What this covers

Mary Hirschfeld, an economist and theologian at Villanova University, speaks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about her book Aquinas and the Market, drawing on medieval philosophy to challenge the modern economic frame for thinking about human happiness. Hirschfeld argues that the standard economic model—maximizing utility subject to income constraints—works as a descriptive tool for certain decisions but fails badly as a guide for how to live. The conversation moves from abstract economic theory into concrete questions about what we actually want our lives to contain, and whether the relentless pursuit of material growth corrodes both our ability to flourish and our capacity to enjoy what we already have.

The argument hinges on a distinction between higher and lower goods. Higher goods—virtue, justice, relationships, community—are not constrained by income or scarcity. When economic thinking treats material accumulation as the primary measure of well-being, it inevitably starves attention from those unmeasurable goods and substitutes them with measurable ones we can buy more of. Hirschfeld traces this not to economists alone but to how economic language amplifies a cultural disorder already present: by labeling the pursuit of more as "rational," the field teaches people to think of finite, ordered desires as irrational. The conversation covers the ancient higher human rationality vs animal rationality that Thomas Aquinas identified, the self-defeating nature of defining success as perpetual achievement, Adam Smith's forgotten insight about the pursuit of wealth as a path to unhappiness, and the practical problem that even the richest people miss the goods already in their possession because they are always scanning for the next thing. Roberts and Hirschfeld also examine whether certain goods—intimacy, justice, dignity—become corrupted when framed in monetary terms, whether crowding out of norms by incentives is as systematic as behavioral economics claims, and whether cultural change toward ordering material desires to higher goods is practically achievable through conversation and example rather than policy mandates.

Sharpest takeaway

Hirschfeld argues that the economic framework of maximizing utility subject to constraint, while descriptively useful, is a bad normative guide because the higher goods that constitute true human flourishing are finite and not income-constrained, and treating material accumulation as infinite corrupts both the lower and higher goods.

  • Higher human goods (virtue, relationships, justice) are not constrained by income, so framing happiness as utility-maximization wrongly centers scarce material goods
  • Economics doesn't single-handedly cause but amplifies a cultural disorder by labeling the pursuit of more as 'rational'
  • Material desires should be finite and ordered toward higher goods; once desire for more becomes infinite, it corrupts the real goods markets can produce

The argument · threads6 threads · 30 claims
0.72

Maximizing mode distorts human reason by misdirecting infinite desire onto finite material goods, creating frenzied unsatisfiable hunger worse than animal appetite.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • When we are in maximizing mode we may be worse than animals, because humans have a deeper capacity for the infinite (the infinite good of God for believers, or richer human goods otherwise), and misdirecting that desire for the infinite onto material stuff produces a frenzied hunger for more that animals do not have—a distortion of human reason that is fallen or disordered.

    “Actually, we are probably worse. When we are in the mode of maximizing, we are probably worse.”

  • The maximizing mentality means you are always looking for the next step, so even as the richest people in history we fail to be fully present to or enjoy the material goods already in our living rooms—meaning we miss happiness on multiple levels, losing both the higher goods and the lower goods we actually possess.

    “if I keep pursuing more and always feel that I have scarcity in my life, somehow I'm not seeing how much I do have.”

  • When you take a lesser good and elevate it too high by pursuing it as an ultimate good, you actually lose all the value that was there in the first place—self-esteem is a perfect example: feeling good about yourself is fine, but pursued without content as an ultimate end it leaves you not feeling good about yourself at all.

    “one way to identify when you've taken a lesser good and put it up too high, is that when you pursue it as an ultimate good you actually lose all the good or all the value that was there in the first place. It corrupts it.”

  • Defining success as being the most famous or accomplished is self-defeating because there is always someone more famous and always a next rung, so you can never enjoy what you have already achieved—an attitude toward the world that guarantees perpetual misery, as Hirschfeld concluded around age 30.

    “I can't even enjoy what I've achieved if I'm always looking to that next rung.”

0.63

Certain goods lose their value when monetized; incentives shape behavior but exclusive incentive-framing erodes norms and higher goods that generate behavior on their own.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Certain goods are clearly mutated or degraded when conceived in monetary terms—there is a reason we regard prostitution as different from marriage—so while incentives are often the easiest and most intuitive policy tool, the warning is to examine each case rather than think exclusively in terms of incentives.

