
What this covers
Dean Baker of the Center for Economic Policy and Research discusses the 2008 financial crisis with Russ Roberts in this EconTalk episode. Baker positions the crisis not as an isolated event but as the consequence of a three-decade structural problem: beginning in the 1980s, wages for most workers decoupled from productivity growth due to weakened unions, globalization, and a strong dollar. This demand gap—roughly $1.2 trillion in annual lost spending—was temporarily masked by successive asset bubbles in stocks (1990s) and housing (2000s), each of which burst and exposed the underlying hollowness. The conversation centers on whether and how government intervention addressed this gap, with Baker arguing that the 2009 stimulus, though it worked, was too small and too short, and that the financial system emerged from rescue fundamentally unchanged.
The discussion ranges across three main territories. On the crisis itself, Baker and Roberts examine the 2006–07 housing collapse's dual mechanism—both direct construction losses and a consumption collapse via the wealth effect—and debate whether the Dodd-Frank reforms and increased Fed transparency went far enough to prevent recurrence. On remedies, Baker defends a larger stimulus and larger multipliers, while Roberts questions whether stimulus can effectively reach workers who are already fully employed. They also challenge the claim that taxpayers profited from bank bailouts, arguing instead that the government lent at below-market liquidity premiums. A third section pivots to health care, where both speakers agree the US system's cost structure is unsustainable—spending more than twice per capita as other wealthy nations—though they diverge on solutions: Baker proposes allowing Medicare beneficiaries to buy into foreign systems at a discount, while the conversation flags the employer-based insurance system itself as the driver of escalating costs.
Baker argues the current economic crisis stems from a demand gap created when wages decoupled from productivity in the 1980s, a gap papered over by stock and housing bubbles, and that the proper remedy is much larger government stimulus plus structural reform of a captured Fed and an over-large, under-taxed financial sector.
- Wages stopped tracking productivity after 1980 (weakened unions, dollar appreciation, globalization), creating a chronic demand gap
- Asset bubbles (1990s stocks, 2000s housing) temporarily filled that demand gap until they burst, leaving ~$1.2 trillion in lost annual demand
- The 2009 stimulus worked but was too small and too short; the Fed and bank bailouts left a captured financial system intact
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Median income and median wage comparisons over time are distorted by changes in household composition—e.g., as the divorce rate rose in the late 1970s the number of households changed, so the median can fall even when every individual is doing better; these effects have not been fully disentangled.
“as the divorce rate starts to rise the household income for example and to some extent median wages of workers start is going to be distorted by changes in the just in the number of households... you can have the median fall even though every person is still doing better”
Long-run US fiscal danger comes overwhelmingly from a broken health care system—the US spends more than twice as much per person as the average of other wealthy countries and the gap is projected to widen—and because more than half of US health care is publicly financed (Medicare/Medicaid), this is the core budget problem, independent of and more important than the case against current stimulus.
“we have a broken health care system and the projections just show health care costs... currently we spend more than twice as much per person as the average four other wealthy countries... more than half of our health care is paid for through the public sector”
Patients are poorly positioned to discipline health spending because they cannot reliably distinguish genuinely needed care from unnecessary care, and doctors—facing legal vulnerability and possessing expert hubris ('a hammer looking for a nail')—tend to over-recommend interventions whose side-effect risks are downplayed.
“how to you know our people in the situation to distinguish between care that they really need and here that might be you know... you have your doctor saying oh you need X Y & Z and you know how many people are getting challenged them”
The Dodd-Frank Act, through an unusual left-right coalition (Alan Grayson and Ron Paul), produced amendments and a Bloomberg lawsuit requiring much greater Fed transparency, including disclosure of who received discount-window lending—progress on openness that, while not solving regulatory capture, makes the system better.
“you had alan grayson one of the most left-wing people in the house joining up with Ron Paul one the more conservative people... that requires a lot more openness in you know what the Fed is doing... they have to disclose now who gets lending through the discount window”
A system already existed to impose losses on failing large financial institutions—the FDIC Improvement Act of the early 1990s, passed to address the moral hazard of past rescues—but when the crisis came, every major creditor except Lehman (and Wachovia, which went through FDIC) received 100 cents on the dollar with no negotiation, per Geithner.
