
How neoliberalism broke economics | Dr Abby Innes
What this covers
Abby Innes, Associate Professor of Political Economy at the London School of Economics, makes the case that neoclassical and neoliberal economics and Stalinist planned economics are not opposites but functional mirrors—both closed-system machine models inherited from late-19th-century high modernism, both attempting to reduce human societies to fully computable, efficient systems. She traces how Britain has adopted a governing model that resembles the late Soviet Union not in politics but in method: a totalizing economic science that promises technical neutrality while removing economic decisions from democratic debate. The twenty-five-minute conversation covers the philosophical and historical roots of this methodological error, which strand of British politics corresponds to which phase of Soviet decline, and what could displace the dominant paradigm.
Innes argues that neoclassical economics began as "social physics," borrowing Newtonian mechanics, and remains locked in axiomatic reasoning that cannot be refuted because it cannot be implemented—a logical trap that late-Soviet economists fell into when they spent decades trying to "mend market failures" in a planning system that could never be completed. She shows how the same pattern now governs British policy: the Treasury's computational general equilibrium models derive from Soviet economist Wassily Leontief and cannot even account for financial markets. The conversation turns toward what philosophy of science reveals about why no single economic science could work for all times and places in an open, evolving world, and moves into contentious terrain when it addresses which kind of reform the current Labour government might attempt. Innes identifies the real danger not as economic failure but as the public losing faith in democracy before abandoning a misconceived paradigm.
Stalinist economic planning and neoclassical neoliberal economics are mirror images—both machine models operating on closed-system reasoning—and Britain has adopted a totalizing economic science that cannot solve real social problems, risking democracy itself if we don't shift to analytical pluralism.
- Both Soviet and neoliberal systems treat the economy as a computable, completely efficient system and rely on quantification, output planning, and regulatory design
- Closed-system machine models cannot work in open-ended human societies with irreducible uncertainty and emerging novelty
- Britain's cost-of-living crisis, poverty, financialization, and corporate capture cannot be diagnosed or solved using neoclassical economics, driving anti-establishment sentiment
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Neoclassical arguments are axiomatic-deductive arguments from assumption (logical reasoning), so they are as impossible to refute as they are to implement — unlike the scientific method of theorization from observation and continuous review — which is why they cannot be straightforwardly disproven yet cannot be made to work in the world.
“neocclassical arguments are arguments from assumption. They're axiomatic deductive arguments. They're arguments from logic. They can't be wrong in the sense that they're they're as impossible to refute as they are to implement”
Closed-system deterministic machine models of the economy cannot work in a human society because that society is an open-ended system that cannot escape uncertainty: the world is always becoming something else through emergent novelty, complex systems and technological change, so no governing science could be valid for all times and places without godlike omniscience.
“closed system deterministic machine models of the economy can't work in a human society that is an open-ended system that cannot escape the uncertainty that we live with because the world is always becoming something else”
The solution is not to replace the old economic science with a new totalizing science ('the old science is dead, long live the new science') — philosophy of science says there is no such thing for the social world — but to embrace analytical pluralism: bringing different perspectives, ideas and solutions into the policy room would improve outcomes almost instantly because the current paradigm has been scraped to the bottom.
“the very worst thing we could do would be to say the old science is dead long live the new science”
Early neoclassical/mathematical economics was originally labelled 'social physics' because it copied Newtonian mechanics and swapped the concept of energy for utility; and contrary to leftwing caricature, many early neoclassicists were socialists, so neoclassicism is best understood as a methodology rather than an inherently right-wing doctrine.
“an early name, a kind of early label for neocclassical economics, mathematical economics was social physics because the idea was that and this is effectively what they do. They effectively cut and paste Newtonian mechanics uh and exchange the idea of energy in Newtonian mechanics and swap it out for utility”
Rational expectations models began as a technical idea that assumes everyone in the model shares the same knowledge as the modeler, and originators like Thomas Sargent have described this as 'the communism of models' because it assumes perfect information and coordination.
