creditor rescue
Government action that protects the lenders to a failing institution by repaying or guaranteeing their claims in full, so lenders do not bear losses from risky borrowing.
As defined in Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
Where it comes up · 1
Most important claims · 10 of 17Search all claims for “creditor rescue” →
- Willem Buiter warned in 1995 that bailing out creditors of Mexico created a one-way bet that made lenders lazy, so investors no longer did their homework on risk, a dynamic Roberts sees as the core of the 2008 problem.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- The 1995 Mexican peso bailout was in substance a rescue of the creditors, largely Wall Street institutions, who had lent to Mexico, not of Mexico itself, and it set the template for later creditor protection.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- Creditor rescue, not too big to fail, is the right name for the problem: regulators do let large firms fail, but they consistently rescue their creditors, which is what changes lender behavior.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- The panic after Lehman's failure was caused less by Lehman's bankruptcy itself than by investors learning that government policy would not rescue every creditor, a change in expectations that Roberts argues is the real source of the turmoil.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- The creditor rescue history began with Continental Illinois in 1984: after risky, heavily borrowed bets, lenders balked, and the Treasury ensured creditors were repaid even beyond FDIC insurance limits, setting a precedent.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- A historical sequence of creditor rescues, starting with Continental Illinois in 1984, through the savings and loan crisis, the Greenspan put, and Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, taught creditors that large institutions' lenders would be protected, reducing their incentive to monitor risk.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- Creditors, not equity holders, are the real watchdogs of recklessness, because equity holders are diversified and want high-variance upside, whereas creditors only receive fixed returns and therefore monitor solvency.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- The government honored AIG's credit default swap and insurance obligations at 100 cents on the dollar in fall 2008, even though AIG had earlier been negotiating settlements around 60 to 65 cents, and Roberts considers that a mistake.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- The Bear Stearns rescue was really a payoff to its largest creditor, JPMorgan Chase, while the failure to rescue Lehman punished its creditors, many of them foreign banks such as Japanese, Asian, and Korean banks, so policy winners and losers must be read through the creditor lens.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- The gains from the housing and mortgage system were private while the losses were socialized onto taxpayers, because policies allowed people to gamble with other people's money and rescues of creditors weakened natural restraints.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010