What this covers

Eugene Kontorovich, an international law expert at George Mason University, joins Russ Roberts on EconTalk to argue that the legal case for Israel's "occupation" of the West Bank rests on a fundamental misapplication of law. Kontorovich contends that occupation is a technical term in international humanitarian law requiring one country to have displaced another's sovereign government—a condition he argues was never met in the West Bank, since Jordan was itself an occupying power there after 1948. The conversation moves through the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, which determines new nations' borders by reference to pre-existing administrative units, and explores the practical security and legal consequences of territorial withdrawal, the structure imposed by the 1993 Oslo Accords, and why proposed alternatives to the status quo have been repeatedly rejected.

The discussion spans several distinct territories of disagreement. Kontorovich challenges the binding authority of the 1947 UN partition plan, examines why every Israeli withdrawal—from Gaza in 2005 and Lebanon in 2000—preceded larger attacks rather than peace, and contrasts current Palestinian circumstances with their condition under Arab rule before 1967. He addresses the fragmented legal jurisdictions created by Oslo, whereby roughly 90% of Palestinians live under Palestinian Authority civil control in Areas A and B, while Israel retains security authority. The conversation also examines the claimed asymmetry of population exchange—that a future Palestinian state is expected to be free of Jewish residents while Israel contains two million Arab citizens—and applies Revealed Preferences to infer that repeated rejection of statehood proposals suggests the status quo may be preferable within realistic constraints. Kontorovich's arguments about security thresholds, administrative detention practices, and the geometry of Israeli vulnerability frame what he sees as an intractable problem unlikely to yield to external solutions.

Sharpest takeaway

Kontorovich argues that Israel cannot legally be an occupier of the West Bank because a country cannot occupy territory to which it has a legal claim, and that the practical alternatives to the status quo have repeatedly been rejected or proven dangerous.

  • Occupation is a technical legal term requiring an international war between two countries where one replaces another's prior sovereign government, which does not fit the West Bank since Jordan was not sovereign there.
  • Under the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, Israel's borders at independence in 1948 included Judea and Samaria, so it holds a legal claim to the territory.
  • Every territory Israel has withdrawn from (Gaza, Lebanon) became a base for larger attacks, so revealed preferences and security realities make the status quo the least-bad option.

The argument · threads7 threads · 32 claims
0.63

Occupation requires displacement of a sovereign state, which did not occur because Jordan itself was an occupying power.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Occupation can only exist in wartime; even under Hansell's own 1977 opinion, which conceded that a peace treaty with Jordan would end any occupation, Israel's 1994 unconditional peace with Jordan would dissolve any state of occupation, just as US troops in postwar West Germany or post-2003 Afghanistan did not constitute occupation absent a state of war.

    “occupation can only exist in wartime”

  • The occupation argument (laid out in the 1977 Hansell opinion) fails because Jordan was not the sovereign of the West Bank; the US and Western European countries agree Jordan was itself an occupying power there, so the territory was not Jordan's sovereign land, undermining the claim that Israel displaced a legitimate sovereign.

    “everybody agrees, or certainly the United States and Western European countries agree that Jordan itself was an occupying power in the West Bank. That was not Jordan's sovereign territory.”

  • Occupation is a technical legal term within international humanitarian law, not merely a 'bad situation'; it requires an international armed conflict between two countries in which one country takes over the territory of another country and begins to administer it as the local government, replacing the prior government.

    “an occupation is a term of art. That is to say, it's a technical legal term. It doesn't just mean a bad situation.”

0.60

Security operations and checkpoints do not constitute occupation since occupation means governing, not self-defense.

2 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Security measures such as checkpoints and military raids do not create an occupation, which is defined by actually running the government rather than self-defense; checkpoints arose only after the First and Second Intifadas, and under UN Charter Article 51 every country has an inherent right to self-defense, so Israel's security operations would be valid even if a Palestinian state existed.

    “security measures do not create an occupation. An occupation is when you're actually running the government, not when you're trying to defend yourself.”

  • Administrative Detention—holding someone without a grand jury indictment, usually for months up to a year pending a trial decision—sounds shocking to Americans only because the US lacks it, but it exists in civil law systems such as France, applies to both Jewish settlers and Palestinians, and is distinct from the convicted terrorists Hamas actually seeks to free.

    “Administrative Detention is a term that sounds shocking to Americans because we don't have it, but it exists in civil law systems. They have it in France where a judge can basically authorize you to be held without a grand jury indictment.”

0.57

Palestinian statehood would grant military capabilities existentially threatening to Israel and is rejected as a condition because of unfair ethnic-purity expectations.

11 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The 1947 UN partition plan has no legal effect because the UN General Assembly is a treaty organization whose only binding power is over its own budget; it has never created a country and has no authority to draw borders, so the resolution was merely a recommendation to Britain.