“rational expectations model started life as a technical idea that everyone in the model shares the same knowledge about the system as the modeler and it allows the modeler to come up with kind of probabilistic arguments out of this model. They often use the an idealized social planner as the model and the originators people like Thomas Sergeant in rational expectations models talks about the communism of models literally because they they are the idea that everyone in the system understands the system and it's a perfect system of coordination no information gets lost.”
Early mathematical/neoclassical economics was explicitly called 'social physics' because it cut and pasted Newtonian mechanics, swapping 'energy' for 'utility' to create a scientific mathematical approach to economics.
“an early name, a kind of early label for neocclassical economics, mathematical economics was social physics because the idea was that and this is effectively what they do. They effectively cut and paste Newtonian mechanics uh and exchange the idea of energy in Newtonian mechanics and swap it out for utility in order to have this sort of scientific mathematical approach.”
Many early neoclassicalists were socialists, a fact lost in many left-wing critiques that caricature neoclassical economics as inherently right-wing; the theory is better understood as a methodology that has been used for both libertarian and social democratic purposes.
“a lot of the neo early neocclassicists were socialists uh which is something that gets lost actually in a lot of leftwing critiques of neocclassical economics slightly caricatures the fact the idea that it's that it's all rightwing. It's better understood as a methodology”
The worst thing we could do would be to say 'the old science is dead, long live the new science,' because the philosophy of science teaches us that 'there ain't no such thing as a governing science' for the social world—instead, we need analytical pluralism with different perspectives in the room.
“the very worst thing we could do would be to say the old science is dead long live the new science because what the philosophy of science would tell you is h there ain't no such thing for the social world. So what you need is to go which is actually a relatively easy thing to do. You need to embrace analytical pluralism. You need different perspectives in the room.”
Closed-system deterministic machine models of the economy cannot work in human societies that are open-ended systems unable to escape irreducible uncertainty, because the world is always becoming something else and solving the 'riddle of history' would require godlike omniscience.
“closed system deterministic machine models of the economy can't work in a human society that is an open-ended system that cannot escape the uncertainty that we live with because the world is always becoming something else.”
The real risk is that people conclude it is democracy, not the economy, that doesn't work — so the danger is that society gives up on democracy before it gives up on an economic paradigm that was misconceived from the beginning.
“the way they would get worse is if people decided that what doesn't work is not the economy, it's democracy. So the real risk is that we give up on democracy before we give up on a paradigm that was misconceived from the beginning.”
The Treasury's computational general equilibrium models used to calculate tax breaks under Osborne originate with the Soviet economist Wassily Leontief, and cannot even bring financial markets into the picture because doing so is too complicated.
“the models we use to calculate tax breaks under Osborne um are exchange models actually originating with a Soviet economist called Vaseline Leontev but those were the computational general equilibrium models that the Treasury used anyway. You can't even bring the financial markets into those models because it's just too too complicated.”
Rational expectations models began as a technical idea that everyone in the model shares the same knowledge of the system as the modeler — Thomas Sargent literally called this 'the communism of models' — using an idealized social planner, which embodies the assumption of a perfect coordination system where no information gets lost.
“rational expectations model started life as a technical idea that everyone in the model shares the same knowledge about the system as the modeler”
A core damage of high-modernist neoclassical/neoliberal economics is that it has habituated us to the idea that social problems have technical solutions and that economics can be depoliticized — the Blairite 'third way' dream of using the state to regulate markets so efficiently that the state merely mends a presumptively mendable system.
“almost the most damaging aspect of these kind of high modernist philosophies but neocclassical neoliberal economics is it has got us entirely used to the idea that there are technical solutions for social problems”
Britain operates in an 'analytical monoculture' in economics, but a great deal of empiricist, social-purpose, inventive economic experimentation is emerging as a coping mechanism in cities and communities, rediscovering an approach that understands the economy as an ecosystem rather than a watch.
