What this covers
Garett Jones argues for a modest reduction in democratic power, proposing that rich democracies could govern better if voters had somewhat less short-run influence and insulated experts and long-tenured officials somewhat more. He does not claim democracy is bad; rather, that its primary function is catastrophe prevention—eliminating famines, massacres, and wars—rather than optimizing policy choices. The core of his case rests on three claims: that government as catastrophe-avoidance is democracy's genuine strength, that short-term voter pressure distorts decision-making in domains requiring patient judgment, and that collective performance depends heavily on intelligence's social multiplier effect and on culture as repeated-game equilibrium.
The conversation ranges across economics, politics, and psychology. Jones examines how independent central banks already represent a voluntary shift away from pure democratic control, defends stakeholder theory of governance against single-group rule, and argues that intelligence produces roughly six times higher social returns than private returns. On contested ground, he draws on Axelrod's repeated prisoner's dilemma framework to claim that smarter people cooperate more—because they are more patient, more willing to initiate cooperation, and better at tracking history. He also defends the Flynn effect as evidence that substantial national cognitive differences reflect environment and culture rather than fixed traits. Discussion includes electoral mechanics (first-past-the-post versus proportional representation, the viability of selection by lot), and the accountability problem embedded in modern large-scale organizations, whether firms or governments.
Garett Jones argues that rich democracies would govern better with roughly 10% less democracy—giving somewhat more power to insulated elites and experts and somewhat less to short-run voter sentiment—because moderate democracy's main value is avoiding catastrophe rather than optimizing decisions, while accountability, intelligence, and culture drive collective performance.
- Moderate democracy reliably prevents famines, massacres, and possibly wars, but is not a good calculating mechanism for optimal policy
- Insulating decision-makers (longer terms, independent central banks) reduces hyperbolic, short-run voter pressure
- Group performance depends heavily on intelligence's social returns and on culture as a repeated-game cooperative equilibrium
Democracy's core value lies in eliminating worst-case outcomes, not optimizing policy.
- The biggest benefit of even a small or moderate dose of democracy is avoiding the very worst outcomes: democracies—however measured—are associated with no famines, negligible massacres of their own citizens, and probably starting fewer wars; although moving from correlation to causation is hard, this means democracy is excellent at eliminating the greatest tragedies even if it is a poor calculating mechanism for optimal policy.
“even a moderate dose of democracy is associated with no famines, and negligible numbers of massacres of a country’s own citizens, and probably starting fewer wars.”
- A government run entirely by its bondholders would care only about the gap between revenues and costs, not the productivity of the economy, leading it to impose horrors like slavery and restrictions on freedom and to neglect the deaths of the poorest, while the small upside is that it would manage revenue reliably like a firm that faces little competition.
“If the bondholders are running the government, then they’re going to only care about the gap between government revenues and government costs.”
- Bondholders can be a good check on government abuses—just as voters can—when they act as a check on voters rather than as a 100 percent alternative to them, but giving them monopoly governance powers is far too much for any acceptable governance system.
“Bondholders can be a good check on government, just as voters can be a good check on the abuses of government itself. But giving them monopoly powers is far too much”
- Giving 100 percent of governance voice to any single group—bondholders, landholders, or voters—is a bad path because those weakest in the bargaining situation can be wiped out completely; a stakeholder arrangement where many people have a voice produces better results.
“100 percent voice to any one group is a bad path. Something more like a stakeholder theory — the state where there’s a lot of people who have a voice — that gets us better results.”
Firm and national success alike require coordination on cooperative equilibria within repeated games.
- Drawing on Gary Miller's Managerial Dilemmas, Arrow's impossibility theorem and Condorcet preference cycling apply inside firms just as in voting, so corporations face the same difficulties making rational decisions; the only solution is to recognize firm culture as an equilibrium to a repeated prisoner's dilemma—a long-run cooperation game—where failed firms are those that failed to coordinate on a good cooperative equilibrium, an insight that explains not just firms but societies as a whole.
