Public Choice
The branch of economics that applies the assumption of self-interested behavior to political actors and government decision-making.
As defined in et_797
Other definitions
The application of economic reasoning (individualism, purposive behavior, exchange) to non-market phenomena, especially politics; analyzes political actors as self-interested decision-makers.
Michael Munger on EconTalk's 500th EpisodeThe economic analysis of political behavior and incentives, here invoked to describe the dysfunctional incentives of political life that fail to attract high-quality public servants.
Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 2--A Discussion of Part I 04/15/2009
Where it comes up · 46
- Russ Roberts on the Price of Everything 08/25/20085 claims
- Don Boudreaux on Buchanan4 claims
- Michael Munger on Constitutions4 claims
- Michael Munger on Industrial Policy3 claims
- Paul Collier on Democracy and Violence 07/06/20092 claims
- Christopher Coyne on Exporting Democracy after War 04/07/20082 claims
- Roger Noll on the Economics of Sports2 claims
- Anthony Gill on Religion2 claims
and 38 more
Most important claims · 10 of 70Search all claims for “Public Choice” →
- The international community is not a conscious agent or decider with responsibility or feedback incentives; the UN is not under anyone's control, so interventions done in its name face public choice problems that individual decision-makers do not.Paul Collier on Democracy and Violence 07/06/2009
- Foreign intervention in poor countries creates a bootleggers-and-Baptists problem: high-minded advocates' justifications can enable others with less attractive agendas, and because the 'international community' is not a conscious decider bearing responsibility, it faces weaker feedback incentives than individuals.Paul Collier on Democracy and Violence 07/06/2009
- Buchanan, a founder of Public Choice which sought to strip the romance from politics, late in life argued for sustaining the 'mythology' of the constitutional project for the public interest, because if people only see governance as a grab for one another's resources, they collapse into a rent-seeking race; we must believe rules can bind such grabbing, and intellectuals must perpetuate this mythology to keep the American experiment going.Peter Boettke on Public Administration, Liberty, and the Proper Role of Government
- It is a self-serving lie that economists are disinterested social engineers: ironically, where Chicago scholars treat every other actor—bureaucrat, judge, parent, trade unionist, politician—as driven by rational self-interest, the neoclassical economist is elevated to a quasi-judicial status able to evaluate socio-economic behavior in an entirely disinterested manner, when in fact economists are themselves self-interested and benefit from their ideas becoming prominent.Will Davies on the Economics, Economists, and the Limits of Neoliberalism
- Smith is huge because his most important insights—increasing returns and trade through division of labor being limited by the extent of the market, the power of competition, and the phenomenon of public choice—are so deeply embedded in modern economists that they underrate that Smith came up with them first.Tyler Cowen on the GOAT of Economics
- To understand an economic system you must look with 'two eyes'—incentives and information—and the central question is whether using both can generate a better outcome than markets, which already generate information through prices.Does Market Failure Justify Government Intervention? (with Michael Munger)
- Writing a trade primer had little effect on Congressman Dick Gephardt's protectionism, because politicians pursue their own self-interest, such as re-election and constituent pressures, regardless of what books they read.Russ Roberts on the Price of Everything 08/25/2008
- Public Choice is the application of economic reasoning to non-market phenomena, particularly politics, built on three elements: methodological individualism, the assumption that individuals act purposively, and the recognition that people cooperate through non-market institutions (what Buchanan called 'politics as exchange').Michael Munger on EconTalk's 500th Episode
- Political rulers, in both democracies and autocracies, are driven first by the imperative to survive in office (re-election or avoiding coups), second by the desire for revenue and control of resources, and only third by economic growth—which explains why rulers often forgo growth-producing policies when those conflict with survival or revenue.Anthony Gill on Religion
- The ideal institutional design is one that can survive 'choppy seas' with inferior leadership, but in reality you must staff offices with real people drawn at random, so no set of rules can save a system if it consistently gets people at the bottom; therefore you need sound institutions and a culture of achievement that elevate strong people, and you can survive occasional bad actors but not pervasive bad ones.Richard Epstein on Classical Liberalism, Libertarianism, and Lochner