Higher rationality
In Aquinas and the ancients, the distinctly human capacity to step back from immediate impulses to deliberate about what is good, true, and beautiful and to order one's life around chosen ends—contrasted with the pleasure/pain calculation shared with animals.
As defined in Mary Hirschfeld on Economics, Culture, and Aquinas and the Market
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- Aquinas identifies incentive-driven rationality (do more when paid more, less when taxed more) as the kind of rationality humans share with animals because it runs off pleasures and pains; on this Hobbesian view the only difference between human and animal is that we are cleverer at the calculations, but Aquinas and the ancients posit a higher human rationality that lets us step back from impulses to ask what is good, true, and beautiful and to order our lives around chosen finite goods.Mary Hirschfeld on Economics, Culture, and Aquinas and the Market