Francis Fukuyama: Why Global Order Is Breaking Down And Why the “End of History” Never Happened
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This is a conversation with Francis Fukuyama, a professor and research fellow at Stanford and one of the most famous and influential scholars of political science and international relations of our time. Although he has decades of scholarship behind him, he is by far most well known for one book, titled the “End of History and the Last Man” which is both highly influential and highly misunderstood and in which he argued that following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, humanity has reached the final stage of human government in the form of liberal democracy.
We talk about what the argument of the book actually was, why it is so often misunderstood, and why the End of History did not happen. About why history seems to have taken a turn backwards and why we are witnessing democratic backsliding and return of large scale wars and conflicts, why democracies everywhere seem to be going through major crises and how to fix that, or what - if the history is not ending - is ahead of us now. And what still gives him hope that liberal democracy is not going anywhere just yet.
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Fukuyama argues that while liberal democracy remains the most viable political system without a superior alternative, it is experiencing genuine crisis due to technological disruption, loss of institutional credibility, and the psychological dissatisfaction of citizens who reject peace and prosperity in favor of struggle and ideological conflict.
- The rise of populism and democratic backsliding is driven not by material hardship but by existential dissatisfaction with liberal stability, echoing Nietzsche's critique of the 'last man'
- The internet and social media have destroyed traditional information gatekeepers, enabling mass-scale misinformation that was previously impossible
- Modernization theory—the belief that economic development automatically produces democratic liberalization—has been disproven by China's rise without democratization
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Social media and the internet have destroyed the traditional information gatekeeping function that newspapers and television once provided, allowing anybody to broadcast outright lies to large audiences, which was not possible before and could not have produced phenomena like the antivaccine movement without this technology.
“I think that the one that is probably the most persuasive is actually the internet. uh and social media because it really has taken away uh the kinds of controls that existed over information. You know, previously there had been certain uh intermediaries that you know could vouch for the credibility of basic factual information. You know, these are traditional media companies, newspapers, television, you know, and the like. There was obviously a lot of distortion and bias and whatnot, but you know, they weren't broadcasting just outright lies. The internet has permitted uh anybody to say anything and to get really big audiences uh to listen to them. And that's exactly what's happened. And so you got this very weird phenomenon of the antivaccine movement where, you know, vaccines have been one of the great miracles of, you know, the past century. uh and yet you've got millions of people that somehow think that they're actually dangerous uh and you know have stopped taking them. So I don't think that that kind of thing could have happened without the internet and without uh social media.”
Right-wing populism around the world is partly driven by the fact that many people do not want to be 'last men'—they are not content with simple peace and prosperity delivered by liberal democracy but want something more, leading them to turn toward exclusive nationalism.
“I think that a lot of the right-wing uh populism that you see in many countries around the world, you know, it's very hard to understand why it's happening right now because in many ways the world is better than it ever was in terms of material prosperity, in terms of, you know, basic political stability. But I think that there are a lot of people that don't want to be last men. You know, that they aren't content with simple peace and prosperity, which is what liberal democracy has brought them. Uh but they want something more. And as a result, they're turning against liberal democracy and, you know, trying to go for something different like, you know, a return to some form of um uh of exclusive nationalism.”
The only explanation for why Americans are electing authoritarian figures under benign material circumstances when they rejected authoritarianism during the Great Depression is psychological boredom—people do not like the prospect of continuing peace and prosperity and want to struggle for something they perceive as higher.
“I think the only explanation for that is something like this uh what I had talked about boredom at the end of history that people just don't like the prospect of continuing peace and prosperity. They want to struggle. They want to pretend that they're fighting for something higher. And that has proved to be very disruptive for American democracy.”
The phrase 'end of history' originated with the philosopher Hegel in the early 19th century, who believed that human societies and norms changed over time in a progressive manner, and for him history (with capital H) meant what we today might call development or modernization.
“the phrase the end of history was not mine. It was really um a concept of the philosopher Hegel in the early 19th century. Uh Hegel was the first historicist philosopher meaning that he believed that human societies and human norms changed over time uh basically in a progressive manner.”
During the Great Depression, unemployment in the United States exceeded 20%, with millions of people out of work and a disrupted global order with rising communism and fascism, yet Americans did not vote for a dictator but rather for Franklin Roosevelt and stayed within democratic bounds.
“we're actually living in one of the best uh uh imaginable times. If you look back at the Great Depression in the early 1930s, the unemployment rate in the United States was over 20%. Uh you had uh you know, millions and millions of people out of work. uh and a general world order that was very much disrupted with the rise of communism and fascism. Uh and yet the American people at that point did not vote like the German people or the Italian people for uh a dictator. They you know they voted for Franklin Roosevelt and they stayed well within the bounds of you know a recognizable democracy.”
Democracy has come in waves: the third wave began in the early 1970s with Spain and Portugal and crested around the time of the global financial crisis in 2008, following prior first and second waves, so there was never a linear movement toward democracy.
“democracy has come in waves. Uh the third wave began in the early 70s with Spain and Portugal and it crested around the time of the global uh financial crisis in 2008. Uh but you know you've had prior you've had the first and second waves uh previously and so there was never a linear uh movement towards democracy.”
