proprietary trading
Trading that a financial firm conducts with its own money to profit, as opposed to executing trades on behalf of clients.
As defined in Eugene White on Bank Regulation
Where it comes up · 5
- Luigi Zingales on the Costs and Benefits of the Financial Sector3 claims
- Richard Posner on the Financial Crisis 11/16/20092 claims
- Eugene White on Bank Regulation1 claim
- Cathy O'Neil on Wall St and Occupy Wall Street1 claim
- Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty1 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “proprietary trading” →
- The transition of Wall Street firms from private partnerships—where senior managers' own money was at stake and they asked whether a risk was prudent for themselves—to large public bureaucracies meant traders no longer risked their own money, fundamentally changing how people took risk and reducing felt responsibility to markets, customers, and themselves.Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty
- Paul Volcker's proposal to bar banks from proprietary trading and risky affiliated divisions, and proposals to bring off-balance-sheet liabilities (special investment vehicles, credit default swaps and other derivatives) onto bank balance sheets, are sensible reforms because such hidden liabilities make it hard for bank examiners to know a bank's true financial situation.Richard Posner on the Financial Crisis 11/16/2009
- The London Whale episode—where JPMorgan's Chief Investment Office, meant to hedge and be the safest unit, instead lost roughly $9 billion—shows that no too-big-to-fail bank is small enough to be understood or controlled, even by its own CEO, regardless of whether the trades were intentional or attempts to evade Dodd-Frank.Cathy O'Neil on Wall St and Occupy Wall Street
- In the MF Global case, the CEO who pushed the firm into proprietary trading to make money claims not to know what happened to customer funds, yet does not appear to bear any liability for the customer losses, which illustrates a misalignment where senior executives escape responsibility for risks they drove.Eugene White on Bank Regulation
- Paul Volcker's proposed structural reform—prohibiting banks from being affiliated with or having divisions engaged in proprietary trading—has considerable merit as a way to keep a safe commercial banking backbone, though Posner is uncertain it would work since a low-risk commercial banking sector may not be much of a backbone.Richard Posner on the Financial Crisis 11/16/2009
- The dramatic growth of the financial sector is partly explained by a structural change: in the 1960s-1980s financial firms were partnerships investing their own money, but the growth of leverage and publicly-traded investment banks separated decision-makers from the consequences of losses, intensifying agency problems.Luigi Zingales on the Costs and Benefits of the Financial Sector
- Even sophisticated buyers (pension funds, banks) are subject to agency problems—they don't bear the full cost of their actions (banks get bailed out, traders walk away, CEOs walk away, and dispersed shareholders fail to monitor)—so suppliers design securities specifically to extract value from these agency conflicts.Luigi Zingales on the Costs and Benefits of the Financial Sector
- Post-crisis reform was inadequate partly because of bank political power: the Volcker Rule (separating proprietary from non-proprietary trading) is very hard to implement, while a cleaner separation of investment banking from commercial banking was not enacted due to bank lobbying pressure.Luigi Zingales on the Costs and Benefits of the Financial Sector