What this covers

Sebastian Mallaby argues that venture capital's outsized returns rest not on market inefficiency but on scarce human skill and network embeddedness, and that the structural rise of intangible capital will only deepen this advantage. The conversation ranges across why venture capital concentrates in Silicon Valley, how Peter Thiel operationalized the power law in investment practice, whether excess returns survive incoming capital, and what distinguishes venture from hedge funds, mutual funds, and East Coast finance. Mallaby contends that fewer than 1 percent of startups receive venture backing, yet since 1995 half of all public companies and three-quarters of their market cap came from venture-backed firms—a signal of impact far larger than capital share would suggest.

The discussion moves through agglomeration effects and halo effects in clustering, the mechanics of stage-by-stage financing, and why certain industries—semiconductors, capital-intensive hardware—escape venture's model. Mallaby distinguishes smart tail bets, which require a view of where technology is heading (skate to where the puck will be), from mere luck or hope. He argues that intangible capital's growing share in GDP makes hands-on technical evaluation structurally more valuable, not a temporary edge tied to any single boom. The conversation also enters politics and finance regulation—the 2008 crisis, inflation targeting, Fed independence, and wealth inequality's corrosion of opportunity—with Mallaby claiming that efficient markets logic applied to hedge funds and mutual funds misses the role of alpha and uncorrelated returns in portfolio construction.

Sharpest takeaway

Mallaby argues that venture capital's persistent excess returns stem from rare, non-replicable human skill and network embeddedness rather than market inefficiency, and that the rising importance of intangible capital makes hands-on expert investing structurally more valuable over time.

  • Excess VC returns persist because skill and connections are scarce, not capital
  • Intangible capital is growing as a share of GDP and requires hands-on technical evaluation
  • Agglomeration and clustering effects, facilitated by VCs, explain Silicon Valley's dominance

The argument · threads20 threads · 41 claims
0.85

Superior venture investors combine technical expertise, business acumen, networking skill, and energy in rare combinations that are genuinely hard to replicate.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A really good venture capitalist combines technical knowledge of the field being invested in (biotech or computer science), plus business sense, plus the skill of networking and putting teams together, plus phenomenal energy — a combination so rare it is hard to replicate and explains why returns aren't competed away.

    “A really good venture capitalist combines technical knowledge of what he or she is investing in — whether that’s biotechnology or computer science — plus business feeling, plus the skill of networking with people and putting teams together. And a phenomenal energy”

  • The Andreessen Horowitz premise that you had to have been an entrepreneur and run a company to be a good venture capitalist turned out to be false; the firm has now given up the rule that partners must have been former founders because having been a founder is one way to pick a good VC but not the only or best way.

    “The premise of Andreessen Horowitz, the venture partnership set up in 2009, was that to be a good venture capitalist, you had to be an entrepreneur, and you had to have run a company... That just turned out to be false.”

  • Betting on out-of-the-box tail people is replicable, but there's a difference between smart bets on the tail and bad bets; to make smart ones you must have a view of where technology is going — skating to where the puck will be — as Thiel did with Facebook by seeing past the eccentric founder to the future ubiquity of internet-enabled social media despite earlier failures like Friendster.

    “there’s still a difference between smart bets on the tail and bad bets on the tail. To make the smart bets, you do have to have a view and an understanding of where technology is going. You’ve got to skate to where the puck will be”

  • Mike Moritz's distinctive skill was the EQ to enlarge founders' sense of themselves — intuiting their projects and understanding them better than they understood themselves — exemplified by telling Yahoo's founders they were 'the new Apple' and persuading a PayPal founder to accept the X.com merger with a call to make history.

    “When it came to company founders, he had the ability to enlarge their sense of themselves. He could intuit what they were doing... understand them better than they understood themselves, and see more potential in their project than even they saw”

  • Although Thiel isn't deeply technical, his edge includes being deeply embedded in the Silicon Valley network from Stanford and having started PayPal — the PayPal Mafia connections meant some returns came from repeatedly backing technical people he'd been in the trenches with, such as backing Elon Musk's SpaceX despite their PayPal rivalry.

    “He’s also somebody who was deeply in that network. He just so happened to come from Stanford, Silicon Valley... The PayPal Mafia tells you a lot. Some of his returns come from the experience of having been deep in the trenches with people who were technical”

0.73

Venture capital's structural advantage grows as intangible capital becomes more central to economic value creation and requires hands-on expert evaluation.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • There is a deep structural shift in which intangible capital has become more important in the economy; because intangible capital is hard to measure in financial reports and requires hands-on technical evaluation, the rising share of intangible capital in new GDP creation makes venture-style hands-on expert investing increasingly valuable, so VC's edge is structural rather than tied to a single tech boom.

