What this covers

This conversation, recorded by Conversations with Tyler in 2018, presents Eric Kaufmann's account of Western populism's cultural rather than economic roots. Kaufmann argues that across multiple datasets spanning Europe and the United States, attitudes toward immigration and its political salience predict voting for figures like Trump, Brexit, and Le Pen far better than income, class, or economic grievance. The discussion ranges across sociology, politics, and psychology to trace how religiosity and total fertility rate interact to shape long-term demographic change, and how intermarriage drives secularization and assimilation of minority populations.

The conversation explores several distinct territories. Kaufmann examines how cross-cutting cleavages—identity divisions that cut across rather than reinforce each other—hold diverse societies together, using Switzerland and India as cases where this works, and Quebec as a case where aligned cleavages create fragmentation pressure. He argues that psychological traits like openness explain variation in immigration attitudes better than socioeconomic categories, operating through gene-environment correlation as people select into reinforcing environments over decades. On fertility, Kaufmann argues that religiosity rivals women's education as a predictor of total fertility rate, and that high-fertility religious groups can expand dramatically—the Amish and ultra-Orthodox Jews being key cases—but only within liberal democratic contexts. He forecasts that Muslim representation in Western Europe will plateau around 20–25 percent due to falling birth rates in sending regions and intermarriage-driven religious loss, and that American Latinos will assimilate into a broadened white identity as the majoritarian category loses ethnic rigidity. Finally, he addresses identity politics directly, arguing that suppressing discussion of white identity makes far-right conspiracy theories more dangerous underground.

Sharpest takeaway

Kaufmann argues that Western populism is driven primarily by cultural anxiety over immigration and ethnic change—not economics—and that religiosity and fertility differentials, plus assimilation through intermarriage, will reshape the demographic and political future of Western majorities.

  • Across datasets, attitudes toward immigration and its salience predict populist-right voting better than income or class
  • Religiosity is, after women's education, the strongest predictor of fertility, so high-fertility religious groups grow over generations within liberal environments
  • Intermarriage drives secularization and assimilation of Muslim and Latino populations toward the majority

The argument · threads9 threads · 36 claims
0.85

Immigration levels and diversity salience, not economics, are the primary drivers of populist-right support across the West.

9 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Martin Gurri's thesis that the internet causes political disillusion by exposing elites' flaws is unconvincing: television may have begun it, but East Asia has internet and modernity without nearly the political change seen in the West, and heavy internet or social-media users are not more likely to be populist-right voters—so the real driver is migration and multiculturalism, not technology.

    “those who are heavy internet users or heavy social media users are not more likely to be populist-right voters. So I’m less convinced by the technological arguments.”

  • The strongest empirical case in Whiteshift is that across every dataset—Europe and the US—what predicts voting for Trump, Brexit, or Le Pen is not being poor versus rich, nor disliking politicians (far-left voters dislike politicians as much as populist-right voters), but views on whether and how much immigration should be reduced and the salience of that issue; and over time, as concern over immigration rises, populist-right support rises in nine of ten West European countries.

    “It’s not being poor versus being rich. It’s not disliking politicians... so it is really around views on whether immigration should be reduced and by how much. And secondly, how important that issue is to you.”

  • Social categories like class, age, or gender explain little about immigration attitudes or populist-right voting; most variation is within these groups and is largely down to psychology—whether one likes diversity and change (linked to the big-five trait of openness) versus preferring stability and continuity—so educated women are merely less worried, not categorically different.

    “Most of the variation is within these groups and is, in my view, largely down to psychology — whether you like diversity or change — and disposition that would be linked to openness, one of the big five personality traits, or whether you prefer stability and continuity.”

  • Because immigration and diversity issues engage the open-versus-closed cultural and values dimension—and psychological dispositions like openness—more directly than the economic left/right dimension ever did, these cultural issues will increasingly become the basis of politics over time.

    “the fact that these immigration diversity–related issues very much do engage those psychological dimensions, I think that then becomes more the basis of politics over time.”

  • The number of people studying Foucault is vastly disproportionate to his importance for advancing human knowledge.

    “I’d say the number of people studying Foucault is vastly disproportionate to his importance for advancing human knowledge.”

  • Scots are about as worried about immigration as the English but are not strongly pro-Brexit because Scottish nationalism is explicitly pro-European and pro-immigration, making it a cross-cutting cleavage to anti-immigration populism; this explains Scottish patterns on leave/remain even though independence voters on both sides hold roughly similar Brexit views.

    “Scottish nationalism is, in some way, a cross-cutting cleavage to this sort of anti-immigration populism, and that explains some of the Scottish dynamics around “leave” and “remain.””

