What this covers
Marc Rowan, CEO of Apollo Global Management, sits down to discuss the reshaping of global finance and higher education. The conversation centers on a structural shift in how credit flows through the economy: away from banks (which lever borrowed funds 10-to-12 times) toward asset managers and investment funds (which carry zero leverage). Rowan contends this migration makes the financial system more resilient, not riskier, and that the public-versus-private risk distinction is now obsolete. He ranges across private credit, the uneven health of university governance, the lessons of Israel's Darca school network, and why the US capital market's diversity gives it structural advantages over Asian and European competitors locked into equity and bank debt.
The conversation turns on a few contentious reframings. Rowan argues that almost all insurance-industry failures stem from bad liability choices rather than asset problems, and that maturity matching—not leverage—is the real safeguard against systemic risk. He sketches how market-making capital has withered to one-tenth its 2008 level while public markets have tripled, creating hidden fragility that only became visible once quantitative easing ended in 2022. He pushes back against the term "private credit" itself, noting the ~$1.5 trillion in direct lending is a sliver of a $40 trillion universe. On academia, he diagnoses university boards as oversized fiduciaries who never act as such, and offers Penn's recent trustee experience as a case study in governance failure. He closes with observations on restaurant economics, stablecoins as friction-reducers rather than currency alternatives, and how trading capital scarcity is reshaping market structure.
Rowan argues that credit is increasingly migrating from the leveraged, maturity-mismatched banking system to the de-levered, asset-matched investment marketplace, which makes the financial system more resilient and reframes risk as a question of liquidity rather than the public/private distinction.
- Every dollar moved from banks (levered 10-12x) to investors (zero-levered) deleverages the whole system
- Public can be safe-or-risky and private can be safe-or-risky; the real variable is degree of liquidity and whether you're paid for giving it up
- Insurance/retirement-services failures have historically come from liabilities, not assets, so Apollo's narrow liability model and matched assets reduce systemic risk
Credit flows from banks to investors deleverages and strengthens the financial system overall.
- Every dollar of credit that moves out of the banking system (where a bank is levered 10-to-12 times) into the investment marketplace (e.g. a zero-levered mutual fund) deleverages the entire financial system, making it more resilient.
“A bank is levered 10 to 12 times. When you move credit out of the banking system into a mutual fund, it's zero-levered.”
- As 80 percent of credit now comes from investors rather than banks, the Fed's monetary transmission is less direct than when banks were 100 percent of credit, though it still works through the relative attractiveness of credit versus equities as rates change.
“To the extent 80 percent of credit is now provided by investors... there is a less direct but still incredibly important... There are a lot of abilities still of the Fed to influence outcomes, but it is not the direct correlation that you once had.”
- Risk can either be dispersed among many institutions or concentrated in the government-backed, borrow-short/lend-long, guaranteed banking system; every time risk is dispersed away from banks, the overall system becomes more resilient.
“We can have risk dispersed among lots of institutions, or we can have it concentrated in the government-backed, borrow-short, lend-long, government-guaranteed banking system. Every time we disperse that risk, we make the system more resilient.”
- The banking system structurally borrows short and lends long and is therefore always maturity-mismatched, whereas Apollo's funding (half from return-seeking investors with no maturity demands and half from insurers who lend long against long liabilities) is fully asset-matched with nothing daily redeemable.
“the banking system borrows short and lends long. They are always mismatched.”
- Because roughly $500 billion of Apollo's $650 billion in assets is credit and its equity holdings are well-hedged with fixed-rate borrowing, Apollo benefits from higher interest rates up until the point of economic distress.
“We do better on the $500 billion when rates are higher, up to the point that you have economic distress.”
- When a daily-liquid, regulated, transparent, de-levered mutual fund holds credit and investors redeem, the price simply adjusts (the fund is not a price guarantor); this is not systemically risky but actually de-risks the economy compared to holding the same credit in a levered bank.
“Is that a risky activity because it moved out of the banking system and into a mutual fund? I don't think so; I actually think it has de-risked. It's made our economy and our financial system more resilient.”
Banks supply only 20 percent of US credit; investors now provide 80 percent, weakening the Fed's monetary transmission.
- The banking system is roughly 20 percent of US corporate and consumer credit; the remaining 80 percent is supplied by investors, and private asset management did not cause the long-running decline in the banking sector's share.
“the banking system today is roughly 20 percent of corporate and consumer credit in the US. The rest of it is not "private credit"; it's investors.”
- Credit is fundamentally a function of GDP, and it can only come from two sources—the government-guaranteed borrow-short/lend-long banking system or the investment marketplace; restricting the investment marketplace (as Solvency II did in Europe, cutting product availability ~40%) effectively chooses less GDP, which is a poor choice.