“Arrow’s impossibility theorem applies to any kind of decision within a firm.”
- Drawing on Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation, smarter people are more cooperative because they exhibit the 'three Ps' of the repeated prisoner's dilemma to a greater degree: they are more patient (focused on long-run payoffs), more pleasant (willing to start by cooperating), and more perceptive (better at tracking the game's history)—all three of which experiments show are crucial for sustaining group cooperation.
“The three traits that turned out to be especially crucial are what I call the three Ps of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma... intelligent people are more patient, they are more pleasant, and they are more perceptive.”
Reducing US democracy through structural changes like six-year House terms is wise and plausible.
- Lengthening House terms to six years would plausibly raise the influence of political money, because being less accountable to short-run voter demands gives more influence to political investors—when one election has a six-year payoff, investors are willing to invest more than for a two-year payoff.
“When one election has a six-year payoff, you’re willing to invest more than one that has a two-year payoff.”
- Jones's single most-recommended way to give the US 10 percent less democracy is to change the House of Representatives to a six-year term—chosen not for the highest payoff but because it balances payoff with plausibility and people would instantly understand what it accomplishes—while keeping the Founders' staggered elections, which matter even more in the social-media age so that no single period of time dominates the next six years.
“I would change the House of Representatives to a six-year term.”
- Contrary to the idea that people never give up power to elites, rich countries have been shrinking democracy since the 1970s—most notably through the rise of independent central banking, a voluntary ceding of massive financial power to unelected economists with long terms who are essentially impossible to fire.
“since the 1970s, the rise of independent central banking, politicians handing over more and more power to people like me, to economists”
Electoral systems that create personal accountability outperform those diffusing responsibility.
- It is genuinely difficult to judge whether proportional representation or first-past-the-post is more democratic: PR feels more democratic to citizens and likely raises voter engagement, but its ex post coalition formation makes it act less democratically, a tension Jones never resolved.
“PR feels more democratic to the citizens... But you’re right, the ex post coalition formation makes it act less democratic, and I never found a way to solve that.”
- Because even insiders struggle to figure out who is responsible in large organizations—and corporations need clear lines of accountability to assess the value created by 100 or 200 people—modern democracies of any size face this problem to a much greater degree, making a clear line of who is in charge crucial.
“If corporations want clear lines of accountability so that the people inside can assess the value being created by the 100 or 200 people there, monitoring on a regular basis, then modern democracies of any type must face that problem to a much greater degree.”
- First-past-the-post, single-district electoral systems create personal accountability for individual politicians and reduce the free-rider problem—the ability to blame others—much like a modern corporation with a clear person in charge, whereas proportional-representation coalition governments make such clear accountability much harder.
“they create a kind of personal responsibility for the individual politician, or personal accountability, and it reduces the free-rider problem.”
Substantial cognitive skill is shaped by competitive market environments and cultural context.
- Large IQ gains—Ireland surpassing Britain, East Germany's roughly 10-point rise within a decade of communism's collapse—show that substantial amounts of national or regional cognitive skill are shaped by the culture one is marinating in; taking the Flynn effect seriously (per Flynn and Dickens), environments forced upon adults by their society have a huge effect on how they use their minds, showing up in substantive, not merely nominal, intelligence.
“something similar happened in East Germany after the end of communism, where there was this 10-ish point IQ gain within about a decade”
- The environmental lever that raised IQ in Ireland and post-communist East Germany is essentially capitalism—specifically the part of living in a free society with competitive markets where, in youth and middle age, people feel a need to sell themselves as valuable creators; this demand-side desire to use one's mind productively, plus a push-pull dynamic of decoding others' cognitive signals, is what most boosts cognitive skills.
“what is it about living in a free society with competitive markets where, at least in our youth and middle age, we feel a need to sell ourselves as valuable creators.”