    “intangible capital has become more and more important in our economy. The nature of intangible capital is that it’s hard to measure it in financial reports.”

  • Fewer than 1 percent of companies formed each year receive venture backing, yet since 1995 half of all companies that went public got venture backing and three-quarters of the market cap from those companies derived from venture-backed firms — so VC's small capital share belies its outsized impact.

    “Fewer than 1 percent of companies that get formed every year receive venture capital backing, but if you look at the years since 1995, half of all the companies that go public got venture backing, and three-quarters of the market cap from those companies derived from venture-backed companies.”

  • Venture capital's advantage of stage-by-stage financing — giving small amounts so that early failures fail cheaply — is also why it's poorly suited to extremely capital-intensive projects like a new semiconductor fab that require billions up front, which are better left to established makers like TSMC or Samsung.

    “One of the advantages is the idea of stage-by-stage financing. You give the company a bit of money, and then if it fails early, it fails cheaply because you haven’t given it a huge check right from early on.”

0.65

Geographic clustering of venture capital generates persistent returns through syndication networks, idea circulation, and concentrated skill pools that cannot easily relocate.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The lesson of Silicon Valley is that agglomeration and clustering effects are even bigger than traditional economics explains; the standard account holds that deep labor markets produce better matching between worker skills and company needs and easier access to specialized local suppliers, which is why startups cluster.

    “the lesson of Silicon Valley is that agglomeration effects and clustering effects are actually even bigger than economics as traditionally explained.”

  • Because the Chinese government erects barriers that keep US tech companies out, Chinese giants dominate Chinese tech, but in the early phase these companies — Sina, Sogou, NetEase, Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Ctrip — were almost always funded by American venture capital firms who replicated the Silicon Valley cluster in China using the same DNA: American lawyers, Cayman Islands incorporation, and US-style employee stock options.

    “Then you’ve got Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Ctrip. All of these companies are backed by Western VCs.”

  • Once a region produces a major unicorn like Spotify in Stockholm, a whole cadre of people who experienced dramatic growth from the inside become wealthy and can start new companies, become venture capitalists, or serve as angel advisers — a halo effect like Seattle's off Microsoft and Amazon that seeds a self-sustaining ecosystem.

    “what that’s telling you is that there’s a whole cadre of people who have experienced dramatic, intoxicating growth from the inside. They are now wealthy. They can start their own new companies. They can become venture capitalists”

  • Venture capital deals cluster geographically because the business relies on syndication — different VCs lead successive Series A, B, and C rounds with multiple co-investors — making it economical for entrepreneurs to pitch many VCs without flying around, and because the circulation of ideas, people, and money works better when concentrated.

    “this is a business where people syndicate into each other’s deals. One venture capitalist will lead the Series A around financing a company, and then another one will lead the Series B, and another one, the Series C.”

0.53

Power-law returns from outlier bets on unconventional founders reward investors who foresee technological futures rather than backing normal-looking deals.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Peter Thiel articulated the idea of the power law more fully than anyone before in venture capital and designed his investing and firm around it; the logic is that since all returns come from a couple of outlier bets, you must bet on outliers and out-of-the-box people rather than normal-looking deals that lack a moat and won't produce supernormal returns.

    “Peter Thiel is fascinating because he articulated more fully the idea of the power law than anybody else before in venture capital.”

  • Hedge fund strategies generate alpha until enough capital understands them and competes the returns away, but the industry is a dynamic Darwinian evolutionary one where new methods — now including big data and AI algorithms crunching novel datasets to find repeating patterns in defiance of efficient-market logic — keep being invented as old ones cease to be profitable.

    “this is a dynamic Darwinian evolutionary industry, and new methods and techniques will be invented as the old ones cease to be profitable.”

0.47

Venture capital's edge persists because skill and network connections remain scarce relative to available capital, preventing full competition away of returns.

1 pointcentrality 4/5
  • With alternative asset managers like hedge funds and venture capital, money is effectively limitless but the skill and connections in Silicon Valley are not, so skill at the far tail of the distribution can continue to generate excess returns without being competed away by incoming capital.

    “The money may be limitless, but the skills and the connections in Silicon Valley and what have you — that is not unlimited. Skill can continue to generate good returns.”

