self-indication assumption
The 'observer-first' approach: assume you are typical within the set of all observers across all scenarios, which boosts the credence of scenarios containing more observers.
As defined in 200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
Where it comes up · 2
- 111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation4 claims
- 200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse2 claims
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- There are two main ways to apply typicality: the world-first approach (self-sampling assumption) assigns a prior to each cosmological scenario and then assumes you are typical within it, so a single observer in a small universe is more probably you than any one observer in a big universe; the observer-first approach (self-indication assumption) assumes you are typical across all observers in all scenarios, boosting scenarios that contain more observers.200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
- Carroll tentatively endorses giving a bonus to cosmological scenarios with more observers, but only because larger universes have a higher probability of producing an observer like you, not because of an a priori preference for many observers; this bonus saturates once observers like you become nearly inevitable, distinguishing his view from the pure self-indication assumption which would boost indefinitely with observer count.200 | Solo: The Philosophy of the Multiverse
- The self-indication assumption implies the absurd 'presumptuous philosopher' result: faced with two finite-universe hypotheses differing only in observer count (e.g. trillion-trillion vs trillion-trillion-trillion observers), one could declare the larger-population hypothesis a trillion times more likely without running any experiment, purely from the fact of one's own existence—an overreach that counts as evidence against the self-indication assumption.111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation
- The self-indication assumption—that the mere fact you exist is evidence that many observers exist, as if there were more 'slots' for you to be born into—exactly cancels the probability shift the Doomsday argument demands, so accepting it eliminates the Doomsday conclusion in one stroke.111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation
- A possible third route between self-sampling and self-indication is to treat yourself as a random sample only from a narrower reference class of relevantly similar observers (excluding, say, post-humans who know they survived the 21st century), with different observers using different reference classes, potentially blocking both the Doomsday and presumptuous-philosopher conclusions.111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation
- Anthropic methodology is genuinely unresolved: each candidate principle (self-sampling, self-indication, reference-class relativization) has its own counterintuitive consequences, and we do not yet understand the area well enough to be justifiably confident in any of them—so the Doomsday conclusion should be taken seriously but not accepted as established.111 | Nick Bostrom on Anthropic Selection and Living in a Simulation