total fertility rate
The average number of children a woman would have over her lifetime given current age-specific birth rates; about 2.1 is replacement level.
As defined in Eric Kaufmann
Where it comes up · 5
- Eric Kaufmann8 claims
- “Deep Thoughts”: Tyler Cowen on AI and the Future of Work2 claims
- Marc Rowan1 claim
- Conversations with Tyler - Paul Gillingham1 claim
- 402 - The Geopolitics Of Trump 2.01 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 13Search all claims for “total fertility rate” →
- Because fertility rates have fallen below replacement nearly everywhere except sub-Saharan Africa, aging Western societies have relied on immigration to offset decline; when center-right governments themselves allow immigration surges (Biden's open border, post-Brexit Tory immigration increases), they make it very hard to tell voters to avoid the far right, which is the single most straightforward explanation for far-right populism's rise.402 - The Geopolitics Of Trump 2.0
- China's total fertility rate is 'low and plummeting'—'getting rid of the one-child policy hasn't helped'—creating demographic constraints on economic growth and military capacity that US doesn't face.“Deep Thoughts”: Tyler Cowen on AI and the Future of Work
- Mexico's fertility rate fell below the US level because of a uniquely strong separation of church and state—so Catholic clergy did not inveigh against contraception as elsewhere in Latin America—combined with female primary education, which globally correlates with women's autonomy to adopt contraception, driving the pill's rapid uptake from the 1960s.Conversations with Tyler - Paul Gillingham
- US intertemporal national wealth relative to debt is more favorable than China's; the US has superior demographics (higher fertility, immigration), higher-quality capital, and better institutions, making long-term US portfolio more attractive than Chinese portfolio.“Deep Thoughts”: Tyler Cowen on AI and the Future of Work
- Iran's very low total fertility rate is not evidence of secularization; under Khomeini the religious authorities themselves issued fatwas endorsing family planning and contraception, which brought fertility from about 6 to 1.8 per woman in roughly 20 years—demonstrating that when religious leaders sanction it, birth rates can fall rapidly even in a religious society.Eric Kaufmann
- Next to women's education, religiosity is the strongest predictor of total fertility rate worldwide; there is almost no country where committed religious women have below-replacement fertility, and in Western developed countries religiosity actually matters more than women's education, making it a durable key driver of future fertility differences.Eric Kaufmann
- Religious fertility is supported not only by theology like 'go forth and multiply' but by participation in a congregation, which provides a child-minding and childcare support network and a pro-natalist atmosphere; in Israel this religious effect has even bled into the secular population, raising secular Jewish fertility to about 2.2 children, extremely high for any secular group.Eric Kaufmann
- Fertility relates to patriarchy in a U-shape: highly patriarchal societies have high fertility and fully non-patriarchal societies have moderate fertility, but societies in the middle—where women can work but face a sharp patriarchal trade-off on exiting work (as in Japan and southern Europe)—have the lowest fertility; giving women easy workforce entry and exit without imposing rigid gender roles yields higher fertility.Eric Kaufmann
- World-denying fundamentalist sects like the Amish are not motivated by economic incentives; their population growth comes from rejecting modern contraception and family-size limitation as a deliberate stand against secularism and liberalism, so even if they run out of land their fertility will not fall, because modern fertility is driven by culture and religion rather than the material pressures (needing children to work land) that drove it in the past.Eric Kaufmann
- When a group maintains roughly twice the fertility rate of the surrounding population together with fairly high retention—as with the Amish (5,000 in 1900 to ~300,000 today) or Mormons—its share rises exponentially across generations, making such groups increasingly influential, with Israeli ultra-Orthodox serving as the key test case for whether such groups eventually drop fertility or assimilate.Eric Kaufmann