What this covers

Arnold Kling and Russ Roberts examine the structural mismatch between how knowledge is organized in modern economies and how political power is distributed. Kling, author of Unchecked and Unbalanced, argues that specialization has fragmented knowledge across millions of experts and enterprises—evident in proliferating medical and legal specialties, new occupations, and product diversity—while government has undergone simultaneous "scale creep" and "scope creep," concentrating power in fewer hands without acquiring the expertise to wield it well. The conversation traces how this imbalance contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, where regulators like Bernanke and Paulson failed to understand the embedded derivatives and put options in the mortgage system, and how it generates persistent inefficiency across medicine, education, infrastructure, and finance.

The discussion ranges across concrete failures and theoretical foundations. Kling shows how regulatory capture insulates failing institutions: ratings agencies survived their crisis blunders because their customer was the regulator, not the bond market, and the SEC's licensing oligopoly protects them from discipline. He argues that centralized power systematically selects for overconfident generalists while markets impose discipline through shareholder revolt and competition. The internet emerges as a counterweight—enabling decentralized problem-solving and instant contestation of authority—and Kling sketches possibilities like "virtual government," where citizens could opt into different jurisdictions' services, or governance modeled on engineering standards bodies. Roberts pushes back at points but grants the underlying logic: that markets aggregate dispersed knowledge in ways centralized planning cannot replicate, a principle Kling grounds in Hayek and extends to challenges in school consolidation, healthcare specialization, and the illusion of omniscient regulators.

Sharpest takeaway

Kling argues that knowledge has become increasingly dispersed and specialized while political power has become increasingly concentrated, and this discrepancy fuels inefficiency, contributed to the financial crisis, and threatens democracy—favoring decentralized, competitive, market-like mechanisms over centralized regulation and omniscient generalist regulators.

  • Markets aggregate dispersed knowledge (Hayek), so growing dispersion argues for more market-mediated transactions, not more central planning.
  • The financial crisis showed regulators lacked the expertise they were assumed to have (Bernanke/Paulson misunderstood mortgage instruments).
  • Government scale and scope creep concentrates power without efficiency gains and lacks the checks and balances that discipline private CEOs.

The claims · ranked26 claims · weighted by value

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0.79

In response to dispersed knowledge, the private economy adapts in an emergent Hayekian way through less vertical integration—firms outsource specialist tasks, and households outsource food preparation, cleaning, and lawn care—making everyone increasingly dependent on others' implicit expertise.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“it really makes us very much dependent on other people's expertise”

0.79

The push for omniscient generalist regulators systematically selects for people who overestimate their own knowledge, because anyone with a realistic understanding of their limitations would not seek a position requiring impossible feats—so you 'get what you pay for' (e.g., Mark Zandi confidently stating a fiscal multiplier of 1.5 when the value is empirically indeterminate).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“somebody who had a realistic understanding of their limitations probably would not find their way into a position where they're expected to do something that they don't think is possible”

0.79

The ratings agencies survived their crisis failures because their effective customer was the regulator, not the bond buyer: they messed up rating securities held on bank books to obtain lower regulatory capital requirements, and since regulators didn't care and didn't fire them, the agencies were insulated—whereas if they had misrated bonds actually traded in the market, normal buyers would have abandoned them and some would have gone out of business.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“where they messed up was in rating securities that were not going to be traded in the marketplace... the customer indirectly was the regulator”

0.78

The Hayekian socialist calculation insight—that dispersed knowledge cannot be aggregated into a central computer—means a competent 'super regulator' who knows whom to ask and obtains the right information is fundamentally elusive, a conclusion people find counterintuitive and prefer not to be true.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Arnold Kling

“it's just for the reason that Hayek you know explained during the socialist calculation debate you just cannot put all of the information into a central computer”

0.75

Knowledge is becoming more specialized as evidenced by the rising number of medical and legal specialties, the proliferation of college majors compared to 30 years ago, increased product diversity, and entirely new occupations (web design, social media marketing) that did not exist 20 years ago.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“you can track the number of Medical Specialties and that's clearly going up I think you can track legal specialties if you go to a college campus you will see many more possible majors than you did 30 years ago”

