
Paul Romer on Charter Cities 04/26/2010
What this covers
Paul Romer and Russ Roberts examine why poor countries remain poor despite having access to proven technology, and propose charter cities as a practical solution. Romer argues that the binding constraint is not lack of knowledge or people's ability, but rather the rules—formal laws and informal norms—that govern economic life. The conversation traces how wage gaps between Haiti and the United States, electricity costs, and productivity differences all reflect institutional environment rather than human capital. Romer's core claim is that the most efficient way to improve outcomes for the world's poorest is to build new cities with credible, better rules under a guarantor nation, allowing people to opt in rather than attempting to reform entrenched systems in place.
The discussion moves through several reinforcing layers. Romer explains how ideas and concepts differ from physical objects in their ability to be shared, making urbanization inherently valuable, yet this value is squandered in dysfunctional cities with poor sanitation, corruption, and broken contracts. He distinguishes between formal rules enforced by courts and informal norms enforced through social pressure—showing how the same situation (jaywalking, congestion pricing) can yield entirely different equilibria depending on what people regard as normal or right. The conversation addresses why shifting from one equilibrium to another is so difficult, even when the new rules would make everyone better off. Romer cites around 700 million people willing to migrate permanently, yet emphasizes that meaningful development requires scale—roughly a hundred new cities of ten million each. The conversation acknowledges practical puzzles: how to secure guarantor nations, how to fund infrastructure, and whether the concept can overcome political opposition and skepticism from those who doubt such cities would function as promised.
Romer argues that the binding constraint on development is bad rules (institutions), and that the most efficient way to improve them is to build new 'charter cities' with credible, better rules under a guarantor nation, giving poor people the choice to opt in rather than trying to reform entrenched rule systems in place.
- Massive wage and price gaps between Haiti and the US reflect differences in rules, not in people, so moving people to better rules multiplies their productivity.
- Existing political processes struggle to move from inefficient to efficient equilibria because of vested interests and norms about right and wrong.
- Cities are relatively self-contained modules with limited interfaces, making them the right unit for installing a coherent new set of rules.
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The theory of technological ideas predicts poor countries should catch up quickly by copying existing technology rather than reinventing it, but the glaring counterexamples where they fail to catch up persuaded Romer that development requires understanding institutions, politics, and why people stick with rules that make everyone worse off.
“technological idea should say that poor countries should be able to catch up really fast because they don't have to reinvent the wheel they just copy it but yet... the glaring counter example is the ones where they don't they don't catch up”
Ideas (technological concepts) are economically distinct from physical objects because they can be shared, which makes it valuable both to trade with many people and to live next to many people — so urbanization and globalization are both manifestations of the power of sharing ideas, explaining why being around other people is a good thing.
“when you can share concepts things like it's very valuable to trade with a lot of people but it's also very valuable to live right next door to a lot of people so urbanization and globalization are both signs of the power of sharing ideas”
America's cultural norm of keeping contracts — sustained by reputation and conscience rather than only by law — is an unquantified, textbook-invisible competitive advantage, illustrated by a post-Soviet Russian hotelier who broke a reservation contract saying 'sue me, I got a better offer.'
“the main reason it doesn't happen very often I think... is it's somebody who does that feels pretty lousy about themselves and our culture punishes people both through reputational issues and through conscience”
Sharing concepts and ideas—unlike physical objects—makes it valuable both to trade with many people and to live next door to many people, which is why urbanization and globalization are both signs of the power of sharing ideas and why being around other people is a good thing.
“it's very valuable to trade with a lot of people but it's also very valuable to live right next door to a lot of people so urbanization and globalization are both signs of the power of sharing ideas”
Rules come in two kinds — formal rules enforced by courts and police, and informal norms enforced by individuals punishing violators — and the same situation can settle into different equilibria (e.g. jaywalking is normal in New York but socially punished in Zurich) depending purely on norms.
