logical necessity
A property of a proposition whose denial is self-contradictory and therefore false; a necessity grounded in the laws of logic and reason rather than in contingent facts about human nature.
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 50 Scottish Realism
Where it comes up · 3
- A History of Philosophy | 50 Scottish Realism2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein1 claim
- A History of Philosophy | 34 Descartes on God and Nature1 claim
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “logical necessity” →
- Wittgenstein rejects the law of induction (the uniformity of nature) as a law of logic because it is a proposition with empirical sense, and therefore it refers to empirical data, not logical necessity.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Psychological necessity (where human psychology makes certain beliefs unavoidable) differs from logical necessity (where the contradiction of a proposition is self-contradictory).A History of Philosophy | 50 Scottish Realism
- The response to the objection about defining false triangles is that one is not merely stating something about geometry but analyzing the concept of a triangle logically—a triangle whose angles only add up to 150 degrees would not be a triangle at all.A History of Philosophy | 34 Descartes on God and Nature
- Moore's claim that contradictions between theory and practice demonstrate logical necessity is not well received by non-realists, and some suspect a category mistake—mixing the practical order (action) with the theoretical order (propositional truth).A History of Philosophy | 50 Scottish Realism