What this covers

John Cochrane and host Russ Roberts discuss why the standard ideological binary—more government versus less government—fails to illuminate real policy problems. Rather than rehashing this tired division, Cochrane proposes that policymakers focus on productivity as the master variable determining long-run growth and living standards. The conversation ranges across tax design, financial regulation, inequality, and the structure of the regulatory state itself, with Cochrane arguing that the machinery of modern policy has become so entangled—bundling revenue collection, redistribution, subsidies, and implicit decisions about government size into a single incoherent code—that substantive reform is nearly impossible. Breaking these functions apart, he contends, would unlock the bargains needed to move forward.

Cochrane identifies three distinct problem areas. First, on growth and regulation: he attributes the slowdown not to exhausted innovation or insufficient demand, but to creeping regulatory friction that has sanded the gears of individual markets. Second, on inequality: he reframes it as a symptom rather than a root cause, tracing it to specific policy distortions—fractured education, restrictive zoning, restrictive immigration—that prevent returns to skill from equalizing through normal supply and demand. Third, on the financial system: he contends that bank risk stems almost entirely from extreme leverage backed implicitly by the taxpayer, and that equity-financed banking would eliminate the need for the apparatus of regulation that regulatory capture has rendered both sclerotic and toothless. Throughout, he emphasizes rule of law over discretionary power as the dividing line between sensible and destructive regulation.

Sharpest takeaway

Cochrane argues that the stale 'more vs. less government' debate is a trap; instead policymakers should separate the distinct functions of policy (raising revenue, redistributing, subsidizing, sizing government), restore rule-of-law clarity to regulation, and prioritize productivity-driven growth as the master variable that solves nearly every other problem.

  • Long-run growth comes almost entirely from productivity, so growth-killing regulation matters more than the size of government
  • Inequality is a symptom of broken education, zoning, and immigration policy rather than a primary cause to redistribute against
  • Bundling revenue, redistribution, and subsidies into one tax/regulatory code makes grand bargains impossible; separating them enables progress

The argument · threads9 threads · 34 claims
0.71

The tax system bundles incompatible goals, wastes talent on evasion, and creates perverse incentives through cronyism and poverty traps.

8 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The corporate tax should be eliminated entirely — not because corporations shouldn't contribute, but because corporations never actually pay: every cent comes from higher prices, lower wages, or shareholders' pockets; and the corporate tax is the engine of cronyism because it creates the incentive to lobby Washington for deductions, loopholes, and tax extenders, so eliminating the tax is the only way to remove that cronyism.

    “Corporations never pay. Corporations, every cent that they pay comes from higher prices, lower wages, comes out of your pockets.”

  • The tax code is broken because it tries to do four incompatible things simultaneously — raise revenue, subsidize activities, transfer income, and implicitly decide the size of government — and the key to progress, like marriage counseling, is to break these apart and discuss them separately rather than all at once.

    “raise revenue, subsidize activities, transfer income, and decide the total size of the government--all four. And the key to marriage counseling is, when you are talking about 4 things at a time, you are never getting anywhere.”

  • Asked privately, away from political jobs, virtually any economist will agree the ideal tax system is a tax on people's consumption with low marginal rates and a very wide base, and bipartisan commissions point the same direction, because the first thing that matters is how a tax distorts economic activity through incentives, not who pays more or less.

    “Pretty much any economist will say, 'We should have a tax on consumption--on people, on consumption--at a relatively, with low marginal rates and a very wide base.'”

  • Grand bargains fail because each interest group reasons 'everyone else keeps their special break, so I'll make sure I keep mine,' and the art of a great politician is to assemble a coalition where everyone gives up their privilege simultaneously — 'if I give up the mortgage interest deduction, you give up the health care deduction and the energy deductions' — rather than each suffering a unilateral loss.

    “each one says, 'Well, they've all got their thing, so I'm going to make darn sure I've got mine.'”

  • The United States pretends to spend far less than it actually does by using mandates ('you shall provide X for your workers') and tax credits, which make taxing-and-subsidizing look like neither; recognizing and moving these onto the budget would make government look bigger but allow the tax code to raise revenue at minimum economic distortion while redistribution and subsidy happen transparently.