“credit is a function of GDP. If you want GDP, credit can only come from two sources... There's no third choice. Make your choice. If we want less GDP, that's a choice.”
Retirement services require capital, long-term cheap liabilities, scaled operations, and solvency backed by safe, higher-yielding assets.
- Apollo's retirement-services business is a spread business in which the absolute level of interest rates is unimportant; what matters is earning a positive spread between asset yields, liability costs, and operating costs sufficient to stay profitable and attract long-term capital.
“in that spread business, the absolute level of rates is not all that important. What matters is that we are able to earn a spread on our assets versus our liabilities”
- Athene's comparative advantage in liabilities comes from a simple single business model—only retirement services via annuities and pensions, insuring neither life, health, home, nor catastrophe—producing simple locked-in liabilities backed by a tax-advantaged retirement-savings system in a country facing a retirement crisis.
“We're in the business of retirement services, and therefore, we don't guarantee or don't insure your life, we don't insure your health... We simply insure your retirement”
- The US faces a retirement crisis in which people have not saved enough and Social Security is unlikely to provide a good standard of living for the vast majority, while the tax system encourages retirement savings that compound tax-free over 5-20 year horizons.
“We have a retirement crisis in this country. People have not saved enough, Social Security is unlikely to provide a good standard of living for the vast majority of people”
- Success in retirement services requires four things: capital, long-term low-cost liabilities, a scaled low-cost operating infrastructure, and proven (and projected) solvency backed by ample low-cost, lower-risk, higher-yielding assets.
“in our industry, you need four things to be successful. The easiest of those things is capital.”
- Public retirement-services companies raised virtually no capital over the last decade because investors decided they did not trust them as good stewards of capital, and most paid out their entire book value as dividends instead.
“Fundamentally, investors have decided they do not trust the public companies as good stewards of capital, and in fact, the vast majority of these companies have paid out their current book value as dividends over the last decade.”
- The restaurant business is better than its reputation; failures come not from the food but from the business side—most entrants know nothing about running a restaurant as a business and are undercapitalized, so they fold at the first difficulty, which is why finding the right operating partner matters most.
“Most people who go into the business are undercapitalized, and therefore, the first time that they experience some difficulty, they go under.”
Critical reasoning, relatability, collaborative culture, and judgment under uncertainty matter more than credentials or conformity.
- What students need to learn is how to figure out what's true—critical reasoning, context, and how to apply critical criteria to resources—rather than the memorization of dates, times, places, and orders, which is probably not all that important given how much intelligence can now be gathered outside the classroom.
“How to figure out what's true, critical reasoning, how to use the resources and apply critical criteria to those resources. Is the memorization of dates and times and places and orders all that important? Probably not.”
- Even in a complex financial business, people do business with people they like, so relatability and the ability to convey an answer in a way another person will absorb and engage in dialogue matters more than merely having the right answer.
“People do business with people they like. Are you likable? Are you relatable?... Being able to convey that answer in a way that someone else will absorb and to engage in a dialogue with them — much more important.”
- The skill that turns analytical mastery into genuine decision-making is the ability to take a blank piece of paper and think about what's not there—to reason about uncertain futures and make capital commitments under uncertainty—a capacity you cannot detect in a 22-year-old and only see years later.
“being able to take a blank piece of paper and think about what's not there is the skill that gets them from mastery of numbers, of analytics, to actual decision-making.”
- University boards should be small enough to debate and set guidelines, and like corporate boards they should set strategy, tone, and policy and pick a leader—not micromanage—then hire the next president against a clear strategic plan rather than leaving them directionless, as Penn's board (including Rowan) failed to do for its past president.
“They set strategy, they set tone, they set policy, and they pick a leader.”
- While the world has changed massively in almost every sector, academia has not—professors still stand in front of classrooms—but the Darca school network in Israel proves change works: teaching the state curriculum with union teachers any way they want, using technology, games, and experimentation, raised poor peripheral communities (Ethiopians, Bedouin, Druze) to a ~90% university-matriculation rate over 38 years.
“The world has changed massively in almost every sector, not so much in academia. We still have professors standing in front of classrooms”
- Academics are conformist because of career risk—they have bet their careers on achieving tenure and reputation among colleagues and are loath to lose it—while a large silent group genuinely interested in academic excellence and research suffers because, absent guiding principles on free speech and viewpoint neutrality, university responses to crises seem arbitrary.
“the answer is, I think it's career risk. I do think that they've bet their careers on achieving tenure and achieving the notoriety or reputation amongst their colleagues, and they're loath to lose that.”
- What matters in office design is not the exterior but whether the interior encourages collaboration; Apollo's move to nine contiguous floors connected by a staircase with shared coffee bars and cafeterias produced productivity gains from the casual collisions of people seeing each other daily.
