What this covers

Binyamin Appelbaum, a New York Times journalist, discusses his book The Economists' Hour with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Appelbaum argues that a free-market revolution beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, led by Milton Friedman and allied economists, successfully persuaded government to retreat from active economic management. While the movement addressed genuine problems—especially mid-century price and quantity regulations that had become counterproductive—Appelbaum contends it was ultimately taken too far, producing three consequential harms: slower growth, greater inequality, and erosion of democratic cohesion. Roberts pushes back throughout, questioning how decisive economists' influence actually was and offering competing explanations for the same economic outcomes.

The conversation moves across several distinct arenas. It traces how stagflation in the 1970s broke Keynesianism as a governing framework, creating the opening through which monetarism and Friedman's ideas took hold. It examines the paradox that regulation overall did not shrink—mid-century economic controls did vanish, but health, safety, and environmental regulation exploded—yet the philosophical shift from equality toward efficiency reshaped tax, monetary, and deregulation policy in ways that raised inequality. The speakers also spar over empirical questions: whether disinvestment in basic research and weakened antitrust enforcement genuinely slowed growth, whether Alan Greenspan's interventions undermined the self-correcting mechanisms they claimed to protect, and whether Privileging the Measurable—especially through cost-benefit analysis—has crowded out values that resist pricing. A running theme concerns the Consumer-Producer Tradeoff: goods and services became cheaper for consumers, but often at the cost of communities and worker livelihoods that bore the adjustment burden.

Sharpest takeaway

Appelbaum argues that a free-market revolution led by Milton Friedman and like-minded economists pushed government to retreat from managing the economy, and that this retreat was taken too far, producing slower growth, greater inequality, and weakened democratic cohesion; Roberts contests how decisive the economists' influence really was.

  • The mid-century discrediting of price/quantity regulation was a genuine economist-driven victory, but it was offset by an explosion of new health, safety, and environmental regulation.
  • Policy explicitly shifted from equalizing opportunity toward efficiency and growth, which directly raised inequality across tax, monetary, and deregulation policy.
  • Disinvestment in basic research and education, plus weakened antitrust enforcement, plausibly slowed growth and new business creation.

The argument · threads6 threads · 36 claims
0.80

Friedman's monetarist framework captured policy by offering a ready alternative when Keynesian crisis broke, establishing monetary policy's centrality to macroeconomics.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • For much of the 20th century there was remarkable homogeneity in mainstream U.S. economic thinking, and although Paul Samuelson would have won any poll as the most important American economist, he ended up conceding to Friedman on a number of important issues, making him a smaller figure in the story than expected.

    “Paul Samuelson ended up conceding to Milton Friedman on a number of really important issues, and I think was not as influential, and therefore is not as large a figure in the book”

  • Friedman's profound insight about how economists influence policy is that you have an alternative framework ready to go for when things break down; the 1970s stagflation crisis broke Keynesian understanding and created the opening through which monetarism prevailed.

    “Friedman has said that the way that economists influenced public policy... is when things break down, you have an alternative ready to go.”

  • Friedman argued, even before he had the evidence, that fiscal policy was the wrong primary lever and that monetary policy should be central but minimalist—steadily increasing the money supply at a regular rate rather than situationally adjusting—and his correct early-1970s predictions against the Fed established monetarism and reshaped central banking worldwide.

    “Friedman begins to argue, vigorously, even before he has the evidence for it, that really this is misplaced... what you want to do is focus on monetary policy.”

  • Even though some of Friedman's specific goals failed or only partially materialized, his total influence was massive: he succeeded in placing monetary policy at the center of macroeconomic policy and his allied ideas prevailed in flattening income taxation and ending economic regulation of industry—most people never win even one battle of that magnitude.

    “Most people don't succeed in winning even one battle of that magnitude; and he came in and changed our society in multiple respects.”

