311 | Annaka Harris on Whether Consciousness is Fundamental
What this covers
Sean Carroll hosts Annaka Harris in a conversation that unfolds across experimental neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and the foundations of physics. Harris lays out an argument for a radical reordering of how we understand consciousness: rather than viewing it as a property that emerges once matter becomes sufficiently complex, she proposes it is a fundamental feature of nature itself. The dialogue moves from concrete cases—split-brain patients, anesthesia awareness, timing illusions—to abstract puzzles about where in nature consciousness could plausibly arise, then to implications for quantum mechanics and AI.
The substance turns on a diagnosis: our intuition that consciousness emerges from neural complexity rests on demonstrable illusions about how perception and memory work. Consciousness cannot be directly observed except through report, yet neuroscience shows that reports depend entirely on memory and integration, not on the actual presence or absence of felt experience. This means the apparent boundary between conscious and non-conscious systems is an artifact of what can be communicated, not a fact about nature. From here, Harris argues that every attempt to place consciousness at some threshold in evolutionary or physical complexity runs into the same paradox: there is no non-arbitrary point where it could switch on. The conclusion, which she reached against her own preference, is that consciousness must go "all the way down." She is careful to note that this position remains fully physicalist and compatible with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, while also creating space for questions about plant sentience and what new research directions might open if we abandon the emergence assumption. The conversation touches on meditation, sensory addition, and the looming problem of machine consciousness.
Annaka Harris argues that our intuitions about consciousness arising from neural complexity rest on demonstrable illusions, and that the most rational conclusion is to treat felt experience as a fundamental feature of reality that goes 'all the way down' rather than emerging at some point in complex life.
- Neuroscience (split-brain cases, anesthesia awareness, timing illusions) shows our access to consciousness is mediated by memory and report, undermining the assumption that consciousness equals complex processing
- Wherever one tries to place the emergence of consciousness in nature, one runs into the same paradoxes, so by necessity it must be fundamental
- Treating consciousness as fundamental can remain fully physicalist while opening new research avenues, including a better fit with the many-worlds interpretation
The unified self and conscious will are constructed illusions, not continuous entities driving behavior.
- The sense of a solid self moving continuously through time is an illusion: present-moment experience is generated afresh by neuronal firing in each moment, influenced by but not continuous with prior moments, much as we mistakenly call an ever-changing ocean wave a single 'thing'; equating consciousness with this illusory self obstructs clear thinking about consciousness.
“this new experience is being generated afresh, a new now that is obviously influenced by previous moments, but it still has to be brought into being in each moment.”
- Conscious will, the sense of a self solid across time, and the feeling that consciousness drives our behavior are interrelated illusions; neuroscience suggests conscious experience occurs at the tail end of brain processing, so it may simply be how those processes feel rather than the cause of the behavior we attribute to it.
“It's not causal in the way we feel it is. We think we've evolved consciousness based on the behavior we think it's associated with, when in reality it's possible that it's simply how these processes feel, but the processes are just playing out, and the conscious experience of them is not necessarily the thing that's driving them.”
- Experiments inserting and then removing imperceptible delays between a button press and a beep cause subjects to experience the sound as occurring before they pressed the button, showing that conscious experience of timing is not a direct perception but a constructed best-guess by the brain that we cannot override.
“if they remove the delay, they go all the way back, but they don't do it gradually. The brain doesn't have time to adjust. And the person has the experience that the sound was made before they pushed the button.”
- Meditation runs counter to the brain's normal operation and lets people catch illusions such as the sense of self in the act of being created, much like neuroscience experiments expose how the brain works; this makes thinking more creative and helps reveal where assumptions have been mistaken for facts.
“Meditation is an interesting thing to do. It's very counter to the way the brain normally is operating. And so I think it has a similar effect of, kind of you're able to catch these illusions in the act of being created.”
Emergence of consciousness has no non-arbitrary point, making panpsychism-style fundamentalism the more rational default view.
