What this covers

This is an EconTalk conversation in which Russ Roberts questions Robert Higgs about why the US Depression lasted as long as it did and what actually happened to the economy during World War II. Higgs starts from what he calls the Great Duration: earlier downturns, such as the 1890s depression, lasted about five years at most, and most other industrial countries recovered faster. He then goes through the three facts behind the standard claim that the war ended the Depression, which are low unemployment, surging real GDP, and rising consumer well-being, and argues that each fails on inspection.

Much of the conversation is about measurement. Higgs notes that market prices covered about 90 percent of GDP in 1940 but only about half by 1944, because government bought nearly half of output at bargained contract prices. He describes how Simon Kuznets's doubts about valuing wartime output were set aside by a Commerce Department convention. On labor, he points to a rise in defense-related employment from under 2 percent of the labor force to almost 40 percent, drawn partly from a draft of more than ten million men. He also covers Michael Darby's alternative unemployment count for 1940, price controls that quietly degraded housing and goods, and the queuing and searching costs consumers bore. Real consumer outlays, he says, did not regain their 1941 level until 1946.

The second line of argument is regime uncertainty, which Higgs dates from about 1935. He holds that private investment never recovered to late-1920s levels until after the war because investors distrusted Roosevelt's erratic policy and feared for property rights. His evidence includes a 1941 Fortune poll of executives, private accounts such as Henry Morgenthau's, and a 1940-41 refusal by businessmen to take munitions contracts. Higgs presents the postwar Great Escape as the result of controls being dropped quickly and trust returning. He says mainstream Keynesian and monetarist models cannot explain the 1945-1947 transition. This is the most contested part of the discussion.

Sharpest takeaway

Higgs argues that the apparent wartime recovery of the 1940s was illusory, because coerced mobilization and price controls made unemployment, output, and consumption statistics meaningless, and that New Deal 'regime uncertainty' explains why the Depression lasted until the war ended.

  • Unemployment fell and GDP rose during WWII only because the government coerced workers into the military and defense industries while price controls distorted measured output
  • Real consumer well-being fell during the war, and standard price indexes and GDP figures miss quality deterioration and transaction costs
  • Private investment stayed depressed through the late 1930s because businesspeople distrusted Roosevelt's unpredictable policy changes, which is regime uncertainty

The claims · ranked51 claims · weighted by value

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0.86

Price controls led to quiet quality deterioration: landlords stopped maintaining housing, and clothing, shoes, and other goods declined in quality, so the official price indexes overstate real consumption.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“housing deteriorated clothing deteriorated shoes deteriorated”

0.86

Market prices priced about 90 percent of the goods and services in GDP in 1940 but only about half by 1944, because government purchases of almost half of output were made at prices set by bargaining with contractors rather than by market bids and offers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“available to price about ninety percent of the goods and services that went into GDP was only being used to price about half”

0.86

Economist Simon Kuznets, father of the national income accounts, repeatedly doubted how to value wartime output and was overwhelmed by Commerce Department resources, after which the Commerce Department kept a convention that assumes government purchase prices equal value, hiding the problem.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“Simon Kuznets who more than anyone else is the father of national income and product accounts”

0.86

A 1941 Fortune magazine poll of about 1,000 business executives found that 40 percent expected a semi-socialized society or complete economic dictatorship after the war, with 52 percent expecting government to take over many public services, and only 7 percent expecting a restored free enterprise system.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“a system of free enterprise restored very much along the pre-war lines 7%”

0.86

Real consumer outlays fell from 1941 to 1943, and did not return to their 1941 level until 1946, and that understates consumer hardship because transaction costs like queuing, trade-arranging, and searching for scarce goods were also borne by consumers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“real consumer outlays fail from 1941 to 1943 came back a little bit but didn't get back to their 1941 level until 1946”

0.83

Regime uncertainty, the atmosphere of apprehension created by erratic government policy, explains why long-term investment did not recover after the mid-1930s, and it is a better explanation than a simple ex post rationalization of dislike for Roosevelt.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“the Roosevelt administration from at least 1935 on behaved in such a way that it created an atmosphere of extreme uncertainty and apprehension among investors”