“we had a system in place for dealing with this the FDIC Improvement Act... passed and I think 91 sir early 90s on the grounds that we created a moral hazard with past rescues”
The demand gap left by stagnant wages was filled by asset bubbles—the 1990s stock bubble and then the even larger 2000s housing bubble—which temporarily pushed the economy to high employment but inevitably burst.
“the demand gap was in effect filled by the bubbles so in the 90s we had the stock bubble that ended up pushing the economy to you know in many ways very high levels of employment output but of course that couldn't last”
The argument that taxpayers 'made money' on the bank bailouts is bad accounting because the government lent at rates far below the liquidity premium of the time—analogous to giving someone a 30-year mortgage at 1% and claiming profit because it was repaid.
“it's like if I gave you a 30-year mortgage at 1% interest and you paid it off and then I walked away say hey look I made money on it... that's not the way we were nearly do accounting”
Stimulus that pays already-employed skilled workers (e.g., machinery operators) to do more work would crowd out private uses of those skills by bidding up their wages; the absence of real-wage growth across major occupations is therefore evidence against large stimulus effects unless the multiplier works through spending.
“I look at the resources that aren't scarce which are I suspect some of those higher skilled machinery running machinery stuff folks and so you put increase the demand for them you drive up their wages and you crowd out people who would have done other things with those skills elsewhere in the private sector”
A more market-oriented health care fix would be to allow free trade in health care—e.g., let Medicare beneficiaries buy into other countries' lower-cost health systems (paid their full cost plus a premium) and pocket part of the multi-thousand-dollar annual savings—creating a real consumer incentive to economize.
“let people are on Medicare... let them buy into the healthcare systems of other countries of lower-cost... buy into England's health care system or Germany's and pocket half the difference”
The 2006-07 housing bubble collapse caused the economic downturn through two channels: a direct loss of roughly four percentage points of GDP (~$600 billion/year) from falling construction, plus a fall in consumption via the housing wealth effect (a savings-rate rise from ~0% to over 5% cutting ~$500 billion in annual demand), totaling a shortfall over $1.2 trillion in annual demand.
“we lost around four percentage points of GDP in annual demand because of the fall-off in construction it's about six hundred billion a year then on top of that you had a consumption demand being driven by the the housing wealth effect”
The collapse of the 2000-01 stock bubble actually fed the growth of the housing bubble for two reasons: Greenspan's 1% federal funds rate made conditions conducive to housing, and burned stock investors shifted into housing believing it was safe ('you can always live in your house').
“one is that in the wake of the collapse of the stock bubble course we had very low interest rates Greenspan low federal funds rate 1%... and the other was just that you know the psychology that you had a lot of people felt there really burned in the stock market so they thought housing was safe”
The Blinder-Zandi counterfactual study overstated the bailout's benefits by assuming an implausible alternative—that without the bailout the government would never have done anything at all, even months or a year later—which is not a serious counterfactual for policy analysis.
“their implicit counterfactual not just that we don't have the bailouts but we never do in we don't do anything... that's really not a serious counterfactual”
Obama's biggest mistake was not failing to ask for a larger stimulus per se, but pivoting after passage to deficit reduction and overselling recovery ('green shoots') even though he knew the stimulus wasn't enough—undermining the case for a follow-up and being both bad economics and (in retrospect) bad politics.
“once it was passed he knew it wasn't enough... but instead of saying that he turned around said okay now we're gonna focus... on deficit reduction... and you know he did this horrible over selling”
A widely under-appreciated benefit of the Affordable Care Act is that it gives genuine insurance to people who only think they are insured today: those who get coverage through their jobs would lose it upon becoming too sick to work, so they are effectively uninsured against chronic, debilitating illness.
“if I were to get seriously ill I would at some point have to give up my job and at that point I give up my health insurance as well... if I were to get some chronic debilitating illness end of the day I'd find myself uninsured”
There is little empirical evidence that the ACA's uncertainty cost jobs, because the signatures you would expect—rising average weekly hours (to avoid covering more workers) and rising temp employment (since temps need not be insured)—are not present; average weekly hours remain below pre-recession levels and temp employment is way down.
“we should expect to see a rise and average hours work you don't see that... like to see more temp employment and employment still way down... so I just don't see the evidence for that”
Since at least the 1984 rescue of Continental Illinois there has been a steady pattern—despite free-market rhetoric—of socializing the financial sector's losses and privatizing its gains; the sector has grown larger and more politically powerful, and its wages and profits appear tied to that political power rather than to its contribution to economic life.
