What this covers
Historian Jill Lepore and Tyler Cowen discuss how historical perspective reshapes our understanding of American institutions and their actual performance. The conversation moves through several foundational concepts—privacy, representation, democracy, technology—tracing their origins and the gap between their intended promise and lived reality. Lepore argues that the way we use history matters: treating the past as a mirror to the present ("Trump is just like Jackson") collapses important distinctions, whereas stretching time open to see real transformation between moments offers clearer insight. She also traces how technology repeatedly fails to deliver on its democratizing hopes, from Frederick Douglass's 1860s optimism about portrait photography to contemporary internet utopianism.
Several unexpected origins emerge. The Right to Privacy, the legal foundation for much reproductive rights argument, grew from men's desire to shield women from public view—a flaw that, Lepore argues, made it vulnerable to later reversal. The American conception of representative democracy itself is now breaking down, she suggests, as instant polling and digital culture train citizens to treat elected officials as instruments to execute individual preferences rather than as trustees making decisions on a community's behalf. The conversation also touches on how the East Coast establishment's decline is far older than recent politics (dating to the Sun Belt ascendancy in the 1960s), how Eleanor Roosevelt quietly reframed the New Deal as fundamentally about women's civic role, and how certain constitutional wrongs—like the three-fifths clause and slavery's foundational contradiction—foreclosed the cultural flourishing Enlightenment thinkers predicted for America. Cowen and Lepore also work through what made Charles Dickens furious about America, how to write synthetic history without ideological distortion, and why John Dewey should rank higher in our thinking than Silicon Valley figures.
Lepore argues that historical understanding improves when we 'stretch the accordion' to see the distance and transformation between past and present rather than collapsing them into facile analogies, and that this lens reveals how foundational American concepts—privacy, democracy, technology—carry hidden origins and unmet promises.
- The right to privacy historically originated in men's desire to keep women out of public view, making it a flawed basis for reproductive rights
- Historical analogies that compress time ('Trump is just like Jackson') are less edifying than examining the transformation between two moments
- Digital technology's expected democratizing effects (from Douglass's photography optimism to internet utopianism) have not materialized
Historical method must stretch time open to reveal distance and transformation between moments rather than compress them into misleading analogies.
- Rather than compressing the accordion of time to claim the present is just like the past ('Trump is just like Andrew Jackson'), the more edifying and historically defensible move is to stretch the accordion open to see the distance and transformation between two moments—paralleling the contrast between originalism (squishing time to ask 'what would Madison think') and asking what happened between then and now.
“That completely understandable desire to find a historical analogy is just like to take an accordion and compress it.”
- A synthetic history works best when it abandons textbook completeness and instead selects content by asking 'what are the things that are still big questions?'—as in the 1954 Out of Our Past, which chose to emphasize the Negro in America over most 19th-century presidential administrations—producing a coherent story that is not highly ideological, a difficult balance to strike.
“let’s use as our tool in determining what should be in this book and what should not be in this book, "What are things that are still big questions?"”
- A greater vantage on the present day can be a distorting force in historical work because the historian is always tempted to gather together what they believe of the world today and make the history come out that way—writing history to confirm how you think it's supposed to come out—which Lepore identifies as a genuine and difficult challenge of the craft.
“having a greater vantage on the present day, in some ways, can be another kind of distorting force in your work because you’re always trying to gather together what you believe of the world today, and make it come out that way”
Representative democracy has broken down because citizens now treat elected officials as instruments to execute individual preferences rather than acts of faith in community representation.
- The core problem is a mismatch: we have a representative system of government but no longer believe in representation—reinforced by technologies that let us constantly broadcast our individual views, we increasingly treat representatives as instruments to tally and execute our individual preferences (instant polling, referenda like Brexit), abandoning the older idea that electing someone to represent a community's views is an act of faith and community.
“the problem is that we have a representative system of government, but we no longer believe in representation. We actually believe in direct democracy.”