- The social returns to intelligence are much higher than the private returns: roughly one IQ point raises an individual's private marginal product about 1 percent but raises society's marginal product about 6 percent in the long run; because this operates as a level effect rather than increasing returns to scale, you would not expect to see massive agglomeration in the wealth-creation process.
“one IQ point raises your private marginal product about 1 percent, but it raises your society’s marginal product in the long run with about 6 percent, so that’s a level effect.”
Innovation, entrepreneurship, and quality judgment flourish where land and entry costs remain low.
- Economists are skeptical that wine quality is more than self-perception, but blind-tasting inter-rater reliabilities among judges run about 0.3–0.4, which is exactly the modest-but-real correlation you'd expect from genuine quality signal; the practical superpower of wine knowledge is finding diamonds in the rough—a $20–30 bottle as good as a $200 one—a Kirznerian entrepreneurship of searching for underappreciated gems, which is also how great restaurants make their margin.
“inter-rater reliabilities — when people are doing blind taste tests... are in the 0.3–0.4 range.”
- Innovation occurs where land is cheap enough to take risks—the best restaurants are found in strip malls and the most exciting winemaking now happens in Sonoma rather than Napa, because inexpensive land lets people take big risks while nobody is taking risks where land prices are highest.
“you’re going to find the best restaurants in strip malls because that’s where the most innovation can occur. Similarly, in Sonoma, there’s enough inexpensive land that people can still take big risks. Nobody’s taking a risk in Napa anymore.”
- At its best, America is built on hope and a created (not endowed) exceptionalism—a sense of adventure and pioneering spirit combined with strong social capital, embodied in the Mormons who had social capital strong enough to stand up to others yet took huge risks and endured persecution to build a new world; this rare blend characterizes roughly 20–30 percent of the US experience, something many countries never achieve.
“It’s a mixture of a pioneering spirit with an element of strong social capital.”
- From working in Senator Orrin Hatch's office, Jones learned that genuine camaraderie across deep political disagreement—exemplified by Hatch and Ted Kennedy genuinely hugging when they met—is the heart of building good political negotiation and maintaining a healthy political culture.
“That kind of camaraderie across people who really disagreed intensely on politics — that strikes me as the heart of building good political negotiation and keeping a good political culture.”
- On a long road trip Jones expected to see the detritus of civilization and social decay the internet had described in the Midwest, but while there were real pockets of distress and genuine opioid-crisis concerns, the median heartland showed substantial capital investment, new machines, and rural rebuilding—doing far better than he had been led to believe.
“The median part of the heartland, the Midwest, the American West just was doing far better than I had been led to believe.”
- The US government's fiscal capacity and high credit rating are a superpower because they give firms, organizations, and individuals the ability to make credible promises to each other; the large existing stock of Treasury assets would persist even under budget balance, and the Treasury could create bonds and invest the proceeds, for example in a sovereign wealth fund.
“The high credit rating of the United States is a superpower, and that gives firms and organizations, individuals, the ability to make credible promises to each other.”
- Mormons are over-represented in occupations like the FBI and CIA because three things are highly valued there—being able to speak a foreign language, being able to pass a drug test, and being able to keep secrets—at all of which Mormons excel.
“places like the FBI and the CIA — places where being able to speak a foreign language is incredibly important, and being able to pass a drug test is incredibly important, and being able to show you can keep secrets is important. And Mormons are great at all three.”
- If Jones could be a benevolent dictator for ten years, Rwanda offers the greatest potential 50-year impact because Paul Kagame's reforms have drawn attention across sub-Saharan Africa and the country has a populace open to moderate reform and leaders open to technocratic governance while improving life for the masses—essentially following the Lee Kuan Yew path.
“I would like to think that it would be Rwanda. Paul Kagame has made quite a number of reforms.”
