
Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 2--A Discussion of Part I 04/15/2009
What this covers
This episode pairs Dan Klein from George Mason University with Russ Roberts for a close reading of Part I of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. The conversation moves through Smith's core claim that human happiness and moral judgment rest not on material prosperity but on how we are regarded by others and how we regard ourselves, mediated through sympathy—a mutual calibration of feeling between people rather than an individual possession. The speakers unpack what Smith means by propriety, the impartial spectator, and the asymmetry between gains and losses that anticipates modern behavioral economics, all while treating Smith as a practical psychologist rather than an abstract theorist.
The discussion ranges across several distinct territories. Klein and Roberts distinguish propriety (relating to motives) from merit (relating to consequences), then explore how this gap creates problems for institutional design. They examine why the rich and powerful command deference not through promised reward but through the sheer difficulty of resisting their sentiment. A striking thread concerns the two roads to respect—the pursuit of wisdom versus the pursuit of wealth and ostentation—and how Smith observes these diverge sharply in the upper stations of life, where flattery and falsehood replace merit as the path to favor. The speakers also address Smith's claim that those who reach public adoration often face ruin if they fall, having lost all sense of happiness among equals. Throughout, Klein emphasizes that Smith grounds morality in an original sense of rightness, with social utility arriving only as an afterthought refined through cultural evolution, whereas later economics stripped away this multifaceted picture of human motivation and sentiment.
Klein and Roberts argue that Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments grounds human well-being and morality not in material wealth but in mutually coordinated sentiment (sympathy) calibrated against an impartial spectator, with utility functioning only as a downstream 'afterthought' to a prior, evolving sense of propriety.
- Smith posits sympathy as mutually coordinated sentiment that exists 'between' people rather than atomistically
- Human happiness depends overwhelmingly on how we are viewed by others and view ourselves, not on consumption
- Propriety and moral notions are 'original' while social utility is an afterthought refined through cultural evolution
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Smith holds that prosperity and good fortune never lift us very far above our normal state of contentment, whereas very bad things can devastate us—an asymmetry that means losses loom larger than gains, anticipating loss aversion and the divergence between willingness to pay and willingness to accept in behavioral economics.
“prosperity good things actually never really lift us very high above our normal state of contentment or happiness whereas very bad things can really devastate us”
Mankind is disposed to go along with and be obsequious toward the passions of the rich and powerful not out of any expectation of favor or gain but simply from a desire to coordinate sentiment with them; it is extremely difficult to maintain one's judgment and balance in the presence of such people, and they know how to play it.
“the disposition of mankind is to go along with all the passions of the rich and powerful... not necessarily out of any expectation of a favor or gain but just they want to rub shoulders”
Smith distinguishes propriety/impropriety (relating to the motive or cause of an action) from merit/demerit (relating to the action's effects or consequences); because motives are hard and mixed to know, systems often have to focus on merit, which connects to local knowledge problems.
“the aspect having to do with motives and causes he speaks of in terms of propriety and impropriety... whereas merit and demerit include consequences”
Thomas Paine's dialectic—'one step above the sublime makes the ridiculous and one step above the ridiculous makes the sublime'—captures how a visionary's perception seems ridiculous until others are brought to share a higher sense of beauty, at which point it becomes sublime (illustrated by the riot at Stravinsky's Rite of Spring later accepted as a masterpiece).
“one step above the sublime makes the ridiculous and one step above the ridiculous makes the sublime”
Smith's notion of harmony is not perfect convergence or unison but mere 'concord'—a pleasant, workable correspondence of sentiments sufficient for society—so that remaining imperfections and disharmonies are naturally part of social life.
“though they will never be unisons they may they may be Conchords and this is all that is wanted or required”
Smith argues that those who reach the pinnacle of being adored and loved by the public—celebrities, politicians, athletes—suffer a curse: if they fall from grace their life is effectively ruined because, having despised ordinary life and lost their notions of propriety toward ordinary people, they can never find a substitute source of happiness in the world of equals.
“if you're in that's that group that is rich and powerful and you're getting all this love and affection and you fall from grace it's over for you your life is ruined you will never be happy again”
In the middling and inferior stations of life—where success depends on the esteem of intelligent, well-informed equals—honesty is almost perfectly the best policy and virtue is the natural road to advancement (commerce rewarding probity and punctuality), whereas in the superior stations and courts, success depends on the fanciful favor of ignorant, proud superiors, so flattery and falsehood prevail over merit.