0.83

With roughly 40 percent of the labor force in defense work, only about 60 percent was left for the rest of the economy, so it would be shocking if private civilian output had thrived, and the replacement workers were less productive.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“the people you've removed from the labor force are especially productive people”

0.83

Defense-related employment grew from under 2 percent of the total labor force in 1940 to almost 40 percent by 1943-44, as the armed forces expanded from about half a million in 1940 to more than 12 million by 1945 and workers were needed to support them.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“by the time we get to 1943 four five the peak Warriors almost 40% of the total labor force is employed in defense employment”

0.80

More than ten million men were drafted during the war, and many who enlisted did so only to avoid being drafted into the infantry, so the military buildup depended largely on government coercion rather than free labor-market choices.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“this entire buildup hinged very largely on the government's coercion of workers”

0.79

Regime uncertainty, created by Roosevelt's administration from about 1935, made investors apprehensive about property rights and the future, so long-term private investment never recovered to late-1920s levels, when private investment had been about 16 percent of GDP, until after World War II.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“about 16% of GDP went into private investment in the late 1920s economy didn't get back to that your rate of investment until after World War Two”

0.78

Most economists plug Commerce Department GDP figures into macroeconomic analysis without understanding how the numbers are constructed, and the assumptions and interpolations involved are unsettling once examined.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“this has been my most difficult point to get across to my fellow economist”

0.78

In 1940-41, businessmen refused to accept government munitions contracts because they did not trust the Roosevelt administration, a 'strike of capital' that Higgs says ended quickly once Roosevelt brought businessmen into government to run the buildup.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“the businessmen simply didn't trust the Roosevelt administration”

0.76

Some real wartime output gains came from more intensive use of existing resources: the manufacturing workweek rose from about 38 to 45 hours, and many plants moved from one shift to double or triple shifts.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“the work week in manufacturing increased from an average of 38 hours per week to 45 hours per week”

0.74

The Great Depression lasted much longer in the United States than earlier downturns such as the 1890s depression, which lasted about five years at most, and Higgs calls this the 'great duration' that needs explaining, especially since most other industrial countries recovered faster.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“why was it that that unlike all previous experience we had in this country including that depression of the 1890s”

0.73

The standard view that WWII ended the Great Depression rests on three facts: unemployment fell to extremely low levels by 1943-44, real GDP rose sharply, and real consumer well-being increased, and Higgs argues these data collapse under scrutiny.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“the standard account hinges for the most part on those three facts”

0.73

Government-built wartime plants added to the capital stock in ways that were overwhelmingly specialized for military use, and the rapid use of capital raised true depreciation above what the Commerce Department's sinking-fund formula recorded, so measured productivity misstates the war economy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“the capital stock was being used up much quicker than”

0.73

Privately expressed statements by businessmen in the late 1930s, including Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau's account, show they feared Roosevelt was becoming a dictator, and this private testimony cannot be dismissed as public complaining by plutocrats.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“businessmen were scared they were afraid that Roosevelt might be making himself a dictator”

0.73

Mainstream macroeconomic models based on quasi-Keynesian and monetarist mechanisms, such as those used by Christina Romer, fail to explain the transition from 1945 to 1947, so they cannot account for the post-war recovery that Higgs's regime uncertainty explanation covers.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“all of these ways these models that fit people claim people like Christina Romer claim explained the late 1930s utterly failed to explain what happened in 1945”

0.73

The 'Great Escape' after WWII happened because wartime controls were abandoned quickly after Truman took office and businessmen stopped distrusting the government, so long-term investment became safe again.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“many of these wartime rules and regulations and government takeovers were abandoned fairly quickly”

0.73

The war's apparent prosperity was not genuine: Higgs argues the wartime government takeover of the economy pushed the economy into a state of artificial output, which he calls phony prosperity, while the post-war transition to real prosperity came from dismantling those controls.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“a view that explains the great duration the phony prosperity of World War 2 and the successful transition”

