What this covers

Agnes Callard, philosopher at the University of Chicago, joins Russ Roberts on EconTalk to discuss her book on Aspiration and the puzzle of self-transformation. The conversation centers on a fundamental puzzle: how can a person rationally move toward values they do not yet hold? Callard argues that acquiring deep personal values is a distinct, rational process that cannot fit into standard rational choice frameworks, which assume fixed preferences and information. She distinguishes between two modes of reasoning—reasoning from value, which chooses among known options given stable preferences, and reasoning toward value, which describes the learning process of aspiration itself. The key insight is that a person working toward a new value does not already value it the way the standard model requires, yet they can still act rationally across time as their desires, information, and evaluative capacities all shift together.

Callard traces two contrasting philosophical traditions about aspiration's centrality to human life: Plato's vision of perpetual self-perfection and Aristotle's view that character hardens early and life becomes mostly execution. She argues that self-creation becomes coherent once we reject the assumption that the earlier self must authorize change; instead, the later, transformed self serves as the authoritative judge. The discussion covers how aspiration differs from weakness of will—akrasia emerges when an old, unintegrated part of yourself persists—and why transformative life choices exceed the scope of decision theory, unlike the sterile optimization picture of the rational choice supermarket model. Callard also addresses how cultural shifts away from tradition toward open-ended choice have made aspiration urgent yet disorienting, and why moral aspirations differ from other pursuits: no dispositional fact can render kindness or justice genuinely unattainable.

Sharpest takeaway

Callard argues that acquiring fundamental values ('aspiration') is a distinct, rational, temporally-extended learning process that cannot be reduced to decision-theoretic choice, because the aspirant is moving toward preferences they do not yet hold rather than maximizing fixed ones.

  • Standard rational-choice frameworks assume fixed preferences, options, and information, which fails when those very things are changing through aspiration.
  • Self-creation is possible because the self is an organic whole of cognitive, affective, and motivational value-structures that can grow, not a mere bundle of desires.
  • The later, transformed self is the authoritative judge, so we work toward values we glimpse as promising rather than deriving them from the earlier self.

The argument · threads9 threads · 41 claims
0.70

Aspiration is a rational learning process of acquiring new values, fundamentally distinct from decision-making among fixed preferences.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Aspiration is distinct from ambition (satisfying a value one already understands, such as wanting money) and from self-cultivation (adding a desire for a known reason, such as wanting to exercise for health); only aspiration involves fundamental value-learning where one does not yet know why the thing is good.

    “somebody who, quote-unquote, "aspires" to make a lot of money already knows why they want money. They're not trying to learn why they want money.”

  • Aspiration is the rational process by which a person acquires fundamental new values—how they came to care about the things they now care about, having once not valued them at all.

    “Aspiration is the rational process of value acquisition.”

  • There are two distinct forms of rationality that must not be conflated: reasoning from value (the legitimate economic mode of choosing among options given fixed preferences and information) and reasoning toward value (the aspirational mode of moving toward acquiring preferences one does not yet have); the latter is a learning process and cannot be understood as a special case of the former.

    “there's another thing called reasoning towards value, and that's the process I'm trying to describe. One of the sort of projects of my book is to say, 'Don't assimilate these two things. They're not the same.'”

  • Large transformations in people's lives are rational, but their rationality is not captured by the framework of decision-making; rather than picking among fixed pre-articulated options with fixed information and desires, the aspirant undergoes a temporally-extended learning process in which information, desires, and the mode of evaluation are all changing, so its rationality can only be seen across a stretch of time, not at an instant.

    “I propose that the large transformations in people's lives are rational though their rationality is not best captured through the framework of decision-making.”

0.70

Self-creation is possible through embracing later-self authority and working toward promising values rather than deriving from earlier commitments.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Self-creation appears impossible because either the new self was already latent in the old self (so no real change occurred) or the change came from outside (so you didn't do it); the resolution is to abandon the assumption that the earlier self must be authoritative—instead, the later self is the authoritative judge, and one works toward values seen as 'promising' rather than deriving the later self from a promise made by the earlier self.