“in the middling and inferior Stations of life virtue actually works honesty is the best policy”
Smith holds an Aristotelian/Maimonidean ethic of moderation in which moral behavior consists in finding the mean between extremes—neither the alcoholic nor the teetotaler, neither excessive nor absent resentment—because even good things taken to extremes lead to wrong outcomes.
“there's a very much you know in the Jewish tradition I associated with Maimonides an emphasis a moral behavior is is a question of moderation to go to extremes in either directions unhealthy”
People pursue rank and distinction not for the ease or material pleasure greater wealth brings but out of vanity—the desire to be the object of attention and approbation; thus people enter rock music, Hollywood, or politics primarily to be loved rather than to be rich.
“it's not the ease or the pleasure which interests us but but the vanity the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation”
Mere harmony of sentiment is morally ambiguous because people could synchronize on something evil; therefore there must be a higher-level check—via Hayekian cultural evolution producing useful norms or a divine guarantor—that the norms converged upon are actually good.
“of course there are lots of things you could synchronize like that that would be evil... so there's in the background some idea perhaps that either in a Hayekian evolutionary sense the norms that emerge are useful”
For Smith, utility is an 'afterthought': our original liking or admiration of well-modulated conduct stems from a direct sense of its rightness or propriety, not from a calculation of its usefulness, even though social utility plays a role in the evolution of our moral notions.
“he says that our first liking or admiration stems from this acuteness from this rightness okay from this proper Ness and this is a big theme throughout the book that while utility... plays an important role in the evolution of our notions our moral notions they're not what originally affects us”
Smith's rich, human picture of human behavior shows how off-track economics later became when it modeled humans as mathematical functions; the behavioral-economics 'correction' is essentially a return to the multifaceted view of humanity Smith already held in 1759.
“doesn't this show how off-track economics god it's like Smith was talking about human beings not as mathematical functions but as human beings he had it all”
Smith reframes the Christian (and Jewish) precept of loving your neighbor as yourself bidirectionally: it equally means we should love ourselves only as much as we love our neighbor—i.e., the sufferer should modulate his grief and demands on others rather than expecting them to enter fully into his troubles.
“as to love our neighbor as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbor”
Smith's view of sympathy is not atomistic but a mutual coordination of sentiment, almost as though the sentiment exists between two people—neither yours nor mine but ours—captured through musical metaphors of harmony, keeping time, and entering into one another's feelings.
“my sentiment in your sentiment kind of converge are in common in almost as though the sentiment exists between us neither yours nor mine but ours almost like the beat of a song for keeping time”
Smith argues a person's happiness depends overwhelmingly on how they are viewed by others and how they view themselves rather than on material consumption—contrasting with the textbook economic model where utility depends on consumption of goods.
“there's an enormous emphasis on a person's happiness not depending on X 1 and X 2 which is the textbook version of happiness that our utility depends on our consumption of goods but overwhelmingly here depending on how we are viewed by others”
We should not expect others to enter too deeply into our sentiments because the situation always affects the person principally concerned far more than anyone who could sympathize with them.
“we shouldn't expect people to enter too deeply into our sentiments at or our situation if where the person principally affected... it always affects you know the person concerned much more than anyone who you can hope to sympathize with you”
Smith describes two divergent roads to becoming respected: the pursuit of wisdom and virtue (humble modesty and equitable justice) versus the pursuit of wealth and greatness (proud, ambitious ostentation); the mob mostly admires the ostentatious, and the two paths diverge sharply for those in the upper stations.
“he speaks of two roads that's being respectable as well as being respected one is through wisdom in pursuit of wisdom and virtue and the other is towards wealth and greatness”
For Smith, sympathy depends heavily on imagination because one must imagine another person's situation, motives, and position to enter into their feelings, and sympathy can be partial—endorsing only some aspects of another's view rather than wholehearted agreement.
“you have to imagine what the situation is of the person you're sympathizing with you have to imagine what their motives are you have to put yourself in their position so imagination I think is very central”
Smith enjoyed a position of cultural royalty in his own day—statesmen and politicians solicited his assistance and he sat atop the Scottish moral philosophers who were themselves a peak of European culture—which constrained how he wrote and led him to hedge and cloak his views.