“there are some rules which are formal rules enforced by courts and police officers and there are other rules that are part of people's norms they are normative in the sense that it seems like the right thing to do”
Rules come in two forms—formal rules enforced by courts and police, and informal norms enforced by individuals punishing violators—and shared norms about what is 'right' and 'normal' shape what views people express in the political sphere about changing formal rules.
“there are some rules which are formal rules enforced by courts and police officers and there are other rules that are part of people's norms”
Cultural norms of conscience and reputation in the US make people feel lousy about breaking contracts, providing an unquantified, non-textbook advantage over places (like post-Soviet Russia) where an entrepreneur would break a contract for a better offer and say 'sue me.'
“somebody who does that feels pretty lousy about themselves and our culture punishes people both through reputational issues and through conscience”
Stockholm implemented congestion pricing with extra buses for seven months, then turned it off and held a referendum on whether to bring it back — a 'try before you buy' approach that let the system pass democratically.
“they actually implemented the congestion pricing system and the extra bus signs and everything... for seven months... and then they agreed they were going to turn it off... and then they held a referendum about whether or not to go back to the congestion pricing”
Stockholm successfully adopted congestion pricing by implementing the full system (including extra buses) for seven months, then turning it off and holding a referendum—a 'try before you buy' democratic mechanism that let voters experience the change before approving it, and it passed.
“they actually implemented the congestion pricing system and the extra bus signs and everything about what the new system would be like for seven months... then they held a referendum about whether or not to go back to the congestion pricing”
Jaywalking in New York is an accepted efficient norm while in Zurich crossing against the light is scolded as wrong—two stable equilibria enforced primarily by norms of right and wrong—illustrating that the key question is what can shift a society from one norm-based equilibrium to another.
“the norm is that it's okay to jaywalk she can get across the street without getting hit by a car that's an efficient thing to do that's right in Zurich the norm is that it's wrong to jaywalk and people will scold you”
The single most effective thing the world could do for the developing world is to give more poor people the chance to move permanently with their families to systems of rules they choose as better, which would also facilitate the highly efficient and life-enriching transition from rural to urban settlement.
“in the developing world I just unambiguously the single most effective thing we could do is give more poor people the chance to move permanently with their families to other systems of rules that they choose as being better than the ones that they currently live with”
The bottleneck in economic development is inefficient systems of rules (institutions) that hold people far from the efficiency frontier; shifting to demonstrably better rules could make people in poor countries and the rest of the world better off.
“the bottleneck here is systems of rules that hold people back rules that could be different we have demonstrated cases of better rules and with these inefficient rules people are very far away from the efficiency frontier that if we shifted the better rules everybody could be better off”
It is very hard to move people from an existing equilibrium to a clearly more efficient one—as seen in congestion pricing and overfishing—because the puzzle is not just about opposing interests but about norms of right and wrong that economists have not adequately studied.
“the evidence suggests that it's very hard to persuade people in the United States to move from an existing equilibrium to something that could clearly be be more efficient”
The single most effective development intervention is to give more poor people the chance to move permanently with their families to systems of rules they choose as better, and facilitating the rural-to-urban transition (which is far more productive) could massively improve the quality of life for billions.
“in the developing world I just unambiguously the single most effective thing we could do is give more poor people the chance to move permanently with their families to other systems of rules that they choose as being better”
Technological ideas predict poor countries should catch up rapidly because they can copy existing technology rather than reinvent it, but the glaring counterexamples where they don't catch up forced a shift toward understanding institutions, politics, and what happens inside people's heads when they stick with rules that make everyone worse off.
“technological idea should say that poor countries should be able to catch up really fast because they don't have to reinvent the wheel they just copy it but yet... the glaring counter example is the ones where they don't catch up”
Around 700 million people say they are ready to move permanently to another country, with many more who would move if it seemed realistic; since the world's worst-governed places predictably generate the most would-be emigrants, any real solution to bad rules must scale to hundreds of millions — e.g. roughly a hundred cities of ten million.