    “the big mistake that sets up the paradox and makes it seem like self-creation is impossible is that we assume that if there's going to be any relation of continuity between the earlier and the later self, the earlier one has to be the authoritative one. And, what I want to argue is that the later one is the authoritative one”

  • If the self is merely a bundle of desires, then a later different bundle is just another self and continuity is unexplained; but if the self consists of value-structures that are organic wholes with cognitive, desiderative, and affective parts, those wholes can grow and change radically over time while remaining one thing—just as a baby and an adult look very different yet are one person because the organs grow.

    “if what the self is these value structures that are organic wholes that have cognitive parts and desiderative parts and affective, like, emotional parts, and those things can slowly change over time and grow... then that's like the way in which a baby and an adult can look really different, but be one person”

  • Aspiration and luck typically operate together: most of the things we come to value started with an element of luck, but no external influence can fully explain the change—part of the process is the aspirant's own active engagement of perceiving value they hadn't seen and wanting to see more of it.

    “I don't think that there's anything anyone could have done to you such that sort of all of the explanation of your appreciation of Faulkner is the stuff that they did to you.”

  • Frankfurt's framework of higher-order desires (desires about desires) is too narrow to capture valuing; a proper architecture of the self requires values, which are organic wholes with a cognitive component (evaluating something as genuinely good), an affective component (feeling loss if it's destroyed, anger if it's threatened), and a motivational component (desire)—not merely iterated desires.

    “You actually need something other than desires in your story. You need values. And, values aren't just urges to do things. Values involve a cognitive component where you evaluate the thing as being really genuinely good.”

0.56

Aspiration involves incomplete vision and extended temporal learning, not instantaneous choices or clear logical calculation.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Using L.A. Paul's mediocre-chess-player example, Callard argues that although we can clearly see only one or two 'moves' ahead in life, much of what matters is what we unclearly see and can work toward seeing more clearly; so a large part of life is not trading pieces (small clear decisions) but getting a fuller vision into view.

    “there's one another part of the story which is what we unclearly see; and that's a really important part of the story... you can work your way towards seeing it more clearly.”

  • Callard agrees with L.A. Paul that transformative 'big' choices straddle two preference spaces and cannot be handled by standard decision theory (which preference set should one maximize?), but disagrees that they must be framed as decisions; Callard holds they are not decisions but temporally-extended learning processes that can be navigated rationally, whereas Paul, treating them as decisions, finds no clear rational way to navigate them.

    “the decision straddles two different preference spaces, and that is super weird. Decision theory does not tell you how to navigate that situation because which set of preferences am I supposed to maximize?”

  • Acquiring the values of motherhood is not an instantaneous transformation inflicted by a decision; it begins well before having children (e.g., while babysitting and imagining), continues after birth, and keeps requiring learning because mothering a toddler differs from mothering a teenager—so the value acquisition is something worked for as part of an ongoing learning process.

    “it's not right to think that becoming a mother is like this thing where like one day you find yourself a vampire and you have all these values that mothers have... it starts well-before you even really think about having kids--when you're babysitting”

  • Open-ended aspiration—growth with no particular value yet in view—is normally pointless, but special institutional contexts can make it productive; college is precisely such an institution, providing structures (classes, romance, sports, culture) that let students try things and discover what resonates, making it a historically contingent solution to not knowing what to value.

    “through most of human history, it's not a decision to have a child. It's what you did. It's what your religion pushed you in that direction or your culture pushed you in that direction.”

0.49

Two competing philosophical views differ on how central aspiration is across the human lifespan.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Aristotle's view that the learning element of life should become backgrounded relative to the doing element is driven by his belief that the soul dies with the body, whereas Plato's picture of infinite self-perfection coheres with his belief in the soul's immortality and reincarnation.

    “the sort of learning-element of your life gets backgrounded relative to the doing-element of your life. And, the importance of that backgrounding for Aristotle is driven by the fact of death.”

  • There are two competing pictures of how central aspiration is to a human life: the Platonic view treats life as a totalizing project of perpetual self-perfection and value-learning, while the Aristotelian view relegates aspiration mostly to the early part of life, after which one's character is fixed and life becomes about exercising and achieving with the values one has.