  • Although the rise of inflation targeting after the Volcker era was portrayed at the time as a failure of Friedman's ideas, it was actually his victory in a slightly different form: the core ideas that monetary policy is central, should be minimalist, and should keep things on an even keel all prevailed.

    “I think it was his victory in a slightly different form than he anticipated, but the idea that monetary policy was central, that it should be minimalist in its approach... was really the core of his idea.”

0.75

The free-market revolution successfully deregulated industry and flattened taxation, but pulled back from managing economy too far, producing worse growth and higher inequality.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • There was a coincidence of interest between advocates of deregulation and corporations who were delighted to find their self-interest articulated as economic verities; the economists who rose to policy prominence were often those willing to recast corporate interests as principles, as when George Stigler shifted from fierce opponent to defender of large corporations—an evolution hard to separate from corporate money.

    “people like George Stigler and others who were once fierce opponents of corporate size... came to see large corporations as a preferred alternative. I think it's hard to miss the influence of corporate money on that evolution.”

  • There were two kinds of regulation: mid-century economic regulation where government set prices and quantities (airlines, telecom, even steel prices), which was fundamentally discredited and is now inconceivable; and health, safety and environmental regulation, which barely existed before the 1960s but expanded enormously—so total regulation increased even as one type vanished and another more than replaced it.

    “the sum total of regulation has increased, undoubtedly. But that one kind of regulation has gone away almost completely, and another that didn't really exist has more than taken its place.”

  • A free-market revolution beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, led by Friedman and like-minded economists, successfully convinced government to pull back from managing the economy; while it began by addressing real problems, it was ultimately taken too far, producing three harms: worse economic growth, more inequality, and strained democracy.

    “this revolution, as many revolutions do, went too far. That this effort began with real problems... But we took them too far.”

  • The free-market policy era explicitly shifted government's focus from equalizing opportunity and distribution toward efficiency and growth across the tax code, monetary policy (prioritizing inflation over employment), and deregulation (which transferred protected-industry compensation to executives and investors rather than to consumers), directly increasing inequality.

    “it was an explicit purpose of many of these policies to shift the focus of government policy from an equalization of opportunity and of distribution of output to an emphasis on efficiency and overall growth.”

0.71

Rising inequality erodes democracy and growth itself; policy should regulate disruption's pace, reinvest in replacement industries, and maintain social safety nets.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • While change is good and globalization was inevitable and beyond U.S. policymakers' control, government should regulate the pace of disruptive change—as dockworkers' unions did by negotiating gradual phase-outs during containerization that preserved one generation's livelihoods while their children retrained—plus reinvest to seed replacement industries and maintain a social safety net.

    “one important function of government as an economic policy maker is regulating the pace of change or creating an environment in which that can be done. This is a point that Karl Polanyi makes very powerfully”

  • A problem does not become a political issue until a credible alternative policy exists, as illustrated by a congressional aide who told an economist his critique was not political because no alternative had been offered—so ideas matter precisely by supplying available options that shape how venality and fear get expressed.

    “The aide said, 'Well, you haven't given me an alternative, and until there's an alternative, it's not a political issue.'”

  • The rise of cost-benefit analysis was one of the most profound revolutions of this era, with real benefits, but it makes explicit that anything you can put a dollar figure on gets privileged over things that cannot be priced, producing almost frantic efforts to monetize things like an unimpeded view or a wilderness no one experiences—an approach that is misguided as the only or best way to weigh such values.

    “that approach basically makes explicit the idea that if you can put a dollar figure on something, then it's going to be privileged in the consideration of public policy over those things that cannot have dollar figures assigned to them.”

  • There is a growing body of evidence that inequality itself begins to weigh on economic growth, alongside feedback loops between economic breakdowns and societal breakdowns.

    “there's a growing body of really interesting evidence that inequality itself begins to weigh on growth. And I think that is important.”

  • Rising inequality has eroded democracy because 'We, the people' depends on shared circumstances; as people have less and less in common, it becomes harder to construct common purpose and pursue shared goals.