    “the United States tries to pretend that we spend a lot less money than we do. The way we do it is we have mandates... That makes it looks like we are not taxing, and subsidize.”

  • The highest-taxed Americans are poor people, because earning an extra dollar of income can cost them more than a dollar in lost benefits, producing horrendous effective marginal tax rates; the only way to remove these poverty-trap disincentives is to spend more money, so social programs should be reformed toward more generosity but limited in time rather than limited in money.

    “right now the highest-taxed Americans are poor people... because if they earn $1.00 of income, they lost $1.10 of their benefits. They are facing horrendous effective marginal tax rates.”

  • Charitable foundations function partly as tax and estate-avoidance vehicles: a wealthy person can set up a foundation, fly relatives to board meetings on private jets, pay children high salaries to work for it, and avoid the estate tax because the foundation lives on after death — making the charitable deduction equivalent to the government matching private donations at a higher rate for the rich.

    “you can use the charitable foundation to fly all your relatives in and out of town on private jets that come for the Board Meetings. And that's how you can avoid the estate tax, because the Foundation lives on but all your kids can keep working for it at high salaries.”

  • The tax system, especially the corporate tax, wastes thousands of hours of very smart people's effort on evading and manipulating the code and engineering corporate inversions to move money around the world to lower taxes — talent that could instead be spent making better products for consumers.

    “all these inversions we're hearing about, all the best minds are sitting about thinking about 'How do I move my money around the world to lower taxes?' As opposed to making better products for you and me.”

0.70

Regulation increasingly blocks market entry, protects incumbents, and prevents the dynamism that drives growth and equalizes skills.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Claims that regulation isn't harming business suffer from a selection problem: an observer who talks only to executives still in business misses the firms that languished before the FDA for eight years and ran out of money — the casualties of regulation are precisely the companies that no longer exist to be interviewed.

    “You're talking to people who still are in business... It's the ones who languished in front of the FDA for 8 years and finally they ran out of money.”

  • Heavily regulated industries are losing dynamism and converging on a European model of 3-4 entrenched, regulated firms with no entry or exit: only one new bank has been chartered since Dodd-Frank (to serve the Amish), no new health insurers have formed while existing ones disappear, and a revolving door sends regulators to lucrative jobs in the firms they regulated — alongside falling new-business formation and reduced geographic mobility.

    “I think one new bank has been chartered since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, and that was designed to help Amish people. No new health insurers; in fact, lots of health insurers are disappearing.”

  • Among three views of the growth slowdown — that we ran out of ideas (Gordon), that there is a perpetual lack of demand requiring stimulus (secular stagnation), or that creeping regulation is sanding the gears — Cochrane holds the third: there is no single 'Aha' fix because every little market is individually screwed up, and when every small market is distorted the whole economy slows down.

    “My view is that we have creeping regulation sanding the gears. What's hard about this is every little market is screwed up.”

  • Most economic regulation is designed to stop growth by protecting incumbent ways of doing things: productivity-enhancing innovation comes from new companies upending the status quo (Uber being the prime example, putting people to work while taxi companies hate it), so the discomfort that innovation causes drives the displaced to lobby politicians to stop it.

    “most of economic regulation is designed to stop growth. It's designed to protect the old ways of doing things.”

0.63

Productivity growth, not redistribution or stimulus, is the sole source of rising living standards.

2 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Long-run growth comes from one thing only — productivity, meaning new and better ways of doing things, new products, and new companies — and not from the Federal Reserve, stimulus programs, or anti-inequality programs; people got richer not because unions raised wages for digging coal with a pickaxe but because someone introduced the bulldozer.

    “long run growth comes from one thing, and one thing only: Productivity. New and better ways of doing things.”

  • Over a 10-20 year horizon, almost nothing in economic policy matters as much as the growth rate, because compounding small percentage differences determines whether living standards double, and faster growth simultaneously enables better health, environment, debt repayment, and social programs — making growth a bigger issue than any of the problems usually debated.

    “just nothing matters as much as reestablishing or improving on the traditional growth rates. The United States used to grow about 3.5% a year; now we're down to 1.5%--2% if we're lucky.”