“we don't understand the extent to which we are operating in an analytical monoculture in economic terms”
British capitalism today bears no resemblance to the promises of the Thatcher revolution: excessive financial extraction and the excessive power of the financial industry — which closed-system models cannot even integrate (the Treasury's computational general equilibrium models, originating with Soviet economist Wassily Leontief, leave financial markets out as too complicated) — alongside cost-of-living crisis, 4 million children in abject poverty, financialization and corporate state capture, none of which neoclassical economics can diagnose, yet which drive poverty and alienation from democracy.
“British capitalism at this point bears absolutely no resemblance to any of the promises that were made for it by the Thatcher revolution.”
Neoclassical reasoning is institutionalized across virtually every British and international economic agent: the Treasury Green Book is a neoclassical second-best framework defining decision-making across all government departments, international financial institutions use neoclassical reasoning, and central banks rely on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models built on a 'representative agent' and rational-expectations models.
“The Treasury Green Book that defines the decision-making processes across all government departments is a neocclassical second best world green book.”
The British Treasury's Green Book that defines decision-making processes across government departments is based on neoclassical second-best world theory, and computational general equilibrium models used for tax break calculations cannot even incorporate financial markets because they are too complex for the closed-system model.
“The Treasury Green Book that defines the decision-making processes across all government departments is a neocclassical second best world green book. That is that methodology.”
International financial institutions, central banks, and integrated assessment models for climate change all use neoclassical reasoning and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, creating an analytical monoculture in economic and policy-making institutions globally.
“International financial institutions use neocclassical reasoning. Central banks use dynamic stoastic general equilibrium models that are effectively general equilibrium models that use the idea of um the representative agent. Uh you have rational expectations models that are also used by central banks.”
The Popperian/Kuhnian philosophy of science tradition holds that every theory is built on the back of theories that came before and you cannot suddenly transcend that history—there is no Archimedean point where you can read the world clearly, even if you found a perfect explanation.
“the canian tradition in the philosophy of science would say is you can't do that. You can't escape the history of your own curiosity. Every theory we have is built on the back of the theories that came before. You can't suddenly transcend that. So there's some kind of Archimedian point where you can read the world clearly. And even if by some miracle you could bump into a perfect explanation of how we got here”
Neoclassical economics is not useless: it can be genuinely insightful for analyzing simple markets with repeated, isolable phenomena (such as asymmetries in contracting), rationalizing what happened or recurs in certain circumstances after the fact — but it cannot serve as a sufficient governing science, which is unsustainable both in philosophy of science and, judging by Britain's condition, socially and politically.
“I don't want to argue that neocclassical economics is useless it's around asymmetries in contracting it can be very insight ful if you're looking at simple markets where you can reasonably coherently say that there are repeated phenomena”
The mainstream (Blairite) economic tradition treats neoclassical economics not as literal description but as a 'second best' scientific heuristic for diagnosing and mending market failures — fixing monopoly, asymmetric contracting, or pricing nature to solve climate — but the idea that you can mend market failures is a fallacy and a category error: it confuses a logically valid model with something reproducible in the social world, falsely assuming each fix moves society toward a horizon of perfectly competitive markets.
“the idea that you can mend market failures is a fallacy. It's assuming that by mending the broken connections in a system, you're getting closer to the horizon where everything is complete and competitive, perfectly competitive markets.”
Stalinist planned economics and the mathematical neoclassical economics underpinning neoliberal policy since 1979 are effectively mirror images: both are closed-system, deterministic 'machine models' of the economy that assume a fully efficient system is achievable (a perfect plan or a perfect market) and therefore converge on the same statecraft of quantification, output planning and forecasting.
“Stalinist economics specifically and the mathematical formal neocclassical economics which is the basis of neoliberal policies since 1979. Uh they're effectively both machine models of the economy. They both operate with sort of closed system reasoning about the possibility of a completely efficient system”
Late-Soviet economists (Russian, Polish, Hungarian) spent the later decades of the USSR trying to mend the broken connections and solve information failures in a planning system that could never be made complete — and later generations of neoclassical economists are doing exactly the same thing, on the same misunderstanding that information failures can be solved in a world that is always becoming something else.