- The biggest danger to the LDS church is its substantial loss of male participation over recent decades—driven by the appeals of secular life, exposure via Google to church history not taught in church, and the broader struggles of non-college-educated white men (e.g., spending time on Fortnite instead of church)—reversing its century-long success at maintaining high male engagement.
“They’ve really lost male participation in a substantial way over the course of my lifetime.”
- The real goal of college teaching is not to deliver the full body of knowledge in the classroom but to give students a few key pieces of information, anecdotes, stylized facts, and elements of deep theory that stick in their heads and make them passionate enough to go home and study the subject on their own for two or three hours, making the knowledge their own.
“My job is to give students a reason to feel passionate enough about the topic so that they’ll go home for two or three hours and study it on their own.”
- The term 'hive mind,' originally a frightening science-fiction concept (the Borg), is now routinely treated as positive on social media because the synergy of grabbing and synthesizing ideas from many people—where the whole exceeds the sum of its parts—is far more visible today than 50–75 years ago, even though the scary downside of collective intelligence remains real.
“The hive mind used to be a negative idea, but now people routinely, on social media at least, treat it as a positive idea.”
- The most natural case where voters have better judgment than experts is when there is an academic or elite indoctrination that is completely opposed to reality—as with early-20th-century communism, which Jones calls the opiate of the intellectuals—and the masses simply roll their eyes at it.
“The most natural cases are cases where there’s an academic indoctrination that’s completely opposed to reality.”
- Election by lot works in small polities (like the Athenian system in groups of 5,000–20,000) and in juries, but not for management-heavy governance jobs that require specific expertise; random selection from the populace is most valuable precisely when the goal is to capture the informed opinion of a typical person rather than to apply management skill.
“when it comes to management skills, which is what a lot of these governance-type jobs are about, that’s where we really want some level of expertise”
- Aspiring research economists should build an enormously broad and deep set of econometric tools because that is the language of the field in the age of big data, and—crucially—having such tools means you will never worry about going hungry, which frees you to take big risks with your career, as Jones did with controversial IQ research.
“if you have incredibly broad and deep econometric tools, you will never worry about going hungry, and therefore, you will feel more comfortable taking big risks with your career.”
- Although Gordon Tullock had more weird ideas, James Buchanan is more underrated because he did the harder work of building an intellectual empire—an organization and a culture that shares ideas—which is how important ideas actually get embedded in an ecosystem and gave him a power Tullock could not have.
“Buchanan took the time to do something that I personally am not that skilled at... which is building an intellectual empire, building an organization and a culture that shares those ideas.”
- The macroeconomic warnings of 20–30 years ago about preparing financially for the baby boomers have come true: rich countries did a mediocre-to-below-mediocre job, so demographic decline and a large elderly population will haunt rich-country fiscal positions for the next 30 years, producing exactly the intergenerational tension that was predicted.
“we needed to get ready financially for the baby boomers. We did a mediocre to just-below-mediocre job of that. And now we’re reaping the regime that you’d expect in that world, which is more intergenerational tension.”
- Trial by jury works because deliberately ignorant jurors balance the weakness of individual ignorance against the benefit of concentrated individual responsibility in a small group, where the incentive to become informed outweighs the cost of starting uninformed.
“Juries are intentionally made ignorant about the case that they’re supposed to be evaluating. It seems to balance that weakness against the big benefit of individual responsibility.”
- Campaign ads in which a prosecutor brags about how many people they convicted exploit emotional, short-run hyperbolic discounting and impulsive thinking that behavioral economists warn about, giving voters far too much influence over outcomes that should rely more on deliberation.
“That’s triggering that short-run hyperbolic discounting, impulsive thinking that the behavioral economists have warned us about. And that ends up having, I think, far too much influence.”
- For non-Mormons, Salt Lake City offers a high quality of life because it sits at a 'bliss point' or top of the Laffer curve—enough LDS social capital to deliver its benefits, yet enough non-LDS people to sustain a rich social network including activities like a wine dinner—whereas more LDS-centric areas leave non-Mormons feeling isolated.