“the productivity increase that we've experienced from the casual collisions of people seeing each other every day needs to happen inside a physical space in this office.”
- By taking a windowless office off the trading floor for himself (and having former SEC head Jay Clayton do the same), Rowan gained moral authority to make office allocation egalitarian, with leaders sitting with their teams rather than in executive suites, reinforcing a collaborative culture.
“I have a windowless office off the trading floor... It's given me tremendous moral authority when it comes to the arrangement of people's offices, to say, "You're welcome to take mine."”
- A small group cannot run Apollo because too many important decisions occur at levels the CEO will never see; running the organization requires the buy-in of roughly 200 partners, so strategic plans are presented in debate mode with very little done by dicta.
“A small group of us cannot run this business. There are too many important decisions... I have to get the buy-in of 200 people to successfully run this organization.”
- Private equity is 'hours of boredom followed by moments of terror'—only 10-20 decisions a year, where you can wait until you like what you see—whereas the credit business requires taking the least bad alternative every day, so the job is to create more origination, diversification, and options to supply insurers' steady $6-7 billion monthly need.
“we make 10 or 20 decisions a year. Everything else is ceremony. So, hours of boredom followed by moments of terror”
- University boards have failed because trustees—graduated from advisory boards without being told they have become fiduciaries—do not behave differently, and with ~50 members it is impossible to have substantive debate, so trustees have not fulfilled their charter duties (setting admission and faculty-promotion standards, strategy, and evaluating departments).
“When you move to the trustees, you actually become a fiduciary. No one tells you that. The boards don't behave any differently. With 50 members, it's very difficult to engage in substantive debates”
Private credit markets should include all investor-supplied credit, not just below-investment-grade lending, and are far larger than commonly understood.
- The popular term 'private credit' usually refers only to a ~$1.5 trillion sliver of below-investment-grade direct lending to buyouts, but the real private-credit universe is roughly $40 trillion—everything on a bank balance sheet, including loans to companies and consumers, is private credit.
“people use private credit to refer to a very small sliver of a market... it is a $1.5 trillion market... But the market that I'm talking about for private credit is $40 trillion. Everything that's on a bank balance sheet is actually private credit.”
- The largest companies have daily access to both banks and the investment-grade bond market, but medium-sized and smaller companies—no matter how creditworthy—have less bank access and virtually no direct bond-market access, so they increasingly obtain credit through intermediaries, some below-investment-grade and some investment-grade secured.
“Medium-sized and smaller companies, no matter how creditworthy, have less access to the banking system and have virtually no access directly to the bond market. So, they increasingly will come through intermediaries.”
- Financial services is not a status-quo business: products that are mainstream today (high-yield bonds, levered loans, ETFs, securitized product) barely existed when Rowan started, so there is no reason to expect the same dominant products in 15-20 years; new markets will reflect changing market, regulatory, and institutional conditions.
“Those four products today, we take as mainstream products. Why do we expect that 15 years from now or 20 years from now, the same four products will be as dominant?”
- Contrary to the old cliché that restaurant profit comes mostly from wine and drinks, Rowan's Montauk venue deliberately serves only wine and beer (no hard liquor) and still does fine on food, because customers come for the experience.
“No, it's not true... reputationally, we've decided only to serve wine and beer. No hard liquor. Could we make more money serving liquor? Absolutely, but it's not how we run.”
- Stablecoins and convertible-to-fiat on-ramps will play a real role by reducing the cost and friction of dealing with the financial system, but in a KYC-AML world Rowan sees little value in an alternative currency within the US, though it may have more appeal in other parts of the world.
“Things like stablecoins, things like on-ramp, things that are convertible back into fiat currency are absolutely going to play a view... I don't really see, in a KYC-AML world, a value of an alternative currency.”
Apollo fills gaps between equity and bank debt in Asia where capital markets lack the diversity of US fixed-income structure.
- Because India (like much of Asia) has only equity and bank debt, and now has ample local equity capital plus low-cost banks, Apollo's strategy is to occupy the space between equity and bank lending—e.g. lending Adani $750M for the Mumbai airport or families $400M to consolidate real estate—rather than competing as an equity or bank-debt provider.
“our business plan in India is to be between equity and between bank because there's virtually nothing that exists of size and scale.”
- The US is in an extraordinary position relative to other major capital markets because of its diversity of capital sources; Asian and European economies rely essentially on just two products—equity and bank debt—lacking the depth and diversity of US fixed-income and investment markets.
“If you look at almost every Asian economy — two products, equity and bank debt. Look at Europe — equity and bank debt... there is not the diversity of capital sources that you have here.”
- Apollo's fastest growth is in India, where its Mumbai operation (500 people heading to 1,000 in three years) is not a back office but a full office staffed from all over the world, drawing on an incredible English-speaking, favorable-time-zone, strong-work-ethic labor pool across professional, risk, and technology businesses.
