How the Constitution Can Bring Us Together (with Yuval Levin)
What this covers
Yuval Levin of the American Enterprise Institute speaks with Russ Roberts about how the Constitution addresses a foundational problem: how free people, who will always disagree, can nonetheless act together as one political body. Levin argues that the document does not aim for uniformity of thought but rather designs institutions to make action impossible without broad consensus. The conversation centers on what Levin calls mitigated majority rule—the system of checks, separated powers, and regional balance that forces majorities to build coalitions and grow durable before they can wield power. Much of the current sense of dysfunction, Levin contends, stems not from the Constitution's design failing but from its displacement by a Progressive, centralized approach foreign to the original framework.
The discussion ranges across how specific mechanisms work and why they matter. Levin defends the Electoral College as a force that compels candidates toward the political center and clarifies that majorities are created by electoral systems rather than existing as raw public opinion beforehand. He examines the role of constraints like the filibuster not as defects but as inducements to negotiation, and he traces much current polarization to the collapse of cross-partisan deal-making in Congress, driven by incentives that reward performance for partisan audiences over actual bargaining. Levin also addresses the real danger he identifies—erosion of unwritten norms around peaceful power transfer—while arguing that fears of systemic collapse are overstated given how narrow recent majorities have been and how little they actually accomplish. The conversation treats Aristotle and Madison alongside contemporary politics, grounding constitutional design in both classical reasoning and lived American experience.
Levin argues that the U.S. Constitution defines unity not as agreement but as the capacity to act together despite disagreement, and that its frustrating features (checks, the Electoral College, the filibuster, regional balance) are deliberate devices to broaden majorities before empowering them—so reacquainting citizens with that logic is the path out of current polarization.
- Unity means acting together, not thinking alike; free people will always disagree.
- The Constitution mitigates majority rule to protect minorities and force coalition-building.
- Apparent dysfunction stems largely from the success of a Progressive, majoritarian vision foreign to the original design.
Constitutional structure forces majorities to build coalitions and restrains unchecked democratic power through separated branches and bicameralism.
- In a free society, unity cannot mean universal agreement because free people will always form different opinions; therefore unity must be understood as the capacity to act together even when we don't think alike, and answering how that is possible is the central question the Constitution addresses.
“unity does not mean thinking alike. Unity means acting together. And, it is not only possible but necessary to act together when we don't think alike.”
- Whether the American system gets 'enough' done depends on what its purpose is; the Constitution's purpose is to facilitate cross-partisan bargaining and a cohesive political culture rather than rapid major legislation, so Congress's true failure is the collapse of cross-partisan negotiation—which is why constraints like the filibuster, far from being defects, are the best remaining inducement to deal-making.
“I think it's failing to facilitate cross-partisan bargaining. That's its job. And, we're so divided in our politics now because there's just not a lot of cross-partisan negotiation and bargaining.”
- The American system is best described as 'mitigated majority rule'—a republic rather than a pure majoritarian democracy—because the founders, writing in a moment uniquely aware of the dangers of unchecked democracy after a too-radically-democratic post-Revolution decade, built in restraints that force majorities to grow and build coalitions to be legitimate.
“I would describe the American system as mitigated majority rule. And, the reason it's mitigated is that majority rule is a dangerous thing.”
- Faced with fundamental either/or questions (empower small or large states, make the president a clerk or a head of state), the Convention repeatedly chose to contain the tension within the system by answering 'yes, both,' which lets the regime shift its weight without losing balance and keeps deep constitutional questions perpetually alive rather than resolved.
“rather than making things incoherent, that allows the system to shift its weight without losing its balance.”
- Although majority rule is essential to legitimacy, majority rule can be oppressive of minorities, so the Constitution intentionally creates restraints (bicameralism, separated branches, a peculiar executive) that force majorities to be broad and durable rather than narrow and ephemeral before they can wield power.
“The American Constitution intentionally creates a set of restraints on majorities even as it empowers majorities.”
Competition between factions and electoral units moderates political behavior by requiring each side to appeal beyond its base.
- The Constitution channels factional disagreement into competition—between candidates, branches, and houses, and in speech, press, and commerce—because competition forces factions to make themselves attractive, win converts, and put their best foot forward, making it a powerfully moderating force in a divided society.
“competition can be a powerfully moderating force in a divided society. It forces people to put their best foot forward.”
- Because the Electoral College requires winning divided swing states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Georgia rather than running up totals in safe states, it compels presidential candidates to campaign to the middle of the country, making American politics less polarized and less partisan than a direct popular vote would produce.
“because of the Electoral College, everybody has to win Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia--states that could go either way. And, that means that our Presidential candidates have to talk to the middle of the country.”
- The closest analogue to a national popular vote is the popular vote for the House of Representatives, which Republicans have won 11 of 15 times since 1995—including years when Democrats won the presidential popular vote—illustrating that answers to one electoral question don't predict answers to a different one.
“since 1995 and what we think of as the modern era in Congress, Republicans have won the popular vote for the House 11 times out of 15 elections.”
- Majorities are created by electoral systems rather than pre-existing as raw public opinion, so under the Electoral College the national popular vote total is an incidental byproduct that answers a question voters were never asked; a differently structured election would produce a different electorate and a different majority.
“majorities are actually created by electoral systems. There's not just some thing out there as public opinion.”