0.40

Venture capital is fundamentally early-stage adventure investing in companies below roughly five-hundred-million-dollar market caps, distinct from later-stage growth equity.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The useful definition of venture capital is early-stage 'adventure' investing; once you invest in companies worth more than about $500 million in market cap, it becomes growth equity rather than venture, with $500 million chosen because Amazon's IPO market cap was between $400 and $500 million in the late 1990s.

    “the useful definition of venture capital is that it is an early-stage venture, an adventure, in fact. When you get to investing in companies which are more than about $500 million in market cap, that’s a different thing. That’s growth equity.”

  • Angel investing only became a factor in the mid-to-late 1990s once Silicon Valley matured enough to have rich exited entrepreneurs who funded younger founders like them; angels are best for the first round of money and mentoring, after which founders graduate to a Series A from a proper VC for more money, formal structuring, and clear milestones.

    “Angel investing wasn’t really a factor until the mid-late 1990s. Once it became a factor — and that happened because Silicon Valley had reached a point of maturity, where there were enough rich, exited entrepreneurs”

0.40

American venture capital successfully replicated the Silicon Valley model internationally, driving European and Chinese tech ecosystems through capital and institutional transfer.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • American VC firms are now opening European offices and the number of unicorns in Europe is growing exponentially, and Mallaby predicts that over the next 10 years Europe will grow a lot faster than the US tech ecosystem.

    “The number of unicorns in Europe is growing exponentially, and I predict that in the next 10 years, Europe will grow a lot faster than the US tech ecosystem.”

  • Europe and South England have world-class science, abundant coders, and rich consumer markets but historically lacked venture capital; the supposed cultural lack of risk appetite is actually downstream of missing VC, because when venture investors underwrite the risk of startups, people become willing to start them with someone else's capital and can hire good people via the VC's brand — so risk appetite is created by VC, not drunk in the water.

    “when you get venture investors added to the mix that are willing to underwrite the risk of small start-ups, all of a sudden people are willing to start them because the risk is paid for.”

0.40

Venture capital worked historically across hardware, semiconductors, and biotech despite assumptions limiting it to software, with future biotech success likely given innovation speed.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The claim that venture capital only works for cheap-to-scale software with network effects is historically inaccurate, since there is a long history of venture investing in hardware — Apple, the pipes of the internet, Compaq, and semiconductor firms — making the software-only thesis simply wrong.

    “There’s a long history of venture investing which was more about hardware than software. It was about Apple computer. It was about U-Net building the pipes of the internet.”

  • Although biotech is more regulated and historically less profitable for venture capital, the past isn't a guide to the future: innovations like gene sequencing and CRISPR make drug development faster and cheaper, and successes like Genentech's 1980 IPO and Moderna's COVID vaccine suggest even capital- and regulation-intensive biotech can work for VC.

    “Now you’ve had a bunch of innovations, from gene sequencing to CRISPR, which makes it faster and easier to develop new drugs.”

0.26

Liberal capitalism's legitimacy declined because wealth inequality bleeds into opportunity inequality despite equal-opportunity rhetoric, requiring estate-tax reform to preserve entrepreneurial incentives.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Liberal capitalism declined in popularity not only because flaws were spotted but because things were allowed to go wrong; in particular, you cannot only care about equal opportunity while tolerating wealth inequality, because severe wealth inequality bleeds into opportunity inequality as people transfer advantage to their kids — making the virtual elimination of the estate tax a really bad thing that needs undoing, even while preserving strong incentives for entrepreneurship.

    “it’s all very well, saying you only care about equal opportunity, but income and wealth inequality is okay. But we know that the latter, the income inequality, bleeds into the former. Once you’ve got really severe inequalities of wealth, people can transfer that advantage to their kids.”

  • Liberal capitalism has declined enormously in popularity since the 1990s when it seemed to have won — Fukuyama bluntly said history was ending and other countries seemed to be converging on the model — but now young Americans say they prefer socialism, signaling it is clearly falling out of favor.

    “liberal capitalism has declined in popularity enormously since the 1990s when we thought that it had won. Fukuyama’s statement was blunter than other people’s when he said history was ending”

0.20

West Coast venture capital's high-risk power-law model fundamentally diverged from East Coast finance's capital-stewardship tradition, forming a distinct cluster.

1 pointcentrality 2/5
  • Postwar East Coast finance archetypes like Prudential and Fidelity were about stewarding capital and not losing it, whereas the high-risk, power-law, grand-slam business of West Coast venture capital is utterly different, explaining why VC formed its own anti-cluster away from the New York financial center.

    “the archetypes were Prudential and Fidelity, and their names tell you a lot about their attitude to risk — they were about stewarding capital and not losing it. This high-risk, power-law return, grand slam business that emerged in venture capital on the West Coast is utterly different.”

