David Skarbek on Prison Gangs and the Social Order of the Underworld
What this covers
David Skarbek of King's College London discusses how prison gangs emerged as a deliberate governance structure in American prisons, operating alongside host Russ Roberts of EconTalk. Skarbek traces the rise of gang organization to a specific structural problem: as California's prison population grew roughly five-fold between the late 1950s and 1970, the informal convict code—an unwritten system of norms enforced through reputation—became unworkable. When populations grow too large and diverse, individuals can no longer effectively track reputation and enforce shared rules. Gangs filled this vacuum by establishing formal governance structures, including written constitutions, membership screening protocols, and community responsibility systems that make members accountable for one another. The conversation examines why these organizations, despite their brutality, have proven durable: they create order in chaos and manage an underground economy worth millions annually through contraband sales and taxation.
The discussion ranges across economics, sociology, and institutional design. Skarbek explains how gangs use polycentric governance—competing rival authorities that communicate to prevent chaotic conflict—and profit-seeking drives them toward order, echoing Mançur Olson's stationary bandit logic: leaders who remain permanently maximize total wealth by providing stability rather than unchecked extraction. The conversation contrasts this with demand-side vs supply-side approaches to gang suppression, arguing that removing gang leaders fails because inmates genuinely demand the security and access gangs provide. Notably, Skarbek points to female California prisons as a control case: lacking gangs despite housing criminals, they maintain small, stable populations where reputation-based norm enforcement still functions, suggesting gangs are not inevitable but population-dependent. The exchange also addresses how scale limits of norms affect policy: when formal rules conflict with informal institutional realities, enforcement fails regardless of intent.
Skarbek argues that prison gangs emerged as a rational, decentralized governance response to the breakdown of the informal 'convict code' once prison populations grew too large for reputation-based norms to function, and that these gangs—despite their brutality—provide real order and enable an underground economy, illustrating that even the least trustworthy people can build functional extra-legal governance.
- Norm-based 'convict code' governance works in small, homogeneous prison populations but breaks down as populations grow large and diverse.
- Gangs use a 'community responsibility system' that makes each member accountable for others, lowering monitoring costs in large populations.
- Gang behavior is driven by profit from the underground economy, which gives them incentives to constrain violence and maintain order.
Gang-based governance uses collective accountability and leader negotiation to maintain order and enable economic cooperation.
- California prison gangs operate as a 'community responsibility system' in which every member is responsible for each other member's actions and obligations—debts and disruptive behaviors are collective—so inter-gang conflicts are resolved by gang leaders negotiating and then exerting tremendous internal pressure (up to forced apologies or assaulting their own member) to gain compliance, which facilitates cooperation between rival groups.
“the distinguishing characteristic of the system is that everybody within a gang is responsible for each of the other gang member's actions and obligations.”
- Leaders of rival gangs within a prison actively communicate with each other because chaotic conflict hits their bottom line, and they will even bring in gang leaders from other prisons or areas to intercede and adjudicate problems, recognizing it is in their interest to avoid serious chaotic situations.
“when conflicts happen, they recognize that it's going to hit them on the bottom line if there's not a way to find a solution... they'll contact gang leaders in other prisons or other areas of the prison to ask them to intercede and adjudicate some problem”
- Many gangs maintain extensive paperwork protocols, sending new-arrival questionnaires to incoming inmates to certify identity, neighborhood, gang affiliation, and crimes, cross-checking responses against prison staff records and the gang's own 'bad-news' or 'no-good' enemies lists, in order to determine who needs to be punished for unpaid debts or unpaid 'taxes' when they show up.
“the gang leader is going to send you a little paper questionnaire, and it's going to ask: Who are you? What neighborhood are you from? What gangs are you associated with? What crime did you commit?”
- Some gangs have elaborate formal structures, including one with a 10-page single-spaced written constitution specifying purpose, positions, appeals processes, elections, and checks and balances; these rules are often not as effective as intended—internal disputes and back-dealing persist—but there is abundant evidence of members assaulting others who violate the rules, showing the rules provide a real check, while cases where rules are broken without punishment are simply less observable.
“One group that I talk about, they have literally a 10-page, single-spaced, typed, written constitution... There's appeals processes; there's elections processes or checks and balances.”
- The community responsibility system is not accidental but functions to place the responsibility of monitoring inmates in the hands of those with low-cost ways of doing so: since you can't watch everybody in a big population, gangs force you to watch your own members, and the system facilitates interaction with strangers because you only need to know a gang's reputation, not each individual's.
“it puts the responsibility of monitoring inmates in the hands of those people who have low-cost ways of doing so... In big prison populations, you can't watch everybody, so the gangs just force you to watch yourself.”