    “Certain goods which clearly would be mutated if you think about them in monetary terms. I mean, there's a reason why we think prostitution is different from marriage.”

  • Even if monetizing kidney donation is morally acceptable, paying for it may not increase supply, because socially acknowledging the gift as a heroic, noble, lovable sacrifice could motivate more donations, whereas paying for it converts the act into 'she just did it for money' and can produce the perverse effect of fewer donations by undermining the underlying norm.

    “maybe you get even more of it if you somehow socially acknowledge it as a heroic, noble, lovable sacrifice. And that, to the degree that you monetize it, then it becomes, 'Oh, she just did it for money.' And you may actually have an adverse effect where you get fewer kidneys and not more.”

  • Incentives genuinely shape behavior and economists are right to understand this, but when public policy is conceived exclusively in terms of incentives we risk forming people to think more is better and thereby undermine the higher norms and goods that often generate good behavior on their own; a good economist must balance using incentives against not eroding the deeper goods being aimed at.

    “Certain goods which clearly would be mutated if you think about them in monetary terms. I mean, there's a reason why we think prostitution is different from marriage.”

  • Aquinas identifies incentive-driven rationality (do more when paid more, less when taxed more) as the kind of rationality humans share with animals because it runs off pleasures and pains; on this Hobbesian view the only difference between human and animal is that we are cleverer at the calculations, but Aquinas and the ancients posit a higher human rationality that lets us step back from impulses to ask what is good, true, and beautiful and to order our lives around chosen finite goods.

    “Aquinas actually identifies that kind of rationality as being the sort of rationality that we share with animals, because it's one that mostly goes off our pleasures and our pains”

  • Although economists are right that in specific cases (like poker) you should ignore sunk costs, as a general practice always ignoring sunk costs elevates your in-the-moment feelings—which are often impulsive or unwise—in decision-making; deliberately honoring sunk costs (the gym membership you paid for, the opera ticket you bought) functions like binding yourself to the mast, using a prior commitment to act on higher long-term goods rather than momentary impulse, and this is far more common and valuable than economists recognize.

    “if I'm always saying to myself, 'Oh, well, whatever it was that happened yesterday is a sunk cost. I have to decide today,' that means I'm always going to be emphasizing what are my feelings in the moment.”

0.57

Economic growth serves impoverished countries but harms wealthy ones by feeding the disorder that more is better; business itself is good when ordered toward finite goods.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Back in the 1930s John Maynard Keynes thought we were about to solve the economic problem and worried about what we would do with all the resulting abundant leisure, yet despite becoming the richest people who have ever lived, we treat the two-income household as a necessity and have less leisure, not more.

    “way back in the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes thought we were about to arrive at a place where we had solved the economic problem. And his concern was: What are we going to do with all this abundant leisure?”

  • Knowing the serious health consequences of smoking was by itself never going to change a smoker's behavior; what actually changed behavior was when the social stigma became unbearable—demonstrating that social/normative pressure can be more powerful than informational or health incentives.

    “I certainly knew all the terrible things it was going to do to my health. But I liked smoking. And that was by itself never, ever going to change my behavior. But change my behavior as a social stigma became unbearable.”

  • The wisdom that endless acquisition is ultimately unsatisfactory is ancient and cross-cultural (Greek pagans, Aristotle, Plato, all religious traditions), but what is missing in modern culture is that we have forgotten to call the pursuit of just-one-more-thing a vice; vice has largely gone out of fashion except for a few items like smoking and intolerance that people remain judgmental about.

    “we have forgotten to call that a vice. We have forgotten to call that out as a lesser--you know, ultimately unsatisfactory path.”

  • Markets and private property are institutions absolutely fitting to human nature; viewed through the lens of higher goods, business is genuinely good—the baker exercises talents, provides for the community, builds relationships, and makes a living, with markets coordinating all of this into beneficial interdependence—provided the goods pursued are recognized as finite rather than an infinite desire for more.

    “I love markets. I think private property is an institution that's absolutely fitting to human nature.”