0.18

Federal Reserve inflation overshoot resulted from surprise, not from political capture or institutional failure, though bubble-blindness in asset-price targeting was a structural mistake.

3 pointscentrality 1/5
  • The story that the Fed was captured by the fiscal authority or president is wrong; since Paul Volcker the dominant mental model among everyone at the Fed is 'don't be Arthur Burns, be Paul Volcker' — and no pressure from the executive branch would override that, so the Fed allowed inflation to overshoot simply because inflation surprised them on the outside, not from bullying.

    “ever since Paul Volcker — the mental model of the Fed — everybody who works there... is that Paul Volcker was a hero. He got inflation under control. Antihero is Arthur Burns”

  • Greenspan's unpublished 1950s PhD thesis shows his career-long obsession with stock market bubbles and balance-sheet effects, so his failure to prevent the mortgage bubble was not from ignorance — he knew more about balance-sheet effects than most critics — but because the institution of the Fed was trapped into inflation targeting and paid no attention to asset bubbles, which was a big mistake.

    “in the ’50s — in other words, right at the beginning of his professional career — Greenspan’s obsession was with stock market bubbles... Balance-sheet effects were at the core of his PhD work.”

  • COVID was an unprecedented shock to both supply and demand, and the Fed's stimulus — multiples of 2008's — got the US through with remarkably little economic hardship and strong household balance sheets; targeting the right amount in uncharted water inevitably risked overshooting inflation, but Mallaby predicts history will judge Jerome Powell a brave risk-taker and a success, while admitting he could be wrong.

    “COVID was this humongous shock to both supply and demand. Unprecedented. The Fed responded in an unprecedented way with a stimulus, which, as you know, was multiples of what was delivered in 2008.”

0.18

Hedge funds generate uncorrelated alpha and improved portfolio risk-adjusted returns despite lower raw numbers, with success driven by evolving strategies beating efficient-market assumptions.

3 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Hedge funds get paid to assess and price risk, so when quantitative easing squeezes and compresses risk spreads to almost nothing, hedge funds are paid less for their work — explaining why net-of-fees positive alpha fell from about 3 percent a year (1995 to late 2000s) toward near zero after 2010, with returns possibly recovering as QE ends and rates rise.

    “If risk spreads are being squeezed and compressed and reduced to almost nothing by the central bank through quantitative easing, then hedge funds are going to be paid less for doing their work.”

  • The right way to judge hedge funds is not raw returns versus the S&P but uncorrelated returns (alpha): any positive return uncorrelated with the benchmark improves a diversified portfolio's Sharpe ratio by dampening volatility, so comparing the S&P's 15 percent to hedge funds' 4 percent is financially illiterate because it isn't comparing apples to apples.

    “Any positive return which isn’t correlated with the stock market benchmark... is good and, in terms of a big, diversified pension fund or endowment portfolio, will help your Sharpe ratio because it’s giving you some extra juice to your return without adding to risk”

  • Bridgewater's long run of success was not about Ray Dalio the man — much of whose public principles are obvious or nonsense — but about the machine he built: a research organization that patiently scraped data and produced precise studies of variable relationships, aggregating that knowledge into an investment black box that genuinely worked for a stretch.

    “if you want to understand why Bridgewater did well for a long time... it’s not about him. It’s not about the man. It’s about the machine he built.”

0.12

Continental Illinois represented the original bailout sin using taxpayer money, distinguishing it from the Fed's salutary creditor-convening approach during Long-Term Capital Management's crisis.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • The original sin of bailouts was Continental Illinois around 1984-1986, when the Fed used taxpayer money to bail out a bank it deemed too big to fail amid the Latin American debt crisis — not Long-Term Capital Management, where the Fed merely convened LTCM's creditors but refused to provide any taxpayer money, which was salutary.

    “No, I think the original sin was Continental Illinois, much earlier in 1986, I believe, when the Fed bailed out this bank which it thought was too big to fail.”

  • Because prime brokers learned from LTCM not to extend leverage without good collateral, hedge funds were not driving the 2008 crisis and turned out to be the relatively more stable part of the system, unlike insurance companies, investment banks, money market funds, and commercial banks that cost taxpayers billions.

