What this covers
Glenn Loury speaks with Tyler Cowen about his memoir and his intellectual life—the shift from economic theory to political commentary, his struggles with addiction and faith, and his evolving thought on race in America. The conversation moves across economics, psychology, and philosophy as Loury reflects on the gap between the stories we tell ourselves and what actually happened. A recurring theme is the distinction between [Cover Story vs Real Story](concept:Cover Story vs Real Story): the self-flattering narratives we construct to explain our choices, versus the messier truths of fear, ambition, and self-delusion that actually drove them. He applies this framework to his own career—revealing that his departure from Harvard's economics department owed less to principled disagreement than to losing his nerve—and to America's racial troubles, where he insists that Us vs Them Framing lets comfortable citizens treat ghetto dysfunction as alien rather than American.
The breadth spans Loury's technical work in mechanism design and environmental externality pricing, through his personal reckoning with crack addiction and his turn toward Christianity, to his current unease with contemporary punditry and journalism. He criticizes reportage he sees as too tendentious—serving progressive programs or protecting political allies—and yearns instead for gritty documentation of how people in struggling communities actually live and speak. Throughout, he grapples with hard questions: whether empathy across lines of difference is humanly possible, why elite students suffer worse mental health despite rosy prospects, and how one dies with dignity. He also sketches disagreements with those close to him, notably Lajuan Loury, who argues he fixates on culture-war targets like affirmative action and critical race theory while dodging deeper structural failures, and contrasts his own indifference to elite opinion with John McWhorter's wariness of it.
Loury argues that intellectual honesty requires distinguishing the self-flattering 'cover story' from the real story, and applies this to his own career and to America's racial dysfunction—insisting that struggling, dysfunctional black communities are 'us,' an American failure rather than an alien 'them.'
- Loury reframes his shift from economic theory to political punditry not as principled choice but as fear of failure and self-delusion
- He insists ghetto dysfunction is an American story, not a black American story, and that empathy across us/them lines is hard for everyone
- He values gritty, non-tendentious knowledge of real lives over reportage in service of political programs
Human capacity for self-delusion is nearly unbounded; people adopt false cover stories and lose access to truth about their own motivations.
- Loury's central self-discovery from writing his memoir is that human capacity for self-delusion is almost unbounded: people habitually adopt a self-aggrandizing 'cover story' for their actions—less craven and narcissistic than reality—and never remember events as they actually were, making honest retrospection a deliberate discipline.
“One of the motifs in the book is to distinguish between the cover story and the real story”
- Loury's real reason for jumping from economic theory to political punditry at the Kennedy School was not the cold Harvard department or the dual economics/Afro-American Studies burden he told himself, but that he choked and lost his nerve—afraid he could never write papers like Myerson's or Milgrom's—and found in punditry an out that no one would expect such work from.
“The real story was that I choked, I blinked, I lost my nerve, I was afraid of failure.”
- The view that changed most through Loury's religious evolution was his willingness to hold himself to account; he had lived as a self-absorbed 'master of the universe' narcissist—accountable to no one, disrespecting his wife and disconnected from community—and becoming religious instilled the responsibility he had refused.
“my willingness to hold myself to account and accept responsibility for the way in which I was conducting my life.”
- After two years sober, Loury deliberately returned to using crack cocaine and confirmed the euphoria was real and as remembered, but it arrived with shame; realizing his obsessive pursuit of that euphoria was undignified and contemptible, he quit permanently—concluding the sensation was genuine but not worth what he had risked.
“The feelings of euphoria came back just as I had remembered them, but also with them came a sense of shame.”
- Loury's style of applied economic theory is now passé; the profession has shifted entirely toward calibration, estimation, and the search for natural or quasi-natural experiments, enabled by modern computing power and data availability, such that his old style of paper would no longer be publishable in top journals or get a young economist a job.
“Everybody is calibrating and estimating, and they’re looking for a natural experiment or a quasi-natural experiment or whatever it is. They’re doing the kind of empirical work that you can do now with the computing power that we have and the data availability and whatnot.”
- Tom Schelling told Loury, suffering a crisis of confidence at Harvard, that the department was full of neurotics hiding behind their secretaries and oak doors, fearing the question 'what have you done for me lately'—and that he should just put his head down and do his work, because everything would be okay.
“This place is full of neurotics hiding behind their secretaries and their 10-foot oak doors, fearing the dreaded question, ‘What have you done for me lately?’ Why don’t you just put your head down and do your work?”
Structural economic inequality and corporate unaccountability, not cultural targets, generate and sustain racial disparities and power imbalance.
- Loury wishes for factually grounded empathy toward the dysfunction he is quick to castigate; he distrusts current reportage as too tendentious—serving a progressive program or protecting Black Lives Matter or fighting Trump—and wants gritty journalism and art that simply shows what people in housing projects actually say, do, and feel, which would let him be less mad and more sad.
“I wish I could have more factually grounded empathy for the people who I am so quick to castigate for creating the problems, but whose genuine life stories I don’t know so much about.”
- Loury's strongest critic on race is his wife Lajuan, who argues his focus on culture-war targets like affirmative action, Defund the Police, and critical race theory is a dodge and smoke screen that avoids the real structural issues—economic provision, untaxed corporations, inequality, unaccountable Wall Street, low wages, poor healthcare—which generate and sustain disparities of power.
“It’s just a dodge. It’s a smoke screen from confronting the underlying power dynamics that generate and sustain inequality and privilege and disadvantage”
- The point the white right wing who admire Loury miss is that the people committing crime and languishing in ghettos, projects, and lockups are 'us'—Americans, our people, our failure—not an alien imposition on a pristine Euro-American canvas, making it an American story rather than a black American story.