“you’re maybe at a bliss point now or at the top of the Laffer curve, where you get these great benefits of high LDS social capital, and yet there are enough non-LDS people that you can have a rich social network”
- Rising US political polarization is driven partly by social media—the 'federalism of the internet'—and partly by rising ethnic diversity, since people from different cultural backgrounds disagree more, which is why ethnic conflict appears so often in the study of wars; the loud elite shouting persists because rich white elites act as self-appointed representatives of other groups, and substantive group existence is needed to sustain a broad social movement.
“Some of it is the rise of social media. It is sort of the federalism of the internet. And part of it is the rise in ethnic diversity across the US.”
Intelligence correlates with cooperation through patience, pleasantness, and perception, not conscientiousness.
- Conscientiousness doesn't predict cooperation because it is none of the three Ps and because cooperation is dangerous: a prudent person watching out for themselves and loved ones should be reluctant to jump into pro-social relationships since many people get ripped off, so if you can't tell whether you're surrounded by scoundrels or saints, the safer default is to assume scoundrels—and the conscientious person notices this.
“a prudent person who isn’t able to tell whether you’re dealing with someone who’s trustworthy, should best respond in an untrustworthy way.”
Institutional arrangements balancing multiple stakeholder voices prevent catastrophic abuses of power.
- Jones would strengthen the jurisdiction of the EU's top court to reach into member states' local political systems, making it more like a national government, and he agrees the EU should replace its diffuse council structure with a single visible executive to provide clear accountability—a direction the EU is groping toward but cannot achieve because of its many competing heads.
“I’d strengthen their jurisdiction to be able to dive into the local political systems of the countries they’re overseeing, make it just a little bit more like a national government.”
- Proposed balanced budget amendments—which would not ban deficits but require a two-thirds or three-fourths supermajority to run one—are a wise example of imposing supermajority rules, and across US states such amendments do appear to work as a partial check on the will of the voters.
“they had to pass some special resolution and get it passed through a two-thirds or three-fourths majority. I think that’s a classic example of something that would be very wise.”
- Bringing in super-smart 'weirdos' to reform the whole civil service destroys itself, but a small Skunk Works kept in a box for two to three years can generate great ideas; in any rich democracy there is probably a 5–15 percent slice of government with a culture open to radical reform, and finding it takes a year or two before the right people can re-engineer it like a corporate reorganization.
“As a general rule for all the civil service, it destroys itself. But as the idea of a sort of Skunk Works that, if kept in a box for two to three years, could generate great ideas”
- New Zealand's contract for its central banker—under which the head of the central bank is fired if the inflation target is missed—is a model of accountability that does not rely on voters; we do too little of this partly because the punishments offered are not extreme, and the absence of objective performance bonuses for such roles is a puzzle.
“something like New Zealand’s contract for its central banker — where if the central bank fails to meet its inflation target, the head of central bank gets fired.”
- Extreme federalism is not very desirable because, as Glen Weyl points out, there are large increasing returns in the world and you want feasible high-level government negotiation where those returns and externalities matter; metropolitan statistical areas better capture the scope of externalities than small city governments, so the broadest-scope parliament is valuable as a Coasean negotiation forum.
“there’s a lot of increasing returns in the world, and you want to be able to have feasible routine government negotiations at the highest level, where increasing returns are mattering.”
Small open economies outperform large democracies because global market accountability drives better policy.
- Small open economies are underrated because their accountability to global markets, not voters, drives good policy; the middle-income economies hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis learned their lesson, made banking systems more robust, strengthened regulation, and raised capital requirements, which is why they fared well after the global financial crisis—unlike richer countries such as Iceland and Ireland that blew up in 2008.
“The small, open economies learned their lesson in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. They made their banking systems far more robust. They made their regulatory systems more effective. They increased their capital requirements.”