0.73

Under wage, price, and rent controls, persistent excess demand for labor and consumer goods was rationed by non-price means, so private-sector prices during the war also did not reflect consumers' marginal valuations or producers' marginal rates of transformation.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“there were persistent excess demands and those demands were rationed through a non price means”

0.73

The official BLS unemployment rate in 1940 was 15.7 percent, but if people in emergency work programs like the WPA and Civilian Conservation Corps are counted as employed, as Darby's measure does, the rate was about 9.5 percent, still very high eleven years into the Depression.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“if you count them as employed what do you get... that's about nine and a half percent”

0.73

The government also coerced private producers: the automobile industry, then the country's largest industry, was compelled to stop making civilian vehicles and convert its facilities to tanks and aircraft.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“the entire automobile industry which is the biggest industry in the country at that time was compelled to stop the production”

0.72

Wartime transaction costs, including standing in line, hunting for ration coupons and goods, and arranging illegal trades, plus government preemption of transportation such as trains for troops, worsened consumer well-being in ways not captured by standard measures.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“their number of transaction costs that had to be borne by consumers during the war”

0.70

The Banking Act of 1935 gave the Federal Reserve power to change reserve requirements, and the Fed's doubling of reserve requirements in 1936-37 caused the sharp 1938 depression, so the New Deal bears responsibility rather than the Fed being an exogenous actor.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“it was that Banking Act that gave the Federal Reserve the power to change reserve requirement”

0.68

Economists measuring 1940 output as a recovery indicator ignored that the economy's productive capacity had grown substantially over the 1930s through population growth and rapid total factor productivity growth, so regaining 1929 output in 1940 did not mean the Depression had ended.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“the economy's capacity to produce it grown greatly”

0.68

Around 1935 Roosevelt shifted toward more radical policies and advisers hostile to business to head off challenges from populist figures such as Huey Long, Father Coughlin, Upton Sinclair, and Dr. Townsend, and this produced measures menacing to investors, including the Wagner Act, Social Security Act, and Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“he said okay you want radicalism I'll give you radicalism”

0.68

Economists who believed wartime spending produced a boom relied on a Keynesian spending multiplier, in which government purchases circulate repeatedly through the economy, and Higgs argues that the right approach is to look at quantities of workers and output instead.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“part of it is a Keynesian mindset that somehow spending has this big multiplier”

0.66

Much of the government-financed capital built during the war, citing Robert Gordon's 1969 work as a precursor, had little or no application outside strictly military uses, so it added little to the productive capital stock for civilian production.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“the government's contribution to building at the capital stock was overwhelmingly a building up capital that had little or no application”

0.66

The measured unemployment rate fell to 1.3 percent in fiscal 1945, effectively zero, but this reflected government mobilization rather than a healthy labor market, since employers were desperate for workers during the peak war years.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“that measured unemployment rate was 1.3 percent which is effectively zero”

0.61

Total factor productivity grew rapidly during the 1930s, and new technologies developed in that decade had not yet been applied until after the war, so in 1940 the economy could have produced far more with its labor and capital than it did.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“the growth of total factor productivity was quite rapid during the 1930s”

0.61

The workers who replaced men drafted into the military were less productive: teenagers, elderly people returning to the labor force, and women with little prior paid work experience, unlike prime-age males who had already built labor-market experience.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“their replacements however were overwhelmingly teenagers elderly people”

0.60

Multiplying the unit count of B-29 bombers by the unit price paid to Boeing, then aggregating about 500,000 such government purchase categories into GDP, produces a meaningless number, so the apparent wartime growth of GDP is an artifact.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“you take that kind of calculation multiply it by about 500,000 for the different kinds of goods”

0.60

Counting the wartime mobilization as economic prosperity is like arresting ten million unemployed people, putting them in prison, and then counting their make-work as a recovery, which people would rightly see as a phony stimulus.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“that's exactly the reaction they ought to have to what happened in the early 1940s”

0.60

Government wartime prices were essentially arbitrary because they were not produced by interplay of private bids and offers; they reflected the state commanding resources through taxation, borrowing, and condemnation, so GDP valued at these prices is meaningless.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“the prices that the government chose to pay for these goods and services that purchase were essentially arbitrary”