“he really enjoyed a position of sort of cultural royalty even in his day... statesmen and politicians did come very much to solicit his you know assistance”
The separation of political economy into a distinct discipline after Smith's time, in which economists became reserved 'scientists' unwilling to express a broad sensibility about the good life, was a great tragedy and sowed seeds for the decline of liberalism.
“I think that's actually a great tragedy I think that the Trump art of the trouble with liberalism and its eventual decline you really see a decline at the end of the 18th century”
We must modulate our sentiments to achieve harmony with others: people who are overly exuberant in joy or overly grief-stricken, beyond what the impartial spectator feels is merited, forfeit much of the sympathy of others in both directions.
“people who seem to be overly exuberant in joy or overly grief-stricken if we as the impartial spectator don't feel it merits that response it for they forfeit a lot of our sympathies in both directions”
Smith asserts that as long as one is in good health, out of debt, and has a clear conscience, almost nothing else matters to happiness, and that compared with the contempt of mankind all other external evils are easily supported.
“as long as you're in good health out of debt and have a clear conscience almost nothing else”
Smith was a sly, deliberately ambiguous writer who, partly to maintain a position of cultural authority, sometimes cloaked his meaning—especially on topics like God—rather than clarifying it.
“I do believe I'm a subscriber to the view that Smith was a very sly fellow a very sly writer... he didn't want particularly to clarify certain things and even perhaps wanted to cloak certain things”
Smith's analysis of the corrupt incentives of princely courts is consistent with the public-choice view that political incentives are dysfunctional—failing to attract high-quality people to serve their political 'customers' (citizens) and instead selecting for those weak or bad in virtue, echoing Hayek's 'why the worst get on top.'
“it definitely is consistent with the public choice view of the dysfunctionality of the political incentives... this is not a well-functioning set of incentives for to attract high quality people who will serve their so-called political customers the citizens”
Smith distinguishes virtue from mere propriety: propriety is meeting the norm of society (which in low-expectation societies can be a kind of mediocrity), whereas virtue is the aspirational, beautiful excellence deserving admiration and celebration rather than mere approval.
“there is in this respect a considerable difference between virtue and mere propriety between those qualities and actions which deserve to be admired and celebrated and those would simply deserve to be approved of”
Resentment and hatred are 'unsocial passions' that are uncomfortable to sympathize with because they involve conflict and divide our sympathy; Smith is no fan of whining or chronic grousing and favors composure, but he insists these passions must be expressed in dignified, moderated form because suppressing them entirely makes society complacent toward injustice.
“he talks about the unsocial passions hatred and resentment... these are always a little uncomfortable for us... we have divided sympathy”
Sentiment and passion are two aspects of emotion: passion is the more active sense that stirs one to act as a moral agent, while sentiment is the more passive aspect of emotion.
“passion being a more active sense of emotion a passion actually stirs you to do to act and to do something as a moral agent as a doer whereas a sentiment is a more passive”
Smith describes two roads to becoming respected: the pursuit of wisdom and virtue (humble modesty and equitable justice), and the pursuit of wealth and greatness (proud ambition and ostentatious avidity)—and the mob mostly admires the great and ostentatious; for people in the middling and inferior stations the two roads largely coincide because commerce rewards honesty (probity and punctuality via reputation), whereas in the courts of princes success depends on the fanciful favor of ignorant superiors so flattery and falsehood prevail over merit.
“he speaks of two roads that's being respectable as well as being respected one is through wisdom in pursuit of wisdom and virtue and the other is towards wealth and greatness”
Smith observes that mankind is disposed to go along with and be obsequious toward the passions of the rich and powerful—starstruck and eager merely to rub shoulders—not out of any expectation of favor or gain but simply to coordinate sentiment with the powerful, and it is extremely difficult for anyone to maintain judgment and balance in the presence of such people, which the powerful know and exploit.
“the disposition of mankind is to go along with all the passions of the rich and powerful and he talks about basically being starved people being starstruck”
Smith argues that what drives people toward rank and distinction is not the ease or material pleasure of greater wealth but vanity—the belief in being the object of attention and approbation; people enter rock music, Hollywood, or politics to be loved rather than to be rich, even if wealth follows.
“it's not the ease or the pleasure which interests us but but the vanity the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation”
Smith holds that we learn to modulate our sentiments toward others' capacity to sympathize: if you are overly grief-stricken or overly exuberant in public beyond what an impartial spectator feels the situation merits, you forfeit the sympathy of others in both directions—a deeply true insight despite our different modern notion of propriety.