“700 million people say they are ready to move permanently to another country and and a lot of the people who say they aren't ready to move probably would agree to move if if they thought it was a realistic prospect”
Cities are so valuable that people will live in awful sanitary conditions (e.g. squatter residents in Phnom Penh) just to be close to the economic action.
“squatter residents in Phnom Penh really wonderful article describing how cities are just so valuable that people will live in awful conditions yeah in terms of Sanitation to be able to be close close to the action”
Government's role in cities is twofold: get out of the way by removing barriers that stop people from coming together, and create a structure that enforces some mixture of formal and informal rules (sanitation, traffic, pollution) that make life livable — the balance of formal versus informal depending on the population attracted.
“the things that you need to government do is one get out of the way remove the things that are stopping people from coming together but then to create a structure that will somehow enforce some rules that makes the quality of life good for all of the people that live there”
Moving a Haitian worker from Haiti to the United States raises her wages by a factor of five or ten almost immediately, and electricity costs Haitians two to three times what it costs Americans — evidence that the difference in productivity comes from the environment of rules, not the workers themselves.
“if you take a Haitian worker yeah and move her from Haitian Haiti to the United States her wages go up by a factor of you know five or ten almost almost immediately”
Special economic zones are often a good way for a nation to reform rules because changing rules for the whole country provokes opposition from those who don't want rules forced on them, whereas a new zone with new rules gives people the choice to opt in.
“it's often a good way for a nation to reform its rules because if you try and change them for the whole country you get opposition because some people don't want to have the rules forced on them but if you create a new place where the new rules are established then people have the choice about opting in”
China's massive rural-to-urban migration was unleashed by removing two barriers: restrictions on people moving as permanent residents, and local restrictions on the infrastructure needed to make cities livable — though making a city work also requires some rules (sanitation, traffic, pollution).
“there were two things that held back urbanization in China one were restrictions on movement by people especially movement as permanent residents the other were local restrictions on things like infrastructure that you need to make a livable city”
Moving a Haitian worker from Haiti to the United States raises her wages by a factor of five or ten almost immediately, demonstrating that the environment of rules—cheap power, road access, trade partners, export opportunities, security—rather than the worker, drives productivity differences.
“if you take a Haitian worker yeah and move her from Haiti to the United States her wages go up by a factor of you know five or ten almost almost immediately”
Two things held back urbanization in China—restrictions on permanent movement of people, and local restrictions on the infrastructure needed to make cities livable—and removing these over recent decades caused hundreds of millions to flood into cities where they find jobs and opportunity.
“there were two things that held back urbanization in China one were restrictions on movement by people especially movement as permanent residents the other were local restrictions on things like infrastructure”
Building entirely new cities in the United States creates little net social value because cities are not scarce there — gains to the new city's land are largely offset by falling land values in the places people leave — whereas in the developing world the gains are enormous and can finance the needed infrastructure.
“building a brand new city probably doesn't create that much additional value... the total gains to society from creating entirely new cities the United States are you know probably not that large whereas in the developing world the gains are just enormous”
Charter schools have been a mixed bag and have not dramatically transformed student test scores partly because of a coherence problem: an education system has many interdependent parts (curriculum, schools, assessments, teacher training, higher schools) that must work together, and changing only the school building is too small a bite to fix the system.
“all of these different parts need to be coherent... what we're trying to do here in the United States just pull out one piece the actual school building and change it but not necessarily align it with all of these other pieces and so you're taking a bite which is too small”
Building entirely new cities in the United States produces little net social value because cities are not scarce and an open equilibrium of movement exists, so gains to a new city are largely offset by reductions in land value elsewhere—whereas in the developing world the gains are enormous and can finance the needed infrastructure.
