market for corporate control
The market in which control of corporations is bought and sold through takeovers, disciplining managers whose firms underperform their potential value.
As defined in Michael Munger on Crony Capitalism
Other definitions
The ability of outside bidders to take over a company through tender offers or hostile bids, which disciplines management that underperforms.
Going Activist in Japan
Where it comes up · 4
- Going Activist in Japan3 claims
- John Cochrane1 claim
- Michael Munger on Crony Capitalism1 claim
- Arnold Kling on Knowledge, Power, and Unchecked and Unbalanced 09/06/20101 claim
Most important claims · 6 of 6Search all claims for “market for corporate control” →
- Historically hostile takeover bids were frowned upon in Japan and Japanese banks refused to finance them, so without debt financing, aggressive leveraged buyouts were impossible and no real market for corporate control existed, making Japan resemble the U.S. in the 1980s.Going Activist in Japan
- Universities and hospitals are dysfunctional partly because nonprofit status protects them from the market for corporate control—you cannot buy up shares, replace bad management, and improve a failing Stanford or hospital the way you could a public company—and the US nonprofit designation has been widely misused as a cover for avoiding estate tax and subsidizing political activity at taxpayer expense.John Cochrane
- Markets provide checks and balances on overconfident CEOs that government lacks: a CEO who overreaches into industries he doesn't understand will be punished by shareholders, investors, or the market for corporate control, whereas government officials can declare by fiat that they are capable of regulating drugs, urban planning, or creating an electric-car grid with no one able to say no, leading to inefficient, badly run outcomes.Arnold Kling on Knowledge, Power, and Unchecked and Unbalanced 09/06/2010
- Negative enterprise value stocks in Japan can still lose money when cross-shareholders block change, so value traps persist unless a market for control provides an exit through another buyer.Going Activist in Japan
- Before the M&A guideline change, management could take a company private at a low price with board endorsement and cross-shareholder support, creating a risk that insiders steal the company at six times EBITDA.Going Activist in Japan
- Even if a CEO virtuously refuses to seek legal subsidies, the firm's stock will be underpriced relative to its rent-seeking potential, so a corporate raider can make a tender offer, buy up the stock, install a more 'rational' manager who pursues subsidies, and thus the market for corporate control drives even good companies toward crony capitalism—and it takes only a few rent-seekers at the margin to do this.Michael Munger on Crony Capitalism