- Cities that have maximized land value (Manhattan, San Francisco, Dubai, Singapore, London) are extremely well run partly because they face global competition for labor; the freedom to leave prevents a city from getting rich by trapping its most productive workers.
“the extremely valuable freedom to leave means that a city can’t get rich by just telling its most productive workers, “You’re not allowed to go anywhere. You have to stay here.””
Long-run unemployment stems from real sectoral and technological factors, not wage stickiness.
- Nominal wage stickiness, though real (as Nakamura's work confirms), cannot explain sustained unemployment lasting a decade because the invisible hand is more powerful than wage stickiness in the long run; long-run unemployment is better explained by real factors—technology shocks, costly sectoral or regional adjustment, family ties, and generous unemployment benefits—as captured in Sargent and Ljungqvist's work on the European Unemployment Dilemma.
“These things can’t explain 10 years of unemployment. The invisible hand is more powerful than wage stickiness in the long run.”
- Crowding out from high US fiscal deficits is muted because the global economy makes many people willing to invest in the US and financial markets are far more open than 40 years ago, so one nation's deficit matters less; still some crowding out occurs, and achieving macroeconomic budget balance might show up as roughly a third of that in higher investment.
“Financial markets are a lot more open than they were 40 years ago, so one nation’s deficit shouldn’t have nearly as much of an effect.”
Macroeconomic debate suffers from under-evidence and folk theorizing rather than theoretical gaps.
- The biggest mistake in Twitter macroeconomics is seeking simple answers—such as the belief that much more nominal expansion or early Great Recession spending would have had an obvious huge multiplier effect and eliminated unemployment; the folk versions of Larry Summers's secular stagnation theory, and even Summers's own version, are not so much under-theorized as under-evidenced.
“this belief that more spending early on in the Great Recession could have obviously had a huge multiplier effect seems wrong.”
- Sargent and Prescott lost influence with younger economists because of the rise of micro data and big data and a lack of interest in grand synthetic stories; modern macro resembles the 1960s, studying micro foundations without synthesizing them into a macro story, leaving a vague New Keynesian narrative that admits 'we really don't know what's happening,' whereas Sargent and Prescott were wedded to big macro stories that could explain the whole world.
“It’s because of the rise of micro data, the rise of big data, the lack of interest in finding grand synthetic stories.”
Intelligence's private wage correlation is weak; job design and late-career income effects explain apparent strength.
- The correlation between individual IQ and wages is high enough to keep on the radar but low enough that you should always do the job interview rather than hire on the SAT score; the IQ-income link looks stronger than the IQ-wage link partly because income data for late-middle-age people includes nonwage financial flows (smarter people are paid better in markets), and because jobs are deliberately constructed to be foolproof so the smartest person isn't much more productive than the worst in a given category.
“the correlation is just high enough for you to keep it on your radar, but it’s just low enough that you should always do the job interview and not just hire on the SAT score.”
- If you weight intelligence less in hiring, you should weight more an ability to adapt to what the group needs at any moment—social flexibility and openness to experience (weakly but positively correlated with IQ)—which matter most for nonroutine jobs, manual or mental; since women tend to have more of this trait in some studies, properly valuing intelligence would lead to hiring more women than currently.
“an ability to adapt to what the group needs at any point in time because I tend to think a version of openness”
Economic growth follows semi-endogenous patterns with diminishing returns, settling near constant long-run rates.
- Paul Romer's 1990 prediction of literal increasing returns to scale and rising growth rates didn't materialize because of his coauthor Chad Jones's semi-endogenous growth theory: more people searching for ideas helps, but there are diminishing returns to the idea-research process, so once the low-hanging fruit is grabbed, harder ideas get more expensive and growth settles back to a roughly constant long-run rate (maybe 1–2 percent), much like the Solow model.
“Chad Jones’s semi-endogenous growth theory basically says... there’s diminishing returns to the idea research process, just like there are diminishing returns to capital.”