“the later decades of the Soviet Union were spent with talented, brilliant economists, Russian economists and Polish economists and Hungarian economists trying to figure out how to mend the broken connections in a planning system that you could never make complete.”
If you believe you live in a computable world, then the methodology of organizing the state is necessarily quantification, output planning, and forecasting, with the assumption that appropriately designed regulations will ensure enterprises work in socially productive ways.
“Because if you believe you live in a computable world, then the methodology of organizing the state uh is a methodology of quantification and output planning and forecasting and the assumption that if you design regulations in the appropriate way, enterprises will only ever work in a way that is socially productive.”
Soviet totalitarianism and British liberal democracy are politically opposite, but both are 'misadventures in high modernism' — late-19th/early-20th-century projects seeking methodologies to transcend the uncertainties of the social world and obtain definitive answers, and Britain has imposed a totalizing economic science on itself without physical coercion or revolution.
“What they hold in common is that they're both misadventures in high modernism. So they're both coming out of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century and looking for methodologies that will effectively allow us to transcend the vicissitudes and uncertainties of the social world.”
45 years of first-best neoliberal policy (privatization, deregulation) failed on the terms by which it was justified — these had effects but not the promised ones — and the subsequent generation (Blair, Cameron, US New Democrats, the European Commission) spent ~25 years trying to mend market failures, only to be baffled as institutions evolved dynamics and pathologies that neoclassical economics cannot even describe, let alone solve.
“we've spent the last 45 years trying the first best version, finding that none of it works private in the terms by which it was justified. Privatization, deregulation, all of these things had effects, but they weren't the effects we were told they were going to be.”
The book 'Late Soviet Britain' argues that British capitalism under neoliberalism bears absolutely no resemblance to the promises made for it by the Thatcher revolution due to excessive financial extraction and financialization.
“British capitalism at this point bears absolutely no resemblance to any of the promises that were made for it by the Thatcher revolution. And if between excessive financial extraction out of the economy and the excessive power of the financial industry”
British political history maps onto Soviet decline: Thatcherism functioned like Leninism (revolutionary idealism that didn't work as supposed), Blairism like the reformist Khrushchevite phase of mending market failures, and the last 14 years of Conservative government like Brezhnev-era stagnation — a neotraditionalist phase that gives up real reform and just 'sings the old songs' hoping they work.
“you could think of thatism was like Leninism, right? It's the point of revolutionary idealism. And then it didn't work the way it was supposed to.”
Both Soviet and neoclassical systems are misadventures in high modernism—shared late-19th and early-20th-century aspirations to transcend the vicissitudes and uncertainties of the social world through scientific methodology.
“What they hold in common is that they're both misadventures in high modernism. So they're both coming out of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century and looking for methodologies that will effectively allow us to transcend the vicissitudes and uncertainties of the social world.”
Brexit was the wrong diagnosis of a real crisis, and the real crisis was a crisis of the British state.
“the intuition I had was that Brexit was the wrong diagnosis of a real crisis and the real crisis was a crisis of the British state.”
Without the neoclassical governing science, governments would be 'starting again'—stripping out the institutionalized methodology that every major economic actor (government, banks, financial entities, credit rating agencies, corporations, consultancies) is built around.
“without it we'd be starting again. I mean we would really be stripping out the governing science that we have institutionalized in almost every single economic agent in the country whether that's government or banks or financial entities or credit rating agencies or uh you know corporations or consultancies”
The cost-of-living crisis, 4 million children in abject poverty, financialization, and corporate state capture cannot be diagnosed or explained using neoclassical economics, yet these are the very things driving both poverty and alienation from democracy and encouraging the rise of anti-establishment parties.
“we're in a world where the cost of living crisis, the fact that we have 4 million children in abject poverty, the fact that we have financialization, the fact that we have corporate state capture, none of these things you can diagnose with neocclassical economics, but they are what is driving both poverty and alienation from democracy. they are what is encouraging the rise of anti-sistent parties.”
