Tyler Cowen on Stubborn Attachments, Prosperity, and the Good Society
What this covers
Tyler Cowen sits down with Russ Roberts to defend a provocative thesis: that sustainable economic growth, properly defined, is the moral foundation for civilization. The conversation centers on Cowen's book Stubborn Attachments, which applies a zero intergenerational discount rate—the idea that future generations matter as much as the present—to reshape how we think about public policy. When the distant future is weighted equally with today, compound growth becomes overwhelmingly important, and this shift from a static to dynamic framing dissolves classical problems in welfare economics and aggregation that have bedeviled philosophers and economists.
The discussion ranges across where growth lives and fails. Cowen argues that higher living standards co-move with human flourishing—not merely material comfort but happiness, health, longevity, and the capacity for virtue—and he anchors growth in the practical mechanisms that produce it: clustering of talent in cities, religion as a predictor of future-oriented thinking, and the perverse incentives that keep elite universities small. On the liability side, he contends that credentialism spirals upward wastefully, that most environmental problems improve with affluence (except carbon), and that the real moral question is not redistribution but whether our policies maximize growth rates. He also acknowledges hard constraints: human rights are absolute side-conditions that growth cannot violate, utilitarianism is a necessary but insufficient test for policy, and some redistributions—public health, enabling poor people to become creators—can themselves accelerate growth. The conversation also touches inequality, the underappreciated risk of civilizational collapse, and why the complaint that growth no longer lifts all boats reflects policy failure, not an inherent property of growth itself.
Cowen argues that sustainable economic growth, properly defined to include leisure and the environment and bounded by inviolable human rights, is the moral key to civilization because using a zero intergenerational discount rate makes the compounding well-being of future generations dominate policy choices.
- A zero intergenerational discount rate makes the distant future overwhelmingly important, so a higher compound growth rate dominates other considerations.
- Higher living standards co-move with most human virtues and well-being, not just material wealth.
- Aggregation problems in philosophy (e.g. Arrow) dissolve when shifted from a static to a dynamic growth framework.
Growth maximization should guide policy decisions across taxation, deregulation, and redistribution.
- The complaint that growth no longer lifts all boats is really a complaint that we are doing a very bad job maximizing the rate of economic growth; there are many policy changes—education reform, deregulating building, reducing crony capitalism, increasing mobility—that would both boost growth and help the less fortunate, but we are failing to make them.
“today we're doing a very bad job at maximizing the rate of economic growth... there are plenty of changes we can make to economic policy that would both boost growth and improve the lot of people who are less fortunate--say, starting with education, or deregulating building, or helping our society be less crony-capitalist, more mobile”
- Because most aspects of the environment improve with growth (the Kuznets Curve) but carbon emissions are an exception that wealthy countries fail to clean up, a carbon tax is the way to grow as fast as possible: since something must be taxed, taxing a negative externality rather than productive labor yields higher growth in almost any model, with offsetting cuts to capital income taxes if needed.
“I think a carbon tax is the way to grow as fast as we can... We've got to tax something, right? So, you can either tax productive labor or you can tax something that with some probably emits a negative externality. In almost any model, taxing the negative externality will give you higher growth.”
- American tax policy is among the most complicated in the world and taxes capital at too high a rate, slowing innovation and causing firms to shift operations or accounting profits overseas to evade tax; most economists across parties think a better tax code would boost growth.
“American tax policy is one of the most complicated in the world. In some regards we tax capital at too high a rate; it slows down innovation. You have American firms shifting operations or just accounting profits overseas for the sole purpose of evading tax”
- Some redistributions, such as public health programs and giving poor people more resources to become creators or inventors, can boost the growth rate; redistribution should be checked by which kinds of redistribution will maximize the growth rate rather than ruled out entirely.
“some redistributions could boost the rate of economic growth a lot, and they have in the past: Public health programs would be an example. Giving poor people more resources so they have more opportunity... I think it says we should check redistribution by what kinds of redistribution will maximize the growth rate.”
- To boost the U.S. growth rate Cowen recommends committing fully to free trade, more government spending on scientific research, radically deregulating building, deregulating most economic activity (with environment and finance as partial exceptions), systematic tax reform, and treating capital income better.
“I think we should commit truly to free trade... I think our government actually should spend more supporting scientific research... I think we should radically deregulate building... Have systematic tax reform and treat capital income better.”
- Maximizing growth must be subject to respecting human rights, and some human rights are absolute side-constraints that should not be trampled even if doing so would boost the growth rate.
“I do adopt the qualification that maximizing growth should be subject to respecting human rights; and some human rights are absolute. We shouldn't trample over those even if it will somehow boost the growth rate.”
Growth framework resolves aggregation and welfare problems by delivering compounding improvements.
- Systematically introducing the idea of sustainable economic growth into philosophy, welfare economics, and social choice theory resolves aggregation problems, because if one economy has a higher rate of compound growth than another, over some decades that situation will clearly be better for almost everyone.
