“The total amount of dark matter in our universe is around five times by mass as much ordinary matter in the universe. And that's a small number... why are they so close in density, a factor of five?”
Whether dark antimatter exists depends on the dark matter particle's nature: a neutral boson like the axion has no anti-particle so there is no dark antimatter, whereas a fermionic WIMP would have produced roughly equal dark matter and dark antimatter that annihilated until densities dropped, leaving a relic abundance — which underlies the (so far inconclusive) search for dark matter annihilation gamma rays.
“If the dark matter is a neutral boson, like the axion... then there wouldn't be dark antimatter 'cause there's just no such thing as an anti-axion. On the other hand, if the dark matter is a fermion, which many WIMP models are”
Carroll holds 'reality realism' — the real world exists and is described by some particular mathematics but is not made of mathematics — rejecting Tegmark's view that all mathematical structures equally exist and rejecting modal realism, while accepting many-worlds branches as real because they are causally connected via the Schrödinger equation rather than merely posited.
“My phrase from my own point of view about this is reality realism. What do I think is real? Reality... I think that the real world exists and it's described by some mathematics and not others”
Schemes that try to leverage many-worlds — such as quantum-randomizing all 2^256 cryptocurrency private keys so a version of you guesses every key — gain nothing real, because for all actionable, pragmatic purposes there is no difference between a 2^-256 probability of success and there being 2^256 branches in one of which you succeed; the existence of a successful copy means nothing to you.
“there is no important difference between those cases. By important I mean for us human beings... For all practical purposes, for all actionable, pragmatic purposes, how should I behave in this world, those two situations are exactly the same.”
A panel of the greatest dead physicists wouldn't offer physics wisdom unavailable today, because there's no reason to think dead physicists were more intelligent than living ones and we now have far more knowledge — Carroll knows more general relativity than Einstein did, who knew nothing of black holes or singularity theorems; the only value would be historical or biographical insight into how those figures thought.
“I know a lot more about general relativity than Einstein ever did. That doesn't mean that I'm smarter than Einstein. He invented it, but we made progress”
There may be a real constraint that organic life is the main kind of complex thinking creature possible, because evolving a conscious creature via natural selection takes billions of years and there is a competition between the emergence of complexity and the heat death of the universe; alternative substrates like a galaxy or black-hole-Hawking-radiation-powered life would require vastly longer time scales the universe may not provide.
“There's a competition going on between the emergence of life and complexity and the heat death of the universe. Being a conscious creature takes time”
A fundamentally different kind of musical harmony would not require a universe with different mathematics, because math is the same across universes (Pythagoras' theorem and 440/2=220 hold everywhere); the right place to look is different relationships within known math — such as moving beyond discrete single frequencies to richer spectra of sound — or different laws of physics, though those might not even permit sound.
“I don't even know what it would mean to talk about a universe with a different kind of math... math is math. Math goes back and forth between universes.”
Someone can move from philosophy into contributing to science (or vice versa) just as Carroll moved into philosophy, but only by doing the real work — taking seriously the existing knowledge base and expertise of practitioners — rather than dabbling; examples like Ann-Sophie Barwich (philosopher turned smell-lab scientist) show this is achievable.
“the word dabbling is the wrong word to use. You have to do the work... you have to take seriously both the knowledge base and the expertise of people who already do this thing”
It is not possible to be totally fulfilled, because to be alive and human is to be a process that is always changing; imagining there is one final state to get into after which our work is done is the opposite of how we should think about living, which is better captured by a sailboat metaphor than Maslow's static pyramid.
“To be alive and human is to be a process, to be changing... it's completely wrong, in my view, to imagine that there is one state that we just need to get into, and then our work is done”
The words used in physics (quantum mechanics, relativity, wavefunction, dark energy) are labels, not definitions — it is not necessary that 'quantum mechanics' be the mechanics of quanta — and the battle to make all terminology self-explanatory is essentially unwinnable and usually not worth fighting for physics, as long as everyone knows what the label refers to.
“Words are labels. When you say quantum mechanics, you mean a certain theory, it is not necessary that the theory be the mechanics of quanta.”
Although the laws of physics don't forbid consciousness made of human-scale components, in practice human consciousness depends on special properties of brains shaped by billions of years of evolution into highly coherent information processing with a sense of self; nations are loosely organized with no special structure, and unlike brains they have a boss whose persuasion suffices, so they are not conscious organisms.