“those people are us. They’re our people. Those are Americans. They are us. That’s us. It’s not them.”
Religious agnosticism and belief offer non-logical sources of dignity, accountability, and courage in facing death and community.
- Loury distinguishes his agnosticism from atheism: he cannot literally believe the resurrection, but rejects the arrogant presumption of omniscience that dismisses faith as bunk; the quest for belief is noble, there is genuine mystery and awe, and he sometimes immerses himself among the faithful—not seeking a logical answer but being in their midst.
“Agnostic is not atheist. It’s saying that there’s a kind of mystery there, and there’s a kind of awe”
- Loury fears he would face death badly—furious, self-pitying, inconsolable, asking 'why me'—rather than with his late wife Linda's courage and dignity, and worries that stepping away from Christianity makes this worse; he concedes that although belief in life after death seems an absurdity, only embracing some such belief might allow one to die honorably and with dignity.
“I fear further than that, that my stepping away from Christianity makes it more likely that that’s the guy that I would be.”
- Loury suggests the best place to raise a family is a small town in the Midwest with a church on the corner—suffocating in that everyone knows everyone's business, but with decent schools, safety to let kids play outdoors, and unlocked doors—while acknowledging this sounds corny.
“a small town in Ohio or Missouri or someplace like that, where there’s a Presbyterian church or a Lutheran church on the corner, where it’s suffocating in the sense that everybody knows everybody else’s business. But schools are halfway decent”
- Loury has consistently held, even before becoming Christian and unchanged by his religious evolution, that a pre-viable fetus is one matter where termination might be a private choice the law shouldn't intervene in, but a late-term fetus is a human being that cannot be disposed of for convenience.
“late term — that’s a human being, and you can’t just dispose of it for your convenience. I’ve always thought that. I thought that even before I was a Christian.”
Elite meritocratic competition produces severe mental-health deterioration among undergraduates despite objectively favorable circumstances.
- Elite undergraduates suffer worse mental health than 20 years ago partly because they are fiercely competitive over scarce prestige outcomes—each believes he must be in the top 10 percent when only 10 percent can be—producing intense grade-grubbing and stress despite objectively rosy prospects.
“they seem to be driven by this idea that each and every one of them has to be in the top 10 percent when only 10 percent of them are going to be.”
- Black students at elite schools face a different mental-health situation than peers because affirmative action in postgraduate admissions and employment gives them a competitive leg up; comfort varies sharply by background, with children of prosperous black families feeling at ease while discovered, disadvantaged students of color often feel socially uncomfortable in self-consciously elite environments.
“affirmative action, both in postgraduate admissions programs and in employment, gives them a leg up. A black kid with a decent portfolio coming out of Brown probably is in a relatively advantaged competitive position for the next step.”
Intellectual and political integrity demand resisting elite opinion pressure; moral judgment requires empathy grounded in direct observation, not ideology.
- The most abstract difference between Loury and John McWhorter is that McWhorter cares what his New York Times colleagues think of him—living in New York, attending the cocktail parties, and refusing to even discuss topics like the transgender debate for fear a ton of bricks would fall on him—whereas Loury stopped caring about elite opinion long ago.
“He cares what his colleagues at the New York Times think about him, and I stopped giving a damn about that a long time ago.”
- The us/them lesson fails to get through because of human nature: it is difficult for anyone—right or left—to suspend disbelief, interrogate visceral instinct, and resist ad hominem and stereotype; moreover, political actors who must marshal electoral majorities have incentives that militate against a moderate, self-effacing, humble posture.
“Maybe human nature. Maybe it’s very easy — us and them.”
- Loury claims that in retrospect he was more often right than wrong in the political positions he took as a Reagan conservative, and that conservatives had the better of those arguments in those years—an upsetting remark to some who know him.
“I was more often right than wrong in some of the political positions that I took... I think conservatives had the better of those arguments in those years.”
- Loury fears the fentanyl death epidemic could be very bad and that society may be only 'at the end of the beginning,' raising the unaddressed possibility of social contagion spreading it beyond Midwest whites to other populations given heroin's existing presence and high substitutability in urban black communities.
“It could be that we’re not at the beginning or the end, and we’re just at the end of the beginning with it.”
Markets under-price environmental externalities, but monopoly correction risks overshoot and political feasibility of Pigouvian taxation is nearly zero.
- A monopolist restraining output in resource extraction could move the market closer to optimum by mimicking internalization of external costs, but a strong enough monopolist could overshoot beyond the appropriate Pigouvian correction; the quantitative magnitudes determine which.
“Maybe the monopolist’s monopoly is so strong that he overshoots in terms of internalizing the kind of Pigouvian tax that you’d want to slap onto the market price in a competitive environment.”
- Under competitive conditions without internalized environmental externalities, markets exhaust natural resources too rapidly because the initial price level is set too low; the theory holds prices rise at the rate of interest regardless, but the level is too low when external costs are unpriced.
“in that you haven’t internalized the environmental externality, I’d say, probably, if I had to answer that question — too rapidly or too slowly — too rapidly.”
- Better than relying on monopoly to restrain resource extraction would be a government estimating the correct non-priced external cost and imposing that tax, but this is a political impossibility—and governments often subsidize fossil fuels more than they tax them.
“Better than relying on monopoly would be having a government that could estimate what the right non-priced external cost of the use of the fuel is, and then slap that tax on, but that’s a political impossibility.”
- In Loury's 1979 model of market structure and innovation, using number of firms as the measure of competition, the rate of innovation is increasing in the number of firms—though the model assumed identical firms and never engaged real industrial organization with oligopoly and firm-size distributions.
“I think the rate of innovation is increasing in the number of firms, but I think that’s what I found”