toxic assets
Financial assets, typically mortgage-related securities, whose value collapsed and became hard to price or sell during the 2008 crisis.
As defined in Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism
Other definitions
Real-estate-related securities that lost most of their value in the crisis and were considered too risky to value or sell, sitting on bank balance sheets as losses.
Neil Barofsky on Bailouts
Where it comes up · 8
- George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession3 claims
- Robert Higgs on the Great Depression 12/15/20081 claim
- Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation1 claim
- Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism1 claim
- Neil Barofsky on Bailouts1 claim
- Guillermo Calvo on the Crisis, Money, and Macro1 claim
- Luigi Zingales on Incentives and the Potential Capture of Economists by Special Interests1 claim
- Tyler Cowen on the European Crisis 12/05/20111 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 10Search all claims for “toxic assets” →
- An industry's political power is a function of how large and how homogeneous its firms are; competition among firms with divergent interests produces balanced lobbying, but consolidation that aligns all firms' interests eliminates that competition and lets one-sided proposals dominate, as when everyone on Wall Street lobbied Paulson with the same message to buy toxic assets.Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism
- The argument that the bailouts were fine because the Fed ultimately lost no money is a red herring, because the toxic securities (e.g. Maiden Lane assets worth 39-44 cents on the dollar in 2010) only recovered value as a result of the Fed's own concerted efforts to pump up their prices by continuing to buy them and keeping interest rates artificially low—not because the assets were genuinely sound.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- The Fed went beyond pure monetarism: the first QE was an attempt to buy toxic assets and commercial paper—unprecedented heterodox actions—showing they recognized that simply increasing the money supply à la Friedman was insufficient, since otherwise there would be no reason to purchase toxic assets.Guillermo Calvo on the Crisis, Money, and Macro
- Bernanke's hypothetical defense that the housing decline was a temporary liquidity-driven run that would bounce back is unconvincing, because mortgage-backed securities collapsed in value not from fire-sale panic but because housing prices fell and default rates rose substantially, changing the perceived riskiness of the assets; moreover, due to the securities' complexity, no one—including the Fed—really knew where their value would settle.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- During the financial crisis, policymakers received uniform advice from finance insiders — a Bush Treasury official noted every call from Manhattan's 212 area code said 'buy the toxic assets' — and this lack of variety in information, with trusted advisors all sharing the same exposures, makes it hard even for intelligent, well-meaning policymakers to avoid being influenced.Luigi Zingales on Incentives and the Potential Capture of Economists by Special Interests
- The US response in 2008, injecting money and guaranteeing toxic assets such as Bear Stearns', saved institutions rather than letting them fail, and Roberts asks why the alternative of letting every institution fail and using liquidity injections to the system was not chosen.Tyler Cowen on the European Crisis 12/05/2011
- The Fed's motive for buying the toxic assets (as opposed to its motive for paying interest on reserves) was to get those assets off the banks' books because that helped the banks rebuild their balance sheets and get through the crisis—an interpretation Roberts characterizes not as stupidity but as implicit corruption or 'cognitive capture' from constantly listening to bankers' worries.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- Current financial markets suffer a similar regime uncertainty problem, because unpredictable government bailouts make it impossible for investors to assess risk-return, and toxic assets stay unsold because buyers expect the government to offer better prices later.Robert Higgs on the Great Depression 12/15/2008
- The Bear Stearns event was not really a bailout of Bear Stearns the firm—Bear Stearns disappeared and its equity holders suffered—but a bailout of the repo creditors who were made whole by J.P. Morgan Chase, which was only willing to honor those obligations because the government guaranteed about $30 billion of toxic assets. The real beneficiaries of these 'creditor bailouts' are short-term creditors and bondholders, not the firms.Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation
- TARP was sold to Congress as a $700 billion program to buy toxic real-estate-related assets off bank books to avert a depression, but during and after the pitch Treasury realized buying toxic assets wouldn't work and instead injected money directly into banks by purchasing shares of stock.Neil Barofsky on Bailouts