- The notion of digital democracy is the leftover of 1960s New Left utopianism—the personal computer as liberation from the big-business mainframe world of IBM and UNIVAC—but research shows the political expectations placed on digitization and the internet have not been met, and the intellectually demanding task is not reflexive dystopianism but steering a middle course to measure what is actually working and not.
“that’s where the whole digital democracy notion comes from. That this is the leftover of a ’60s utopianism, a new Left utopianism.”
- Through the Tea Party's popular constitutionalism it became clear that liberals had failed to talk in constitutional terms when making political arguments, leaving room for conservatives to appear to have the Constitution on their side while liberals seem to think everything is made up—a structurally unequal fight—and it becomes problematic that liberals only invoke the Constitution when out of power.
“you could see how entirely liberals had failed to talk in constitutional terms in making political arguments”
Intellectual and cultural sorting into hostile groups has damaged Americans' capacity to see political opponents as beloved community members rather than enemies.
- Coming from a lower-middle-class background, Lepore experienced how elite institutions communicate to people that they don't belong—a sense she has never shed—distinct from the experience of first-generation college students who come 'from nothing,' which she does not claim to share.
“there’s so many ways that elite institutions communicate to you that you don’t belong. And I’ve never really shed that.”
- Eleanor Roosevelt's 1933 book It's Up to the Women, written while FDR prepared for his inauguration, was a subtle nose-thumbing assertion that recovery from the Depression depended on women, reflecting her belief that the real New Deal was a new civic role for women—a stance so provocative that H. L. Mencken's 1937 satirical New Deal constitution mocked it with a clause letting the president appoint family members to tour and make speeches.
“Eleanor Roosevelt says the real New Deal is a new civic role for women.”
- Adam Smith's ideas about sensibility, the moral imagination, and forming ourselves through empathy and sympathy suffused the whole 18th-century culture and came out of Smith's experience of that culture as much as he injected ideas into it—demonstrating that ordinary people, not just the founding fathers, were bound up in the world of ideas.
“the degree to which we form ourselves in relation to one another through the act of empathy and sympathy, were ideas that suffused the whole culture”
- The decline of New England and the liberal East Coast establishment is a long-term trend, not new: the 1964 Goldwater-over-Rockefeller nomination fight marked the rising tide of Sun Belt conservatism that, despite Goldwater's resounding defeat, ultimately won out—evidenced by Mitt Romney running as a Utah figure rather than as a Massachusetts governor—with Silicon Valley now filling the vacuum left by the East Coast establishment.
“I think that’s a long-term trend. I don’t think that’s something new.”
- Stuart Little was effectively banned by librarian Anne Carroll Moore not because of mouse adventures but because E. B. White and Katharine White did not believe in children's literature as an endeavor—the mouse being born from a human mother was too shocking, and the book was a continuation of White's satire (e.g. 'Is Sex Necessary?', 'The Birth of an Adult') attacking the juvenilization of American culture and the so-called Golden Age of Children's Literature.
“What’s really going on in the story is that E. B. White and Katharine White didn’t really believe in children’s literature as an endeavor.”
- Dickens's 1842 disillusionment with America, though he piously attributed it to being sickened by slavery, was driven as much by practical grievance: his work was widely pirated in the United States and he came to argue for international copyright law to be paid for his hugely popular but uncompensated work, only to be met with contempt from newspaper editors who found it hypocritical for the poet of poverty to demand payment.
“his work is generally pirated in the United States, and he goes to Washington to argue for copyright law, an international copyright law that would protect his work because he’s earning just pennies”
- Steve Bannon strikes Lepore as a very 1840s, Dickensian figure—the schlumpy man with a baggy coat and bulbous red nose one could picture wandering a precinct on election day in an 1840s painting of American politics—rather than fitting a clean historical analogy.