- When you try to identify where in nature consciousness would emerge, you run into the same paradoxes at every candidate point, so by necessity there is no non-arbitrary place to locate its emergence, leading to the conclusion -- reached against her own will -- that the most rational view is that consciousness goes all the way down to the most fundamental level.
“you run into paradoxes wherever you try to place that emergence, and that you run into the same arguments for why it doesn't make sense to assume there. And so it's kind of like it just by necessity goes all the way to the bottom.”
- Because we have direct evidence of our own conscious experience, the answer to 'where does consciousness exist in nature' cannot be 'none'; we are therefore forced to choose between it emerging at some point out of complexity or being fundamental to all of nature, and our intuitions for the emergence view are far weaker than assumed.
“we're really forced to either assume that it arises at some point, it emerges at some point in nature, or it's fundamental to nature. It's either in all systems or some. Because we know the answer isn't none.”
- The term panpsychism should be abandoned because it is an old framework developed before we understood the universe, carries new-age connotations, and uses an '-ism' that wrongly implies a solution has been found; the better move is to treat 'is consciousness fundamental?' as an open scientific question.
“Part of my issue with these frameworks is they were developed so long ago, before we understood anything about how the universe works.”
Consciousness persists without reportability; absence of communication is not evidence of absence of experience.
- We cannot tell the difference between loss of memory and loss of consciousness, because we are completely dependent on a stream of memories to report our experiences; felt experience in systems like the liver never enters that stream and so the 'I' can never report on it, biasing us toward thinking consciousness belongs only to complex reportable processing.
“we can't tell the difference between loss of memory and loss of consciousness, that we're completely dependent on this stream of memories to think all the thoughts we think”
- In anesthesia awareness the paralyzing drugs work but the consciousness-suppressing drugs fail, leaving a patient fully conscious and experiencing pain during surgery yet unable to communicate; this, like locked-in syndrome, shows that consciousness can be fully present while no behavior or report is possible, so absence of report is not evidence of absence of consciousness.
“something called anesthesia awareness, where the paralyzing drugs take effect, but the drugs that are meant to make the person unconscious do not. And so the person is completely paralyzed. They have no way to communicate that they're fully conscious.”
- When the corpus callosum is severed to treat epilepsy, experiments suggest the brain splits into two separate centers of processing that each behave like a self, with the verbal left hemisphere and the non-verbal right hemisphere holding different opinions, tastes and perceptions -- demonstrating that within a single body there can be consciousness that never gets communicated to the outside world.
“when those connections are completely severed, there are now two islands of consciousness, two kind of centers of processing that seem to feel like a self.”
- Consciousness can only be known from the experience itself, so we are always reliant on report and communication and can never conclusively know any other system is conscious -- not a plant, not even another person; we can only make better or worse guesses by accumulating arrows pointing in one direction.
“I can't even know conclusively that you're conscious. And so we're kind of limited. We seem to always be limited in that sense.”
Consciousness should be defined as felt experience itself, fundamental and widespread though not unified in non-integrated systems.
- Consciousness should be defined not as complex thought, self-awareness, or self-reflection, but as the basic fact of felt experience -- the property that some systems in nature 'feel like something' from the inside, a perspective that cannot be observed apart from the experience itself.
“so my definition and the I'm interested in whatever we call it is really just the fact of felt experience. Why is it that some systems in nature feel like something from the inside?”
- Selfhood may begin with a single cell, which comes into being simultaneously with the bath of chemicals around it because they exist only in relationship; maintaining its borders and selectively letting in what it needs marks the rudimentary beginning of a self, even prior to memory.
“When a cell comes into being, a single cell, that essentially the cell and the bath of chemicals it's in come into being in the same moment because they're in relationship... in order to keep the borders that it has and to let in the things it needs to let in and maintain itself as a system, that that's kind of the beginning of self.”
- Even if consciousness is fundamental, objects like an abacus or stick are not integrated systems the way a brain is, so they would not have a unified experience; rather there would be countless tiny experiences coming into and out of being at that location in space and time, and treating such objects as single conscious things is a mistake.