0.60

Banking regulation creates moral hazard spirals that grow monstrous; banks need equity, not debt guarantees, to be safe and unregulated.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • By the Modigliani-Miller theorem, the total risk held by the private sector is the same regardless of how a bank slices its assets between debt and equity (like Casey Stengel's pizza cut into more slices doesn't make more pizza); so requiring banks to hold far more equity capital is not a drag — historically banks operated with 40% capital — and leverage can be moved out of the bank into a downstream holding company that can be resolved in a morning because its assets are publicly traded equity.

    “the total amount of risk that is held by the private sector is the same no matter how much you slice up that risk between debt and equity.”

  • Both Dodd-Frank and the ACA are classic 'old lady who swallowed a fly' regulatory spirals: the 1930s solution to financial panics was to guarantee bank debts so people wouldn't run, but guaranteeing debts creates moral hazard (encouraging reckless 'Las Vegas' betting), which requires regulation to constrain, which firms evade, leading to losses, bigger guarantees, and more regulation — an escalating spiral that produced today's monstrous, sclerotic system.

    “both of them are classic cases of the Little Old Lady Who Swallowed a Fly.”

  • It is paradoxical that enormous regulatory effort targets bank risk, because banks' assets (loans and bonds, i.e. fixed income) are among the safest things around — far safer than the cash flows of Google or a venture startup — and the only reason banks are dangerous is that they are leveraged roughly 90-to-1 with borrowed money backed by the taxpayer; if they issued equity they would be safe, boring companies needing almost no regulation.

    “What are banks' assets? Banks' assets are loans... They are about the safest thing around. The cash flow of any venture capital startup, the cash flow of Google... is much, much riskier than any of the assets of a bank.”

  • Bank runs and financial crises stem from banks promising depositors they can withdraw a fixed amount at any time, which causes runs; if banks instead issued floating-value claims like a money market fund or equity — which technology now makes instantly tradable (swipe a card, sell bank stock, cash in 20 milliseconds) — companies issuing equity simply cannot go bankrupt or be run on, eliminating the need for the entire array of risk regulators.

    “What are banks' assets? Banks' assets are loans... They are about the safest thing around. The cash flow of any venture capital startup, the cash flow of Google... is much, much riskier than any of the assets of a bank.”

  • The shift toward higher bank capital is already happening: regulators who once claimed moving from 31-to-1 to 29-to-1 leverage would be a disaster now accept capital ratios of 20, as people understand the Modigliani-Miller theorem that higher capital is no drag — and reform can proceed by offering banks a regulatory safe harbor from Dodd-Frank in exchange for issuing more equity, plus ending the tax deductibility of debt, letting Dodd-Frank quietly float away.

    “now they are talking about 20 is fine. So we are moving to higher and higher levels of capital. People are understanding the Modigliani-Miller Theorem”

0.53

Modern regulation lacks rule of law, giving discretionary power that silences regulated firms and threatens political freedom.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • When a regulator has the discretionary power to shut down your business, regulated firms learn to stay silent — no banker dares speak against Dodd-Frank and no health insurer against the ACA — so the erosion of rule-of-law protections in regulation is not just an economic problem but a threat to political freedom, which is why such regimes self-perpetuate.

    “What banker dares speak out against the Dodd-Frank Act? What health insurer dares speak out against the ACA... When the regulator has the power to just shut down your business, people learn to shut up very quickly.”

  • The right regulatory debate is not 'more versus less' but rule of law: good regulation is a knowable rule you can read and obey (like the FAA's 18,000-foot ceiling), whereas modern regulation in banking, health, and most business is vague, complex, applied after the fact, requires permission rather than rule-following, and lacks rights of appeal — making the regulator prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner.

    “what I'm seeing when I'm out there is not so much the quantity of regulation but the nature of it.”

  • The legal system has shifted fundamentally: laws once made by Congress and enforced by judges are now largely made by regulatory agencies and enforced by those same agencies outside the legal system, as Congress passes 2,000-page bills directing agencies to write 20,000 pages of still-incomplete rules containing vague standards like prohibitions on 'abusive or manipulative' practices.

    “We used to have laws that were made by Congresses and enforced by judges. And most of what counts as law now is made by regulatory agencies and enforced by them, quite outside the legal system.”