    “the United Nations General Assembly is a treaty organization. The only power it has is over its own budget, and all it can do is make recommendations.”

  • Between 1948 and 1967, Palestinians were undisputedly occupied by Jordan (West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza), yet no one demanded a Palestinian state then; Egypt never annexed Gaza, while Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 with only one or two countries recognizing the annexation, showing that statehood was not seen as warranted by occupation.

    “they were certainly occupied--everybody agrees--from 1948 to 1967 by Jordan and Egypt, respectively. But, that was not thought to warrant a Palestinian state.”

  • The Armistice Line is not a natural boundary but simply where the Israeli army stopped the advancing Jordanian and Egyptian armies in 1948-49; the Gaza Strip's lack of a natural eastern boundary and the line running through Jerusalem show that the West Bank's extent equals the reach of Jordanian aggression and conquest in 1948-49.

    “That's why the so-called Armistice Line, which was made at the end of this war, runs through the middle of Jerusalem. That's not a natural boundary. That's simply where the Israeli army managed to stop the Jordanian army.”

  • The claim that giving an enemy its own state brings peace is undermined by Lebanon, which has had an independent state since before Israel yet remains a launching ground for Hezbollah attacks, showing statehood alone does not produce peaceful coexistence.

    “Lehanon has an independent state. They've had an independent state since before Israel, but they don't seem to want to live together in peace.”

  • Having a country versus having autonomy would change little in daily Palestinian life, but statehood would allow Palestinians to legally buy military equipment only countries can acquire—fighter planes, tanks, artillery—which, given an Israel only eight miles across at its narrowest pre-1967 borders, could be turned on Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion airport, making the downside of a failed two-state solution existential for Israel.

    “what they could do is buy military equipment that only countries are allowed to buy. Fighter planes, tanks, artillery.”

  • There is a double standard whereby Arab areas (Gaza, Areas A and B) are expected to be free of Jews—no Jews can safely live there—while Jewish Israel contains two million Arab citizens and Area C contains Arabs; the expectation that a future Palestinian state begin free of Jews is, as Abbas has demanded, an unusual condition not imposed in comparable self-determination conflicts.

    “It's a weird double standard that for some reason it's okay for Arab nations to not want to be with Jews, but Jews are not allowed to live without Arabs.”

  • The international community refuses to recognize Crimea as Russia's not because of self-determination (a majority were ethnically Russian) or colonial distance, but because Crimea was part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic after Khrushchev transferred it in the 1950s; it therefore became part of Ukraine on independence, and the ethnic argument Russia made (mirroring the Palestinian argument) was rejected.

    “Crimea was part of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and had been part of the Russian Empire until the 1950s when Nikita Khrushchev...redrew the internal maps and gave Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.”

  • Reported settler violence data is worthless because it originates from biased European-funded anti-Israel NGOs via the UN that uncritically count any injured Palestinian as a victim of settler violence, including armed attackers killed in clear self-defense; the data therefore gives no sense of the true magnitude even though real hooliganism exists and should be punished.

    “The UN alleges that seven Palestinians were murdered by extremist settlers in 2023 before October 7th. Among these victims of settler violence was someone who was shot by the army while trying to infiltrate Israeli settlement, armed with a knife and explosives.”

  • Not every territorial takeover in war is an occupation; Western Sahara, taken by Morocco in 1974, is called 'disputed' or 'administered' rather than occupied by many European countries because it was not previously a country (an abandoned Spanish colony), so it fails the two-country requirement for occupation.

    “many, including many European countries don't refer to it as occupied. Rather they call it disputed territory or administered territory because it failed the two-country ingredient.”

  • Because the threat from Hezbollah is so massive—directly supplied by Iran, with missiles reaching central Israeli cities—any military operation against Lebanon must be fast and intense, but the international community will demand Israel stop before Hezbollah is defeated, as demonstrated in 2006.

    “the only military operation that could be had against Lebanon is going to have to be fast and intense. And, we know the international community is going to say stop before Hezbollah is defeated. How do we know? Because it already happened in 2016.”

  • A core lawyerly skill is identifying which of the many available facts are legally relevant, since most facts in a dispute are not legally relevant to the legal question at hand.

    “what they teach you in law school is how to identify the legally relevant facts. There's always a lot of facts. Which facts are legally relevant?”

0.49

Every territory Israel withdrew from became a base for larger attacks, proving full withdrawal produces worse security outcomes.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Because the level of hostilities is lower where Israel maintains security control, the West Bank model—IDF freedom of movement combined with a Palestinian civil administration—needs to be exported to Gaza, which would be safer for both Gazans and Israelis than the full-withdrawal model that produced Hamas rule.