    “I call that the Platonic picture. Right? I think Plato thought of life as a kind of project of self-perfection.”

0.44

Agency and aspiration require help from external influences yet remain genuinely one's own achievements.

8 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Following Sartre, people both want freedom and cannot tolerate it; because freedom is unbearable, we constantly produce stories of how we are caused, determined, and forced, preferring that others tell us what to do rather than having to figure it out ourselves.

    “Sartre... thought that like we all want freedom but freedom is also unbearable. We can't tolerate our freedom.”

  • We are not blank slates, and the role of our own agency in aspiration grows over time: when young, we are more under the sway of outside influences (parents, basic care, mentors), and aspiration always requires help, yet it is consistent to say both that one needed help and that one is the agent who did it—agency exists inside a field of other agents and forces.

    “in terms of the role of your agency in aspiration, it grows over time. So that you're doing less aspirational work when you're younger.”

  • Callard's book Aspiration originated as a theory of weakness of will that kept getting refuted by good objections; she eventually realized the theory was actually a good theory of a different, previously-unnamed phenomenon, which she later named 'aspiration'—so the work came about by keeping a theory but shifting its topic.

    “'Oh, it's not a theory of weakness of will. It's a theory of something else that philosophers haven't yet talked about.' And, then eventually I came to the word 'aspiration,'”

  • We have a tendency to tell self-serving narratives—the story we want to hear—to explain our actions, sometimes merely playing with words; but this tendency does not invalidate the practice of reasoning about ourselves, because philosophers, by thinking clearly, drawing distinctions, and attending to influences like literature, can fight this tendency and make the story humanity tells of itself better.

    “We have this kind of tendency to tell the story that we want to hear. That is true. But, it's not true that that's not a thing we can--we can fight that. And, that's what philosophers are trying to do.”

  • Following Aristotle's notion of natural virtue, people have constitutional differences that make the path toward virtue easier in some areas than others—some are naturally courageous, others naturally empathetic, others naturally judicious—even within the same family, so we should not judge others for not meeting standards we hold ourselves to, since ease of virtuous action varies greatly.

    “Aristotle actually has a nice discussion of this. He called this natural virtue... some people are naturally such as to just like be brave.”

  • Even a reductionist neuroscientist cannot sincerely dismiss the language of agency, values, and reasons, because they continue to use that very language to explain themselves (e.g., how they got interested in neuroscience); the philosopher's job is not to displace this language but to help people use it consistently and coherently.

    “you're going to keep doing it. Like, you're not really dismissing it. You're not sincere. Because you're going to keep talking about yourself using all the language that I use in my book.”

  • The fact that a system is composed of many individual parts (as the brain is a 'committee' of evolved pieces, or an economy of individual exchanges) does not entail that there is no possibility of studying it coherently at a higher level; reductive composition does not invalidate higher-level explanation.

    “It wouldn't follow from the fact that the system is composed of a bunch of individual things that there is no possibility of studying at the higher level.”

  • Framing behavior in terms of identity can be a powerful motivator: telling students not to cheat not because of punishment but because cheating makes you a cheater—and you don't want to be a cheater—appeals to one's motivational structure through self-conception rather than external consequences.

    “Why shouldn't you cheat on a test?,' say. It's not because you'll be punished. It's because if you cheat you'll be a cheater and you don't want to be a cheater.”

0.43

Aspiration is worth pursuing only for the concrete value itself, not for aspiration as a general good.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Aspiration in itself is not a good thing—it often feels terrible, signals you are bad at something, and involves embarrassment and learning rather than knowing; it is only worthwhile because of the importance of the particular value being pursued, so aspiration should be 'sold' on the strength of the concrete value, not on aspiration generally.

    “Aspiration isn't a good thing. It actually kind of sucks. It often feels terrible. It means you're bad at something. You feel embarrassed and ashamed of yourself. You're learning instead of knowing.”

  • Even moral aspiration contains an irreducibly self-focused element: when an aspirant fails (e.g., a child failing to be brave), framing the failure in terms of one's own self-improvement project is a legitimate and good response, but it differs from a purely other-directed response that forgets one's aspirational journey.

