Agnes Callard
What this covers
Agnes Callard discusses aspiration—the rational process of acquiring values one does not yet hold—as a phenomenon requiring fundamentally new philosophical frameworks. She argues that standard decision theory, moral psychology, and moral responsibility cannot accommodate aspiration as long as philosophers assume all reasons are internal to antecedent desires. To make aspiration intelligible, she introduces proleptic reasons, which have two faces: a distal face pointing toward the valuable person one aims to become, and a proximate face one can currently grasp. She distinguishes aspiration sharply from ambition, which merely scales up existing desires, whereas aspiration acquires genuinely good new values. The conversation ranges widely across philosophy, psychology, and literature, grounded in her interpretation of classical texts.
A second major thread concerns how to read Socrates and Plato. Against dominant scholarly tradition, Callard argues for reading Socrates literally rather than ironically—a stance she treats as an ethical demand, since ironic readings distance his words from contemporary life. She frames Socratic philosophy as an adversarial division of epistemic labor, where refutation is essential to acquiring knowledge, and contrasts this with Plato's later work, where the philosopher internalizes all epistemic roles. The discussion also takes up death, immortality, and boredom through Samuel Scheffler's work on future generations; the metaphysics of personal identity via Derek Parfit and David Lewis; and the value of literature for philosophy, illustrated through Shakespeare's Hamlet and its portrait of inner life. She defends refutation as disciplinary practice, examines Jordan Peterson's self-help moralism, and argues that aspirants are characteristically defective yet still genuinely pursuing good.
Callard argues that aspiration—the rational process of acquiring values one does not yet hold—is a distinct, undertheorized phenomenon that requires breaking standard philosophical frameworks, and that classical philosophy (especially Socrates) is best read literally and seriously rather than ironically.
- Proleptic reasons let agents act rationally toward becoming a person they are not yet, with a 'distal' aspirational face and a 'proximate' graspable face
- Aspiration is distinguished from ambition: aspiration acquires genuinely good new values while ambition serves existing desires
- Socratic philosophy is an 'adversarial division of epistemic labor' that should be read seriously, not ironically
Refutation and adversarial intellectual division of labor are constitutive to philosophy's epistemic method.
- Refuting one another is essential to philosophy—it is in a sense what philosophy is—and although it must not be done badly or inhumanely (such aggression may deter underrepresented groups), the discipline does roughly the right amount of refutation and should not abandon the practice.
“We have to not do it in an inhumane way, but I think it’s essential to philosophy. It’s sort of what philosophy is, that we refute one another.”
- Adversarial systems are warranted when a goal contains an internal tension that threatens to pull it apart: in justice, the goals of convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent diverge; in philosophical knowledge, William James's 'Will to Believe' identifies the tension between wanting to hold true beliefs and wanting to avoid believing anything false—and it is in these contexts that an adversarial division of labor (refutation) makes sense.
“The reason why we have adversarial systems for pursuing certain goals is that there’s actually a tension inside the goal itself. The goal threatens to pull itself apart.”
- Socratic philosophy is a solution to the problem of how to acquire knowledge when you don't have it: the method is the 'adversarial division of epistemic labor,' whereby two people pursuing truth split the inquiry into subordinate jobs (refuter and interlocutor), and if each does their job, together they can inquire.
“His method was — I call it the adversarial division of epistemic labor. If you and I both want to find the truth, we can actually divide up the process of finding the truth or acquiring knowledge into two subordinate jobs. You do one and I do one.”
- In the Republic, Plato's own thought emerges (rather than Socrates's): the city's division of labor becomes an analog for the soul, suggesting one person—the philosopher—can perform all the epistemic jobs internally and no longer needs an adversarial division of epistemic labor with others.
“What you get is the image, the idea that maybe you don’t need an adversarial division of epistemic labor. Maybe one person, the philosopher, can do it all on his own. The city in which there is this division of labor is being used as an analog for the soul”
- It is harder to be Socrates's interlocutor than to be Socrates; putting a position forward—knowing people will tear it down—is an act of courage, yet tearing it down is the correct response.
“To put something forward is an act of courage, and especially when you know people are going to tear it down. But I think tearing it down is the right response.”
- To hold any belief at all requires thinking that belief is true: 'I believe there's snow outside,' 'that's true,' and 'there's snow outside' are three ways of saying the same thing, so philosophers necessarily believe their proposed ideas are right at the time they propose them.
