End of history does not mean the ceasing of events, but rather concerns the trajectory of modernization and what the most modernized societies will ultimately look like.

Fukuyama argued in 1989 that the Hegelian version of the end of history—a liberal state with a market economy—was more likely than a communist end of history, and he still believes this is the case.

The phrase 'end of history' originated with the philosopher Hegel in the early 19th century, who believed that human societies and norms changed over time in a progressive manner, and for him history (with capital H) meant what we today might call development or modernization.

In China, given the instability throughout most of the 20th century, people were actually looking toward a more authoritarian form of government, suggesting that crisis conditions produce demand for authoritarianism.

The real question is whether we are going to see permanent regression in democracy or whether this represents another wave that will be followed by another pro-democratic movement, and the answer is currently uncertain.

Right-wing populism around the world is partly driven by the fact that many people do not want to be 'last men'—they are not content with simple peace and prosperity delivered by liberal democracy but want something more, leading them to turn toward exclusive nationalism.

Fukuyama did not think American voters would elect someone like Donald Trump, let alone twice, even after Trump attempted to overturn the 2020 election, believing Americans were more committed to liberal democracy than this indicated.

When the United States begins acting like an authoritarian power, it gives permission to every other country to backslide from good democratic practice and the rule of law.

Trump's claim that things have never been worse and that the United States is being destroyed from within are absurd assumptions because the United States is peaceful and prosperous.

The rise of fascism in 1930s Germany was understandable given that the country had suffered World War I defeat, hyperinflation, and economic collapse, but the United States in recent times faces nothing comparable.

The only explanation for why Americans are electing authoritarian figures under benign material circumstances when they rejected authoritarianism during the Great Depression is psychological boredom—people do not like the prospect of continuing peace and prosperity and want to struggle for something they perceive as higher.

Artificial intelligence is going to be probably even more effective than the internet at destroying the credibility of existing information sources.

Every prior wave of technological disruption was eventually overcome as people learned to regulate it and adapt to it, and Fukuyama suspects this will happen with current technological challenges like the internet and AI, though if it doesn't, modern democracy is in serious trouble.

Trump is a uniquely talented politician who has created a movement that will be very hard to undo, having recruited many followers and converted many normally intelligent people to repeat his arguments about vaccines and elections.

There is a path forward where, assuming the United States holds an election that constitutes a setback to Trump, the country may be able to get past the worst of contemporary populism.

Fukuyama has significantly revised his views from 'The End of History' and authored a two-volume series, 'The Origins of Political Order' and 'Political Order and Political Decay,' which was an attempt to rewrite the end of history thesis based on his current understanding of human political evolution.

Fukuyama never argued that liberal democracy was inevitable, but instead posed a much more modest question: is there a systematic alternative to liberal democracy and a market economy that would be more successful, more stable, and more satisfying for people to live under?

China appears to be the closest competitor to liberal democracy with its combination of an authoritarian political system and a semi-market economy, having been very impressive in consolidating its regime, though Fukuyama is uncertain whether this model can be replicated in most other countries.

Economic development, people's past experiences of alternative political forms, and cultural factors all play roles in determining whether a society democratizes—not just economic development alone.

During the Great Depression, unemployment in the United States exceeded 20%, with millions of people out of work and a disrupted global order with rising communism and fascism, yet Americans did not vote for a dictator but rather for Franklin Roosevelt and stayed within democratic bounds.