Large prison populations cannot sustain decentralized norm-based governance, forcing inmates to create gangs for security.
- Prison gangs in California formed primarily because inmates wanted safety in a dangerous environment; gangs did not exist for the system's first hundred years and only emerged in the 1950s when officials' level of security proved insufficient for what inmates needed.
“The main reason why gangs form, in California, initially is because inmates want safety. So, because they are in this dangerous environment, they join with other people and those are people that they feel can keep them safe”
- A roughly five-fold increase in California's prison population between the late 1950s and 1970 drove the formation of gangs, because decentralized, norm-based governance mechanisms cannot function in large populations—so the way inmates protect themselves looks radically different depending on whether the population is small or large.
“starting in the late 1950s and through to 1970 there was about a 5-fold increase in the size of the prison population... And in big prison populations, the sort of, what the book refers to as decentralized governance mechanisms can't work.”
- Norm-based governance is relatively effective in small, homogeneous environments where everyone agrees on acceptable behavior, deviations, and punishments and where reputations are widely known; large populations undermine norms because it becomes too difficult to track everyone's behavior and standing, while a younger, more diverse inmate population further erodes norms since youth experiment with violations and diverse communities disagree on what counts as a violation.
“Big prison populations undermine the effectiveness of norms, because in bigger populations it's much more difficult to keep track of everybody's behavior... We also see a much more diverse community, of younger inmates. And both of those things tend to undermine norms.”
- Prison is prone to danger because a much greater proportion of its population has committed acts of violence, inmates test lowest on self-control measures, and the environment combines extreme poverty with people most willing to use force to alleviate it.
“Across the board these are people who test lowest on self-control measures. It's a dangerous environment because it's an environment that's characterized in many ways by extreme poverty and people most willing to use force”
Prison gangs persist because suppression targets supply when demand for security, stability, and contraband remains unmet.
- Although prison officials and the physical structure provide real security, formal governance is insufficient to meet inmates' demand for governance in nearly every prison setting, both because many inmates still feel vulnerable and want to provide their own marginal safety, and because officials refuse to regulate the underground economy that supplies goods and services inmates want.
“what we find when we study prisons, in really just about every setting, is that that formal governance is insufficient. It's insufficient to meet the demands for governance that inmates have.”
- There is a large amount of money at stake in the prison underground economy, which creates a strong financial incentive for those profiting from it to maintain order, because a breakdown in order ruins that economy; prisons generate this market because their rules prohibit goods inmates want, from mundane items to drugs, alcohol, and tobacco.
“there's an enormous financial incentive for some people who are profiting from that to maintain order, because a breakdown in order ruins that economy”
- Speculatively, since suppression fails, prison officials could reduce gang influence by addressing the demand side—providing more order and stability themselves so inmates need gangs less—and by loosening the restricted prison economy, since prohibiting tobacco (in 2005) and charging roughly $1/minute for phone calls simply created lucrative illicit markets in smuggled tobacco and cellphones (15,000 confiscated in 2011).
“if inmates turn to gangs for order and stability, maybe prison officials can provide more order and more stability for them.”
- The dominant suppression or supply-side strategy of identifying the most active gang members and isolating them in segregated housing has failed because gangs are not a supply-side problem of angry violent people but a demand-side phenomenon: inmates generally demand the security, order, and contraband gangs provide, so removed leaders are quickly replaced—just as removing all restaurants would not eliminate the demand that brings new ones tomorrow.
“Gangs don't exist because there are angry, violent people who are in prison. Gangs exist because there's inmates generally who have a demand for what gangs provide.”
Formal governance is insufficient because officials cannot prevent violence in blind spots and refuse to regulate underground economy.
- Prison violence including premeditated murder is possible because no prison is a true Panopticon: architectural blind spots, limited numbers of guards, unmonitored cells at night, and overcrowded dormitories create constant daily opportunities for serious violence that officials cannot fully control.
“there's always blind spots in the way that a building is set up. There's a limited number of guards to watch people; in a cell at night there's not someone who is monitoring each individual cell.”
- Treating prisoners as rational and self-interested is analytically useful because former inmates describe prison as an intensely strategic environment where people must monitor how their behavior is perceived and protect themselves from opportunistic actions by others, so assuming good intentions cannot be the starting point.
“people who have been in prison say that prison is an incredibly strategic environment. It's an environment where people have to pay attention to how their behaviors are being perceived by other people”
- Because prison strips inmates of all normal avenues for help—you can't go to guards without being labeled a snitch, which can get you killed—the gang becomes someone to turn to: once a cleared inmate joins the program, the group will, because its reputation is on the line, take steps to right wrongs done to its members, filling the vacuum of authority and stability.