“In order to have any beliefs at all, you have to think that those beliefs are true.”
Aspiration is a sui generis motivational state distinct from ambition and desire that requires new theory.
- Proleptic reasons solve the paradox of how people get themselves to care about things they don't yet value: they are the reasons one acts on while working into a new domain of value, and they are divided into two faces—a 'distal' face that points toward the valuable person one will become (e.g. citing the intrinsic value of classical music, though the words ring hollow) and a 'proximate' face one can currently grasp (e.g. admired people are in the class, or a fantasy of an enriched life).
“Proleptic reasons are supposed to solve this problem. They are the reasons that you act on when you are working your way into a new domain of value. What I say characterizes these reasons is that they have two faces.”
- People cannot aspire to something without knowing that they aspire to it; aspiration must be as transparent as possible given that the aspirant has only a partial grasp, so one cannot be unknowingly aspiring to some hidden end.
“it’s part of my view that people can’t aspire to something without knowing that they aspire to it. Aspiration has to be as transparent as it can be, given that you only have a partial grasp”
- One can only aspire to something that is in fact good; aspiration cannot acquire false values because every attempt to describe an 'aspiring gangster' collapses into the distinct phenomenon of ambition—where one merely satisfies pre-existing desires or values at larger scale—whereas with the aspiring student the difference is specifiable, so the only viable account counts movement as aspiration when the thing moved toward is genuinely good.
“Every time I’d tell the story of the aspiring gangster, I found that it could equally well be read as the story of the ambitious gangster, and there was no way to specify the difference”
- Aspiration is mimetic (imitative) though not crudely so; because aspirants don't really know what they're doing, they make many mistakes and missteps when they imitate, but there is no other way to learn to acquire new values.
“I think that aspiration is mimetic, but I don’t think it’s crudely. I just think it is mimetic. It’s imitative, and when we imitate, we often go wrong and make missteps, but I don’t think there’s any other way to learn.”
- A theory of aspiration requires breaking the central apparatus philosophers use in three major areas of ethics—decision theory/rationality, moral psychology, and moral responsibility—because if you don't, aspiration becomes impossible; specifically, giving up the idea that all reasons are internal and all motivations are explicable by antecedent desires forces a new theory of decision and choice.
“if you want to give a theory of aspiration, you have to kind of break the central apparatus that philosophers have been working with in each of these three areas. If we don’t do that, then aspiration becomes impossible.”
Literary examples resist distortion better than invented philosophical examples because they embody deep understanding.
- Literature is valuable for philosophy because philosophical examples tend to collapse under theoretical pressure—there is a constant impulse to rewrite an example to make it easier to analyze—whereas examples one did not invent oneself, created by someone who deeply understood the phenomenon, are tough and resistant to that distorting impulse.
“The problem with examples, though, is that they can collapse under theoretical pressure. There’s a constant impulse to rewrite the example”
- Hamlet is powerful because it shows that people are significant not only for what they do but for how they live inside their own skin—the first-personal point of view; from his early line 'I have that within which passes show,' the play points to the reality of the inner life, against which royal status, great actions, and wars become mere background.
“it’s about how the inside of an experience — or the first-personal point of view on it — is significant. People are significant not only for what they do but for how they live inside of their skin”
- Rereading a classic lets one read it differently: a reader naturally pulled along by plot and emotionally invested in characters' fates needs several readings before being able to set that investment aside and read the work less diachronically.
“It actually often will take me a couple readings before I can set that aside and, in a way, read the work a little bit less diachronically.”
- Hamlet resembles Descartes in being trapped inside his own head—the play is unusually confined to his perspective, his monologues are meditations on life and emotion rather than on surrounding action—and in the early play he is like Descartes engaged in systematic doubt but who has not yet found anything like the 'I think' to stop the doubting and build upon.
“his monologues are meditations on the nature of life and emotion. They’re not really speeches about the action or people around him. He seems, in this weird way, apart from the world.”
Socrates's ethical doctrines function as rules for living that anchor his philosophical method and life.
- One of Plato's primary motivations for writing dialogues was to preserve the memory and activity of Socrates—a man who invented a new way of thinking and living by walking around asking questions but who wrote nothing down—and the dialogue form was an effective means to achieve this preservation.