    “The idea of 'We, the people,' is being strained because we have less and less in common. And as a consequence, it is harder to govern this society”

  • During the Greenspan era the Fed behaved as an inflation-targeting central bank before saying so publicly, with Greenspan asserting without evidence that lower inflation was always better; calculations suggest it tolerated unemployment as much as a percentage point higher than necessary on average, meaning millions of Americans were out of work unnecessarily because inflation was prioritized at the margin.

    “on average during the Greenspan Era, it was as much as a percentage point higher than it needed to be. Which is to say that millions of Americans were out of work unnecessarily during that period.”

0.56

Antitrust enforcement collapse and housing regulation failures have slowed new business creation and reduced workers' bargaining power while concentrated industries innovate less.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Airline deregulation under Carter and Alfred Kahn produced three decades of falling prices and expanding choice, but over the last ten years prices stopped falling and U.S. air travel became more expensive per mile than Europe's; a plausible explanation is that Europe arrested concentration earlier, leaving more airlines competing while U.S. consolidation to four carriers killed competition.

    “for the last 10 years, prices have not been falling. For the first time in history, it's more expensive to fly in the United States than Europe on a per mile basis.”

  • Failures of regulation—both housing regulation that blocks affordable workforce housing and the dismantling of antitrust enforcement—have produced a sclerotic landscape where it is hard for new businesses to grow against big competitors, which is a critical reason U.S. new business creation has slowed.

    “We've seen a real, real slow down in new business creation in the United States. And I think one big reason for that is that... It's just really hard for new businesses to find the room to grow and to thrive against big competitors.”

  • The Chicago-school reshaping of antitrust (via Aaron Director persuading courts) has little evidence of harming consumers and probably helped them, as with beer consolidation yielding cheaper, better products; but consolidation reduces workers' employment options and bargaining power, lowering wage growth, and concentrated industries innovate less—as when allowing T-Mobile to buy Sprint removes the survival pressure that drove mobile innovation.

    “Concentrated industries have fewer incentives to innovate. This is a big concern... the solution is that we're now allowing T-Mobile to buy Sprint--which is just antithetical to capitalism.”

0.51

Prior prosperity rested on public investment in education and research that the 1990s onward cut, while tightening IP rules, causing subsequent growth decline.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Government has historically had to fund basic research because private industry underprovides it; though total research spending has risen, the nature of investment shifted away from fundamental research toward applied work, which is a consequential change.

    “Funding for basic research is something that government historically has had to provide because it's under-provided by private industry.”

  • The 1990s prosperity rested on prior investments—the most educated workforce in the developed world, a stockpile of basic-research innovation, and a development ecosystem with looser intellectual-property rules—and as the U.S. cut education and research funding and tightened IP control during the 1990s, growth declined afterward; if you stop planting seeds in the orchard, you get fewer apples.

    “If you stop planting seeds in the orchard, you get fewer apples.”

0.51

Economic growth achieved cheap goods and services by moving production abroad, decimating communities and creating lower-wage jobs despite lower prices.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The economy successfully made consumer goods and services much cheaper, but the way those victories were achieved—exemplified by Huffy moving bicycle production from Celina, Ohio to China under Walmart price pressure—tore the heart out of communities; unemployment recovered but the new jobs pay less, so people buy cheaper goods while earning less money.

    “The bikes are cheaper, but the people are making less money. And that in a nutshell is the condition of a lot of communities across the United States.”

  • The growth of homelessness in cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York is driven not by the relatively stable traditionally homeless (mentally ill or substance-abusing) population but by a new economic homelessness in which working people—teachers, Walmart and Disneyland employees—lose their homes because they cannot afford housing despite having jobs.

    “The people who sleep there are school teachers and Walmart employees and Disneyland employees. They're not mentally ill. They're not abusing substances. They simply don't make enough money to afford a home in Los Angeles.”