“if you are overly se grief-stricken publicly grief-stricken or overly exuberant about your success you will reduce the sympathy received from others”
Smith draws a profound distinction between two sets of virtues: the amiable virtues (gentle, compassionate, indulgent humanity) which are called for when the self is disintegrating under trouble and which the observer extends to the sufferer, and the awful/respectable virtues (self-denial, self-government, command of the passions tied to dignity and honor) which are called for to reintegrate the self and which the sufferer must exercise to remain relatable—and these map onto the two sides of any interaction between people.
“there are the respectable the great self-denial self-government associate sit with dignity and honor”
Smith holds that prosperity and good fortune never lift us very far above our normal state of contentment, whereas very bad things can devastate us—so losses loom larger than gains; this anticipates modern behavioral economics (the Thaler/Kahneman finding that willingness to pay differs from willingness to accept) and parallels the modern happiness literature.
“prosperity good things actually never really lift us very high above our normal state of contentment or happiness whereas very bad things can really devastate us”
Smith argues that nature implanted in us the desire for attention and importance—which leads us to over-imagine that material goals will make us happier—and that this is actually good because it drives us to produce, strive, and increase the means by which more people can be born and sustained.
“it's good that nature put this in us because that leads us to go off and produce and strive and increase the means for people being born and being sustained”
Smith reinterprets the precept to love your neighbor as yourself by stressing the reverse direction—'to love ourselves only as we love our neighbor'—meaning the person in distress (e.g., one whose house burned down) should modulate his grief and demands on others rather than loving himself far more than he loves his neighbor, requiring modulation on both ends to reach harmony.
“as to love our neighbor as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbor”
There is a strong Aristotelian emphasis on moderation throughout the book—paralleled in the Jewish/Maimonidean tradition—such that moral behavior consists in finding the mean: an alcoholic and a teetotaler are both bad and the goal is responsible drinking; similarly, you should neither over-punish (e.g., death for jaywalking, or the death penalty for someone whose bad outcome was no fault of their own) nor refuse to judge at all.
“in the Jewish tradition I associated with Maimonides an emphasis a moral behavior is is a question of moderation”
Smith paints a strongly negative picture of political and noble life—in the courts of princes and the drawing rooms of the great, success depends not on the esteem of intelligent equals but on the fanciful favor of ignorant, presumptuous, proud superiors, so flattery and falsehood prevail over merit—which is consistent with the public choice view that political incentives are dysfunctional, attracting and selecting people weak or bad in virtue (echoing Hayek's 'why the worst get on top'), supporting a case for depoliticizing society as much as possible.
“in the courts of the princes in the drawing-rooms of the great where success and preferment depend not upon the esteem of intelligent and well-informed equals but upon the fanciful and foolish favor of ignorant presumptuous and proud superiors flattery and falsehood to often prevail over merit and abilities”
A passion or vision that exists only in one person's imagination and is not made tangible or shared appears ridiculous to others; to win others over a visionary must develop and teach the image so people can see propriety in it—otherwise free-society ideals like liberalism are dismissed as ridiculous fantasies.
“such passions then of this of the guy who has this image in his head is very important... are always in some measure ridiculous”
Smith distinguishes two sets of virtues: the amiable virtues (gentle, indulgent, compassionate sensibility) and the awful/respectable virtues (self-denial, self-government, command of the passions), and a flourishing self cycles dialectically between disintegration (calling for amiable virtues) and reintegration (calling for respectable virtues).
“the softer the gentle the amiable virtues the virtues of candid... condescension and indulgent humanity are found upon the one the great the awful and respectable the virtues of self-denial of self-government”
Smith uses 'impartial' to mean having a sense of the whole rather than a part, a usage Klein prefers over the objective/subjective dichotomy—someone more impartial has a greater sense of the whole rather than merely being unbiased.
“impartial means you know not that I don't care about either disputant but I'm sort of seeing the whole or I have it more of a sense of the whole”
Smith treats the unsocial passions (hatred, resentment, indignation) as always somewhat uncomfortable because they create divided sympathy—we cannot side wholly with the resentful person without becoming partial—so resentment is a 'downer' and even when we know its cause we have to be sympathetic to consider it an attractive response.
