Kieran Setiya on Midlife
What this covers
Kieran Setiya of MIT discusses his book Midlife with host Russ Roberts, exploring why so many people experience malaise in their middle years and what philosophy offers as remedy. The conversation draws on John Stuart Mill's own crisis at twenty—the realization that achieving his goals would not make him happy—and Mill's recovery through art and poetry. Setiya argues that midlife unhappiness stems not from external circumstance but from how we structure our values and attention: lives organized almost entirely around completing goal-directed projects leave us depleted once those projects end, while the absence of open-ended pursuits robs us of the present-moment satisfaction that makes life worth living.
The episode moves through several interconnected domains. Setiya distinguishes between telic vs atelic activities—the former having endpoints you work toward, the latter having value in their ongoing process—and argues that existential vs ameliorative value occupy different moral registers: reducing suffering is categorically different from creating positive goods like art or love. He examines how value pluralism and the incommensurability of values make certain losses inevitable and uncompensatable—choosing one life path means permanently forgoing others—and proposes that this plurality, rather than being a defect to fix, is what gives life richness. The discussion also addresses regret about roads not taken, the rationality of fearing death despite philosophical arguments to the contrary, and how attachment to particulars can either deepen meaning or fuel needless anguish. Throughout, Setiya explores how philosophy as cognitive therapy—reframing how we relate to time and value—can help, though intellectual insight often lags behind emotional acceptance.
Setiya argues that midlife malaise stems from over-investing in goal-directed 'telic' projects and problem-solving while neglecting open-ended 'atelic' activities and 'existential' value, and that recognizing the incommensurability of life's values is what reconciles us to regret, missed paths, and our own finitude.
- Lives consumed by ameliorative problem-solving lack the positive existential value that makes life worth living
- Exclusive focus on telic (completable) projects is self-undermining because completing them destroys what was meaningful
- The incommensurability of values means missing out is inevitable and is the price of a rich, plural life rather than a defect to be solved
Overemphasis on completing telic projects while ignoring atelic process-value drives midlife crisis.
- Telic and atelic are not mutually exclusive modes of acting; in almost any activity we are doing both simultaneously (rushing kids to school is also parenting), so the issue is not which activity to choose but where one's evaluative focus lies—on the completion or on the ongoing process.
“anytime we're doing anything, we're almost with very rare exceptions doing both. So, when I'm rushing my kids to school in the morning, I am also parenting.”
- Telic activities have a built-in endpoint, so engaging with them means trying to complete and thereby 'destroy' the meaningful thing; if you exclusively value projects—checking them off and moving to the next—you miss the value of process found in atelic activities that have no endpoint, which is a core driver of midlife crisis.
“what you're doing when you engage with it is, in a way, trying to finish it. So, you're taking this thing that's meaningful to you. And, what you're, in effect, trying to do is destroy it.”
- Schopenhauer held that desire is futile because wanting something you lack is painful and achieving it leaves you empty, leaving no escape; Setiya argues this is wrong because Schopenhauer failed to conceptualize atelic activities, which are happening right now with nothing more wanted beyond the present act, so they don't defer satisfaction to an always-receding future.
“Schopenhauer on the futility of desire, which I talk about in the book, that he thinks this is sort of endemic to the structure of human desire and there's really no way out. And, I argued that it's because he doesn't really conceptualize atelic activities.”
- Philosophy can function as a kind of cognitive therapy—descended from Stoic thinking about the emotions—but instead of targeting mistaken beliefs about whether others like you, it targets mistaken beliefs about how you relate to time and where the value of your activities lies; the cognitive correction can sometimes help, though the affective follow-through often lags behind the intellectual recognition.
“it's a kind of philosophical cognitive therapy. And, this is kind of an idea that--cognitive therapy itself goes back to Stoic thinking about the emotions.”
Suffering reduction is merely ameliorative; existential value from love, art, and process makes life worth living.
- There is a subtle distinction between activities that meet needs we'd rather not have (purely ameliorative) and activities that meet needs—like the need for other people and loving relationships—that we do not wish we lacked; the latter carry existential value precisely because the need itself is a welcome part of being human.
“Sometimes there are needs that we actually think, 'Yeah, I do need other people, and I don't wish I didn't have that need.' So, that's something I would count as having existential value.”