Stalinist economics and mathematical formal neoclassical economics, which underpins neoliberal policies since 1979, are effectively mirror images—both are closed-system machine models of the economy assuming the possibility of a completely efficient system, whether through central planning or perfectly competitive markets.
“Stalinist economics specifically and the mathematical formal neocclassical economics which is the basis of neoliberal policies since 1979. Uh they're effectively both machine models of the economy. They both operate with sort of closed system reasoning about the possibility of a completely efficient system. whether that's a completely efficient social plan or a completely efficient market.”
The concept of 'market failure' is a fundamental category error: it conflates something logically valid (the mathematical concept) with something you cannot actually reproduce in the social world (a system you can mend by fixing broken connections and approaching perfect competition).
“My argument is that's not nearly as metaphysically neutral or as a-political or as politically expansive as that implies because the idea that you can mend market failures is a fallacy. It's assuming that by mending the broken connections in a system, you're getting closer to the horizon where everything is complete and competitive, perfectly competitive markets.”
Because neoclassical arguments are axiomatic-deductive, proceeding from assumptions through logical reasoning rather than through observation and empirical testing, they are impossible to refute and equally impossible to implement, making them unfalsifiable in Popperian terms.
“neocclassical arguments are arguments from assumption. They're axiomatic deductive arguments. They're arguments from logic. They can't be wrong in the sense that they're they're as impossible to refute as they are to implement because they are forms of logical reasoning from assumption rather than what we think of as the scientific method which is theorization from observation and continuous review.”
The depoliticization of economics—the claim that you can remove politics through technical methodology—is the most damaging aspect of high-modernist neoclassical economics, as it naturalizes what are actually contested value choices as technical necessities.
“the most damaging aspect of these kind of high modernist philosophies but neocclassical neoliberal economics is it has got us entirely used to the idea that there are technical solutions for social problems that so the idea that you can depoliticize economics it's such a lovely idea”
Privatization and deregulation, the first-best neoliberal solutions promoted over 45 years, had effects but not the effects they were promised to have, and the second-best generation (Blairites, Cameron, New Democrats) spent 25 years trying to mend market failures only to find institutions continued evolving with pathologies that neoclassical economics cannot describe, let alone solve.
“We've spent the last 45 years trying the first best version, finding that none of it works private in the terms by which it was justified. Privatization, deregulation, all of these things had effects, but they weren't the effects we were told they were going to be. And then the next generation as it were Cameron's generation the Blairite generation the new democrats in the US the European Commission I mean you know pick your institution pick your party has basically spent the last sort of 25 years trying to mend the market failures and being increasingly baffled that all those institutions continued to evolve with dynamics and pathologies. that neocclassical economics can't even describe, let alone solve.”
The real risk is that we give up on democracy before we give up on a paradigm that was misconceived from the beginning—if people decide that what doesn't work is not the economy but democracy itself.
“the real risk is that we give up on democracy before we give up on a paradigm that was misconceived from the beginning. because what the way they would get worse is if people decided that what doesn't work is not the economy, it's democracy. So the real risk is that we give up on democracy before we give up on a paradigm that was misconceived from the beginning.”
Certain policies outside the neoclassical paradigm (like Sure Start) genuinely improved social outcomes, showing that alternatives to 'mending market failures' can work and demonstrating that the paradigm is not necessary for progress.
“although certain things did improve that I mean shore start things like that that are outside of that paradigm were brilliant and and genuinely improved things and mending market failures was better than not mending market failures but we still got into deeper and deeper structural problems.”
The Conservative governments of the last 14 years (Cameron/May/Johnson/Truss/Sunak era) represented 'neoliberalism the Brezhnev years'—a return to singing old songs and hoping they will work, abandoning serious attempts to reform the system.
“What the conservative governments of the last 14 years have been like is neoliberalism the braith years right where you basically give up the attempt at really reforming it and you end up with a kind of neotraditionalist attempt to just sing the old songs and hope they're going to work.”
