second industrial revolution
The wave of rapid, broad-based technological advance beginning around 1870 across many sectors at once, distinct from the first Industrial Revolution
As defined in 209 | Brad DeLong on Why the 20th Century Fell Short of Utopia
Other definitions
Period roughly 1870-1930 when modern technological and industrial infrastructure was invented and deployed at scale, including automobiles, aviation, electricity, manufacturing techniques, radio, television, and air conditioning
From ChatGPT to Billions of Robots: Marc Andreessen’s Prediction
Where it comes up · 5
- Brad DeLong3 claims
- Marc Andreessen3 claims
- From ChatGPT to Billions of Robots: Marc Andreessen’s Prediction2 claims
- John Nye1 claim
- 209 | Brad DeLong on Why the 20th Century Fell Short of Utopia1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 10Search all claims for “second industrial revolution” →
- Technological growth jumped to roughly 2.1% per year from 1870 to 2010 because the last pieces of an institutional configuration fell into place: the industrial research lab to routinize discovery, the modern corporation to routinize deployment, and the fully global market economy to make deployment profitable while letting others copy and diffuse the technology worldwide.209 | Brad DeLong on Why the 20th Century Fell Short of Utopia
- Between 1870 and 1930, during the Second Industrial Revolution, essentially everything we view today as the modern world was invented, including airplanes, manufacturing techniques, air conditioning, television, radio, and automobiles.From ChatGPT to Billions of Robots: Marc Andreessen’s Prediction
- Between 1870 and 1930, the US experienced a second industrial revolution where basically all the physical infrastructure and technological foundations of the modern world were invented—including airplanes, manufacturing techniques, air conditioning, television, radio, automobiles—during the McKinley presidency.From ChatGPT to Billions of Robots: Marc Andreessen’s Prediction
- The First Industrial Revolution is overrated: dating it to 1760, growth in England was very slow and workers' living standards did not dramatically improve until the 1840s-1850s; the big growth boosts and modern economic growth only accelerate in the second half of the 19th century (the Second Industrial Revolution) in Britain, France, the US, and Germany.John Nye
- The roughly 2 percent per year income and productivity growth that became normal after the Second Industrial Revolution is completely unprecedented in human history—there was nothing comparable before, not in the biggest historical efflorescences nor in the classic British Industrial Revolution.Brad DeLong
- The modern office is not a natural necessity but an artifact of a specific technological time and place—a derivation of the factory and mass-production/time-and-motion thinking from the Second Industrial Revolution—evidenced by the fact that the Roman Empire was administered with no office buildings (aristocrats worked from home, the Senate, and country houses), so new portable technologies now make the regimented office construct obsolete.Marc Andreessen
- The humanities and social sciences before roughly the 1960s (and even before the 1930s) were a fundamentally different, largely descriptive and verbal tradition merging history, economics, philosophy, and politics—economics, for instance, was descriptive rather than a branch of physics full of formulas—whereas today everything is filtered through contemporary politics, making the older tradition hard to understand without reconstructing what people actually discussed at the time.Marc Andreessen
- The original J.P. Morgan, primarily a banker who financed large-scale industrial enterprises like railroads, also acted as a venture capitalist—significantly financing Edison's efforts and becoming the first customer of Edison's indoor lighting system, which caught fire and burned down his library before he rebuilt it and rehired Edison.Marc Andreessen
- The fragmentary, weak productivity numbers for the late 19th century and before genuinely reflect how small economic progress was back then; John Stuart Mill could plausibly believe working-class real wages had not risen from 1800 to the 1870s, partly due to distribution but substantially due to genuinely slow growth.Brad DeLong
- From 1770 to 1870 about half a percent per year of technological progress came one-third from cheap surface coal left by glaciers, one-third from the second globalization concentrating manufacturing in the most efficient districts, and only one-sixth percent per year from underlying invention; once the cheap coal ran out and manufacturing was globalized, that underlying rate would have produced only a steampunk Malthusian economy—the post-1870 jump to 2% growth via Schumpeterian creative destruction is what produced the modern world, a story Greg Clark misses by viewing it from too high an altitude.Brad DeLong