0.75

The difficulty of being a Renaissance person today reflects rising returns to specialization: the cost of mastering many fields has increased, so even within a single discipline like mathematics or physics no individual can master the whole field anymore.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the cost of mastering lots of things has probably gone up and maybe that's proof of your point it's really the return to specialization has gone up”

0.73

The expertise required to regulate a complex financial system simply does not exist, as demonstrated when Bernanke and Paulson, and the regulators generally, failed to understand the embedded put options being written (e.g., by AIG) and wrongly expected the subprime crisis to be confined to housing.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“the at the expertise that you want to have to regulate the financial system just plain does not exist”

0.73

Markets provide checks and balances on overconfident CEOs that government lacks: a CEO who overreaches into industries he doesn't understand will be punished by shareholders, investors, or the market for corporate control, whereas government officials can declare by fiat that they are capable of regulating drugs, urban planning, or creating an electric-car grid with no one able to say no, leading to inefficient, badly run outcomes.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“think of the checks and balances that are in place in the market when a CEO thinks that he... can do more than he really can... investors out there are going to punish him for doing that”

0.73

A strong central government does not weaken concentrated economic power but tends to ally with it; powerful government and powerful large firms become friends, as shown by Goldman Sachs, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae being protected from going out of business even when they fail.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“I don't think that there's much evidence that having a strong central government weakens concentration of economic power... ultimately powerful government and powerful large firms are friends”

0.73

If government exited the egg (or meat) inspection business, producers would have a strong incentive to fund a credible private inspection service, which would likely guard its credibility more carefully than the government agency—because a private inspector that failed as badly as the recent salmonella episode would lose all trust and go out of business, whereas no one even knows if anyone was fired at the government agency.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“the egg manufacturers would have a really strong interest in being able to sell certified eggs and so they would look to somebody to create an egg Inspection Service”

0.73

Knowledge has become increasingly specialized and dispersed while political power has become increasingly concentrated, and this discrepancy causes inefficiency and general dissatisfaction because dispersed knowledge calls for more market-mediated transactions but we instead have more transactions mediated by central planning.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“knowledge has become increasingly specialized and dispersed but power is becoming increasingly concentrated that's the discrepancy”

0.73

Government has undergone both 'scale creep'—rising dollars spent per constituent multiplied by rising constituents per fixed government unit (one Congress, 50 states, 435 representatives) yielding an explosion in overall government scale—and 'scope creep,' becoming involved in areas like environmental protection, health insurance, and education that it previously was not.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“so I call that scale creep in addition you get what I call scope creep that is government seeming to become involved in in things that at least in the United States it didn't used to be involved in”

0.72

The internet advantages decentralized knowledge and disadvantages concentrated power: unlike the mass media of the 1950s-60s where licenses and equipment limited broadcasting to a few, anyone can now publish, so a presidential address is instantly met with critics posting their challenges, replicating an almost-anarchic, self-organizing order whose only central control is domain registration (ICANN).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Arnold Kling

“it creates advantages for the for decentralized knowledge and for the uses of decentralized knowledge and it creates fewer advantages for concentration of power”

0.71

Most regulations are not written by elected officials or agency heads but by specialist staff with deep domain knowledge, then contested through a Byzantine adjudication process where industry, NGOs, and members of Congress push back—so regulation is not as purely autocratic as critics claim, though the biggest businesses with the biggest lawyers tend to win.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“most regulations are not very specific the specificity is turned over to the agency not an expert... they write those regulations the details and then it goes through this bizarre process of adjudication”

0.71

Elite policy illusions can erode through negative feedback over time, as the 1970s wage-and-price-control consensus did after its results proved horrible and no serious elite advocates it today—offering hope that elites may eventually learn that concentration of power works worse than expected, despite the mind's strong tendency toward confirmation bias and tuning out negative feedback.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“in the 1970s where the elites thought that wage and price controls would be a solution... we finally tried it in 70s the results were horrible and no one advocates wage and price controls is the solution today”