  • The view that Canada is immune to anti-immigration populism is wrong: French Canada resembles continental Europe (the CAQ won on immigration reduction), English Canada shows it via the Doug Ford administration and a new People's Party that won 11 percent in a Vancouver by-election, and the electorate is now more polarized on cultural issues than ever, so Canada will not remain the great exception much longer.

    “the idea that English Canada is immune from this is actually wrong, and we’re going to see more of it going forward. The electorate is now more polarized on cultural issues than it’s ever been in Canada.”

  • Portugal is relatively immune to alt-right or populist politics simply because of the low share of Muslim and non-Christian immigrants it receives; if it took large numbers of Muslims or non-Christians, populism would emerge there too—it is not genuinely immune.

    “I think, really, it’s as simple as the share of Muslim non-Christian immigrants... if they were getting large numbers of Muslims or non-Christians, then I think you would see it there. I don’t think they’re immune.”

  • Brexit will slouch toward a last-minute soft Brexit deal because Labour needs a story it can sell to its remain supporters—'we voted for this deal only to avoid a hard crash out'—which is acceptable, whereas owning a deal that pushed Britain out of the EU would get them punished by their base.

    “I still believe it’ll sort of slouch towards some soft Brexit in the end, when people are looking over the cliff... I think the Labour Party has to come up with a story that it can get away with with its supporters.”

0.68

Religious commitment is the strongest predictor of fertility rates, operating through theology, congregation support, and cultural orientation against secularism.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Iran's very low total fertility rate is not evidence of secularization; under Khomeini the religious authorities themselves issued fatwas endorsing family planning and contraception, which brought fertility from about 6 to 1.8 per woman in roughly 20 years—demonstrating that when religious leaders sanction it, birth rates can fall rapidly even in a religious society.

    “If you go back to Khomeini, they actually issued fatwas that endorsed the family policies. The mullahs themselves, the religious authorities themselves, actually endorsed family planning and contraception.”

  • World-denying fundamentalist sects like the Amish are not motivated by economic incentives; their population growth comes from rejecting modern contraception and family-size limitation as a deliberate stand against secularism and liberalism, so even if they run out of land their fertility will not fall, because modern fertility is driven by culture and religion rather than the material pressures (needing children to work land) that drove it in the past.

    “I think these world-denying, fundamentalist sects really are not that motivated by economic incentives... The material incentives are no longer the driver. Fertility is cultural and religious.”

  • Religious fertility is supported not only by theology like 'go forth and multiply' but by participation in a congregation, which provides a child-minding and childcare support network and a pro-natalist atmosphere; in Israel this religious effect has even bled into the secular population, raising secular Jewish fertility to about 2.2 children, extremely high for any secular group.

    “participation in a congregation gives a support network around child-minding, childcare, and creates a more pro-natalist atmosphere... the secular Jewish women have, on average, 2.2 kids, which is extremely high for any secular population.”

  • Next to women's education, religiosity is the strongest predictor of total fertility rate worldwide; there is almost no country where committed religious women have below-replacement fertility, and in Western developed countries religiosity actually matters more than women's education, making it a durable key driver of future fertility differences.

    “next to women’s education, religiosity is the next strongest predictor of total fertility rate. There’s almost no country in the world where committed religious women have a below-replacement fertility.”

0.55

Allowing moderate white identity expression prevents far-right radicalization better than suppression or double standards.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Penalizing or suppressing white identity talk makes things more dangerous, not less: it lets the far right claim a real double standard (everyone else gets an identity), which becomes the foundation for conspiracy theories like 'white genocide' that thrive underground; getting the arguments into the open lets them be refuted, and there is an inverse correlation between populist-right support and far-right attacks (Ravndal's 1990-2015 Norway data).

    “if you really suppress it, it goes underground. I think that’s actually the worst solution... if you look at even the correlation between populist right support and far right attacks, there’s actually an inverse correlation”

  • Attachment to one's own ethnic group is not the same as hatred of the outgroup—absent violent conflict, the two are distinct, and American National Election Study thermometer data show whites who feel warmer toward whites are not colder toward blacks; therefore outlawing white identity rather than allowing its moderate, common-good-subordinated expression stores up more trouble than treating it like any other identity.

    “Unless there’s a violent conflict going on, attachment to your own group is not the same as hating an outgroup. Attachment to being white or attachment to a North European ancestry is not a predictor of disliking a minority.”

  • The Orange Order is not a form of white identity politics but a Protestant identity association, evidenced by thriving lodges in Ghana, West Africa, and among native Indians in Canada; where it has functioned as an ethnic association (Northern Ireland, Newfoundland) that was incidental to the dominant ethnic group's coincidence with Protestantism.

    “I don’t think it is a form of white identity politics, actually... It’s mainly about being Protestant, so it’s a Protestant identity.”