We are operating in an analytical monoculture in economic terms, with brilliant experimentation in cities and communities happening as a coping mechanism, using empiricist, social-purpose-driven, inventive economics that understands the economy as an ecosystem rather than a watch.
“we don't understand the extent to which we are operating in an analytical monoculture in economic terms and there's a lot of brilliant experimentation and very different ways of doing things happening really as a coping mechanism in a lot of cities and communities which don't follow any of this rubric and they are discovering rediscovering a way of doing economics which is much more empiricist. It's much more about social purpose. Uh it's much more inventive. It understands that the economy is much more like an ecosystem than a watch.”
The neoclassical claim to have a methodology that can depoliticize economics and deliver 'technical solutions to social problems' is seductive and has captured the imagination of both right-wing and left-wing policymakers, making it very difficult to escape.
“almost the most damaging aspect of these kind of high modernist philosophies but neocclassical neoliberal economics is it has got us entirely used to the idea that there are technical solutions for social problems that so the idea that you can depoliticize economics it's such a lovely idea”
Public sector outsourcing, quasi-markets in the welfare state, and new public management represent failures in state capacity that look familiar to someone familiar with late Soviet system pathologies, suggesting a structural equivalence between the systems.
“I was looking at failures in things like public sector outsourcing uh quasy markets in the welfare state and at the new public management. And the thing that would became really strange was that the more I looked at it, the more I thought these failures are really familiar and they were familiar to me as someone with a background in the old Soviet system and in the postsviet transition to neoliberalism.”
Neoclassical economics can be insightful and useful when looking at simple markets with repeated phenomena where you can isolate generative mechanisms, and it can let you rationalize what may have happened or will happen repeatedly—but the idea that it is a sufficient governing science is unsustainable both philosophically and socially-politically.
“I don't want to argue that neocclassical economics is useless it's around asymmetries in contracting it can be very insight ful if you're looking at simple markets where you can reasonably coherently say that there are repeated phenomena that you can isolate the generative mechanisms in that story then neocclassical reasoning can be very insightful after the fact. It can let you rationalize what may have happened or what may happen repeatedly in certain circumstances in a way that is is insightful. But the idea that it is a sufficient governing science is unsustainable in the philosophy of science. And if you look at the state of Britain today, I think it's also un unsustainable socially and politically.”
The 'efficient market hypothesis' is no longer the lead position of mainstream neoclassical economics; the mainstream has shifted to market-failure mending, but this still relies on the same flawed methodology.
“the old position on the efficient market hypothesis that it doesn't apply to reality but that is the lead of our current”
The aspiration behind early neoclassical economics was genuinely utopian: to create a science that could solve poverty, conflict, and 'metaphysical horror' by transcending uncertain political debate and instead providing definitive answers.
“I think the aspiration is to say look there's all this you know conflict and poverty and endless metaphysical horror if you like. Imagine if we had a science that could solve it.”
The question for the future is how to mainstream alternative economic attitudes and encourage those with authority to recognize that the machine model of economy won't work and to look outward for new ideas, which exist in communities but must be brought into institutional conversation.
“the question for me then becomes how do you mainstream those attitudes and encourage those with authority to say oh we can't make the machine work the way theory is telling it's going to work and that it will look outward and it will look for those new ideas because at the moment it does that it will find that the country and this would be true in Europe it would be true in the US it find that those ideas are there. It's a matter of of bringing them into the conversation”
The Blairite vision of the 'third way' promised to use the state to regulate markets so effectively and efficiently that the state's only function would be to mend the presumptively mendable system and make it efficient and effective—a great dream but a utopian one that has proven unworkable.
“in the Blerite terms, the third way terms, get the best of markets and states, right? where you could use the state to regulate markets so effectively and efficiently that the state would only have the function of making a presumptively mendable system mended and and efficient and effective. I mean it's a it's a great dream but it's a utopian dream but it is so ingrained.”