    “the prime brokers who extend leverage to hedge funds learned the lessons from LTCM, and they didn’t extend loans without taking good collateral. In actual fact, hedge funds turned out to be the relatively more stable part of the system in 2008”

0.12

Japan retains innovation opportunity in the silver economy and aesthetic engineering despite demographic decline, and South Korea shows entrepreneurship flourishes despite cultural barriers when outsider perspective applies.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Despite Japan's underwhelming macro picture from a declining population and restrictive immigration, it retains interesting innovation areas, particularly the 'silver economy' — provision for old age — where its many elderly people drive efforts to make aging work for society, alongside continued aesthetic and technical engineering sophistication.

    “in areas like innovation around provision for old age — that’s an obvious area where Japan has a lot of old people, and they’re doing quite a lot of things to make that work for society. The silver economy, as it’s called, is something to look at in Japan.”

  • Masayoshi Son shows that entrepreneurship is not impossible in Japan, though as a Korean-Japanese who felt marginalized he left in his teens for a UC Berkeley degree before returning to build SoftBank and a tech-investing holding company — suggesting his outsider background may have made the difference.

    “It shows that entrepreneurship is not entirely impossible in Japan. I think it could happen, can happen. I’m not close enough to it to understand why more of it hasn’t happened.”

0.12

Sequoia Capital's transformation into a diversified firm with permanent capital, growth equity, and hedge funds demonstrates how leading venture firms scale beyond early-stage investing.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Sequoia, which Mallaby regards as the top venture capital partnership in Silicon Valley, has generated returns of about 12 times investors' money this century — 1200 percent.

    “Sequoia, which I regard as the top venture capital partnership in Silicon Valley, has generated returns of about 12 times investors’ money this century. That’s 12x.”

  • Sequoia transformed from a traditional early-stage shop in 2000 by grafting on growth equity, a hedge fund, and an endowment fund, and with permanent capital it will end up with multiple business lines like Goldman Sachs — though its venture portion will remain the early-stage part.

    “They were a traditional early-stage investment shop in 2000, and then they grafted on this growth equity business. They grafted on a hedge fund business. They built an endowment fund on top of that.”

0.06

Collective journalism focused on specific domains like technology is more sustainable than individual Substacks, which exhaust exceptional energy after three to five years.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • While a Substack can be excellent when run by an exceptional, exceptionally energetic person, most people can only sustain that level of focus for three to five years before going off the boil and throwing away the brand they built; therefore a collective journalistic effort focused on a specific area — like The Information covering only tech — is a more sensible and sustainable media model.

    “somebody can be great at a Substack for three years, possibly five years, but it’s pretty hard to sustain that level of focus and energy. If you don’t sustain it, you’ve built a brand over three to five years, and then you throw it away”

0.06

Deep immersion in subjects' decision-making and institutional contexts enables addressing under-covered questions by sorting nonsense from actual causal sources of outcomes.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Mallaby's writing method is to spend five years getting into the cockpit of his subjects to understand the world through their eyes and explain their thought process, which lets him address under-covered questions like the actual source of investment alpha by getting close enough to sort through the nonsense.

    “my objective is to get into the cockpit with the people I’m writing about and fly around the landscape and really understand how the world looks through their eyes, to explain their thought process to people.”

0.06

China's graduation to major World Bank shareholder creates governance gridlock risk as veto-wielding powers disagree, threatening the institution's strategic clarity.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • China both graduated from being a profitable World Bank borrower and became a problematic shareholder; the Bank and IMF worked well partly because the US as lead shareholder provided clear strategic direction, but a big, influential China can now disagree with the US — as in the Doing Business ranking controversy — risking turning the Bank into a frozen UN Security Council where veto-wielding powers are at loggerheads.

    “Part of the reason why the World Bank and IMF worked well for a long time... is that you had this lead shareholder in the form of the United States, which basically called the shots. That provided some clarity and strategic direction”

0.06

Active mutual funds persistently underperform despite fees because manager skill is insufficient, mirroring how people gamble and invest despite unfavorable odds from hope.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Actively managed mutual funds have produced negative alpha because the skill purportedly provided is less than even a 1 percent fee, yet people keep buying them because hope springs eternal and everyone believes they're in the top quintile of clever managers — much as people gamble in Las Vegas despite the house's better odds; the same logic explains continued investment in active hedge funds and venture capital.

    “Why do people continue to buy exposure in these money-losing, actively managed mutual funds is because hope springs eternal, and people always think that they are investing in the top quintile of clever managers”

0.06

The Grand Budapest Hotel exemplifies zany surrealistic charm as Mallaby's favorite film.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Mallaby names The Grand Budapest Hotel as his favorite movie for its zany, surrealistic, irresistible charm.

    “I think The Grand Budapest Hotel has a kind of zany, surrealistic charm that is irresistible, so I’m going to pick that as my favorite movie.”