Trump's claim that things have never been worse and that the United States is being destroyed from within are absurd assumptions because the United States is peaceful and prosperous.
“If you listen to him, he says uh that things have never been worse. You know, that the United States uh is being destroyed from within. Uh the country is not recognizable uh anymore. All of these are just absurd assumptions. You know, the United States is peaceful. It's prosperous.”
In China, given the instability throughout most of the 20th century, people were actually looking toward a more authoritarian form of government, suggesting that crisis conditions produce demand for authoritarianism.
“I think that in China uh given the instability throughout most of the 20th century you know people were actually looking towards um a more authoritarian form of government.”
When the United States begins acting like an authoritarian power, it gives permission to every other country to backslide from good democratic practice and the rule of law.
“that's been a huge disappointment and it's also very serious for the rest of the world because when the United States begins acting like an authoritarian power that gives permission to every other country to you know backslide from uh good democratic practice and the rule of law.”
Economic development, people's past experiences of alternative political forms, and cultural factors all play roles in determining whether a society democratizes—not just economic development alone.
“democracy, you know, is uh rests on a number of things going on in society other than the level of economic development including, you know, people's past experiences of alternative uh forms.”
Authoritarian governments have certain real problems with decision-making systems, but they can be very effective at responding to emergencies or making fundamental political changes because they don't require democratic consensus.
“there's also real problems with an authoritarian uh decisionmaking system at certain times it can be very effective because you know you need to respond to an emergency or you need to make certain very fundamental changes in your political system. It's easier to do that if you're an authoritarian government than uh a democracy.”
Artificial intelligence is going to be probably even more effective than the internet at destroying the credibility of existing information sources.
“Well, you haven't even mentioned artificial intelligence yet, which is actually going to be probably even more effective in destroying the credibility of a lot of existing uh information sources.”
Every prior wave of technological disruption was eventually overcome as people learned to regulate it and adapt to it, and Fukuyama suspects this will happen with current technological challenges like the internet and AI, though if it doesn't, modern democracy is in serious trouble.
“I think that every other wave of technological disruption eventually uh was overcome and people learned how to regulate it and uh adapt to it. And I suspect that that's uh you know going to happen in this case. Um uh if it doesn't I think you know modern democracy is in a lot of trouble.”
In the 1990s the ratio of democracies to autocracies was going in favor of democracies, but now it has shifted with more autocracies and fewer democracies, suggesting underestimation of how resilient autocracies and such regimes can be.
“in the 90s the ratio of democracies and autocracies was definitely going in favor of democracies and now it has shifted and there we're having more autocracies and fewer democracies.”
Democracies have an ability to correct themselves, whereas authoritarian systems do not, and there may be a big correction coming to how the United States is governed.
“democracies do have an ability to correct themselves. Uh and you know, we may see a big correction in the way that the United States is governed.”
The rise of fascism in 1930s Germany was understandable given that the country had suffered World War I defeat, hyperinflation, and economic collapse, but the United States in recent times faces nothing comparable.
“it's one thing in the 1930s when uh you know Germany had suffered defeat in the first world war then hyperinflation then economic uh collapse you know in a way you can understand the rise of fascism uh under those circumstances because they went through a very very extreme uh set of traumas but the United States has not done that”
American government was not efficient and effective even before Trump's rise, and there are things that need to be fixed about the way the system operates, suggesting pre-existing institutional problems.
“I mean, it's true. I think that uh American government was not by any means uh efficient and effective, you know, before the rise of Donald Trump. And so there are still things that need to be fixed about the way our system operates.”
Trump is a uniquely talented politician who has created a movement that will be very hard to undo, having recruited many followers and converted many normally intelligent people to repeat his arguments about vaccines and elections.
“I think that he is a uniquely talented politician and it is going to be very hard to undo uh what he has created. He's created a movement and actually one of the most depressing things is to see how many followers he has recruited and how many normally intelligent people are willing to help him and you know repeat his ridiculous arguments you know about vaccines about the election uh so forth and so we're going to be stuck with a uh right-wing movement for some time to come”
China appears to be the closest competitor to liberal democracy with its combination of an authoritarian political system and a semi-market economy, having been very impressive in consolidating its regime, though Fukuyama is uncertain whether this model can be replicated in most other countries.
“The one the country that came closest or comes closest is really China which has an authoritarian political system and a semiarket economy and it's been very impressive you know the um uh the degree to which they've consolidated consolidated that regime uh is it going to be an alternative that people will be turning to in the future that I'm less certain about because I'm not sure that you can replicate the Chinese model in you know most other countries.”
End of history does not mean the ceasing of events, but rather concerns the trajectory of modernization and what the most modernized societies will ultimately look like.
“the end of history really uh is not the ceasing of events. It's where is modernization taking us. The most modernized societies are going to look like what?”
Fukuyama never argued that liberal democracy was inevitable, but instead posed a much more modest question: is there a systematic alternative to liberal democracy and a market economy that would be more successful, more stable, and more satisfying for people to live under?