“if you go back to 1984 in the rescue of continental Illinois and its creditors you see a long steady pattern get lots of free-market rhetoric but the fact is in terms of practice there's a lot of socializing of losses and privatizing it gains”
Low interest rates do not necessarily produce bubbles—rates were low in the 1950s and early 60s with good investment growth and no notable bubbles—so the 1990s/2000s bubbles reflect a different, more bubble-prone economy and a Fed (Greenspan) that chose to look the other way despite knowing about them.
“low interest rates don't necessarily mean you'll have bubbles we had low interest rates in the 50s and early 60s certainly we didn't have any notable bubbles”
The Federal Reserve's structure is an abomination because twelve of nineteen members of the FOMC (or five of twelve voting members) are effectively appointed by the industry being regulated, which makes regulatory capture easy; the Fed should instead be appointed by the president, approved by and answerable to Congress.
“how do you justify having a regulatory agency we're twelve of the nineteen members of its main body... are actually appointed by the industry being regulated it makes capture really not so difficult to to do”
Whether you use the GDP deflator or the CPI as the denominator, the wages of the median worker and of production workers (roughly the bottom 70-80%) did not keep pace with productivity growth over the 1980s-90s, even after controlling for education and age—so the result is robust to measurement objections.
“it doesn't matter what your denominator is... for the typical work or the median worker or for production workers their wages did not keep pace with productivity growth”
The Fed and policymakers deserve roughly a 'D' for the 2008 crisis: preventing a chain-reaction financial collapse was good, but they left the same insolvent banks and executives in place rather than pairing the rescue with a total overhaul that downsized banks and replaced leadership.
“I'd say give them a D I mean we didn't want a financial collapse... but they basically left everything in place so all the banks that got us here... the same people running the banks they were left left at the helm”
Having the world's dominant currency makes it easier to run large deficits, but only for a while; the US may be drifting toward the end of that period, so spending real resources on low-payoff projects like a California bullet train can itself punish future generations.
“having the world's dominant currency certainly makes it easier to run large deficits at least for a while you always run the risk that you're gonna find out that that periods over and I think we're a little bit in that direction”
Deregulation like the repeal of Glass-Steagall was justified by efficiency, but the efficiency argument is largely contradictory because the banks themselves claimed to maintain a strict separation between insured commercial banking and investment banking; in reality the efficiency gained was efficiency at using taxpayer-backed (explicitly and implicitly insured) money to take risks.
“the argument well it's more efficient... but the fact is it doesn't it makes them more efficient at it using my money and I that's not good as long as that's there hanging over it I don't care how efficient it is”
Health care costs rise not just from innovation but because we spend other people's money—particularly via the employer/insurance and tax-subsidized system—so as long as that structure persists, costs will keep escalating.
“part of its the fact that we're spending other people's money and as long as we do that... we keep subsidizing it's just it's gonna get more expensive that way”
Beginning in the 1980s, wages for most (median/production) workers stopped moving in step with productivity growth—driven by weakened unions, the willingness to fire and replace striking workers after the PATCO strike, and a high dollar that hurt unionized manufacturing—which created a demand gap.
“following the beginning of the decade the beginning of the 80s wages for most workers no longer moved in step with productivity growth this in effect created some of the demand gap”
The human cost of prolonged unemployment—parents losing two or three years they cannot get back to raise, educate, and house their children—makes the case for stimulus 'not a close call,' outweighing manageable fiscal concerns given that the US, like Japan at over 200% debt-to-GDP, can still borrow cheaply.
“we're talking about them being unemployed two three years you know that's they're not getting that time back... that's lost and that's an enormous price so I don't to my mind I don't think it's a close call”
The financial sector should be made less powerful by breaking up the largest banks (e.g., splitting JPMorgan into 5-8 component parts none of which is too big to fail) and by imposing a financial transactions tax, which would both shrink bloated computer-driven trading volumes and correct the fact that finance is under-taxed relative to other goods that bear sales/value-added taxes.
“I would love to see breaking up of the large banks... breaking up a JPMorgan into five six eight eight banks their component parts are not too big to fail”
The 'crowding out' critique of stimulus is weak: the standard interest-rate channel is implausible given accommodating Fed policy and ~$1.6 trillion in excess reserves, private equipment-and-software investment has largely recovered to pre-recession levels (~7.5% of GDP), and a study trying to show stimulus reduced private-sector employment in high-spending states failed to find a significant effect.