“if you have one economy with a rate of compound growth over time higher than that of another economy, over some number of decades one of those situations will just very clearly be better than the other for almost everyone”
- The way to resolve aggregation problems such as the Arrow Impossibility Theorem is to move away from the static framework and think dynamically in terms of economic growth; at the social level this means people thinking big and believing in transcendent values—an almost religious component to ethical thought—which is itself part of the path to growth maximization.
“the way to resolve aggregation problems like the Arrow Impossibility Theorem is to move away from the static framework and think dynamically in terms of economic growth.”
- We should use an intergenerational discount rate of zero because no one is sitting around impatiently waiting to be born; once you adopt this, the far future becomes very important and the gains from a higher compound growth rate overwhelm anything else in the calculation.
“we should use an intergenerational discount rate of zero. That is, the distant future we should not discount at all. There's positive time preference within a life, but over the course of generations no one is sitting around impatiently waiting to be born.”
Higher living standards directly improve health, happiness, virtue, and philanthropic capacity.
- The most relevant moral question is not whether to forgo personal consumption like an ice cream cone but what one can do to make the global economy grow faster, since growth helps the poor—including in other countries—more than anything else through technology transfer, remittances, immigration, and multinationals hiring at higher wages; the right response is to work hard, innovate, save, and contribute to highly productive organizations.
“the most relevant question is: What can you do so the global economy grows at a higher rate? And that's going to help the poor, including in other countries more than anything else because of technology transfer, remittances, immigration. Multinationals, hiring people at higher wages”
- People with higher living standards tend to be happier, live longer, suffer less pain, recover better from trauma, and are better able to be charitable; most of what we consider the virtues co-moves with having a much higher level of social wealth, and 'living standards' includes leisure, health, and control of one's time, not just money.
“people who have higher living standards, there's plenty of good evidence that they tend to be happier within their societies. They live longer lives. They suffer less pain. They recover better from trauma. They are better able to be charitable”
- A much richer society will generate more voluntary philanthropy, and we do know some interventions work—immigration, multinationals setting up plants and hiring at higher wages, and public health programs like vaccination and eradicating malaria, polio, and smallpox—so it would be strange to think we will never find more things that work; the path is not moralizing but everyone working harder and smarter and cultivating a culture of philanthropy.
“the much richer society will generate more philanthropy... we know immigration works. We know having large multinationals who set up plants in other countries and hire people at hire wages--we know that works... if you vaccinate kids, or if we can get rid of malaria, or, you know, polio in some places, smallpox in others, that works.”
- Even relatively poor people today are much better off than they were in less wealthy societies of the 18th to early 20th centuries—with access to cheap food, partial access to antibiotics, a cleaner and healthier environment, and safer water—so that virtually all people are better off in a society with 5 to 7 times the GDP of an alternative policy course, short of literal unanimity.
“even relatively poor people today are much better off than they were in less wealthy societies of the 18th, 19th, or early 20th century--that they have access to cheap food, partial access to antibiotics, a much cleaner and healthier environment, safer water.”
Clustering in cities dramatically boosts productivity through information aggregation and talent concentration.
- Clustering raises productivity even though you only interact with a few people directly, because there is an aggregation mechanism for information: the best ideas get passed along through chains of people you each speak to, so you are in closer contact with the best ideas relative to the region, and rapid hiring of scarce talent is only feasible in the cluster.
“in an indirect way you do interact with all of them. So, there's some kind of aggregation mechanism for information, so the best ideas get passed along... what gets passed along are the best ideas relative to, say, the Bay Area.”
- The reason clustering matters more now than decades ago is that economic growth has concentrated in clustering-intensive sectors—information technology, finance, creative industries—unlike spread-out activities such as cement production, while increased credentialism and globalization further raise the value of being in major cities.
“look at what's grown in our economy. It's been information technology, finance, and creative industries... Those are all very clustering-intensive. Something like cement production--you know, the cement producers are not all clustered in one part of Ohio.”
- The benefits of clustering smart people together in cities like San Francisco or New York have turned out to be much stronger than most economists expected, especially in information technology, finance, and creative industries, making constant building-restriction policy far more costly because overflow workers in places like Atlanta or Tulsa are far less productive than anticipated.
“The extent to which clustering benefits--having so many smart tech people together in San Francisco... those lately have been a lot stronger than most people expected. I think information technology in particular, is remarkably clustered.”
Reaching growth requires cultivating transcendent and religious values that orient people beyond themselves.
- Human beings are biologically programmed to focus on the immediate and short term, so reaching growth maximization requires a longer-term perspective achieved not by suppressing high time preference but by cultivating broadly religious or transcendent values—love of descendants and care about higher values—that orient people beyond themselves.
“people as biological beings have a lot of programming to think about the immediate and short term... You get people to think about the deeper future, you know, love of descendents, care about higher values... And those, you might call religious in some way.”
