GSE
Government-Sponsored Enterprise; in context, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-chartered firms operating in the mortgage market with implicit federal backing.
As defined in Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
Where it comes up · 5
- Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design7 claims
- Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/20106 claims
- Equifax: Your Score & More3 claims
- Max Simkoff - Redesigning the Home Buying Experience - [Founder’s Field Guide, EP. 47]3 claims
- Jim Millstein on the Massive Risks of Any 'Mar-a-Lago Accord' | Odd Lots1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 20Search all claims for “GSE” →
- Since the 1970s the US has been tempted to use the banking system as a vehicle for off-balance-sheet income redistribution because checks and balances thwart direct fiscal redistribution, leaving hidden subsidies through arcane bank regulation; this distorts incentives for everyone and makes the US crisis-prone, unlike Australia which addresses inequality directly through fiscal policy such as down-payment assistance.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
- The US checks and balances that thwart direct fiscal policy to address inequality leave freedom to act in hidden ways—through GSE support and arcane regulation—so people who trust those checks miss that inequality problems get addressed destructively via financial-system subsidies that destabilize the system rather than head-on.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
- Because Fannie and Freddie for many years refused subprime and dominated prime 30-year fixed mortgages, Wall Street's incentive was to escape the GSEs through subprime; subprime lenders, not being banks, were entirely dependent on Wall Street for warehouse funding and for buying their loans, making them creatures of Wall Street.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- For many years Fannie and Freddie wouldn't touch subprime and dominated prime, so Wall Street's incentive was to escape GSE control. Because subprime companies weren't banks, they depended entirely on Wall Street for warehouse loans (up-front cash) and for buying their loans. They were creatures of Wall Street, and Wall Street ultimately dictated the riskiness of the loans by deciding which loans it would buy and finance.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- Evidence of GSE bullying came from reporting. James Bothwell of the GAO wrote a study saying Fannie and Freddie posed risks to the economy, which they did, and was submarined in a congressional hearing. Fannie's David Maxwell threatened Lou Ranieri that First Boston would never get a Fannie mortgage bond again unless Ranieri sided with him, which was raw business power rather than political power.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- A banking crisis requires two conditions—extremely risky assets held by banks and tolerance for extreme leverage of banks and GSEs—and neither would have occurred absent the underlying political deal; additionally, when Fannie and Freddie relaxed underwriting standards they had to relax them for everyone, not just affordable housing, which opened the floodgates.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
- Under the conventional tri-merge rule, mortgage originators securitizing to agencies had to pull all three bureau files, giving every bureau 100 percent share of mandated units, which created a triopoly and pricing power in mortgage, the only vertical with that power.Equifax: Your Score & More
- Because GSEs faced far lower capital requirements ($1.60 vs $4 per loan) plus a guarantee fee, they could buy loans, securitize them into MBS, and sell them back to banks more cheaply than banks could hold them—creating a tremendous incentive for Fannie and Freddie to be in the business of buying banks' bad loans.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design
- Roberts' insider sources say Fannie and Freddie never did anything they didn't approve of. The affordable-housing mandates, at least early on, were good for the GSEs' business, and they would have stopped them otherwise.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- Mortgage-risk subsidization policy ran as a continuous thread across George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations, showing that ideologically different presidents pursued very similar policies; the underlying coalition paired community activist groups with mega-bank-creating bankers, with activists even testifying for bank mergers at Fed hearings.Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber on Fragile by Design