Jonathan Rodden on the Geography of Voting
What this covers
Jonathan Rodden and Russ Roberts examine why urban voters across the world consistently favor Left parties, tracing the pattern back to industrialization and exploring how electoral rules amplify or dampen the effect. Rodden, a Stanford political scientist, argues that the urban-Left correlation is not primarily about city life converting voters to progressive politics, but rather stems from [path dependence](concept:Path Dependence): dense working-class housing built during the 19th and early 20th centuries remains structurally intact, continuing to attract lower-income and Left-leaning residents even as manufacturing has vanished. The conversation moves from this historical geography into electoral mechanics, showing how winner-take-all voting systems interact with geographic clustering to produce systematic disparities in representation.
The discussion unpacks several layers of that interaction. Current Democratic vote share tracks not present-day manufacturing but Census data from the 1880s–1910s, a striking correlation that illustrates residential durability. Rodden demonstrates that winner-take-all districts convert dense urban precincts—often 80–90% Democratic—into safe seats full of wasted votes, while leaving Democrats too scattered to compete elsewhere. By contrast, European center-Left parties adopted proportional representation to survive Left challengers before Duverger's Law squeezed them out entirely. The pair also address Arrow's Impossibility / Cycling Majorities and the Retrospective Accountability Model of Democracy as frameworks for thinking about whether elections can meaningfully reflect public will. Rural precincts, notably, never reach the polarization density of urban ones—an asymmetry Rodden cannot fully explain—and geographic selection effect versus treatment effects remain analytically unresolved.
Rodden argues that the global tendency of urban voters to favor the political Left is rooted in the geography of industrialization and resilient 19th-century working-class housing stock, and that when this geographic concentration interacts with winner-take-all electoral rules, the Left's votes are 'wasted' in landslide urban districts, systematically underrepresenting it relative to proportional systems.
- Current Democratic vote share correlates with historical (1880s-1910s) manufacturing employment, not present-day manufacturing, because durable urban housing stock keeps attracting Left-leaning residents
- Winner-take-all districts convert dense 80-90% Democratic urban precincts into wasted surplus votes, creating an asymmetry in translating votes into seats
- European center parties switched to proportional representation to avoid being squeezed out by insurgent Left parties; the US and UK never made that switch
Political decisions are coercive and cannot reflect popular will, so markets and free choice should replace political choices.
- Because political decisions cannot reflect anything close to the will of the people and are inevitably coercive, as few decisions as possible should be placed into the political 'sandbox'; the competition of free association and free choice in private markets allows a diversity of outcomes that majoritarian political decisions cannot.
“Because political decisions will struggle to reflect anything remotely like the will of the people, I want as few decisions as possible put into that sandbox.”
One-party rule in US cities functions as a monopoly that harms governance quality regardless of which party dominates.
- Many US core cities have effectively one-party rule, which — like any monopoly — undermines good governance regardless of which party holds it, though how much of urban decline is attributable to this lack of competition versus other causes is hard to establish.
“any time you have a monopoly--essentially what feels like a monopoly--even though there's an election every four years for the mayor, but if the party that the mayor represents wins every time, it can't be very good for serving the customer.”
Institutional barriers to change like the Electoral College create beneficial inertia that stabilizes governance.
- Institutions like the Electoral College persist not only because actors fear losing a perceived advantage but because the Founders deliberately made them costly to change, and this inertia is often a blessing rather than a curse.
“they made it hard to change... it's just that it's very costly to change it; and it gives you that inertia which I think is often a good thing, not a bad thing.”
Proportional representation and redistricting both allow parties to strategically waste opponent votes or consolidate their own.
- The logic of proportional representation preserving Left power parallels redistricting: a known opposing-party incumbent can be 'packed' to win by 90% (wasting their surplus votes for free since they still get only one seat), while your own voters are redistributed to push your share above 50% in more districts.
“you give him a piece of somebody else's district that makes him win by 90%. But that doesn't cost you anything, because he still gets his one seat.”