- Reducing suffering is intrinsically valuable but merely ameliorative—it takes away bad things and at best returns life to a zero, not-bad level; this is categorically different from 'existential value,' the positive good (poetry, nature, art, love, conversation, hobbies) that makes life worth living in the first place, and the two are not commensurable.
“the most you could hope for would be to sort of make life not bad, which is to say sort of reach some kind of zero level, and it wouldn't be positively good.”
- Bentham's hedonism treats all pleasure on a single quantitative scale ('push-pin is as good as poetry'), implying some amount of trivial pleasure could compensate for any profound one, whereas Mill's key shift was to hold that pleasures differ not only in quantity but in quality, so different kinds of pleasure cannot be measured on a single scale.
“One of the big shifts from Bentham's hedonism to Mill's hedonism is that Mill thinks there's not just differences in quantity of pleasure but differences in quality.”
Values are plural and incommensurable, so missing out on unchosen goods is inevitable and rationally acceptable.
- Once you recognize that values are plural and not measurable on a single scale, Effective Altruism's mantra of 'do the most good' becomes very hard to apply: comparing saving 1,000 versus 2,000 from malaria is straightforward, but comparing malaria relief against arts education for children has no single metric and the idea of one is an illusion.
“when you're thinking about malaria versus charities that bring arts education to kids who otherwise couldn't get arts education, the idea of a single metric where you can evaluate these things is, I think, an illusion.”
- The idea of inventing your values from scratch with no input from anyone else is a fantasy; acculturation into values is part of even the best-case scenario, so the genuine challenge is not to test whether values come from inside or outside but to discern when value-transmission is going well versus when inherited cultural values are toxic or oppressive—and there is no formula for that.
“the idea of inventing your values from scratch without any input from anyone else is kind of a fantasy. Like, in some way or other acculturation into values is part of the best-case scenario.”
- Nostalgia and regret for roads not taken—'existential FOMO'—are an inevitable function of value pluralism: because there are diverse, incommensurable goods, choosing one means an uncompensated loss of the others; the only way to avoid missing out would be a homogeneous single-currency life that is dystopian and impoverished, so missing out is the disappointing-but-overall-not-regrettable price of a rich evaluative landscape.
“You're not really saying, 'Well, I'm giving that up, but this is worth more than that.' You're saying, 'I'm giving this up and I don't get that.'”
Focusing on vivid particulars of your actual life can rationally outweigh abstract regret over foregone alternatives.
- Drawing on a Parfit thought experiment (conceiving a child now who will have a health condition rather than waiting for a healthy one), attachment to particular people can rationally switch your preferences so you no longer wish for the abstractly-better outcome; Setiya generalizes that focusing on the intricate particular texture of your actual life—specific students, insights, moments—can reasonably outweigh the abstract knowledge that some alternative life would have been better.
“there's this phenomenon whereby attachment to particular people can rationally switch your preferences so that what you should have preferred back then you now don't prefer”
- Because of the butterfly effect, the exact sperm and egg that became your grandchild depended on the entire intricate causal history of your life, including your mistakes; so you can reaffirm even your worst moments at least a little, since had you not lost your temper that particular grandchild would never have existed—a generalization of Parfit's attachment-to-existence reasoning.
“given the butterfly effect, if you hadn't shouted at your son or whatever, all the little patterns of causality that led to the particular sperm and egg that became your grandchild--they wouldn't even exist otherwise.”
- Even if the expected value of a foregone path (becoming a doctor) was higher than the chosen path at the time, looking back you compare the known, actual, pretty-good payoff of the path you took against a still-uncertain gamble, so a risk-averse preference structure can rationally favor your actual life over the abstractly better-in-expectation alternative.
“even if the expected value of being a doctor in 1996 was greater than the expected value of being a philosopher, I'm now comparing the actual value of being a philosopher with a risky thing in the past.”
- Because attention to particulars drives attachment, you can undermine your peace in two ways: by staying at the abstract level comparing two lives, or—crucially—by imagining the foregone alternative in vivid particular detail, which triggers the same psychological attachment mechanism and generates regret, so thinking in rich detail about roads not taken is rationally optional and best avoided.
“As soon as you start getting those particulars into view, you'll start, I think, triggering the same psychological mechanism of attachment.”
- The strategy of reconciling yourself to a past mistake by affirming the particulars of your actual life has real limits: it works for self-affecting misfortunes, but when the mistake was moral—betraying or lying to someone—reassuring yourself by pointing to the good particulars of how your own life turned out seems to miss the point of the wrong done.