    “So, the West Bank kind of model in which the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has freedom of movement, but there's a Palestinian civil administration, that looks like actually it needs to be exported to Gaza.”

  • Every territory Israel has withdrawn from has become a base for larger attacks: Gaza (2005) led to Hamas rule and rockets, and Lebanon (2000) led to Hezbollah; the counterintuitive pattern is that hostilities escalate precisely where Israel gives up control because enemy forces can mount bigger attacks, forcing stronger retaliation.

    “this is exactly what we did in Gaza...So, we left Gaza and they brought us back.”

  • The 'mowing the lawn' strategy—periodically conducting a bigger operation to knock Hamas back—was devised after the 2005 Gaza withdrawal but failed because Israel was not allowed by the international community to retaliate for every rocket and the operations did not set Hamas back as much as believed; it applies to Gaza, not the West Bank where lower-scale policing suffices.

    “'Mowing the lawn' is a phrase that Israeli generals came up with after the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005...The idea is at a certain point every few years, you can come in and do a bigger operation and knock them back a little.”

0.49

The West Bank model of Israeli security control with Palestinian civil administration is safer than full withdrawal or statehood.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The Oslo Accords were a treaty between Israel and the PLO designed to create extensive Palestinian self-government; roughly 90% of Palestinians live in Areas A and B under the exclusive civil jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, which makes and enforces laws, collects taxes, runs schools and social services, while Israel retains security control and, in Area C, both civil and military control.

    “90%, let's say, of Palestinians live in area A and B. Area A and B are under exclusive civil jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. That means they make the laws, they enforce the laws, etc.”

  • The West Bank hills are visible from Ben Gurion Airport and close enough to hit the airport with a mortar, so Israel's tiny margin of error means an attack from those heights would force Israel to respond with such ferocity that the international community would immediately demand a halt.

    “you can see the West Bank hills from Ben Gurion Airport. When you get out, you look, you see hills; you can hit the airport with a mortar.”

  • The Palestinian Authority's 'pay for slay' policy—allocating about 7% of its total budget to a Martyr's Fund paying people imprisoned for terrorism or their families—proves Israel does not control Palestinian governance, since Israel would never authorize such payments or the anti-Semitic school curriculum.

    “they have this law called 'pay for slay,' where they take 7% of their total budget and give it to what they call a Martyr's Fund.”

0.47

Israel's legal claim to the West Bank derives from its 1948 borders under uti possidetis juris, which uses the largest pre-existing administrative unit.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The core principle is that you cannot occupy territory to which you have a legal claim; applying uti possidetis juris, Israel's borders at independence in 1948 were those of Mandatory Palestine (between the river and the sea, including Judea and Samaria), so the West Bank falls within Israel's legal claim and cannot be occupied territory.

    “Let me restate this all very simply: You cannot occupy territory to which you have a legal claim.”

  • Uti possidetis juris is the established international law doctrine for determining the borders of a new country: the borders become those of the largest pre-existing administrative unit, ignoring history, demography, topography, and fairness because those factors are indeterminate; the rule's virtue is that it is a single, simple-to-administer factor.

    “it is the doctrine in international law that is used to determine borders of new countries. This is not controversial.”

0.38

Palestinians have repeatedly rejected statehood offers, revealing through their actions that the status quo serves their actual interests better.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Applying the economic concept of revealed preferences, when Israel and the Palestinians repeatedly choose the status quo over actually attainable alternatives (statehood offered on at least four occasions and refused), one should infer the status quo is the best option achievable within the real budget constraint, rather than believing in exotic solutions proposed by outside think tanks.

    “there's an idea of revealed preferences. When you have the consumers--Israel and the Palestinians--choosing the status quo over actually attainable alternatives over and over, you might learn that the status quo is the best thing we can afford within the actual budget constraint.”

  • Massive polling support for Hamas, including poll results indicating most Gazans would support redoing the October 7th attack, suggests that a two-state solution is the dream of the Israeli center-left more than of Palestinians themselves, so Palestinian actions should be taken as meaningful indicators of their true preferences.

    “polls of people in Gaza say--if you could, like, redo October 7th, should you redo it? They mostly support a redo. That is not a way to step towards a two-state solution.”

  • A longstanding intractable problem between ethnic-religious groups persists not because a clever solution is one think-tank report away, but because the solutions outsiders favor have been repeatedly rejected by one or both parties.

    “There's this idea that if you have a longstanding intractable problem between different ethnic religious groups, we're just one Middle East studies Ph.D. away from a--just one think tank report away from a solution.”

  • Once international actors endorse a hostage plan that does not distinguish between living and dead hostages, they have effectively sealed the death warrants of all but a symbolic number of the hostages.

    “Once they endorse a plan that does not distinguish between living and dead hostages, they have sealed the death warrants of all but a symbolic number of the hostages.”