“a nation is a bunch of people that is much more loosely organized than that, with no special structure, no special rules of engagement... brains don't have a president or a king or an emperor. None of their neurons is the king neuron”
There is essentially zero chance that quantum computing fails for some deep principled physics reason, because it combines two well-established things — quantum mechanics and computation; the only realistic risk is that practical technological barriers (connecting enough qubits with sufficient reliability and short interaction times) make it prohibitively expensive rather than impossible.
“I think that there's essentially zero chance that quantum computing won't work in some deep principled physics reason”
There is essentially zero chance that quantum computing fails for a deep principled physics reason, since it combines two independently working things — quantum mechanics and computation; the only realistic risk is that practical engineering challenges (connecting enough qubits reliably with short interaction times) make it prohibitively expensive.
“I think that there's essentially zero chance that quantum computing won't work in some deep principled physics reason”
Wolfram's attempt to guess the fundamental laws from almost nothing faces a dilemma: either it fails to recover quantum mechanics exactly (in which case it makes a testable deviation, which is exciting) or it recovers QM exactly (in which case it is unclear why one would not just start with QM); Carroll's own interest is in deriving the observable world from quantum mechanics, not in finding more primitive rules underneath it.
“there's only two options for Wolfram's project. One is, he recovers quantum mechanics exactly, and the other is he doesn't.”
The idea of a universe with fundamentally different musical harmony cannot come from a universe with 'different math' because math is the same across universes (Pythagoras' theorem and 440/2=220 hold everywhere); different physics could change things, but more fruitfully one should explore relationships within known math, like moving beyond discrete single frequencies to richer spectra of sound.
“math is math. Math goes back and forth between universes... the fact that 440 divided by 2 is 220 is going to be true in every universe”
The distinction between an intellectual and an activist is not between two types of people but between roles any person plays; if your goal is primarily to change the world, departing from the truth can be justified, but if your goal is mostly to tell the truth and only somewhat to change the world, you should always tell the truth and pursue change only in ways compatible with truth-telling.
“if your goal is a little bit to change the world and a lot to tell the truth, then I don't see why you should ever not tell the truth. Do your best to change the world in ways that are compatible with telling the truth”
We tend to be insufficiently imaginative about how different alien life could be, especially in basic dimensions like size — movie aliens are almost always human-scale, but we rarely consider intelligent technologically advanced aliens that are 1 millimeter or 1000 meters in size, and we should be more open-minded about such possibilities even if exotic substrates like photon-based life remain implausible.
“we rarely see intelligent technologically advanced aliens that are 1 millimeter in size or 100 meters in size or 1000 meters in size. I think we should be more open-minded about what these possibilities are”
Physics terms like 'wave function,' 'quantum mechanics,' and 'theory of relativity' are labels, not definitions — it isn't necessary that the theory of relativity be about one thing being relative to another; the battle to make every word an accurate self-explaining descriptor is nearly impossible to win and usually not worth fighting for physics terminology, as long as everyone knows what is meant.
“Words are labels. When you say quantum mechanics, you mean a certain theory, it is not necessary that the theory be the mechanics of quanta”
Rather than there being two kinds of people (intellectuals vs activists), any one person plays both roles to differing degrees; the boundary Carroll sets is that if your goal is mostly to tell the truth and a little to change the world, you should never abandon truth-telling — change the world only in ways compatible with telling the truth.
“if your goal is a little bit to change the world and a lot to tell the truth, then I don't see why you should ever not tell the truth. Do your best to change the world in ways that are compatible with telling the truth.”
Carroll served only as a witness, not a judge, to the Veritasium bet between Derek Muller and Alex Kusenko over a wind-powered vehicle traveling faster than the wind, because he considers complicated real-world physics involving friction and air resistance outside his expertise.
“our job was not to judge who's right or wrong, it was literally just to witness the bet”
Carroll has been upgraded to one of the first two fractal faculty members at the Santa Fe Institute (alongside Melanie Mitchell), an increased commitment requiring at least six weeks a year there studying complex systems.
“I am now officially a fractal faculty member, that's the big news of this month in my life”
Carroll prefers way-out, magical superheroes like Doctor Strange, Thor, and Green Lantern over down-to-earth ones like Batman or Iron Man.
“I like those sort of way-out superheroes more than the down-to-earth ones, like Batman or Iron Man or Captain America”
Carroll prefers magical superheroes like Doctor Strange, Thor, and Green Lantern over down-to-earth ones, saying if you're going to be a superhero you should go all the way with magical powers.
“I like those sort of way-out superheroes more than the down-to-earth ones”