“The gang is someone to turn to... when somebody does cause trouble, when there is a conflict, he has someone to turn to--the other members of that group... gangs are kind of a way to fill in for that vacuum of authority and stability”
- Drugs are clearly getting into California prisons in volume: a 2013 California Legislative Analyst's Office random sample found 23% of inmates tested positive for drugs they weren't allowed to have and another 30% refused the test altogether, implying anywhere from 23% to more than 50% have controlled substances in their system.
“23% of those tested positive for drugs that they weren't allowed to have. And another 30% refused the test altogether... So, anywhere from 23% to more than 50% of the inmates randomly selected have controlled substances in their system.”
- Prison gangs constrain violence less because they're peaceful than because large-scale violence triggers lockdowns ('modified programming') that can confine inmates to cells for weeks, months, or over a year, which makes it nearly impossible to earn money in the underground economy; so the desire to keep earning gives gangs an incentive to resolve disputes peacefully or to conduct necessary violence in controlled, concealed forms like scheduled 'cell fights.'
“if there are large-scale acts of violence... prison officials will lock down a prison... when you are locked down, it's very difficult to make money in the underground economy. So, large scale acts of violence undermine the ability for prison gangs to earn money”
Self-interested gang leaders earning substantial money have incentive to minimize chaotic violence and formalize governance structures.
- A roving bandit who will be present only one day has an incentive to steal everything of value, whereas a stationary bandit who will remain indefinitely maximizes total wealth by stealing less in the current period and even providing protection from other bandits, public goods, and governance, so that the population stays productive and yields more to steal in the future—an invisible-hand explanation for how a self-interested ruler can produce general benefit.
“The stationary bandit also wants to maximize wealth, but he's going to be there for the indefinite future. And so, he recognizes: If I steal everything that they have of value today and every other day, then they are no longer going to produce anything of value.”
- Government prosecutions and Appeals Court rulings against groups like the Mexican Mafia and Nuestra Familia indicate many incarcerated gang members make tens of, or hundreds of thousands of dollars every year while imprisoned, earned from selling drugs, collecting 'taxes' or tribute from inmates who sell drugs, and taxing drug dealers operating on the street.
“many of these inmates make tens of, or hundreds of thousands of dollars every year, while being incarcerated.”
- Prison gangs are good only in a limited sense—given large populations and current formal governance, they increase access to contraband and provide stability and order beneficial to many inmates—but their costs are long: they undermine staff goals, their lifetime affiliations undermine rehabilitation and increase recidivism, and their polycentric governance has little accountability, equality, or rule of law and is driven by violence or its threat.
“They are good in the sense that, given large prison populations and given current levels of formal governance, then prison gangs increase access to contraband. And they increase stability and order amongst inmates.”
- The community of prison gangs operates along polycentric lines with competing sources of authority, and like early or primitive states that arise not from social contracts but from a desire to extract resources, the gangs' profit-seeking through taxation creates incentives to formalize and legitimize their organization and to provide order and stability—an invisible-hand explanation echoing Mancur Olson's stationary bandit.
“in a sort of Mancur Olson, stationary bandit style of argument, the desire to profit, through taxation, may lead in early states--or prison gangs--to provide that order and stability.”
Understanding informal governance systems like prison gangs is essential because informal economies represent massive unregulated activity.
- American prisons are far less dangerous than they were 30-40 years ago: the rate of homicides fell 94% between 1973 and 2003, and by 2003 the prison homicide rate was actually lower than in the general population, yet a constant potential for violence remains.
“the rate of homicides fell 94% between 1973 and 2003, for instance. And when it fell in 2003, that rate of homicide is actually lower than in the general population.”
- The prison underground economy is less flourishing than street markets, so drug prices in California prisons are typically 4-5 times higher than on the street, yet enough inmates want these goods that supplying them creates substantial profit opportunities for entrepreneurial inmates.
“the price of drugs in prison is typically 4-5 times higher than out on the streets. But a large number of inmates want those things, and if you can supply them... it appears to create some substantial profit opportunities for entrepreneurial inmates.”
- Before gangs, order in prisons was maintained by the 'convict code'—an emergent, unwritten norm of good behavior (don't steal, don't lie, don't inform, pay your debts) enforced in a decentralized fashion through reputation: those who followed it gained respect and access to others' protective resources, while violators were punished through ostracism, gossip, or violence at the discretion of individual inmates.
“this code is called the 'convict code' or the 'prisoner code' basically told you how to live your life when you are in prison... Don't steal from people; don't lie to people; don't inform on people. If you incur debts, pay those debts back.”
- The fact that the least trustworthy, least cooperative individuals can nonetheless sustain a fairly high level of economic activity through gang governance provides an important lesson that the type of people in a community does not necessarily dictate in a determinate way whether they will be able to flourish economically.