- Religion, including monotheistic religion, is good for economic growth, and religion is one of the very best predictors of a willingness to have children and contribute to the distant future, whereas highly secular societies with falling birth rates shrink economies, increase the debt burden, and lower innovation.
“Religion is very good for economic growth, in my opinion. And I think there is good evidence for that... we have highly secular societies, very often with falling birth rates... that shrinks economies and increases the debt burden. It lowers innovation. And if you ask: What predicts a willingness, say, to have children and contribute to the more distant future? Religion is one of the very best predictors there.”
Inequality itself does not cause political instability; rising expectations and disengagement do.
- Inequality is not the root cause of political instability: Poland has had excellent economic performance with productive manufacturing jobs yet is flirting with illiberal, semi-fascistic ideas, and the literature suggests inequality produces disillusionment and disengagement while instability can instead arise from rising expectations, so simple equations of inequality with social collapse are probably untrue.
“I'm not persuaded by the view the inequality is somehow the root cause of political instability. If I look at a place such as Poland... they've had a wonderful economic performance... And yet they are flirting with illiberal ideas.”
- When evaluating a public policy the first question should be the utilitarian one—will this make most people better off—but it is not the endpoint; one must also weigh justice, distribution, and treatment of animals, and a policy failing the utilitarian test faces a high bar even if it can still be good (a '2/3 utilitarian' stance).
“the first question you should ask should be the utilitarian question: Will this make most people better off? It's not the endpoint. You also need to ask about justice... And if your policy fails the utilitarian test, I'm not saying it can never be good. But it has, really, a pretty high bar to clear.”
- One should hold a radical agnosticism about concrete policy judgments while still believing passionately in the big picture, because the force of compounding sustainable economic growth far into the future is enough that you can be unsure of specific best policies yet act strongly now toward growth-maximizing ends—balancing the skepticism of Hume and Hayek with rationalism.
“when you believe in this power of compounding sustainable economic growth, the force of that far out is enough that you can be agnostic about a lot of your concrete judgments but still believe very passionately in doing a lot now to reach these ends.”
- Although Cowen is skeptical of minimum wages, his growth framework does not resolve whether to adopt one, because a minimum wage could well be neutral with respect to growth even if there is a one-time reason not to put low-skilled people out of work.
“I tend to be skeptical of minimum wages. But I don't think there's anything in the framework of my book that clears up whether or not we should do it, because odds are it could well be neutral with respect to growth”
- Contemporary society is less willing to incur one-off costs for a much better future, exhibiting more sense of entitlement and refusal to give up anything now regardless of future payoff—a complacency moving us in the wrong direction relative to the intergenerational sacrifices that built prosperity.
“we have less of that willingness to sacrifice for the future; more sense of entitlement: 'I'm not going to give up anything now, no matter what it may bring later on.' So, I think we're moving in the wrong direction.”
- The post-WWII upswing of rising living standards, democracy, and public order may not be historically normal, and existential risks such as cyber-security, nuclear terrorism, and foreign policy threats are insufficiently treated as a civilizational priority; we should spend more limiting civilizational-level risk, but complacency and budget pressures make it feel like an unacceptable tax hike.
“There are forms of existential risk that we could do more to protect ourselves against. But I think we're too complacent to actually do it... I would much rather we spend more money limiting risk at the civilizational level than what we are doing now.”
- Finance is an exception to broad deregulation because deposit insurance, which will not really go away even if abolished on paper, creates a backstop that lets institutions take excessive non-productive risk with depositors' money; the best fix is higher capital requirements so banks play with their own money first, and failing to regulate will produce periodic crises leading to even more regulation or nationalization.
“We have this thing called 'deposit insurance,' which, even if you abolished on paper, the actual guarantee in my opinion will not go away as long as we have Congress in the modern world. So that means there's some kind of backstop... My favorite direction is to have higher capital requirements.”
Credentialism has intensified through licensing, sector shifts, employer risk-aversion, and signaling escalation.
- Credentialism has intensified because of more occupational licensing, growth of the certification-heavy service sector, the greater complexity and value of production making employers risk-averse, and a signaling game in which the required credential inches upward each generation from undergraduate to Masters and possibly to PhD without anyone pulling the plug.
“some of it is this kind of signaling game where it inches up, what credential you need; in every generation it gets a bit worse. And it used to be to be an undergraduate degree; now it's a Masters'. Maybe someday it will be a Ph.D.”
- Despite a huge increase in demand for elite education from globalization and higher returns to skill, top universities only marginally increase admissions rather than growing fivefold or more, because faculty are a scarce asset that cannot be duplicated and because nobody has an incentive to expand—the faculty like where they are, there is no owner, and alumni resist diluting the brand.
“it's nothing compared to what a normal market would bring, which is this huge increase in demand stemming from globalization and higher return to skills... you would think, like, these schools would grow by a factor of 5, 10, 15. Whatever. But, of course, it's nothing like that.”