“building a brand new city probably doesn't create that much additional value a whole bunch of people move to this new city the land there would get more valuable but a lot of it would come as a reduction in value and land in other places that people leave from”
Setting up a charter city's foundational rules (e.g., guaranteed freedom of religion, protection of contracts, prevention of kidnapping) does not require central planning of city details like street layout or minimum shop square footage—these are second-order matters separable from the obvious sensible rules.
“we could put those into the rules in a place without deciding whether the minimum square footage for a small shop on entry level of the building has to be least 500 square feet”
The deep puzzle is why people resist moving from inefficient to clearly more efficient rules — evidenced by failures to adopt congestion pricing or fishery quotas — and economists have under-studied how people's notions of right and wrong, not just material interests, block such transitions.
“we haven't thought hard enough about what motivates voters when they vote in an election express preferences about changing rules”
Haiti is held back by specific bad rules — e.g. it was illegal for a private firm to sell power, and even absent that law the risk of expropriation or monopoly hold-up would deter investment — so what is missing is a rule framework enabling win-win deals between Haitians and foreign investors.
“it was against the law in Haiti for a private firm to produce power for sale to others”
Roughly 700 million people say they are ready to move permanently to another country, and many who say they aren't would move if it seemed realistic, so a development solution must scale to billions rather than absorbing a few hundred thousand more migrants.
“700 million people say they are ready to move permanently to another country and a lot of the people who say they aren't ready to move probably would agree to move if they thought it was a realistic prospect”
Giving legislators up-or-down votes that strip out pork-barrel and log-rolling discretion produces better outcomes — examples being the base-closing commission (Congress votes the package up or down) and the Federal Reserve (Congress confirms governors but doesn't vote on day-to-day interest rates).
“the base reallocation and closing Commission... which brings proposals to Congress the Congress just vote some up or down it much better for deciding which bases to close”
Setting a charter that establishes broad rules (e.g. guaranteed freedom of religion, protection of contracts) does not require central planning of city details like street layout or minimum shop square footage — conflating the two is a confusion, as William Penn's Pennsylvania charter shows.
“William Penn set a charter for Pennsylvania and said this is going to be a place where you can have guaranteed freedom of religion... but in setting rules like that it didn't mean that Penn had to be a you know a central planner of the layout of the streets in Philadelphia”
Changing US rules is slow and contentious because the country has built-in 'meta-rules' (rules about changing rules) that create inertia — and while frustrating to all political sides, this difficulty is one of America's great strengths, with large changes effectively requiring more than bare majority rule out of respect for the minority.
“we have a lot of inertia in our system... there a lot of built-in rules about changing the rules that make it hard to change the rules”
Hong Kong was effectively the first charter city — proof the model can work — but was done incorrectly because the deal was forced on China by Britain rather than agreed voluntarily, even though Chinese now say it turned out so well they would do it again.
“Hong Kong was was in a sense number one but it was done incorrectly in the sense that the deal between China and Britain was one that was forced on China China did not voluntarily agree”
Hong Kong was effectively the first charter city, though done incorrectly because the deal between China and Britain was forced on China rather than voluntary; the Chinese today might say it turned out so well they'd do it again.
“Hong Kong was in a sense number one but it was done incorrectly in the sense that the deal between China and Britain was one that was forced on China”
The US system's built-in difficulty of changing rules—respect for the minority alongside majority-rule mythology—is one of its great strengths even though it frustrates both sides of the political spectrum, and majority-rule mechanisms suited to a smaller, more homogeneous society like Sweden may not transfer to the US.
“we have a lot of Mythology around majority rule but we also have a lot of respect for the minority so large changes are tend I think not to be effectively majority rule decisions in the United States”
The bottleneck in economic development is systems of rules that hold people back; with better rules everyone—people in poor countries and the rest of the world—could be better off, so understanding the dynamics of rules and how people move from inefficient to efficient rules is an urgent priority.