“one thing Plato meant to do was to preserve the memory and the activity of Socrates. There was this guy. There was this amazing guy who walked around asking people questions, and thereby inventing a new way of thinking and a new way of life, but he didn’t write anything down.”
- The early Platonic dialogues lay out a set of ethical doctrines that form the groundwork of Socrates's life—'a good man can't be harmed,' 'weakness of will is impossible,' 'knowledge is virtue,' 'doing injustice is worse than suffering it'—collectively known as Socratic intellectualism, which functioned as Socrates's rules for living.
“There are things like, a good man can’t be harmed. Weakness of will is impossible. Knowledge is virtue. Doing injustice is worse than suffering it. Those are sometimes referred to as Socratic intellectualism. They’re Socrates’s rules for living.”
- Against the dominant scholarly reading, Socrates is serious in everything he says rather than ironic, and reading him as ironic (or as being mocked by Plato) is a way of pulling his words away from us so they no longer bear on our lives; resisting this reading is itself an ethical demand because it preserves the more difficult, challenging content of the text—a stance reinforced by the fact that those who accuse Socrates of irony in the dialogues are antagonists like Callicles.
“the dominant reading of Socrates in the literature has always been to think that he is, at least some of the time, either being ironic or being made fun of by Plato. And I don’t share that reading.”
- The Symposium as a whole is partly about the cultural role of Socrates—the 'cult of Socrates' with imitators—and uses Alcibiades' speech to address whether Socrates corrupted the youth; Plato's implicit answer, putting the case of Exhibit A (Alcibiades) at its heart, is that Alcibiades himself, not Socrates, is responsible for turning away from the philosophical life toward ambition.
“It’s about the cult of Socrates. That’s at the very beginning, right? People are telling stories about Socrates, and they’re also imitating Socrates.”
Theorizing previously neglected domains of human experience reshapes philosophical understanding across ethics.
- Philosophy has undertheorized many aspects of human experience—including parenting, the ethics of sexuality, and the ethics of how to deal with infertile couples (a question Callard believes no prior philosopher has asked)—and theorizing these areas better might in turn affect philosophical theory in other areas.
“There are many aspects of the human experience that are undertheorized by philosophers — parenting, but not just parenting, but a whole range of phenomena that go with it.”
- The best thing to say to infertile couples may be to say nothing and listen, because attempting to say anything suggests you are giving advice and thereby claiming a position of knowledge you probably do not have until you have spent a lot of time listening to them.
“Maybe the best thing to say is to listen and not to say anything because the idea of saying anything at all suggests that you’re giving advice, and that suggests that you’re in a position of knowledge, which you’re probably not”
- The more virtue one has, the more difficult the circumstances in which one can still live and act well; in easy circumstances even an OK person suffices, but positions of power (wealth, political power) or extreme situations like having 30 days left require more virtue to live well and resist understandable panic.
“the more virtue you have, the more difficult the circumstances can be in which you still act and live well. If you’re in relatively easy circumstances, even just being an OK person is enough.”
Fear of death is rational yet must be resisted to prevent it from driving people toward moral catastrophe.
- It is rational to fear death, but its rationality is bound up with the demand for courage in the face of death: we ought to fear death and also fight that fear, because the fear of death can lead people to believe dying is the worst thing that can happen and that there is no fate worse than death—a belief that drives people to do terrible things—so one must see that one's life is valuable yet that death is not the most important thing there is.
“I think it’s rational to fear death, but I also think that the rationality of that is bound up with the demand for courage in the face of death.”
- If we let our ethics drive our metaphysics of personal identity, we should adopt the account that makes death worthy of fear while also making people see that the value of their lives consists in more than mere biological life.
“if we were just going to let our ethics drive our metaphysics, I would say we should adopt the one that would make death worthy of fear on the one hand, but on the other hand, also make people see that there’s more to the value of their lives than... just biological life.”
- Under David Lewis's modal realism, where possible worlds and one's counterparts are real, the ethical implication is paradoxical: if I do good, my counterparts must do the corresponding bad to saturate all possibilities, so rather than taking counterparts into account, one might be morally obligated not to, since a line of thought suggests nothing one does matters because all possibilities are realized anyway.
“if I do a good thing, then in a sense, I know my counterparts — because all the other possibilities have to be, so to speak, saturated — my counterparts are going to do the bad things. So am I just keeping my corner of the possible world space clean?”
