Distributive justice
In Smith's usage, the making of a 'becoming use' of what is one's own—using your own resources, abilities, and time well; its rules are loose, vague, and indeterminate like aesthetics.
As defined in Daniel Klein on Honest Income
Other definitions
In Smith's sense, 'proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own'—the virtuous, voluntary use of one's own resources—distinct from Aristotle's notion of distributing rewards from a community's public stock.
Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
Where it comes up · 4
- Daniel Klein on Honest Income5 claims
- Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/20095 claims
- 139 | Elizabeth Anderson on Equality, Work, and Ideology3 claims
- Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/20091 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 14Search all claims for “Distributive justice” →
- Commutative justice concerns not messing with other people's stuff and is precise and accurate like grammar; distributive justice concerns making a 'becoming use' of what is your own and is loose, vague, and indeterminate like aesthetics.Daniel Klein on Honest Income
- Smith's distributive justice—'proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own'—presupposes a classical-liberal configuration of ownership (this is my car, my house, my income), explicitly distinguished in his footnote from Aristotle's distributive justice (proper distribution of rewards from the public stock); modern social justice instead assumes resources are ultimately owned collectively by the polity, which then delegates sub-domains of use, so minimum-wage laws or similar are restrictions on what is mine, not mere definitions of a sub-domain granted to me.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- The decisive practical difference Smith draws between commutative and distributive justice rests on enforcement: commutative justice can be established and protected by force, and its violators may be coercively punished (even hanged), whereas distributive justice and beneficence carry only moral obligation—failure can be socially frowned upon but not physically punished, taxed, or coerced without violating the liberty principle.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- The poor man's son who pursued wealth purely from ambition and brought about civilizational benefits did not act in a distributively just way, because purpose and intention matter a great deal to justice and virtue; it is not enough that benefits flowed from what he did—virtue requires the right intention.Daniel Klein on Honest Income
- Smith's choice to reserve the unqualified word 'justice' for commutative justice—only adding the qualifier 'commutative' later when reviewing the scholastics, and never calling beneficence 'distributive justice'—is textually significant and reveals his political sensibility that justice properly means only the negative duty to abstain from what is another's.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Klein's proposed 'invisible parable' is of a young person who, having learned from Smith and others that earning 15% in plastics means barefooted kids now wear shoes, pursues honest income with that appreciation and intention—which adds something on the intention side that makes the pursuit distributively just and more becoming, with Smith himself part of the parable as the teacher.Daniel Klein on Honest Income
- Smith distinguishes commutative justice—'abstaining from what is another's,' covering person, property, and contracts—from distributive justice, which he defines as 'proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own,' meaning the becoming use of one's own resources, in explicit contrast to Aristotle's distributive justice as the proper distribution of rewards from the public stock of a community.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- Equality is fundamentally about how people relate to one another rather than merely about the distribution of material goods; distributive concerns should follow from the demand to relate as equals, which is why a hypothetically materially equal but segregated Jim Crow society would still be deeply unequal because segregation itself inherently insults and stigmatizes.139 | Elizabeth Anderson on Equality, Work, and Ideology
- The justness of honest income is not that wages or income reflect virtue or are adjusted to an ideal pattern of contributions; rather, justness lies in a person deciding justly his own action—choosing course A over course B given his own options—so income is not a virtue-meter and earning less is no failing.Daniel Klein on Honest Income
- Earning more honest income—bringing home more bacon—is itself a distributive choice, and Smith makes the case that doing so is presumptively distributively just and a becoming use of one's own.Daniel Klein on Honest Income