“There’s something, to me, very 1840s about Bannon, partly in the schlumpy”
- The historical sorting of Americans into hostile groups—where intellectuals came to hold contempt for mass culture (1950s Left turning against 'the folk') and people now feel unable to converse with politically different family members at Thanksgiving—occurred at the worst possible moment for inter-group tensions and serves many people poorly in how they lead their lives, because those family members are people you love and not enemies.
“in the 1950s, the Left intellectuals decided that the folk had terrible taste... there’s this incredible cultural contempt for mass culture and television in particular”
- A lifelong friend known since childhood serves as an eyewitness to one's own history—knowing who you were 'when she was still a brain stem'—and can provide a valuable correction by reflecting when your current actions are inconsistent with who they know you to be.
“We are each other’s eyewitness to history.”
New technologies and social media have reshaped how visibility and speech operate for women and citizens, with cascading consequences for democratic participation and belonging.
- Frederick Douglass argued in the 1860s that portrait photography was the most democratic art because even the poorest could afford a likeness—displacing the era of kings and bishops being portrayed—so that everyone could see themselves and one another and thereby understand their equality, but this technologically deterministic 19th-century progress fantasy is heartbreaking to read because that is not what photography ultimately delivered.
“he argues that photography is the most democratic art. And he means portrait photography.”
- The real question is not what is wrong with New England but why we have placed Silicon Valley on such a pedestal with so little criticism of the technology being offered and its consequences, especially for politics—such that given a choice between John Dewey and Mark Zuckerberg, one should pick Dewey every time.
“Why there’s so little criticism of what is being offered by way of technology and its consequences, especially for our politics.”
- Doctor Who works by taking the H. G. Wells critique of widening inequality in industrial and post-industrial life and attaching it to nostalgia for the British Empire—the fantasy of being a 'time lord' who travels through time so Britain can be the world's policeman rather than just one Security Council member, reimagining imperialism as the ability to colonize time itself.
“the way that Doctor Who works is to use that sort of H. G. Wells critique of the widening inequality of industrial and post-industrial life, attaching it to nostalgia for the British Empire”
American history was shaped by an original sin of slavery that made the Enlightenment promise of a new Athens impossible to fulfill.
- Enlightenment forecasters who predicted America would soon blossom as a new Athens misunderstood the basic premise of 18th-century republican government: they failed to see the original sin of the Constitution—the three-fifths clause and constitutional sanctioning of slavery—and could not foresee how the first century of American history would be consumed almost entirely by the struggle over slavery, making the predicted cultural flowering, contingent on the ease of equality, impossible.
“They did not see what we would now think of as the original sin of the Constitution, the three-fifths clause and the continuation of slavery”
- Constitutional history is not as neat as 'these people were right, these were wrong'; certain decisions are unequivocally wrong from a modern vantage and were extremely controversial at the time, with Dred Scott (1857) functioning as the recurring benchmark—FDR called the New Deal strikedowns and others invoked Lochner as 'the worst since Dred Scott'—whereas no comparable national consensus exists about the Roberts court's ACA decision.
“Dred Scott in 1857, the worst decision the Court ever made. People of the time said it was the worst decision the court ever made. And then it becomes the measure of "This is the worst decision since Dred Scott."”
Privacy as the foundation for reproductive rights was a historical mistake that backfired because it originated in men's interest in hiding women from public view.
- The modern constitutional right to privacy historically originated from men's interest in keeping women hidden from public view—Warren and Brandeis's 1890 'Right to Privacy' article was animated by new photographic technologies exposing women's and families' private lives—which means grounding reproductive rights in privacy was a mistake that backfired; they would have been better grounded in equal protection or liberty claims.
“the very notion historically comes out of the confinement of women”
- Although women are more visible politically than in the 1920s-30s, new technologies—especially social media—have likely increased the costs of public speech for women through more immediate ways of being shot down, plausibly making the chilling effect on women considering running for office more significant than 15 years ago.
“The cost of speaking in public is different because there are new ways and more immediate ways of being shot down.”