“first of all, I never argued that liberal democracy was inevitable. Um, you know, the question really was a much more modest one. uh is there a an a systematic alternative to liberal democracy and a market economy that looked like it was going to be more successful, more stable, uh you know, more satisfying for people to live under.”
Trump demonstrates willingness to overturn an election (the 2020 election), and may try to do so again, raising serious concerns about whether the United States can have free and fair elections.
“actually, quite frankly, the thing I worry about right now is whether we actually can have a free and fair election in the United States because Trump already demonstrated that he is willing to overturn a an election. Uh, and, you know, he may try to do it again.”
There is a path forward where, assuming the United States holds an election that constitutes a setback to Trump, the country may be able to get past the worst of contemporary populism.
“assuming that we actually do have an election uh that um constitutes a setback to Trump, you know, there's there's a path forward where, you know, we may be able to get past the worst of this kind of populism.”
In his 2001 book 'Our Posthuman Future,' Fukuyama discussed biotechnology and argued that if technology is capable of altering human nature, this will have enormous political implications for understanding human rights and what a human being is, representing a revolution that has not yet begun to unfold.
“You know there there are other potential technological uh disruptions. I published a book in uh I think it was 2001 called our posthuman future where I talked about biotechnology and I argued that if you have a technology that's actually capable of altering human nature that that is going to have huge political implications for our understanding of human rights and what a human being is. And that's a revolution that hasn't really even begun to unfold yet.”
The most significant revision to Fukuyama's thinking was on modernization theory: he originally believed economic development and growth of industrial/information economies would create incentives for more liberal political organization, but China has disproven this by surpassing earlier industrializers in per capita income without democratizing.
“The one the one issue that I think uh probably needed the most serious revision was modernization theory because at the time I wrote the end of history in the last man, uh I believed in some version of modernization theory that said that along with economic development and the uh growth of a modern um industrial than a information economy that there would be greater political incentives to move towards a more liberal form of political organization. And you know at the time uh there were several cases of this uh Taiwan, Japan, Korea had all industrialized and they had all made a transition to uh pretty successful liberal democracies. Uh but I think now you know China has surpassed those countries in terms of per capita income. uh and if modernization were simply true, they should have democratized or at least liberalized a long time ago. Uh and they haven't.”
Fukuyama has significantly revised his views from 'The End of History' and authored a two-volume series, 'The Origins of Political Order' and 'Political Order and Political Decay,' which was an attempt to rewrite the end of history thesis based on his current understanding of human political evolution.
“I wrote this two volume series uh the origins of political order and then the second volume political order and political decay. And that was really an attempt to rewrite the end of history uh uh based on you know what I understand now about the evolution of human politics.”
The last five chapters of 'The End of History and the Last Man' were entirely about ways in which democracy could break down in the future, based on Nietzsche's critique that victory of a liberal society producing peace and prosperity would not be satisfying for many people who want to aspire to something higher than comfortable prosperity.
“The last man uh was a phrase of Nietchas who critiqued the idea of the Hegelian end of history. uh and he basically argued that uh the victory of a liberal society uh that produced peace and prosperity would ultimately not be satisfying for many people. That people want to aspire to something higher uh than just living comfortable, you know, prosperous lives. Uh and that that would lead to instability in democracies. And so the last five chapters of that book were all about ways in which democracy could break down in the future.”
Fukuyama argued in 1989 that the Hegelian version of the end of history—a liberal state with a market economy—was more likely than a communist end of history, and he still believes this is the case.
“the argument that I was making back in 1989 was that the Hegelian version where the end of history was really a liberal state and a market economy looked much more likely than a communist uh end of history. Uh and I still believe that that is the case.”
Fukuyama did not think American voters would elect someone like Donald Trump, let alone twice, even after Trump attempted to overturn the 2020 election, believing Americans were more committed to liberal democracy than this indicated.
“The thing that is the most surprising though is what's happened in the United States because I really did not think that American voters would uh you know elect somebody like Donald Trump and not just elect him once but elect him twice even after he had tried to overturn the 2020 election. Uh I thought that Americans were much more committed to liberal democracy uh than that vote uh indicated.”
Chinese students in Western universities view democracy as a Western concept unsuitable for China, suggesting Western democracy has lost appeal as a model to Chinese intellectuals in recent decades.
“I had a chance to study with several Chinese students in western universities and in every single case um they have seen democracy as a western concept rather than something that would be universal and one that just isn't suitable for China”
The real question is whether we are going to see permanent regression in democracy or whether this represents another wave that will be followed by another pro-democratic movement, and the answer is currently uncertain.
“the real question is, are we going to see some kind of permanent regression or is this, you know, another wave that's going to be followed by another wave of, you know, pro-democratic uh movement? And, you know, we simply don't know at the moment.”
Fukuyama wrote a blog post titled 'It's the Internet Stupid' arguing that internet and social media are probably the most persuasive explanation for the rise of populism, compared to other explanations offered.
“Well, I actually wrote a piece about this uh recently on my blog uh called it's the internet stupid. I think that you know there have been all sorts of explanations given for the rise of populism at this particular moment but I think the one that is probably the most persuasive is actually the internet.”