  • Economic growth is clearly good for impoverished countries emerging from poverty, but it should not be a goal of public policy for already-developed economies like the US, Europe, and Japan, because pursuing growth as an end feeds the disorder that more is better and keeps people chasing the next thing; in a healthy society ordered toward higher goods, growth would still appear as a welcome byproduct, since flourishing organisms tend to grow.

    “Definitely not something public policy should aim for. Caveat: When we are talking about already-developed Western economies.”

  • Working on the Aquinas-based way of seeing the world for fifteen years amounted to a genuine conversion that changed Hirschfeld's consumer behavior and orientation—she no longer needs a raise, is genuinely content with what she has, and finds she can appreciate what is already in her house—but the change required actually practicing it, not just reading about it.

    “I no longer need a raise. Like, I really am happy with what I have.”

  • Significant numbers of people pursue callings that matter to them regardless of status or wealth—income-satisficers like first-grade teachers and nurses who choose meaningful but lower-paying occupations—and the economic framework cannot handle these people well, even if in the aggregate enough people pursue wealth that the models still work.

    “I remember a piece by Tyler Cowen where he suggested that there are a lot of people who are income-satisficers.”

0.54

Material consumption is often illusory substitution for actual skill and discipline; pausing to examine what a purchase truly delivers reveals finite material needs.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Much consumer desire for better gadgets is an illusion that the object will deliver something it won't; often the better camera or better pots and pans is a substitute for not taking the time to become a better photographer or cook, so the discipline is to pause and ask what the purchase would really do for you rather than acting on the impulse.

    “I want the better camera to substitute for the fact that I'm not taking the time to figure out how to, you know, become a better photographer.”

  • Treating happiness as maximizing utility subject to an income constraint is an actively bad idea normatively, because the goods that make up a meaningful human life (justice, close relationships, virtue) are higher goods not constrained by income or time, so the framework inevitably substitutes toward lower material goods that appear scarce and distorts our entire idea of what happiness is about.

    “if you ask the question, 'Should we pursue our happiness by trying to maximize our utility subject to constraint?' there I think the answer has to be No. It's actually an actively bad idea.”

  • If you pause and ask what you want your life to look like and which goods you want in it, you will see that the amount of material goods needed to live a good life is finite; once you know roughly how much you need and order material desires to higher goods, scarcity effectively disappears and you stop treating lower material goods as the point of life.

    “if you do that, you are going to see that the amount of material goods, the amount of stuff you need, is actually finite.”

0.50

Status-seeking is natural but only healthy when grounded in real accomplishments that serve community rather than external markers that elevate oneself over others.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The desire for social approval is built into human nature and will never go away, so the real question is which ways of getting it are good; healthy status rests on real accomplishments like wisdom and prudence and remains oriented back to serving the community in mutual appreciation, whereas unhealthy status seeks to lord it over others through external markers in a way that comes at their expense.

    “we are always going to have status... But it's a status based on real accomplishments rather than these external markers.”

  • Both sides of the inequality debate miss the point by framing it materially: those worried about inequality ignore that the poor have more than 50-100 years ago, but the real problem is the social meaning of inequality—we are increasingly using economic wealth to make invidious status distinctions rather than treating differences in pay as compatible with mutual respect and community, and this shift may itself drive the frantic search for more wealth.

    “the real problem with income inequality is the social meaning it has. And--and that's a different question.”

0.36

Cultural change toward higher goods happens through dialogue and modeled practice, not policy levers; economists amplify consumerism by labeling self-interested maximization as rational.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Because culture has no button to push like the state or the individual, it changes through ongoing conversations and modeled practices; the decline of smoking shows this—a few laws and taxes mattered, but the practice became disreputable largely through people talking until it lost social standing—so reorienting our economic culture toward higher goods is achievable through dialogue and individual example like learning the names of those who serve you.

    “cultures do change. And they change through conversations like this one.”

  • Economists did not single-handedly create the consumerist disorder, but they amplify it: economics looks sensible because it reflects cultural trends already present, but then it slaps labels like 'rational' on pursuing more income, teaches students to think this way, and through popular vehicles like Planet Money and Freakonomics reinforces the message, making it harder to persuade people there is a better approach to happiness.

    “I don't mean that economists have single-handedly created this catastrophe. But I do think they amplify it.”