  • American Latinos will largely assimilate into whiteness because the pull of the culture drives mixing, and as the white majority becomes more admixed there is no longer a monolithic white group to define against, so the mixed population identifies with the majoritarian aspect of its identity—already 60 percent of people with at least one Mexican grandparent identify as white rather than Latino.

    “60 percent of people who have at least one Mexican grandparent identify as white rather than Latino. So this is already occurring to some extent.”

0.51

Ethnic and religious diversity destabilizes polities unless identity cleavages cut across rather than reinforce each other.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Northern Ireland refutes the idea that societies move 'beyond history': although the society looks totally modern, history lives in the present—people take identity seriously and connect themselves to the feats of their ancestors—while whiteness itself does not play a role (black spectators are welcomed at the Twelfth, but Catholics are met with suspicion), making it a nonracial but intensely historical identity conflict.

    “the argument that societies are going beyond history is clearly untrue for Northern Ireland, where history is very present, even as many other dimensions of modernity continue.”

  • Switzerland is not really a counterexample to the homogeneity-cohesion link because identity is built up from the commune level: communes and cantons are largely ethnically and religiously homogeneous (and split when not, as Jura broke from Bern), and these homogeneous units then federate—so the society is multicultural in cities but not at the communal and cantonal level.

    “the identity — it’s built up from the commune level. Communes and cantons tend to be ethnically and religiously homogenous... at the subnational level, there’s a high degree of cultural homogeneity. Then they federate into a larger whole.”

  • Diverse polities stay united when their identity cleavages cut across rather than reinforce each other: Switzerland held together because the Catholic-Protestant line crossed the German-French language line, India avoids fragmentation because caste cuts across the Hindu-Muslim divide, whereas aligned cleavages (language and religion together, as in Quebec) create strong breakup pressures.

    “the line between Catholicism and Protestantism cut across the German-French line in terms of language, so that cross-cutting cleavage, I think, helped. If the language and the religion were aligned, as in, say, Quebec versus the rest of Canada, then you would have had much stronger pressures towards a breakup.”

0.51

Muslim immigration to Western Europe will remain limited by low flows, declining birth rates, and high intermarriage-driven religious loss.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The Muslim share of Western Europe will not exceed roughly 20-25 percent because the immigration flow is only about 20-25 percent Muslim, Muslim (including Arab-world) birth rates have fallen dramatically over two decades, and intermarriage drives religious loss—as seen in UK census data where part-Pakistani/Arab, part-white-British offspring frequently shifted from 'Muslim' to 'no religion' between 2001 and 2011.

    “I don’t think we’re going to head to much more than about 20, 25 at the most, percent.”

  • French Algerians and Moroccans have unusually high outmarriage rates (40-50 percent), assimilating better than Muslims of the same ethnicity in the Netherlands, primarily because of Algeria's large, relatively secular, anti-Arab-Islamist Berber population—not because of any superior French integration policy, which is overstated.

    “the outmarriage rate is almost 50 percent for French Algerian men... I think it is the Berber factor. I don’t think there’s anything magical that the French are doing that the Dutch are not in terms of integration policy.”

  • American Pakistanis assimilate so successfully partly because they are selected from Pakistan's educated urban elite rather than the more traditional, agricultural border regions (Balochistan, areas near Afghanistan) associated with cousin marriage—unlike British Pakistanis drawn from regions like Sylhet/Mirpur recruited into textile factories with cousin-marriage familial links.

    “they’re probably selected. Pakistan has a relatively educated urban elite in the cities... My impression is the American Pakistanis wouldn’t have been drawn from that same subpopulation. So that might explain the difference.”

0.38

High-fertility religious minorities can demographically dominate only in liberal democracies; authoritarian states prevent such takeover through coercion.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • When a group maintains roughly twice the fertility rate of the surrounding population together with fairly high retention—as with the Amish (5,000 in 1900 to ~300,000 today) or Mormons—its share rises exponentially across generations, making such groups increasingly influential, with Israeli ultra-Orthodox serving as the key test case for whether such groups eventually drop fertility or assimilate.

    “There were, I think, 5,000 Amish in the US in 1900. There are probably 300,000 now. In the 2200s there will be 300 million with this rate of growth.”

  • High-fertility religious groups can demographically take over only within a democratic, liberal, tolerant environment; under an authoritarian regime like China the state would simply impose two-child or one-child limits and end the growth, so the long-run dominance of the religious depends entirely on the environment, and a sufficiently fast rate of religious defection could produce an equilibrium that prevents religious dominance.

    “it’s within a certain environment that the religious can take over, and that is a sort of democratic, liberal environment. But within an authoritarian environment, they do very badly.”