- Per Scheffler, the valuing we do now is predicated on assumptions we make about future generations, which is why the continuation of civilization after our death has major significance for present action—but this does not extend to physical or modal copies we only just learned about, since our valuing could not have been predicated on them.
“his thought is that the valuing that I do now is actually predicated on certain assumptions that I make about future generations. And these other copies — my valuing isn’t predicated on them because I didn’t even know about them until a couple of minutes ago”
Immortality and sustained attention require virtue and orientation toward things of eternal significance.
- Whether an immortal would become bored depends on how good a person they are: living for thousands of years means living with yourself, and a bad self—including one not attuned to things of eternal significance—is hard to live with, so to avoid boredom over eternity one would need to find something as riveting as only eternal things are, effectively becoming godlike.
“you’re kind of having to live with yourself for a very long time if you’re immortal... a bad self, I think, is hard to live with. By bad, I don’t just mean... cruel to people or unjust. I also mean not attuned to things of eternal significance.”
- Bodily pleasures would not remain immune to boredom for an immortal merely because they are biological; activities like eating stay riveting over a lifetime because their meaning changes and develops, and while hunger will always prompt eating, hunger alone is not enough to make eating meaningful and worthy of sustained attention.
“at least some of those activities stay riveting for us over the course of our lives because their meaning changes — eating, say... If I hadn’t changed and developed how I eat and what I eat, I would have gotten bored of it.”
Aspirants are characteristically flawed; aspiration to good in one domain coexists with failure in others.
- Callard's mother's framing that there are only two kinds of people—the Mozart kind (effortless, perfect) and the Beethoven kind (laboring, revising)—left her with the lifelong expectation that she had to be someone great, with no third option available, illustrating how a regional/familial culture instills aspiration.
“I do think I sort of came away from my childhood with the expectation like, “You’d better be someone. You’d better be someone great. Here are the choices for you. Those are the only choices that there are.””
- All aspirants are characteristically defective—being a jerk and failing to instantiate one's own ideals is a sign of being an aspirant (as with Stephen Dedalus)—and aspiration to something good in one domain (e.g. aesthetic self-understanding) is compatible with not being good in other respects, since the view only requires that the thing one aspires to actually be good, not that one be good across the board.
“all aspirants are going to be a little bit jerky. It’ll be characteristic of an aspirant that they’re defective, and so the fact that Stephen Dedalus doesn’t instantiate his own ideals is a sign that he is an aspirant.”
Callard changes her mind when refuted by others; her intellectual trajectory reflects engagement with criticism.
- Callard's reputation for changing her mind stems almost entirely from being refuted by others—her entire dissertation was refuted in a job interview when a colleague showed her central distinction didn't work, and a rehabilitated portion was later refuted by a graduate student at MIT—so most of the time she changes her mind because people show her she is wrong.
“Oh, it’s pretty much always because someone has refuted me... My entire dissertation was refuted by one of my now colleagues who asked me a question in the job interview that showed me that the central distinction I was using in my dissertation didn’t work.”
- Callard's method for sampling the philosophy discipline's output is largely driven by her graduate students' topics and her own active projects rather than systematic reading of journals, which she acknowledges causes her to miss good work simply because she isn't working on it or has no student working on it.
“a lot of what I end up doing is reading new things because my grad students are working on them... But I rarely will just read around in journals. I will do that if there’s something I’m working on.”
- Jordan Peterson is the best instance of the self-help genre, putting forward good morals (tell the truth, keep your room clean, pull yourself together, go for the highest good) that work by pulling against current cultural trends; but because self-help gives only part of a larger story rather than the whole story that philosophy aims at, the same morals that are valuable in this culture would be pernicious in another that needed pulling the opposite way.
“I think he’s the best instance of the self-help genre that I’ve ever encountered... he has these morals that he puts forward, like tell the truth, keep your room clean, pull yourself together, go for the highest good. Those are good morals.”
- Callard's transition from physics to the humanities was driven by realizing—via a humanities course reading the Odyssey, Genesis, and Plato—that questions like 'Should you be a vegetarian?' could be about truths, just as physics and math seemed to contain truths, whereas physics teaching had demanded following formulas rather than understanding (e.g. why the magnetic force acts at a right angle).
“The teacher of that class got me to see that questions like “Should you be a vegetarian?” — those could be about truths, too. It hadn’t really occurred to me that there were truths there.”