Beneficence
An old word for active goodness—proactive, supererogatory acts that go above and beyond what is owed to others and are good for their own sake
As defined in Alexandra Hudson on the Soul of Civility
Other definitions
Doing good to others—generosity and kindness in the use of one's own resources. For Smith it is a vague, non-enforceable virtue, contrasted with the enforceable demands of commutative justice.
Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
Where it comes up · 3
- Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/20098 claims
- Alexandra Hudson on the Soul of Civility3 claims
- Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/20093 claims
Most important claims · 10 of 14Search all claims for “Beneficence” →
- Justice and grammar are merely 'negative virtues': merely satisfying their rules earns no praise (a grammatically perfect blank page is still no composition; you can fulfill justice by sitting still and doing nothing), while violations earn disapprobation—whereas beneficence, like aesthetics, is both positive and negative and can earn genuine praise.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Justice and grammar are merely 'negative virtues': merely satisfying their rules earns no praise (a blank page is grammatically perfect yet fails aesthetically; one can fulfill justice by sitting still and doing nothing), while violations earn disapprobation. Beneficence, like aesthetics, is both positive and negative—it can earn genuine praise.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Justice—not beneficence—is the pillar that upholds society, because society can survive without much mutual love but cannot survive the trampling of justice; all that is strictly necessary for the good offices of commerce to be forthcoming is the maintenance of justice.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Smith distinguishes justice and beneficence sharply: justice is necessary, precise, and accurate and may be enforced by physical force, while beneficence must be voluntary and free and ceases to be beneficence if forced (at least among equals). Justice is like grammar—precise and necessary—and beneficence is like the rules of sublime and elegant writing—loose, vague, and indeterminate, more aesthetic.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Justice is precise, accurate, and enforceable by physical force among equals, whereas beneficence must be voluntary and can never be forced—indeed forced beneficence would not be beneficence; justice is like grammar (necessary, exact) while beneficence is like the rules of sublime and elegant writing (loose, vague, indeterminate, aesthetic).Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Justice is the pillar/main load-bearing support of society and is more essential to its existence than beneficence; Smith contrasts three worlds—one where people are pleasant and decent (flourishing), one merely mercenary (still functional), and one of vicious animals where justice is trampled (hopeless)—with the division of labor surviving in the first two but not the third.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Smith's commutative justice consists in abstaining from what is another's—not harming a person's person, property, and promises-due (contract), and (in some passages) reputation. Significantly, Smith calls only this 'justice' (later qualifying it 'commutative' after Grotius and the schoolmen) and never calls beneficence or distribution 'distributive justice,' implying he wants 'justice' to mean only commutative justice—a fact revealing his political sensibilities.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Smith's choice to reserve the unqualified word 'justice' for commutative justice—only adding the qualifier 'commutative' later when reviewing the scholastics, and never calling beneficence 'distributive justice'—is textually significant and reveals his political sensibility that justice properly means only the negative duty to abstain from what is another's.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 3--A Discussion of Part II 04/22/2009
- Smith distinguishes commutative justice—'abstaining from what is another's,' covering person, property, and contracts—from distributive justice, which he defines as 'proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own,' meaning the becoming use of one's own resources, in explicit contrast to Aristotle's distributive justice as the proper distribution of rewards from the public stock of a community.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- Adam Smith's distinction between justice and beneficence maps the spectrum of civility: justice is the bare minimum a society needs to survive—what you owe others—while beneficence is active goodness, the supererogatory above-and-beyond acts that are not expected of you but are good for their own sake.Alexandra Hudson on the Soul of Civility