“there's a very broad recognition amongst people who thinking about development that the bottleneck here is systems of rules that hold people back”
Special economic zones are often a good way for a nation to reform its rules because changing rules for the whole country provokes opposition from those who don't want rules forced on them, whereas a new place lets people choose to opt in.
“if you try and change them for the whole country you get opposition because some people don't want to have the rules forced on them but if you create a new place where the new rules are established then people have the choice about opting in”
Cities are the right unit for installing different rules coherently because they are relatively self-contained modules with limited interfaces (airport, shipping, fiber-optic cable); holding those constant, you can do almost anything within a city—unlike charter schools, which are one piece of a large complementary system and so fail when fixed alone.
“the great thing about cities is they really are components modules that are relatively self-contained they have some interfaces that they use to connect with the rest of the world”
The kidnapping of children for ransom is common in Haiti and largely prevented in the United States, demonstrating the huge gap in rule quality including basic security.
“just think about the probability that a child is going to get kidnapped and held for ransom in Haiti they couldn't prevent that kind of kidnapping from from taking place in the United States for the most part we we do that quite well”
Haiti is held back by specific bad rules—such as a ban on private firms selling power and a credible risk of expropriation or monopolistic holdup—which block win-win deals that would give Haitians cheaper electricity and let foreign investors earn returns.
“it was against the law in Haiti for a private firm to produce power for sale to others”
Cities are the right unit for installing different rules coherently because, unlike special economic zones (which depend on a nearby city's roads or power) or charter schools (a part of a larger complementary system), cities are relatively self-contained modules that connect to the world through limited interfaces like an airport, seaport, and fiber-optic cable.
“the great thing about cities is they really are components modules that are relatively self-contained they have some interfaces that they use to connect with the less the rest of the world so it's an airport and ship the fiber-optic cable”
Three conceptual roles—host (provides land), source (provides people), and guarantor (enforces and protects rules)—can be mixed and matched among nations to build a charter city, as illustrated by India running an internal contest among states or Brazil hosting and guaranteeing a zone for Haitian migrants.
“there are three conceptual rules that nations can play here one is the role of a host... another is the role of a source... The third is the role of a guarantor”
Giving legislators up-or-down votes on bundled proposals—rather than item-by-item ability to pork-barrel and log-roll—improves rule-setting, as shown by the base realignment and closure commission, the Federal Reserve structure, and the move toward strong accountable mayors.
“the base reallocation and closing Commission... which brings proposals to Congress the Congress just vote some up or down it much better for deciding which bases to close”
Poor immigrants to the US typically see their incomes jump many-fold, are highly productive, and make others' lives better, so the main obstacle to admitting them is political plus the handicap of the welfare system rather than any economic downside.
“if we let poor people come the United States as you say their incomes usually jump many fold they're very productive they make our lives better and as long as they didn't live off our welfare system which is a big handicap”
A charter city is unoccupied land with a charter specifying a system of rules that people, investors, and employers can voluntarily opt into, requiring governments to establish a legal governance structure that credibly enforces those rules into the future.
“we could identify unoccupied pieces of land somewhere on earth that are good locations for building a city of 5 10 maybe 20 million people we could establish a system of rules that would apply in this new city and then people would have the choice about whether to opt in to live under those those rules”
New cities are analogous to startup firms: we don't worry about who writes the internal rules and culture of new firms because we let them start, compete, and self-select members — so cities with varied rules should be allowed to enter and compete, with the real test being whether millions choose to move there and thrive.
“new cities as startups are really a lot like new firms when new firms are created they have internal rules including informal rules that are the corporate culture of the organization”
Charter cities involve three mix-and-match roles for nations — a host (provides land), a source (provides people), and a guarantor (credibly enforces contracts/rules) — and these can be combined in various configurations (e.g. India as all three; Brazil as host+guarantor with Haiti as source).