“it provides an important lesson that the type of people in a community doesn't necessarily dictate in a determinate way whether or not they are going to be able to flourish economically.”
- The drug war contributes only about 20% to the nation's prison population, so even in the best-case (and unrealistic) scenario where legalizing drugs released everyone imprisoned for drug offenses, prison populations would remain massively large—large enough that inmates would still need or want to form gangs—meaning gangs are not solely a drug issue.
“The drug war contributes about 20% to the nation's prison population. Twenty percent is a lot, but we still incarcerate far more people than everyone else. So, it's not just a drug issue.”
- Hardcore prison gang members cannot leave the gang even after release because they anticipate a high likelihood of returning to prison; gangs leverage this expectation by demanding released members continue working and sending money, threatening that if they don't comply they will be denied protection and seriously hurt when they return—a threat made credible by prior brutal violence.
“because people anticipate incarceration in the future, prison gangs can wield that knowledge and say, 'You're going to work for us. You're going to send us money. And if you don't, when you come back, we're going to hurt you.'”
- There are diminishing returns to crime reduction from incarceration: the first people imprisoned commit the most crimes most often, but as you lock up more people the offense frequency of each marginal entrant falls, so beyond the point of diminishing returns society would buy more crime control by spending the marginal dollar on police rather than prisons, and by making fewer things crimes.
“as you lock up more people, the frequency of committing criminal offences by the people entering falls and falls... spend more in areas where the returns are still substantial”
- Because California inmates aren't allowed to hold money, stamps serve as the medium of exchange because they are a uniform, durable, transportable, standardized commodity, while larger purchases are settled by having relatives outside transfer currency to relatives of the other inmate.
“In California today, stamps are the medium of exchange. Right? They are a uniform, durable, transportable, standardized commodity.”
- Half of the world's workers are in the informal economy—not regulated, registered, or taxed—doing trillions of dollars of business, so to understand a country's economic activity we cannot ignore them, and studying only formal mechanisms gives not merely an imperfect but a biased picture of society, meaning social scientists must work to make these informal institutions less hidden.
“Half of the world's workers are in the informal economy. They are not regulated, registered, or taxed. Half of the world's workers, who do trillions of dollars of business.”
Governance frameworks explain gang emergence better than importation, deprivation, or cultural theories rooted in values.
- Unlike importation theory (prison life reflects imported outside values) and deprivation/pains-of-imprisonment theory, and unlike appeals to hyper-masculinity or a preference for racism, Skarbek's governance framework can explain both where gangs exist and where they don't, because cultural or value-based explanations cannot account for why California men didn't form gangs for the system's first hundred years.
“that framework doesn't allow us to explain men in California prisons didn't form gangs to dominate. So, what I'm trying to do is kind of be able to explain both where the gangs exist and where they don't.”
- There is a crucial interaction between formal and informal governance: the rules people respond to are not just those given by governments, so if authorities impose formal rules on a community that are inconsistent with its underlying informal rules about trust, values, and acceptable behavior, the intended consequences will not be realized and policy may lead to disaster rather than the desired outcome.
“if they put rules on an underlying community that are inconsistent with the underlying rules, then the consequences that they seek aren't going to be the ones that are realized.”
Gangs use skin color and tattoos as low-cost, credible signals to assign accountability among strangers in large populations.
- Racial segregation persists in prison partly because skin color is a low-cost, observable, and durable signal of which group a stranger belongs to and cannot be easily faked or switched, while tattoos work as credible signals because their permanence and prominence make claims of affiliation and past deeds hard to falsify—both serve as efficient ways to assign accountability among strangers.
“the easiest way to have some sense about which group a stranger associates with is the color of his skin... it's not easy to change the color of your skin. It's something that's very permanent.”
- Disrespect must be answered—even verbal disrespect or spitting—not merely as a matter of pride but because when others publicly witness an insult that goes unanswered, they perceive the target as someone who can be victimized and taken advantage of, so responding to small slights deters future predators from selecting you.
“if you are disrespected in a public way, other people see that and they think you are someone who can be victimized and taken advantage of... it's important that any little disrespect is responded to”
Female prisons with small stable populations lack gang hallmarks, supporting that governance type depends on demographic structure.
- Female prisons in California lack the hallmarks of male prison gangs—no large organized lifetime-commitment groups, no racial segregation, no paperwork, less violence, less flourishing illicit markets—forming instead fleeting 'families' of a few women; one plausible explanation is that female prisons today have small, stable populations that resemble male prison demographics before gangs formed, so casual reputation-based governance is as effective as needed.
“female prisons today are very small. And they are much more stable populations... it looks a lot like what male prisons looked like when they had small prison populations.”