commitment problem
A situation in bargaining where parties cannot credibly promise to honor a deal in the future, which can make war or conflict more likely even when both prefer peace.
As defined in Chris Blattman
Other definitions
The difficulty that arises when parties cannot credibly bind themselves to a long-term arrangement, so each may leave for a better option and underinvest in the relationship.
Robert Frank on Economics Education and the Economic Naturalist 10/15/2007
Where it comes up · 4
- Chris Blattman3 claims
- Chris Blattman on Why We Fight3 claims
- Michael Kremer1 claim
- Paul Romer on Charter Cities 04/26/20101 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “commitment problem” →
- Vaccine markets contain a commitment problem and a global public-good problem: governments may not pay the full social value of a vaccine, under-incentivizing firms, and for diseases like malaria spread across many small African countries, no single country has an incentive to pay a price generating socially appropriate development incentives.Michael Kremer
- Despite cynicism and scandals like cholera in Haiti and harm to local sex-work trades, UN peacekeeping is overwhelmingly effective in the data because the everyday job of a peacekeeper is precisely to solve the drivers of conflict—creating commitment, reducing uncertainty, and tempering emotions—as illustrated by a Liberian town where a Pakistani battalion ended Christian-Muslim riots within hours.Chris Blattman
- The Peloponnesian War illustrates the bargaining commitment problem: massive power shifts can lead to war because it becomes difficult for the temporarily powerful party to credibly be paid off not to exercise its advantage through a first strike to eliminate the rising rival.Chris Blattman
- While individual fight-or-flight reactions are distinct, violence at the level of small groups, large groups, and nations can be unified by a single framework: a game-theoretic view of bargaining where conflict arises from uncertainty and commitment problems, melded with psychological factors like emotions, self-versus-social interest, and systematic mistakes—and this framework explains an astonishing and growing range of phenomena.Chris Blattman
- The commitment problem—best understood through preventive war—occurs when an opponent will be much stronger in the future and you could head that off now by attacking; even though the rising power could promise a good deal later or give up something now, when they cannot credibly commit to honor that promise (because there's no enforcement architecture), the bargain breaks down and war becomes attractive, as seen in WWI (Russia's rise vis-a-vis Germany), the Iraq invasion (Saddam's potential WMD), and Russia's fear of a Western-armed Ukraine.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- All explanations for why rivals fail to find a peaceful bargain fall into five buckets: (1) uncertainty/imperfect information combined with incentives to bluff, (2) commitment problems such as preventive war when one side will be much stronger later, (3) unchecked leaders who don't internalize war's costs or have private incentives to fight, (4) intangible or 'stable' preferences like status, vengeance, or ideology that aren't in the material pie, and (5) misperceptions—persistently wrong beliefs about the other side.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight
- A guarantor nation (or consortium) granted administrative rights over the land by treaty can solve the long-term commitment problem that deters infrastructure investors, because investors won't rely on a single host president's guarantee given the risk of political unrest — as Romer discussed with Madagascar's then-president before a coup ended the plan.Paul Romer on Charter Cities 04/26/2010
- When uncertainty and the commitment problem are layered on top of one another, they create impersonal situational forces that drastically narrow the space for a peaceful agreement; leaders' mistakes and foibles—which observers tend to overestimate—then become crucial only because the room to find a deal was already so small.Chris Blattman on Why We Fight