What this covers
Robert Aronowitz of the University of Pennsylvania speaks with Russ Roberts about the historical shift in modern medicine from curing disease to managing risk across entire populations. The conversation traces how screening and preventive interventions became embedded in medical practice not primarily because they extend life, but because they serve psychological and commercial purposes—manufacturing the fear they promise to alleviate. Aronowitz draws on his research into the history of risk-centered medicine and specific cases like mammography and PSA screening to show how these practices develop their own social inertia, becoming nearly impossible to dislodge once they achieve cultural status as standard medical care, regardless of what evidence later emerges.
The discussion moves through several interconnected problems. Confounding variables and methodological flaws plague observational studies, yet these studies often drive widespread adoption of interventions decades before randomized trials test them—as happened with PSA screening, which spread globally around 1989 but was not rigorously tested until 2009. The false positives and overdiagnosis that follow create real harms: a JAMA estimate shows that for every ten breast-cancer deaths averted by routine mammography in women aged 50–59, over 6,000 women receive false-positive results and roughly 900 undergo unnecessary biopsies. The conversation examines why people who have experienced false-alarm scares often become more convinced of screening's value—a dodged-a-bullet psychological effect—and why family members often push harder for intervention than patients themselves, anticipating regret. Aronowitz argues that [profit incentives](concept:Profit Motive in Risk Treatment) fundamentally distort medical R&D: lifelong risk-management drugs and devices generate far more revenue than cures, pushing pharmaceutical companies to medicalize entire healthy populations rather than develop treatments that consume their own demand. The speaker proposes that the ethical bar for disturbing a healthy person's peace of mind should be far higher than for treating the acutely ill, and suggests that in cases of genuine scientific confusion, first do no harm counsels against raising a test at all rather than leaving its tradeoffs to individual deliberation.
Aronowitz argues that modern medicine has shifted from treating disease toward reducing the probability of bad outcomes, and that much risk-reduction screening and intervention persists not because it improves health but because it serves psychological and commercial functions—creating fear it then promises to relieve—so the bar of scientific evidence before deploying such interventions should be far higher.
- Screening tests often function to control fear and uncertainty rather than to extend life, and the act of screening itself can manufacture the fear it later soothes.
- There is far more profit in treating lifelong 'risk' across whole populations than in curing disease, biasing R&D toward risk interventions.
- Evidence on interventions like mammography and PSA screening shows small mortality benefits at large costs (false positives, overtreatment), yet established screening norms are nearly impossible to dislodge.
Evidence in medicine is inherently ambiguous and shaped by structural biases in how findings reach the public.
- Studies with positive findings get on the front page of the New York Times, while negative findings rarely do, creating a publication and publicity bias that distorts the public's perception of evidence.
“But you get it on the front page of the New York Times. Very hard often to resist that temptation.”
- The JAMA mammography mortality estimates rested on eight large randomized control trials conducted between 1960 and 1990, and the authors themselves conceded these RCTs may not apply to women screened today because they preceded major breast cancer treatment advances and used older mammography techniques—yet the authors said the RCTs nevertheless provide the best data available.
“the authors say that they referenced eight large randomized control trials between 1960 and 1990. They then concede: some argue that the RCTs are unlikely to be applicable to women undergoing screening today, because they preceded treatment advances”
- Looking at the evidence is always a good idea, but the evidence is almost always murkier than advocates on either side concede; numbers rarely speak for themselves because of questions of interpretation, leaps of faith in measuring variables, and confounding effects from unmeasured variables—and it is hard to stay bias-free even when one prides oneself on skepticism.
“the evidence is almost always murkier than advocates on either side of an issue will concede when we're looking at complex issues such as health or economics... The numbers rarely speak for themselves.”
Observational studies cannot establish causation without randomized trials, and clinical decision-making requires understanding tradeoffs doctors are rarely trained to assess.
- A large population in an observational study is not sufficient to make its findings reliable; a study claiming ovary removal increases heart disease risk was unconvincing because, lacking a clinical trial, it could not establish that the women who chose the procedure were comparable to those who did not.
“And she said, 'But it had a big population.' And I said, 'That's not enough.'”
- Being skeptical of imprecise empirical claims is not anti-science; it is pro-science to favor good evidence and oppose bad evidence—and the genuine challenge for decision-makers, unlike idealized scientists, is navigating between the poles of 'I'd rather not know' and 'I must find out and fix the problem.'
“'No, actually I'm pro-science. I'm in favor of good evidence. I'm just not in favor of bad evidence.'”
- We deeply wish to prevent regret, but it cannot be prevented because every decision faces both false positives and false negatives (Type I and Type II errors): we act and bad things happen, we act and good things happen, we don't act and good things happen, and we don't act and bad things happen—and we do not feel the same way about errors of omission versus commission.
“We'd like to prevent regret. And yet there is no way to prevent it. Because there's Type I and Type II errors: there's false positives and false negatives... We don't feel the same about active and passive actions.”
- Remarkably few doctors understand statistical issues, and a biostatistics class is insufficient because it teaches definitions and how to run tests rather than the thoughtful risk-analysis tradeoffs—and quality-of-life considerations—that real medical decisions require.
“I find it remarkable how few doctors understand statistical issues and taking a statistics class or a biostatistics class is not sufficient. What you learn in those classes typically is the definitions of the different techniques and how the tests are run.”
Screening programs generate massive harms from false positives and overdiagnosis that vastly outweigh mortality benefits.
- A JAMA estimate suggests that out of 10,000 women getting annual mammograms (age 50-59), only about 10 deaths are averted while there are over 6,000 false positives and roughly 900 biopsies showing nothing, plus overdiagnosis leading to unnecessary mastectomies and radiation risk—a tragically imprecise tradeoff that the culture treats as a no-brainer.
“I think the JAMA article, it said, out of 10 thousand mammograms, there were over 6000 false positives, and that 10 deaths were averted from those? It's a stunningly imprecise, tragically imprecise thing.”
Third-party payment combined with profit incentives pushes unnecessary medical consumption under a 'better safe than sorry' logic.
- Consuming medical products with other people's money through third-party payments, combined with the profit motive, creates an unhealthy dynamic that pushes products under a 'better safe than sorry' rationale; the speaker would prefer a world of medicine with less third-party payment and more out-of-pocket spending, though the system is moving the other way.
“in a world where often we are paying--we are consuming products using other people's money, third party payments in the medical area, that combined with the profit motive leads to a pretty unhealthy dynamic of pushing products that people think, 'Well, it couldn't hurt. Better safe than sorry.'”