“an abacus itself is really not an integrated system the way that a brain is an integrated system. And so I wouldn't expect the abacus to have an experience, but I would expect there to be countless thousands, millions of experiences coming into and out of being in the point in space and time that that abacus inhabits.”
- If consciousness is fundamental, our perceptions are mappings of other conscious experiences coming in and out of existence, and the structure of matter dictates the resulting conscious experiences; therefore computers, made of very different matter, would entail conscious experiences so unlike ours as to be unrecognizable.
“I think our conscious experiences are dictated by the structure of the matter. And computers are made of very different matter than we are.”
Treating consciousness as fundamental is scientifically conservative, compatible with physicalism, and compatible with quantum mechanics.
- Treating consciousness as fundamental is fully compatible with physicalism and leaves the behavior of physical stuff exactly as current physics describes it; any thought experiment that contradicts well-established physics should be ruled out, so the view defers to existing science rather than altering predictions.
“I think it absolutely leaves the behavior of physical stuff the way we understand it. I think, I mean, the way I'm approaching this and the way I think about this is completely from a physicalist perspective.”
- Two physical theories can be mathematically equivalent yet, by taking one perspective over another, naturally suggest different extensions and modifications; likewise, adopting consciousness as fundamental could reshape how scientists frame questions and inspire new directions even if it leaves day-to-day predictions unchanged, analogous to how realizing the Earth is round altered our sense of place without changing daily life.
“every time there's a paradigm shift, I actually think it inevitably changes everything, including science, in ways that we can't even predict ahead of time.”
- Harris argues that if consciousness is fundamental, the many-worlds interpretation becomes the best interpretation of quantum mechanics because it resolves issues she ran into; she favored string theory aesthetically but accepted many-worlds against her preference as a better fit with consciousness as fundamental.
“many worlds, to me is the best way to describe, is the best interpretation of quantum mechanics. If consciousness is fundamental, that it actually resolves a lot of issues that you ran into.”
Sensory expansion and direct experience are the only viable paths to intuitions about consciousness distribution in nature.
- A promising future research program is sensory addition -- giving humans entirely new perceptions such as a felt sense of magnetic north, building on Eagleman's sensory-substitution work -- because expanding what humans can directly perceive and develop intuitions for, plus building shared experiences and language, is the only route we have for judging how deep in nature consciousness goes.
“I really think the first place to start is kind of where David Eagleman has headed with Sensory Edition. And I talked to participants in a study where they were given an experience of magnetic north.”
- Rather than providing closer data about the fundamental workings of reality, psychedelics and meditation primarily expand awareness of the range of possible experiences and dislodge our dogmatic assumptions, enabling more creative thinking about what experiences other systems in nature might have.
“having an experience that is so different from your typical human everyday experience causes you to realize the range of possible experiences, even for a human brain, that are far beyond anything I had ever known possible”
- Plant biologist Daniel Chamovitz found that anesthesia blocks the flow of information in a Venus fly trap in the same way it does in a human brain, and that plants process light and mechanical stimuli through sense-like modalities at the molecular level, leading him to think plants likely have some short-lived form of sentience though not human-like consciousness.
“you can give anesthesia to a Venus fly trap, and it blocks the information flow in the same way that it does in a human brain.”
- Progress is being made on consciousness in the sense that scientists who would once have dismissed it now openly engage the question and recognize it as a genuine, unexplained problem unlike any other in science; the speaker's own view also transformed over 20 years away from the emergence view.
“when I started writing my book Conscious, I was afraid to share my questions with other scientists. That's where we were. So we're definitely at a place now where many scientists are open to having this conversation”
- We are likely soon to build AI systems whose behavior we normally take as evidence of conscious experience, yet which may feel radically different inside or not map onto our experiences at all, leaving us with no evolved intuitions for navigating whether such systems are conscious.
“if we create systems that actually feel very, very different on the inside but behave the same way we do, I mean, we will just have no intuitions for navigating this situation that we're in.”