free-rider problem
The difficulty that individuals can benefit from a collective good without paying for it, undermining voluntary provision.
As defined in Michael Munger on Constitutions
Where it comes up · 11
- Glen Weyl on Antitrust, Capitalism, and Radical Reform4 claims
- David Henderson on the Essential UCLA School of Economics2 claims
- Michael Munger on Constitutions2 claims
- Garett Jones1 claim
- Russ Roberts And Tyler1 claim
- David Skarbek on Prison Gangs and the Social Order of the Underworld1 claim
- Agnes Callard on Philosophy, Progress, and Wisdom1 claim
- Michael McCullough on the Kindness of Strangers1 claim
and 3 more
Most important claims · 10 of 16Search all claims for “free-rider problem” →
- The dominant assurance contract solves the public goods free-rider problem (which Paul Samuelson deemed unsolvable) by adding one twist to a Kickstarter-style assurance contract: if the funding threshold is not reached, everyone who agreed to pay receives a refund bonus, making contribution a dominant strategy—you benefit whether the project succeeds (you get the public good) or fails (you get the bonus). Lab experiments with Cason and Zubrickas show it roughly doubles the number of successful projects.Alex Tabarrok - Prizes, Prices, and Public Goods
- The euro crisis is a classic tragedy of the commons and free-rider problem: each healthy nation would prefer not to pay for irresponsible ones, but the shared currency means the whole group goes over a cliff together.Tyler Cowen on the European Crisis 12/05/2011
- Because unanimous consent cannot work at the level of specific outcomes (some people are infra-marginal and can free-ride), Buchanan's answer to Rousseau is that legitimacy comes not from consenting to a particular outcome but from having consented to the rule by which the outcome was reached—so a constitution is properly understood as a set of rules about rules.Michael Munger on Constitutions
- It is legitimate to point out that markets work imperfectly (fraud, asymmetric information, externalities), and it is not enough to merely retort that government also has bad incentives; the right approach is comparative institutional analysis—ideally case studies comparing how the private sector and government have actually performed in similar situations—rather than assuming either side will perform ideally.David Henderson on the Essential UCLA School of Economics
- Cowen argues that watching how unwilling so many people are to act on coronavirus until the very last moment has made him much more pessimistic about humanity's ability to respond to climate change, because both involve a free-rider problem where sacrificing lifestyle for reduced external harm is hard to motivate.Russ Roberts And Tyler
- Although Paul Samuelson used the lighthouse as the canonical public good that could not be provided privately because free-riders could not be excluded, Coase showed that private lighthouses actually existed and overcame the free-rider problem, making it awkward for a theory to claim something cannot exist when it demonstrably does.David Henderson on the Essential UCLA School of Economics
- Collective goods like mosquito or flood control can be funded through conditional voluntary contracts—'I will only pay if everybody else pays'—enforced by a third party against non-contributors, which begins to look like taxation but is voluntary in the sense that all consented to be taxed on condition everyone else pays too.Michael Munger on Constitutions
- First-past-the-post, single-district electoral systems create personal accountability for individual politicians and reduce the free-rider problem—the ability to blame others—much like a modern corporation with a clear person in charge, whereas proportional-representation coalition governments make such clear accountability much harder.Garett Jones
- Progress occurs when norms evolve that make doing the right thing self-interested; virtue is about becoming habituated to behaviors that aren't your narrow self-interest but that come to give you pleasure and make you feel good about yourself, so that returning a found wallet or not exploiting people becomes something you do because it is right and feels good rather than for reputation.Agnes Callard on Philosophy, Progress, and Wisdom
- To correct the free-rider problem, public matching funds should give the biggest matches to the smallest contributors—following a Kantian categorical-imperative logic where each acts as if controlling everyone's behavior—so a contributor who is one-thousandth of a good gets a 1,000-to-1 match while a 50% contributor gets only 2-to-1; solving the resulting differential equation yields the quadratic funding form now used to fund open-source software on Ethereum.Glen Weyl on Antitrust, Capitalism, and Radical Reform