“if Jim is hateful or resentful toward somebody because well there's conflict there with Jim and whoever he's resenting and we have divided sympathy”
Smith distinguishes propriety/impropriety (which concerns the cause or motive of the actor) from merit/demerit (which includes the actual effects or consequences), and because motives are hard and mixed to know, systems often must focus on merit/consequences even though that can seem unfair when chance plays a role—connecting to local-knowledge problems.
“sentiment towards an action proceeds both from the cause or motive of the actor or agent as well as from its effect its or consequences and the aspect having to do with motives and causes he speaks of in terms of propriety and impropriety”
Smith holds that harmony of sentiment is not a perfect unison but merely a 'concord'—like two different notes (a C and a G) that sound good together—so that what is wanted or required is correspondence sufficient for the harmony of society, not perfect convergence, leaving room for remaining imperfections and even disharmony as a natural part of society.
“though they will never be unisons they may they may be Conchords and this is all that is wanted or required”
Smith distinguishes mere propriety from virtue: propriety is what simply deserves to be approved of—becoming the norm or 'mediocrity' of a society where not much is expected of people—whereas virtue is what deserves to be admired and celebrated, the more aspirational quality of beauty.
“there is in this respect a considerable difference between virtue and mere propriety between those qualities and actions which deserve to be admired and celebrated and those would simply deserve to be approved of”
There is a dialectic between the ridiculous and the sublime (captured by Thomas Paine's 'one step above the sublime makes the ridiculous and one step above the ridiculous makes the sublime'): a visionary who sees a higher beauty no one else perceives seems ridiculous, but if he can bring others to share that vision it becomes sublime—as with Stravinsky's Rite of Spring, initially reviled and later accepted as a masterpiece.
“one step above the sublime makes the ridiculous and one step above the ridiculous makes the sublime”
Smith affirms that it is principally the moral aspect of our existence that matters to us, illustrated by his claim that as long as you have good health, are out of debt, and have a clear conscience, almost nothing else matters—and that compared with the contempt of mankind, all other external evils are easily supported.
“he speaks of as long as you're in good health out of debt and have a clear conscience almost nothing else”
Smith rejects a 'teetotaler' approach to resentment and indignation that would abstain from them entirely; just as a teetotaler throws away moderate responsible drinking because he cannot manage it, those who never express indignation lose an important signal—and if people become too blase about outrages and injustices they grow docile and complacent, a problem Klein sees in academia where the 'positive not normative' norm functions as an injunction not to be outspoken.
“many people take a kind of teetotaler approach to resentment and hatred kind of like those are you know hate crime like those you should never do”
Smith extends the demand for harmony from sentiments to opinions—including aesthetic and social and political opinions—so that part of Smith's larger project (with the Wealth of Nations) can be read as trying to get people's opinions into the right focal point so society can coordinate on them.
“he connects all this matter of sentiment also to opinions and he very naturally extends it to opinions about things which is much more of an intellectual matter”
Smith argues that our first liking or admiration of someone who gracefully modulates their sentiments stems from a direct sense of acuteness and rightness/propriety, and that utility (including social utility) is only an afterthought; therefore moral notions are originally felt as propriety, and the wise convergence of those notions onto what is actually socially useful must come about through an evolutionary cultural mechanism.
“he says though that the utility is an afterthought he says that our first liking or admiration stems from this acuteness from this rightness okay from this proper Ness”
Mere harmony of sentiment is morally ambiguous because people could synchronize on something evil; therefore there must be a background standard—either a Hayekian evolutionary sense in which the emerging norms are useful, or a divine/other reason—and Smith prompts us as beings seeking enlightenment to check at a higher level whether our accustomed harmonies are worth improving against a fuller understanding of consequences.
“there are lots of things you could synchronize like that that would be evil yes and so there's in the background some idea perhaps that either in a Hayekian evolutionary sense the norms that emerge are useful”
Smith's work is to a great extent an expression of his own sensibilities, so that what propriety actually consists of cannot be reduced to a formula but is the whole sense one gets of what he thinks worthy and unworthy across the entire work—and after Smith's time, especially once political economy became a separate discipline, economists lost this sense of expressing a broad sensibility about the good life, which Klein regards as a great tragedy contributing to the decline of liberalism.
