TARP
Troubled Asset Relief Program—the 2008 U.S. government program of roughly $700 billion to purchase distressed assets and stabilize the financial system.
As defined in et_403
Where it comes up · 20
- Neil Barofsky on Bailouts9 claims
- Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty6 claims
- Ed Leamer on Macroeconomic Patterns and Stories 05/04/20092 claims
- Richard Fisher on Too Big to Fail and the Fed2 claims
- Richard Epstein on the Rule of Law 06/1/20092 claims
- Eric Rauchway on the Great Depression and the New Deal 12/01/20081 claim
- John Taylor on the State of the Economy 07/19/20101 claim
- CBO Director Warns Debt Will Surpass WWII Levels, Interest Rates To Spike | Phillip Swagel1 claim
and 12 more
Most important claims · 10 of 36Search all claims for “TARP” →
- Banks are profit-seeking firms, not social agencies, so government cannot expect them to lend recapitalization funds if they lack good investments or if creditworthy borrowers are scarce; both in the 1930s (RFC/Jesse Jones) and today (Paulson/TARP) the constraint was a shortage of qualified borrowers, not bank timidity.Eric Rauchway on the Great Depression and the New Deal 12/01/2008
- We never ran the counterfactual of what would have happened without the 2008 bailouts and interventions, so whether those policies were justified remains a genuinely open question; by analogy, it took a very long time to reach firm understanding of the Great Depression's causes and recovery.Lars Peter Hansen on Risk, Ambiguity, and Measurement
- HAMP failed homeowners—reaching only about 20% of its 4-million goal—because it was riddled with conflicts of interest that incentivized bank servicers to string homeowners along, rack up fees, and push them into foreclosure rather than grant permanent modifications; this made sense because Geithner's actual goal, in his own words, was to 'foam the runway for the banks,' spreading out foreclosures so they wouldn't hit all at once and giving banks time to earn their way out, meaning HAMP succeeded for banks even as it failed homeowners.Neil Barofsky on Bailouts
- The anger of people in struggling communities is three-pronged: a social dimension (feeling mocked and diminished for liking NASCAR, vaping, eating at McDonald's, or going to church), an immigration/jobs dimension (factories visibly picked up and left as rusted hulks), and a fairness dimension over bailouts (the perception of two sets of rules, where Wall Street gets rescued when it fails but no one helps an ordinary worker when their factory moves).Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty
- Because no Special Inspector General was in place when hundreds of billions of TARP dollars were committed, the money went out with almost no strings attached, no mechanism tied to the stated policy goal of restoring lending, and very few protections against fraud, since no internal watchdog was voicing taxpayers' interests.Neil Barofsky on Bailouts
- The claim that TARP 'made money' is misleading accounting: the Treasury was offering Wall Street salvation with no other buyer available, and gave it away at far below the market rate with no strings attached, so any profit reflects a massively underpriced rescue rather than a genuinely good deal for taxpayers.Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty
- Although money is fungible, that tautology does not mean fund use cannot be meaningfully measured; by taking before-and-after snapshots of a bank's positions (lending levels, acquisitions, lines of credit paid down) and asking banks their intentions, one can establish the general use of funds, and in fact banks themselves tracked their TARP funds dollar-for-dollar.Neil Barofsky on Bailouts
- The dirty secret of the crisis is that the relatively small group of individuals—roughly 15,000 across firms like Citibank, Lehman, Bear Stearns, Bank of America, and Merrill—who made the decisions that lost tens of billions of dollars personally did the best financially, so almost no one who caused the crisis had selfish reason to regret their actions.Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty
- The TARP bailouts set an irreversible precedent: unlike rule-bound FDIC, they were unprecedented, discretionary rescues for an unregulated context, so that for at least a generation markets will now expect bailouts whenever a crisis hits, regardless of government promises not to repeat them.Bryan Caplan on Hayek, Richter, and Socialism 06/28/2010
- Treasury fought SIGTARP's basic transparency requirement that banks report how they used TARP funds partly because they did not want a public record of where the money went, since increasing lending was never really the intent, even as Bernanke and Paulson publicly called the banks healthy while privately confessing doubts about the survival of several of them.Neil Barofsky on Bailouts