“In cases where what you're saying is, 'I made a terrible moral mistake,' reassuring yourself by saying, 'Well, look at the particulars of how my life went for me,' somehow seems to miss the point.”
Disproportionate fear of death as a superpower-lack can be reframed by redirecting attention to daily value.
- Insofar as there is a philosophical therapy for the fear of death, it may not be a way of positively thinking about death that makes it okay, but rather a way of not thinking about it—redirecting attention to the value of what is happening day-to-day, which is more in tune with what is actually valuable about life; this makes writing a whole book to 'conquer' death potentially self-defeating.
“it's not that there's a way of positively thinking about it that makes it okay, it's that there's a way of not thinking about it that is more in tune with what's actually valuable about life. And, that's the thing to do.”
- The argument against immortality that most moves Setiya is the overpopulation argument: we must make room for the next generation rather than colonize space, so there is moral pressure to accept that it would be unfair to occupy more than our fair share of time on Earth—a reason to get used to dying whether one likes it or not.
“the argument that moves me, I suppose, for against-immortality is the overpopulation argument, which is: we got to make room for the next generation.”
- The reframing of death Setiya finds most promising is that wishing not to die is wishing for immortality, which is effectively a superpower like flight or invisibility; we treat the absence of other superpowers as idle wishes not worth agonizing over, so there is something disproportionate about agonizing over lacking the superpower of immortality, and this perspective at least helps put the fear in proportion.
“what I'm agonizing about is in effect the fact that I don't have a superpower. It's like thinking, 'I wish I was a godlike immortal'”
- The classic Epicurean/Lucretian consolations for death are unconvincing: that death is nothing because you won't exist and won't feel pain fails because non-existence means missing out on everything good, and the temporal symmetry argument (you don't fear prenatal non-existence, so why fear postmortem?) fails because it is perfectly rational to be temporally biased—caring more about future pleasures and pains than past ones.
“it's not super-reassuring because you don't need to exist in order to be missing out on things. In fact, the opposite: If you don't exist anymore, you're going to miss out on everything.”
Positional self-worth and temporal anxiety can be addressed through cognitive reframing rather than changed beliefs.
- Longitudinal well-being studies by economists around the world for both men and women find life satisfaction follows a gently curving U-shape: high in youth, bottoming out around the 40s, then rising again in older age, with the drop being significant enough to equal the impact of losing a job or getting a divorce.
“life satisfaction--overall life satisfaction--seems to take the shape of a kind of gently curving U. So, it starts high in youth; it bottoms out varies around the world, but roughly in your 1940s, and then rises again in older age.”
- Competitive, positional assessment—measuring your worth by where you rank against peers—can be instrumentally useful to motivate yourself, but in itself it lets your sense of what is valuable in your own life be determined by how you think others perceive you, which is unreliable (people are mostly not thinking about you) and carries an inauthenticity and lack of autonomy.
“it's very often a way of allowing your sense of what's valuable in your own life to be determined by how you think other people are going to perceive you. And, in general, it's both unreliable--people are mostly not thinking about you at all”
- A counterintuitive Effective Altruism argument holds that working at a hedge fund can do more good than working for an NGO, because if you decline the NGO job someone else will likely fill it nearly as well, whereas the next hedge fund hire is far less likely to donate as much of their earnings—so taking the lucrative job you dislike and giving the money away has greater marginal impact.
“if you can work for a hedge fund, the chances are if you don't work for the NGO, someone else will. But, the chances that the next hedge fund guy will make as much money and give as much of it to charity as you would--much, much lower.”
- For chronic pain, the moment-to-moment discomfort is often not that bad; the real burden comes from anticipation and retrospection—dreading that tomorrow will feel the same and being unable to remember being pain-free—so reframing each episode as merely temporary (as mindfulness techniques do) substantially diminishes its power.
“The problem is retrospection, is the fact that--and anticipation. It's the sense that once you're in it, you look forward to it.”
- Apologizing to one's child is meaningful not because making a mistake plus apology is better than never erring, but because the screw-up makes possible a kind of valued relationship—the repair itself contributes to a relationship worth having, even though one shouldn't conclude that losing one's temper was net positive.
“there's something about the kind of relationship I'm having with my kid that is being made possible by screw-ups. And that is good.”
- Setiya states he is 46, placing him in the midlife 'sweet spot' for the malaise the book addresses.
“I am 46. So, I'm right in the sweet spot.”