“if someone says well what does he mean by propriety what is propriety actually consists of it's like well it's what's in those entire works”
Smith has an egalitarianism in which all humans are seen as aspiring, capable, and full of potential, and he depicts the rich and powerful as developing a contempt for the poor and mean—attitudes their very station almost necessitates—so that when they fall they cannot re-enter ordinary life satisfyingly because there is no way back into the world of equals.
“he speaks of the rich and the powerful as despising the poor in the mean and they develop all these attitudes in those very high walks of life which actually kind of necessitate that”
Smith argues that those who reach the pinnacle of being adored by the rich and powerful are effectively cursed: because such adulation is a uniquely seductive drug for which there is no substitute, once one falls from grace one's ability to find another source of happiness is destroyed and one can never be as happy again.
“if you're in that's that group that is rich and powerful and you're getting all this love and affection and you fall from grace it's over for you your life is ruined you will never be happy again”
The passage could equally be read as an indictment of cultural celebrity—how celebrities literally set fashion, morals, and mores—rather than narrowly of court politics; Smith would likely disapprove of figures like a wealthy TV personality being treated as someone to emulate by millions, though he might also see harmless satire of the rich and great (and even laissez-faire shows and buffoonery) as a useful diversion that keeps people from becoming fanatics in their own sects.
“you could certainly read it as an indictment of the cultural celebrity and how celebrities literally set fashion and set morals and mores and norms”
Smith argues a person's happiness depends overwhelmingly not on consumption of material goods but on how we are viewed by others and how we view ourselves, which stands in sharp contrast to the modern economic textbook view that utility depends on consumption (X1 and X2).
“there's an enormous emphasis on a person's happiness not depending on X 1 and X 2 which is the textbook version of happiness that our utility depends on our consumption of goods but overwhelmingly here depending on how we are viewed by others and how we view ourselves”
Sympathy in Smith is best understood as a mutually coordinated sentiment that exists between two people—neither yours nor mine but ours, like keeping time or beating time together in music—which makes Smith's view of man non-atomistic and is the foundation of his vision of liberal civilization built up through social interaction.
“I think of it as mutually coordinated sentiment that my sentiment in your sentiment kind of converge are in common in almost as though the sentiment exists between us neither yours nor mine but ours almost like the beat of a song for keeping time”
Adam Smith was effectively a behavioral economist who gave a rich, human picture of human behavior, and the so-called behavioral economics revolution merely rediscovered in scientific dress what Smith already had—suggesting that mainstream economics went off-track by modeling the human being as a mathematical function and that the corrective is to get back on Smith's 'main road.'
“Smith was talking about human beings not as mathematical functions but as human beings he had it all you know out all there but you know he was doing a rich picture of human behavior”
Smith distinguishes temperance from prudence: temperance is more of a social virtue concerning how you handle your sentiments in interactions and display, whereas prudence is more about how you look after your own future self.
“temperance being more of a social virtue more of a display matter how you handle your sentiments and interactions whereas prudence is more like how you look after your future self”
Smith's sympathy depends heavily on imagination: to sympathize you must imagine the situation and motives of the other person and put yourself in their position, which makes the Theory of Moral Sentiments more intangible and harder to read than the more concrete Wealth of Nations.
“you have to imagine what the situation is of the person you're sympathizing with you have to imagine what their motives are you have to put yourself in their position so imagination I think is very central”
Smith was a sly and deliberately ambiguous writer who in some cases did not want to clarify—and even wanted to cloak—certain things, particularly about God, leaving them deliberately ambiguous to some extent.
“I do believe I'm a subscriber to the view that Smith was a very sly fellow a very sly writer”
Smith's book is much more about day-to-day, intangible emotional concerns than the concrete subject matter of the Wealth of Nations, and reading 19th-century novelists like Jane Austen and Dickens through Smith's eyes changes how one reads them by revealing how constrained the scope for personal expression—especially for women—was in his era.
“occasionally as I was reading it I found myself slipping into a Dickens novel or a Jane Austen novel”
In The Wealth of Nations Smith argued that one way for government to keep the public from becoming fanatics in their own sects is to allow public amusements—shows, operas, buffoonery, and lampoons—including satire of the rich and great, which Smith smiled upon.
“he does have in the wealth of nations saying that one way to divert the public and keep them from becoming fanatics in their own little sect is for the government to allow just lays a fair shows operas buffoonery”
Smith opens the book by positing sociability and shared sympathy as a given feature of human nature—'how selfish so ever man may be, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others'—and crucially does not try to explain this except by appeal to a providential author of nature, which isn't really an explanation, expecting the reader to accept it as given.