  • Tocqueville may have overestimated the tenacity and durability of American associational life and social capital—what Putnam describes—because that associational life has declined dramatically and may not survive current secularization and individualism.

    “he overestimated the tenacity and durability of that associational life, that it may not survive the current secularization and individualism.”

0.38

Demographic convergence occurs when lagging groups complete their fertility transition, as seen in Catholic-Protestant and other sectarian patterns.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The Catholic-Protestant fertility gap closed because groups enter the demographic transition at different times—Protestants in Northern Ireland went through it about 80 years before Catholics, but as lagging groups enter the mature phase their fertility converges, which is why US Catholic and Protestant rates were nearly identical by 1980.

    “By 1980 in the US, the two fertility rates were pretty much identical. This is just a convergence as groups enter into the mature phase of demographic transition”

  • Intermarriage across the Catholic-Protestant sectarian divide in Northern Ireland is only a few percent and shows no sign of unfreezing, partly because those who do marry across the divide often relocate to Britain where life is less complicated.

    “It is a few percent. It is very, very small. Yeah, extremely low. No statistics I’ve seen have shown that unfreezing”

  • Irish reunification will never happen through economic integration alone; it requires winning over the unionist (Protestant) population through something symbolic—a 'charm offensive' that reassures them—because they are foursquare against reunification and are the group that must be persuaded.

    “it’ll never really happen just through economic integration. I think there’s got to be something symbolic that will win over the unionists.”

0.27

Psychological disposition toward openness and change, reinforced by self-selecting environments, explains political divergence more than personality alone.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Growing up as a foreigner—especially ages 10-11 at an international school in Tokyo with 60 country booths—makes one acutely aware of national identity, which shaped Kaufmann's lifelong research focus on identity; had he grown up in rural Alberta he likely would not have pursued these questions.

    “when you grow up abroad and you are a foreigner in another country, you think more about identity, and particularly national identity.”

  • Although big-five personality dimensions explain little raw variation in immigration attitudes, following Robert Plomin a person with a given disposition (e.g. high openness) selects reinforcing environments—newspapers, parties, social settings—so that by age 50 or 60 the initial small psychological differences are magnified into large political divergence.

    “once you have a particular disposition, you then select an environment that’s different... they will reinforce those dispositions. By the time you hit age 50 or 60, you’re way over here. So the effect is magnified over time.”

  • Following Daniel Bell, modernism was a late-19th-century break with tradition centered on novelty, difference, and expressive individualism that constantly negates the past; its creative peak (the 1910s-30s) depended on having a traditional culture to push against, so once that target was gone the same sensibility became repetitive and exhausted—Jackson Pollock, pop art, and the Tate Modern are not fundamentally different from the 1920s avant-garde.

    “modernism represents a break towards the end of the 19th century with tradition, that it’s about novelty, difference, immediacy. It’s kind of an expressive individualism where you’re constantly negating the past”

  • The same psychological orientation toward preservation versus change underlies both progressive causes (preserving local communities and historic buildings) and populist-right causes (preserving existing ethnic compositions and histories), so a person consistent about valuing preservation should value both—revealing an inconsistency in how the two are usually treated politically.

    “if you want local communities and historic buildings and things which are associated typically with progressivism, then that’s also, actually, consistently associated with things like preservation of existing ethnic compositions or histories, which is a more populist-right thing.”

0.24

Cousin marriage, patriarchal gender-work trade-offs, and community homogeneity at local levels shape social outcomes and political stability.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Northern Ireland's real estate and future prospects may be undervalued, but the economy is roughly 85 percent government-funded from mainland Britain, so without significant private investment it lacks economic dynamism—a legacy of the security situation that historically kept investors away and channeled investment into the Republic of Ireland instead.

    “right now, the economy is about 85 percent government. So unless there is some sort of private investment, then it’s going to be a government-run . . . essentially an economy funded from mainland Britain.”

  • High rates of cousin marriage are plausibly inimical to liberalism and free society because orienting one's worldview around extended family is the opposite of a liberal, individualistic worldview—an intuition consistent with the data even if direct data are lacking.

    “When you’re oriented around family and extended family in that way, and that’s the worldview that you acquire, then yes, that is obviously the opposite of a kind of liberal, individualistic worldview.”

  • Fertility relates to patriarchy in a U-shape: highly patriarchal societies have high fertility and fully non-patriarchal societies have moderate fertility, but societies in the middle—where women can work but face a sharp patriarchal trade-off on exiting work (as in Japan and southern Europe)—have the lowest fertility; giving women easy workforce entry and exit without imposing rigid gender roles yields higher fertility.

    “if you’re very patriarchal, you have high fertility. If you are not patriarchal at all, you have moderate fertility. And if you’re in the middle, you tend to have really low fertility.”