“the simple stories that it would raise interest rates and therefore crowd out other investment I think you'd be hard-pressed to make that story... given that we have someone the order one point six trillion in excess reserves”
The private sector will not step up to fill the ~$1.2 trillion demand gap because there is no dynamic that would cause it to; the gap could be filled with government spending but policymakers are not prepared to do so.
“the private sector is not going to step up and fill it simply because there's no dynamic that would cause the private sector to step up and fill that gap”
Bernanke's Fed has performed better than the European Central Bank, but still not as aggressively as it should; targeting nominal GDP (Sumner) or a higher 3-4% inflation rate (Krugman) would likely amount to roughly the same thing and would both be better than current policy.
“Scott Summers idea targeting nominal GDP I think that's reasonable thing Krugman has a little different version saying that we should target inflation a higher rate of inflation say three to four percent... those end up to my view likely being largely the same thing”
It is irresponsible for officials to declare an imminent apocalypse to push through TARP without evidence, and the forced weekend sale of Bear Stearns to a single guaranteed suitor with no public input—on grounds the assets were 'too hard to figure out'—is undemocratic for decisions of such magnitude.
“to say we had we had no choice but to sell Bear Stearns off for two dollars... to a single suitor over the weekend who was guaranteed 30 29 later thirty two billion dollars worth of assets because quote they were too hard to figure out that's what kind of democracy is that”
The 2008 tax-rebate portion of the stimulus (about a third) had little bang for the buck because there is little evidence people spent it; Baker's own estimates suggest somewhere between 50 and 70 cents on the dollar was spent, which he considers good despite tax cuts not being his preferred instrument.
“a third of it roughly went to a one-time temporary tax rebate that put purchasing power into people's hands they may have spent it there's not a lot of evidence that they did”
Given a long-lasting demand gap, longer-term infrastructure projects would have made more sense than the administration's emphasis on 'shovel-ready' projects, but the stimulus included relatively little long-term infrastructure, making it less well-targeted than it could have been.
“given that we were looking at a downturn that was going to last a long time... I think what made much more sense to have some longer-term projects to focus on some long-term infrastructure and what they put in by way of long-term infrastructure was fairly limited”
The 2009 stimulus worked as designed—creating roughly two to three million jobs (less than the projected three to four because only ~$300 billion/year of actual stimulus was spent)—but it was far too small and too short to close a gap requiring 10-12 million jobs, and its expiration in 2010 created a contractionary drag.
“I think it did work for what it was designed to do which was create on the order of two to three million jobs... the big problem in my view was it was nowhere near large enough”
Aid to state and local governments was the most valuable and quickly-spent stimulus component because those governments face balanced-budget constraints and respond to shortfalls by laying off workers; the aid prevented many such job losses.
“state local governments are operating under tight budget constraints they have to balance their budgets when they have a shortfall they laid people off they've been doing that... I think it certainly kept a lot of people from losing their jobs”
US unionization rates peaked in the mid-1950s and declined steadily thereafter, but the decline accelerated in the 1980s and union bargaining power was further weakened because going on strike could now cost workers their jobs—companies like Greyhound and Eastern fired strikers and hired replacements, a practice considered unusual before the 1980s.
“you had several major private sector employers Greyhound Easterns come to mind but there are a number of others that did the exact same thing they fired striking workers hired replacement workers that wasn't done in in the 50s 60s and 70s”
From the 1950s through the 1970s the US had a virtuous growth pattern where strong productivity growth was passed on as wage growth up and down the income ladder, which raised consumption, demand, and investment; this broke down in the 1980s.
“you had productivity growth very good productivity growth in fact that was passed on and wage growth pretty much up and down the income ladder they had led to increased consumption increased demand therefore increased investment”
Academic and policy economists show a surprising lack of outrage over the 2008 bailouts (grading them B/B+ rather than D) partly because they look the other way and partly because the many economists who believe they are in line for top positions (Fed chair, CEA, NEC) hold their fire against the powerful—a form of capture.
“there's over a hundred economists in the United States who think they're in the top ten of economists... and so I think they're in the running for chair of the Fed or head of this of the council... and so you know they hold their fire and I think it's we're a little bit captured”
Recessions caused by the collapse of an asset bubble are always hard to recover from, as shown by the difficulty of escaping the 2001 recession.
“the recession proved hard to get out of it's always hard to get out of the question caused by collapse of an asset bubble”