The system now fails because politicians treat Congress as performance for constituents rather than negotiation across differences.
- Because 21st-century American majorities have been very narrow, whoever wins any given election wins narrowly and can accomplish very little, meaning the actual stakes of elections are far lower than the increasingly catastrophic rhetoric implies—a mismatch that signals a broken political culture.
“it's actually just not true that the next election is the most important in our lifetimes. That's not true. And, it hasn't been true in 21st-century America.”
- What the system lacks is temperamentally moderate politicians who see their job as negotiating on behalf of constituents with people who think differently; instead members treat Congress as a television studio for performing constituents' frustrations, so each camp only talks to itself about the other, and the system actively punishes deal-making as weakness or betrayal of principle.
“Members think about Congress as a television studio. As a place to perform the frustrations of their voters.”
- America currently has very low-quality politicians, but this is a product less of the constitutional system than of deformations of it—party primaries and the over-empowerment of presidents—which shape the incentives that determine the kind of people the system invites in.
“I think of that as a product less of the Constitutional system than of certain kinds of deformations of it: party primaries and the ways in which we've over-empowered our Presidents.”
- Much of the reason Americans are 'at each other's throats' is that the Progressive, majoritarian vision of the Constitution—including the rise of the Administrative State that concentrates action in executive power—has advanced and succeeded, displacing the original design, rather than because of an unresolved dispute between visions.
“a lot of the reason why we're at each other's throats now has to do with the fact that the Progressive vision of the Constitution has advanced, has succeeded, rather than with the fact that there's this dispute between the Progressive and the Conservative vision.”
Republican government requires virtuous citizens cultivated by family, religion, and cultural institutions that the Constitution alone cannot produce.
- Republicanism presumes citizens who embody selflessness, accommodation, restraint, deliberation, and service, but liberal institutions alone cannot produce such citizens; this vision is a precondition for a free society that must be cultivated by pre-modern institutions—family, religion, and certain educational and cultural institutions—which the First Amendment protects but does not automatically fill.
“that kind of view is a precondition for a liberal society but is not created by liberal institutions alone. And, it's why our free societies require institutions that are pre-modern”
- If a vote were taken on the Bill of Rights in contemporary America—on free speech and freedom of religion—it is not at all certain it would pass, which is precisely why it is valuable that these rights are kept out of the reach of majorities.
“if you took a vote on the Bill of Rights, I'm not sure it would pass in contemporary America. Free speech, freedom of religion--I'm very glad we have them and that they're kept out of the reach of majorities”
- Because the Constitution was written by people unsure it could work, citizens should retain that unsureness and exercise restraint, recognizing that in crucial moments the alternative to the existing system is not their own victory but a collapse of social peace—so cohesion and social peace should be prioritized far more than they currently are.
“the alternative to the system we have is not our winning: the alternative to the system we have is a collapse of social peace in American life.”
- Following a classical argument from Aristotle that the regime shapes the kind of human being one is, the American Constitution shapes national character: Americans absorb assumptions of independence, rights, and equality—even children invoke free speech in the schoolyard—so the Constitution becomes part of who Americans are in ways they cannot escape.
“the kind of regime you live under has to do with the kind of human being you are.”
Americans form a coherent people despite real differences, and the constitutional experiment to create one nation clearly succeeded.
- Viewed with an outsider's eye, the idea that Californians and Texans are too different to be one country is implausible: they are obviously both deeply American—even the way they emphasize their differences is American—and far more similar to each other than to Canadians or other societies, so the 18th-century experiment to create one people clearly succeeded and secession talk is misguided.
“Californians and Texans are obviously both Americans. They're so American. Even the way they think about how different they are is so American.”
- The Constitutional Convention assembled an extraordinary collection of leaders partly because of competition between states: once Virginia announced a high-caliber delegation, every other state felt compelled to send its best people.
“once Virginia announced who it was sending--a really high caliber group of people--all the states said, 'Well, we got to send our best people.'”
- American culture emphasizes procedure and structured decision-making to such a degree—captured in Tocqueville's joke that three Americans together will elect a treasurer—that this procedural instinct is itself a function of the constitutional heritage.
“Tocqueville jokes in the 1830s that when you get three Americans together, they'll elect a treasurer.”
- Despite Americans thinking of their country as young, the United States is the oldest of the existing modern democracies because, unlike Britain whose institutions no longer do what they did in 1800, American institutions like Congress still do the same work in the same system—the Capitol opened in 1800 and houses the same institution today.
“The United States is the oldest of the existing democracies in the modern world.”
- Contrary to the complaint that the Electoral College is insufficiently democratic, parliamentary systems choose chief executives less democratically—Britain has had multiple prime ministers since its last election, each chosen by roughly 250 members of the parliamentary party who attended the same university.
“The British, for example, have had three prime ministers since the last election. How are those people chosen? They were chosen by the parliamentary party. They were chosen by 250 people who all went to the same university.”
Federalism's original limits on national power have eroded as interstate commerce became understood to encompass nearly everything.
- American federalism originally placed most government functions beyond the reach of the national government with the states, but as the interstate commerce power came to be understood as encompassing virtually everything, the limits on national power degraded over time, which is part of why the system now has trouble doing its job.
“because the role of the national government in regulating interstate commerce has come to be understood as involving everything. Everything is interstate commerce; and therefore the limits that exist on government power have really been degraded over time.”