0.70

Ratings agencies are propped up as a protected oligopoly because law effectively requires bond issuers to obtain ratings and the SEC licenses only a small group of approved agencies—analogous to the Big Four accounting firms being protected from failure—so they cannot go out of business regardless of performance.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“I think they're required by law... when they issue a bond to have be rated and as a result I think that is what props up those folks”

0.68

Consolidating school districts beyond the efficient scale (estimated in the 10,000–20,000 student range) yields no efficiency gain but only additional concentration of power, sacrificing responsiveness to the electorate without compensating benefit—unlike market-driven scale, which is disciplined by competition.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“we have in this country consolidated school districts to the point where many many school districts are much larger than that sort of point of maximum efficiency and so all you get at that point is additional concentration of power with no gain in efficiency”

0.66

Market economies of scale (utilities, communications, Google) can legitimately emerge and later be overcome, as IBM's once-dominant scale economies in computing dissolved without needing a forced breakup; by contrast, government scale economies like large school systems are artificial—imposed by fiat rather than won through competition.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Arnold Kling

“somebody who seems to be on top like IBM... we had to worry about breaking up IBM and it turned out we didn't have to worry about breaking up IBM”

0.63

Atul Gawande's New Yorker example shows that a generalist physician who sees an elderly patient's combined problems can prescribe a coherent set of treatments better than multiple specialists who each, hammer-like, treat only their narrow problem; the current healthcare system destroys the incentives for that kind of market-based generalist care.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“rather than looking for a nail with the hammer that his specialty is always using he prescribes a more general set of solutions that are much better for her”

0.63

The internet enables ordinary non-specialists to aggregate dispersed knowledge to solve their own problems—as illustrated by debugging a Skype connection or unclogging a bathtub via Google searches and crowd-sourced public-good answers—reducing reliance on specialists, a phenomenon where people who once watched television now create public goods.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“the internet right allows that kind of problem solving in a way that... aggregates knowledge in an incredible way”

0.61

Government could be disaggregated by decoupling service provision from physical jurisdiction—'virtual government'—so a citizen in New Jersey could opt into California's education or welfare system, just as lawn care is provided by competing firms rather than tied to one's neighborhood, even while remaining publicly funded.

normativehigh valuefringenovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Arnold Kling

“I belong to a California education system even though I live in New Jersey”

0.49

Montgomery County's nine council members allocating a 4.5 billion dollar budget represents an extraordinary concentration of power—roughly 500 million dollars apiece—over nearly a million people, with weak checks and balances such that the county is effectively run by the teachers union and other special interests, illustrating that local government is no longer truly 'local.'

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Arnold Kling

“there are nine County Council members allocating a budget of 4.5 billion dollars... there are very few people who could spend five hundred million dollars apiece every year consistently”

0.48

The internet engineering task force model—self-organizing groups of unpaid volunteer experts who assemble to solve a problem (e.g., standardizing JavaScript), negotiate a proposed solution, stabilize it once complaints stop, and then disperse—offers a decentralized governance model that, if applied to actual government, would be far better.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Arnold Kling

“when basically when people stop complaining about that proposed solution it stabilizes and it becomes the solution and the task force disperses”

0.34

Whether people derive satisfaction from highly specialized jobs is fundamentally a personality issue rather than a property of the specialization itself—some people love mastering one thing and solving the same kind of problem all day, while others crave variety.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Arnold Kling

“I see it more as a personality issue I think there are a lot of people who love doing one thing and mastering it”

0.26

There is a measurement ambiguity in whether households have become more or less specialized: a homeowner running a home IT network is effectively operating an IT center yet understands almost none of it, relying instead on outsourced expertise (Verizon), so specialization and de-specialization coexist within the household.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Arnold Kling

“that's why there's a measurement question here as my household gotten more specialized or less specialized what the heck am I doing with a an IT network in my house”

0.23

The November election will be the first chance voters have had to vote against the bailouts, and the widespread anger about the speed and scope of government involvement in the car and financial industries—rather than just unemployment—is driving the electoral mood.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Arnold Kling

“this election is gonna be the first chance that people have to vote against the bailouts”