0.53

Inequality stems from blocked mobility in education, zoning, and immigration that prevent people from acquiring high-return skills.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Not everyone needs to enter STEM fields for equalization to occur: if the talented 10% who can do STEM move into it, that drives down the returns to STEM and raises returns to other work, and immigrants who start businesses hire low-skilled workers, so a society where people can move freely and use varied skills equalizes on its own without a bureaucracy picking which fields will be valuable.

    “If the 10% who have the talent can move into STEM fields, that drives out the returns to STEM and drives up the returns to--the other things.”

  • Inequality is a symptom rather than a cause of economic problems: what people actually worry about is whether the bulk of people are getting ahead, and stagnating middle incomes reflect slow growth; income is 'earned by' new people who acquired high-return skills, not 'distributed to,' so redistributing money while leaving the underlying policy distortions unfixed makes matters worse.

    “the worry about inequality is I think a symptom, not a cause of problems.”

  • Rising inequality persists because the normal market mechanism that equalizes returns to skill is blocked: when returns to a skill rise, people should acquire that skill (as horse-shoers became car mechanics), but America's broken education system, restrictive zoning, and restrictive immigration prevent people from moving into high-return work or locations, so inequality is a downstream symptom of these specific policy failures.

    “When cars came in, and horses were out of fashion... people who were shoeing horses learned how to fix cars. So, there's supposed to be--when there's a big increase in the return to some skill, people should be getting the skill.”

0.21

Elites exploit public grievance over genuine economic problems by proposing destructive solutions rather than fixing real policy distortions.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The phrase 'peasants with pitchforks' reflects the disdain elites hold for democracy, not Cochrane's own view; ordinary people sense correctly that the system is rigged, growth is too slow, and there is sand in the gears, but the economy is a delicate cause-and-effect machine whose lever-pulls have non-obvious consequences, so the failure lies not with the public's genuine feelings but with leaders who choose destructive themes (like Trump's border wall) to exploit them.

    “The average person senses that the system is rigged; that growth is too slow; that there's sand in the gears. But it's the job of a leader to unite those feelings and to give them expression.”

  • The financial sector's growing entwinement with regulators creates capture through a revolving door: Fed staff report receiving offers of millions of dollars from firms like Goldman Sachs to help on the very matters they were regulating the week before, a dynamic that can worsen over time if not corrected.

    “People I know at the Fed are saying, 'Hey, John... do you know that I just got this call from Goldman and they want to give me, you know, x million dollars to come help them on the things that I was regulating them on last week.'”

0.21

Income-gated benefits and the mortgage interest deduction unfairly subsidize the wealthy and lock people into low-income class status.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The mortgage interest deduction is equivalent to taxing middle-class workers and sending checks to high-income people who refinanced million-dollar homes, because it subsidizes those who pay high tax rates (and thus take big deductions), who have big houses, and who borrow heavily — and if it were proposed openly as an on-budget subsidy, the public would revolt against it.

    “The mortgage interest deduction is equivalent to taxing middle class, hard-working people and sending checks to people in Palo Alto who just refinanced million dollar homes.”

  • Defining people permanently by their current income — offering low-income parking discounts and thousands of similar benefits — turns America into an aristocratic class society and adds yet another disincentive to stop being low-income, when current income is often a transitory state (a student this year may earn much more next year), so such complexity-laden, income-gated benefits are counterproductive.

    “it increases classes of the... it's one more disincentive to not stop being low income. And it creates people who are in classes, like we are an old, aristocratic society.”

0.18

A carbon tax swapping out crony energy subsidies shows how market-friendly reform can solve problems more efficiently than regulation.

1 pointcentrality 2/5
  • A growth-friendly grand bargain on energy is being proposed by real environmentalists and libertarians: trade a carbon tax in exchange for eliminating all the crony energy subsidies, federal contracts, HOV lanes, and special tax deductions — environmentalists accept it because the scattered subsidies do little to reduce carbon, and libertarians accept it because it solves the problem far more efficiently and with less distortion of which technologies get used and of the political system.

    “let's trade. You guys can have a carbon tax, in return for we get rid of all the crony subsidies, all this business gets a Federal contract, all of the HOV lanes, special tax deductions”