0.57

Higgs's regime uncertainty explanation covers the Great Duration, the 'phony prosperity' of World War II, and the transition to genuine post-war prosperity within a single framework, which he sees as its main advantage over monetary explanations.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“it's a view that explains the great duration the phony prosperity of World War 2 and the successful transition”

0.55

Economists used the same standard measures of unemployment, output, and consumer well-being during the war even though wartime institutional changes had stripped those measures of most substantive content.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“even though the standard measures had lost almost all their substantive content as a result of the institutional changes”

0.52

Higgs's regime uncertainty thesis rests on three independent kinds of evidence—private business testimony, opinion polls, and business behavior toward government contracts—rather than on a single regression.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“I have three different forms of evidence and I think that's one of the strengths of this thesis”

0.52

The wartime GDP valuation problem is a skeleton in the closet of macroeconomics since World War II, and it is a major source of the belief in a wartime boom that Higgs considers scientifically unsustainable.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“this is a major source of why we think there was a wartime boom during World War two”

0.51

Current financial markets suffer a similar regime uncertainty problem, because unpredictable government bailouts make it impossible for investors to assess risk-return, and toxic assets stay unsold because buyers expect the government to offer better prices later.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Robert Higgs

“why would anyone want to sell them at a low price when the government may very well take them off your hands at a high price”

0.46

Regime uncertainty is recurring in 2008, as rapid and unpredictable policy changes by the Treasury and Fed make risk-return calculations hard and leave bankers and investors unsure who will be bailed out and on what terms.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Robert Higgs

“the government's volatility in policymaking is it is playing heck with any calculation of risk-return”

0.43

Mainstream economists argue the economy was recovering steadily under the New Deal and that the 1937-38 downturn was a separate event, which Higgs says cannot be divorced from New Deal legislation.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“that well after Roosevelt took office the economy was fine it recovered”

0.40

Official government price series during the war diverged sharply from the prices people actually paid for goods such as chocolate, tires, and silk stockings, so multiplying official prices by output produces a meaningless number.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“if you wanted to get chocolate in the war or tires or silk stockings there was a price but it wasn't the price in the official government series”

0.40

The concept of employed versus unemployed is inherently ambiguous, so classifying emergency make-work workers as employed or unemployed requires arbitrary decisions, and the right choice depends on what the data will be used for.

definitionestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“it's a good example of how inherently ambiguous the concept of employed unemployed is”

0.29

The 1930s policy environment involved a long series of policy reversals, accelerations, and changing wage and price arrangements, and this made the economy unpredictable compared with leaving it alone.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“a much longer list of policy u-turns accelerations changing ways that wages and prices were set”

0.28

War is productively destructive rather than productive, so when resources shift from consumers to the military, consumer output should shrink substantially, and that is what the data show.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Robert Higgs

“war is not productive its destructive”

0.26

Higgs's view that the wartime GDP boom is an artifact of measurement is hard to convince economists of, and the 'meaningless number' point is widely resisted, even though he thinks price-index measurement error is the lesser issue compared with the concept of measuring national product itself.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Robert Higgs

“the price indexes and the mission this measurement is actually a relatively minor issue”

0.25

The Great Depression is the seminal economic event of the twentieth century, and because it can be explained with very different stories, empirical work on it is especially prone to misleading storytelling.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“the ability of people to do really misleading and lousy empirical work and storytelling to explain event is really pretty unlimited”

0.25

Devoting roughly 40 percent of the economy to warfare is not good for the domestic economy on logical and empirical grounds, but the idea that wartime spending was prosperous dies very hard among people.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Robert Higgs

“devoting say 40 percent of the economy to warfare is not good for the domestic economy”

0.21

Higgs's regime uncertainty argument has not been widely accepted, partly because many critics, including bloggers discussing it, dismiss it without reading his evidence.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Robert Higgs

“many of the people who talk about my idea do it without having read my work”

0.21

Roberts says the 1930s policy volatility and dramatic reforms made him more sympathetic to Higgs's argument than before, though he worried he was only confirming his own biases.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“I've always wondered you know whether I was just confirming my own biases”