The idea that you can achieve perpetual peace or simultaneously get the best of both markets and states through effective regulation is a utopian dream that has become so ingrained that it structures how economics is taught and how policy-makers think.
“the origins of neocclassical e economics imagine if we could have a methodology that would take us to a world of perpetual peace or that would in the Blerite terms, the third way terms, get the best of markets and states, right? where you could use the state to regulate markets so effectively and efficiently... I mean it's a it's a great dream but it's a utopian dream but it is so ingrained.”
Rachel Reeves was trained through the Bank of England, which is an essentially neoclassical institution, so the obstacle to change is political will: at what point she will declare that her training, the Treasury and her mainstream economic advice are not fit for purpose is a political decision, not a technical one.
“Rachel Reeves, who is a profoundly smart woman, uh was brought up through the Bank of England. And the Bank of England is an essentially neocclassical uh economic institution.”
Brexit was the wrong diagnosis of a real crisis—it misdirected attention from the genuine crisis of the British state, which manifested in failures in public sector outsourcing, quasi-markets in welfare, and new public management.
“Brexit was the wrong diagnosis of a real crisis and the real crisis was a crisis of the British state. So when I first started working on it, I was looking at failures in things like public sector outsourcing uh quasy markets in the welfare state and at the new public management.”
As soon as policy-makers start making policy on the basis of a bigger plurality of perspectives, ideas, and solutions, things would improve pretty much instantly, because the current paradigm has scraped the barrel to miserable stones underneath.
“as soon as you started to make policy on the basis of a bigger plurality of perspectives, ideas, solutions, things would start to improve pretty much instantly because I think we've scraped the barrel to the miserable stones underneath of this paradigm. And if we shift away from it in incremental, experimental, creative ways, everything will improve.”
Gorbachev's attempt at reform from within the system demonstrates that individual leadership may be insufficient to overcome structural institutional problems, suggesting paradigm change requires more than good-faith effort.
“The trouble is look what happened to Gorbachov. Right.”
The Speaker names Ed Miliband as someone in the Labour government who is analytically open-minded and could potentially embrace this paradigm shift, but worries that the appeal of the existing toolkit (which tells you there are answers to complex questions) is very seductive to policy-makers.
“I would put Ed Milliband in that category uh in terms of being more kind of analytically open-minded. But the risk is that that there is this available toolkit and it is very seductive because it tells you that there are answers to questions that are really complex.”
Rachel Reeves, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, was brought up through the Bank of England, which is an essentially neoclassical economic institution, so it would take courage from her to admit that her training and the advice she receives from mainstream economists is not fit for purpose.
“Rachel Reeves, who is a profoundly smart woman, uh was brought up through the Bank of England. And the Bank of England is an essentially neocclassical uh economic institution. And so it would take and I think she's more than capable of it. But the question is at what point will she say my training and the treasury in front of me and all the advice I'm getting from the mainstream economists that I'm using is not fit for purpose”
Political violence has been used by the British state to suppress economic demonstrations, including the miners' strikes and poll tax riots, despite the claim that Britain operates through liberal democracy without coercion.
“It's not that there's been no political violence. Anyone who remembers the minor strike or the pole tax riots will say, 'Well, the state has been willing to repress in particular those riots or those political demonstrations that have been very economic.'”
The host (Will Hutton) criticized the speaker for strawmanning the position that the efficient market hypothesis doesn't apply to reality, but that is actually the lead of current economic policy.
“So I thought something interesting that happened today on one of the panels was Will Hutton the former editor of the observer labor grande so to speak criticized you for straw manning. Yes. um the old position on the efficient market hypothesis that it's doesn't apply to reality but that is the lead of our current”
Will Hutton, on a conference panel, accused Innes of straw-manning the efficient market hypothesis by arguing it doesn't apply to reality, when that is the basis of current policy.
“Will Hutton the former editor of the observer labor grande so to speak criticized you for straw manning... the old position on the efficient market hypothesis that it's doesn't apply to reality but that is the lead of our current”