“how selfish so ever man may be suppose there are evidently some principles in his nature which interests him in the fortunes of others and rendered their happiness necessary to him though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it”
Smith holds that passions rooted only in one person's private imagination—an image others have not acquired and cannot enter into—are always in some measure ridiculous, which Klein extends to ideology and politics: to rally people around a vision you must make the image shared, tangible, and well-known, and the very ideal of a free society is often dismissed as illusory and ridiculous precisely because it has not yet been drawn concretely.
“such passions then of this of the guy who has this image in his head is very important and such passions though they may be allowed to be almost unavoidable in some part of life are always in some measure ridiculous”
Smith aligns the amiable/compassionate virtues with the female and the respectable/self-command virtues with the male in a traditional 18th-century way, yet his dialectical 'spiral' implies that everyone must be both, so he does not recommend one over the other or hold that the genders should differ in this respect.
“the compassionate amiable is more female and the the other one the more respectable delft denial self-command less emotional inspiration of the self is more more male a traditional interpretation”
Smith uses 'partial' and 'impartial' in a richer sense than subjective/objective: impartiality is not indifference to the disputants but seeing the whole rather than a part, and Klein prefers this 'sense of the whole' vocabulary to the objective/subjective distinction.
“impartial means you know not that I don't care about either disputant but I'm sort of seeing the whole or I have it more of a sense of the whole which i think is a useful vocabulary I prefer it for example to objective and subjective”
There is an irony and a possible personal subtext in Smith's account of the two paths: he repeatedly stresses the sacrifice of choosing wisdom and virtue over celebrity, yet almost no noble or upper-class figure of 1759 is still discussed today while Smith is, and Roberts senses a chip on the shoulder—even a hint of resentment—while Klein argues Smith was in fact cultural royalty of his day whose position required him to hedge and cloak his views, leading Klein to suspect Smith favored the liberty principle even more than he let on.
“I felt there was a little bit of a chip on the shoulder a little bit of if I may use the word it's I hesitate but resentment that that's the way the world is a little bit of defensiveness”
Smith does engage politics in Part I—discussing the different roads to rank and distinction and having a good deal to say about politicians, none of it flattering—even though he does not analyze how people feel toward politicians directly; he is more clearly interested in what we would call the celebrity phenomenon.
“he does talk about I think it's in the page sixties the different roads to rank and distinction and you know some that he describes over much more of a political nature he has a lot to say about politicians”
Smith's book contains far more death and far more modest material success than modern life, reflecting that in 1759 it was harder to climb the economic ladder and people coped with greater levels of grief and early death.
“there's a lot of death in the book there's a lot of he talks he talks at numerous times about people who who drop dead or killed murdered”
The book is largely composed of stated assumptions and presumptions about how the world works, lacking the rich real-world examples found in The Wealth of Nations and relying instead on casual examples that appeal to common sense.
“how much of it is state assumption presumption that that the world works this way that there isn't the incredible richness of examples from the real world that's in the wealth of nations”
There is more death and grief in the world of 1759 than in our day-to-day lives, and economic advancement was much harder, so Smith's readers were coping with higher levels of early death and more modest, constrained prospects for success.
“there's a lot more death in 1759 and there is day to day... and of course levels of success which were much more modest in his day it was harder for people to climb the economic ladder”
Smith distinguishes sentiment from passion as two aspects of emotion: passion is the more active sense that stirs you to act as a moral agent, while sentiment is the more passive aspect of emotion.
“I think passion being a more active sense of emotion a passion actually stirs you to do to act and to do something as a moral agent as a doer whereas a sentiment is a more passive”
Part I starts slow and becomes more interesting and challenging as it proceeds, with lively but sometimes archaic 18th-century language, and Smith relies heavily on stated assumption and presumption with casual common-sense examples rather than the rich real-world examples found in the Wealth of Nations.
“it's how much of it is state assumption presumption that that the world works this way that there isn't the incredible richness of examples from the real world that's in the wealth of nations”
This will be a different type of podcast that works systematically through a great work, and listeners might 'adjust their notion of propriety' to listen to it differently.
“this is going to be a very different type of podcast than we usually have we're going to try to work systematically through a work of greatness”