“The fastest growth in our business right now is taking place in India, and people say, "Well, that's back office." No, it's just an office.”
The public-private risk dichotomy is obsolete; credit quality depends on liability structure and liquidity, not listing status.
- The old heuristic that private is risky and public is safe is now obsolete; today public can be highly risky (e.g. 10 stocks at ~35% of the S&P trading above a 50 P/E, possibly a liquidity bubble) and private can be very safe (AA), because there is nothing inherently credit-sensitive about being public or private—it is only a difference in degrees of liquidity.
“Because something is private, no longer means it's risky. Private goes from AA to levered equity, public AA to levered equity. We're just talking about degrees of liquidity”
- Wealthy individuals and institutions rarely need all their money immediately, so liquidity should be treated as a deliberate choice—the real question is whether investors are being adequately compensated for giving up liquidity and whether they are structurally able to be less liquid prudently.
“they should be looking at using liquidity as a choice. Are they getting paid for giving up that option to be more liquid?”
Insurance industry failures stem from poor liability choices, not asset problems, and Athene's single-product model mitigates this risk.
- Almost all large-scale insurance industry failures over the past 100 years have come from poor liability choices (asbestos reinsurance, D&O for Enron-type firms, Japanese earthquake risk, GE long-term care, variable annuity mispricing), not from asset problems, which have been quite modest.
“Almost all of the problems that have come in the insurance industry of any scale for 100 years have come from traditional companies who have made poor choices as to their liabilities.”
- Contrary to intuition, Athene holds more capital per dollar of assets than the typical bank and 90 percent of its book is investment-grade versus two-thirds for the typical bank, while having no federal guarantee, no Fed access, and no maturity mismatch—undercutting the case for bank-style regulation of insurers.
“We hold more capital per dollar of assets than anyone else. Who holds more investment-grade assets? Ninety percent of our book is investment-grade, the typical bank is two-thirds investment-grade.”
Trading capital has fallen to one-thirtieth its 2008 level relative to market size, creating latent fragility in public markets.
- Trading capital used for market making is now roughly one-tenth of its 2008 level while public markets have tripled in size, implying effectively about one-thirtieth of the prior liquidity—a fragility masked during the QE upswing but exposed when markets turn.
“trading capital — the capital used for market making — is one-tenth, today, of what it was in 2008.”
- After 2008 the entire financial regulatory system was rebuilt, but its real behavior was never tested because $8 trillion was printed and everything rose; only beginning in 2022-2023 did markets start to experience the genuinely new, less-liquid world.
“none of us have experienced that yet for any length of time, because right after we changed all the rules, we printed $8 trillion, and everything went up and to the right.”
- In risk-off environments liquidity does not simply vanish; rather it exists but only at prices far below the assumed market price, as shown by the UK LDI pension crisis where attempts to sell AAA/AA obligations caused the market to gap down repeatedly until the Bank of England intervened.
“there is liquidity. It's just not at or near the market price. I do expect that in risk-off environments, we will actually see much greater price adjustment.”
- Few attractive residential neighborhoods have been built since World War II because whoever arrived first took the best physical locations, and we are now in a rebuilding mode where the most ambitious large-scale new development is happening abroad (e.g. Riyadh's Diriyah, Abu Dhabi's Saadiyat) rather than in the US.
“Whoever got here first took the good physical location. I think we're in a rebuilding mode”
Apollo cannot replicate 2008's cheap-acquisition growth because distressed-asset conditions and forced selling no longer exist.
- Apollo built scale in 2008 by buying old blocks of business cheaply from companies retrenching during the crisis, but that same opportunity no longer exists because there are no big blocks for sale, the interest-rate environment is different, and there is no tumultuous forced selling.
“Today, that same opportunity, by the way, is no longer available because there are not big blocks for sale.”
Demographic decline in Japan and Korea threatens national finances long-term but not Apollo's 10-20 year operating horizon.
- While extreme low fertility (Japan 1.3, South Korea 0.7) likely makes national financial models unworkable in the long run, Apollo's particular corner of the universe operating on 10-20 year horizons is not materially different from today, so demographic collapse doesn't threaten its business near-term.
“in the little corner of the universe that Apollo participates in, a 10-year period, a 20-year period is not really all that different than it is today.”
- Japan is an ideal market for Apollo's products because it is an older, yield-starved society nearing retirement that has endured 20+ years of repressed yields, is comfortable in dollars, needs safe investment-grade yield, and also has an insurance industry in a capital transition that makes it a strong reinsurance market.
“you have a yield-starved society in an older population nearing retirement. They need yield. They're very comfortable in dollars... Japan is absolutely the perfect market for what we do.”