“there are three conceptual rules that nations can play here one is the role of a host... another is the role of a source... The third is the role of a guarantor and these roles can be mixed and matched a bunch of different ways”
A guarantor nation (or consortium) granted administrative rights over the land by treaty can solve the long-term commitment problem that deters infrastructure investors, because investors won't rely on a single host president's guarantee given the risk of political unrest — as Romer discussed with Madagascar's then-president before a coup ended the plan.
“he could solve this problem of commitment long term commitment to investors in infrastructure because he knew that there was a risk of political unrest in the future and that investors wouldn't come in if the only guarantee of their investments was by the president of Madagascar”
After about ten years in a field, a researcher starts to become a bottleneck and roadblock to innovation rather than an innovator, which is why Romer deliberately reset his career out of his original line of work.
“once you've been in a field for about ten years I think you start to become a bottleneck and a roadblock instead of an innovator so I did a reset”
A charter city would be built on unoccupied land with a charter specifying a system of rules, and residents, investors, and employers would have the choice to opt in—requiring governments to credibly enforce those rules into the future.
“we could identify unoccupied pieces of land somewhere on earth that are good locations for building a city of 5 10 maybe 20 million people we could establish a system of rules that would apply in this new city and then people would have the choice about whether to opt in”
New cities are like startups and should be allowed to enter and compete the same way new firms with their own internal rules and corporate cultures do; the real test is whether millions of people choose to move there and thrive, so no central authority needs to author all the rules.
“new cities as startups are really a lot like new firms when new firms are created they have internal rules including informal rules that are the corporate culture”
A guarantor nation can solve the long-term commitment problem for infrastructure investors who would not invest if their only guarantee came from a host country (like Madagascar) at risk of political unrest—as demonstrated when a coup ended the Madagascar charter city plan.
“he could solve this problem of commitment long term commitment to investors in infrastructure because he knew that there was a risk of political unrest in the future and that investors wouldn't come in if the only guarantee of their investments was by the president of Madagascar”
Most of the benefits from congestion pricing would be captured by rent-seekers who get the expanded funds, making genuine compensation of losers extremely difficult.
“I suspect that most of the benefits from congestion pricing would be captured by red seekers who would get the expansion of funds”
After about ten years in a field a researcher tends to become a bottleneck and roadblock rather than an innovator, which is why Romer deliberately 'reset' his career from idea economics to entrepreneurship and then to charter cities.
“once you've been in a field for about ten years I think you start to become a bottleneck and a roadblock instead of an innovator so I did a reset”
The US has many bad rules too — political forces keep sugar prices high, artificially make low-skilled labor expensive, and give government a monopoly over schools — but the difference is that the US can move in the right direction whereas Haiti seemingly cannot get there from its current position.
“there's political forces that keep the price of sugar high that keep the artificially make low-skilled labor expensive that give the government a monopoly over schools and much of the country”
Cities are so valuable that people will live in awful sanitation conditions—as squatters in Phnom Penh do—just to be close to the action.
“a blog post recently about squatter residents in Phnom Penh really wonderful article describing how cities are just so valuable that people will live in awful conditions”
Romer's nonprofit Charter Cities would act only as a think-tank advising nations, not as the designer or operator of any city, because nations must be the key actors who decide what goes into a charter.
“if this succeeds Charter cities could be a think-tank that supports nations but the nations have to be the key actors here you know I'm not gonna design a charter I'm not gonna run a city”
Romer estimated that within a year or two there would be a place running a charter-city-like experiment with a chance to try something quite different.
“in terms of probabilities I you know I I still think within a year - we're gonna have a place like that and we're gonna have a chance at trying something really quite different”
Romer predicts that within a year or two there will be a place running a charter city, giving a chance to try something quite different.
“I still think within a year - we're gonna have a place like that and we're gonna have a chance at trying something really quite different”
Welcome and introduction of the guest and program.
“my guest is Paul Romer of Stanford University Paul welcome back to econ talk”
Charter cities is a discussion about a clever provocative academic idea.
“this isn't just some clever provocative academic idea that you're writing a paper on”