    “I think there's something self-focused about aspiration, even when it's moral, even when I want to be a morally better person.”

  • Unlike non-moral aspiration—where a dispositional fact (such as being tone-deaf) can legitimately prohibit you from a value like appreciating music—moral aspiration is conceptually structured so that no dispositional fact about you can ever make it sensible to say you simply lack it in you to become kinder or more just and should give up.

    “I can be prohibited from appreciating music through a dispositional fact about me. I could be deaf, right?... But, I can't be prohibited from being a just or generous person through any dispositional fact about me.”

  • An aspirational culture is in some tension with a childbearing culture: when having children was simply the default tradition (especially for women), no aspirational choice was involved, but a culture that urges people to pursue their talents and discover what they should value removes that default and pushes the system away from childbearing.

    “there's a way in which an aspirational culture is going to be a little bit in conflict with a childbearing culture.”

0.35

Weakness of will results from an earlier unfinished self remaining partially unreshaped within you.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Weakness of will (akrasia) is best understood as arrested aspiration: an earlier, aspiration-resistant self that was never fully transformed remains within you, so acting against your better judgment is not external compulsion but seeing the world from the recalcitrant point of view of the old you that the newer valuing only partly overrode.

    “The way that I want to think about weakness of will is sort of like Arrested Development--like Arrested Aspiration”

  • Part of life's learning process is learning who you are and your limits: the self does not simply let itself be molded into whatever you want, and accepting some recalcitrant traits (like distractibility) can be wise because such traits may carry advantages, such as a connection to creativity.

    “one of the ways in which life is a learning process is you also learn like who you are in your limits.”

0.35

Fiction broadens the values we can aspire to by expanding the metaphysical space of possible selves we inhabit.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Worries about authenticity ('am I acting or being real?') are themselves a form of self-absorption; fiction helps because while reading there is no self to be authentic to, and the broadening it produces lets one resist 'playing oneself,' making one's actions feel like the product of what one genuinely thinks is good rather than of a character one is performing.

    “I take inauthenticity to be--the worries about inauthenticity to be a form of self-absorption.”

  • Fiction lets a person pretend to live many different lives beyond their single contingent existence, carrying memorable characters with them so they can react not only as themselves but as fictional figures; this fundamentally broadens the metaphysical space in which we live and has aspirational implications by opening us to new values.

    “fiction allows me to do is, like, pretend I could live as a lot of different people. So, it feels hugely expansive of my life. It's like instead of just one life, I get to live so many different lives.”

0.29

Conveying why something is good differs from advising; influence is legitimate when constrained by truth.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Conveying why something is good or beautiful (e.g., loving Ferrante's novels) is legitimate and helps people aspire, but it is fundamentally different from giving advice; one cannot productively advise strangers because good advice requires knowing the person well, not merely being asked.

    “the issue is not whether they've asked me, it's whether I know them. I don't think I can productively tell someone what to do unless I know them pretty well.”

  • Following Plato's Gorgias, there are two kinds of persuasion: one where you will do whatever it takes to persuade, and one where you persuade only insofar as you believe what you are persuading of is true; wanting to influence others is not blameworthy as long as one subjects oneself to the constraint of the truth-bound kind of persuasion.

    “there's a distinction in Plato's "Gorgias" between two kinds of persuasion: the kind of persuasion where you will do whatever it takes to persuade the person and the kind where you will only persuade them so long as you think what you're persuading them of is true.”

  • Assigning great books in teaching is valuable partly because the book functions as an independent voice and a test in the classroom: if the teacher says something plausible-sounding but wrong, students can use the text and its evidence to push back, counteracting the teacher's charisma.

    “that's part of the real value of assigning, like, great books: is that the book, in a way, is a kind of test and a kind of something independent of me that's in the classroom, like another voice.”

  • Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, argues that the basic function of language is that people want to be believed and to shape others' opinions—to be 'followed'—which means in some sense we all want to be influencers; relatedly, Smith holds we especially want our friends to dislike what we dislike.

    “he says something like the basic function of, like, language is people want to be believed. Like, they want to shape other people's opinions... we all want to be influencers”